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NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
NAPOLEON
AND KING MURAT
A BIOGRAPHY COMPILED FROM
HITHERTO UNKNOWN AND
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS
BY ALBERT ESPITALIER a*
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
J. LEWIS MAY, WITH A PHOTOGRAVURE
FRONTISPIECE & 16 OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON: JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD
NEW YORK : JOHN LANE COMPANY. MCMXII
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co.
At the Ballantyne Press, Edinburgh
PREFACE
IT was at Naples that this book was conceived. In
that delightful region, neither terrestrial nor political
upheavals have wrought any change in the wonder-
ful surroundings that witnessed the evolution of
Murat. Everything there recalls his image to our minds :
the splendid bay where Caroline dreamed her dreams ;
the Riviera of Chiaia where the King used to review his
troops with the English bullets singing overhead ; the
Royal Palace with its gallery leading to the theatre of
San Carlo, and its windows looking out over what are
now the floating docks to the open sea beyond — the
sea over which Murat used to be afraid lest the English
should come and hurl their shells into his very palace.
Joachim it was who cut the beautiful road which
leads to Posilippo ; it was he who constructed that
other thoroughfare which runs out to Capo di
Monte. Nay, even so trifling a detail as the Empire
chairs covered with rich tapestry, which may be seen
in that same palace, bring him before us in his habit
as he lived.
Caroline was in love with her environment ; in her
hours of dolce far niente she could appreciate to the full
the magic of its rich and varied colouring, its brilliant
and incomparable charm. Murat whose nature was less
refined and less susceptible to the influence of the pic-
turesque than hers, discovered attractions of a different
order there. In that centre of " far figura," of artificial
pose, his vanity throve as in a hot-house. He was just
272726
vi PREFACE
the king for such a people, and they welcomed him with
open arms. His bearing, his outward style, were ad-
mirably adapted to the habits and ideas of his subjects.
Following " Nasone," who may be far more accurately
described as King of the Lazzaroni than as King of
Naples, Joachim, heralded by an unequalled military
reputation, came to them as a ruler of lofty lineage.
His plumes took the fancy of these street loungers, these
" gens de rue " ; their acclamations won his heart. He
could not resist their " vivas " ; he was theirs heart and
soul, and they, in their turn, numbered him among the
great Kings of Naples. His name was synonymous
with freedom and independence.
But are we to endorse this verdict ? From the
Italian standpoint there was perhaps much to be said for
it. A king who ultimately took arms against France,
a king beneath whose sway the idea of nationality arose
and assumed definite shape, is not easily to be cast
down from his pedestal. The great work of consolida-
tion which took place during his reign, the ideas of
independence which were promulgated alike within and
beyond the confines of his kingdom, at an epoch when
servitude was so universally prevalent ; the sympathy
displayed towards the champions of Italian unity — a
sympathy sealed and ratified by an energy of action
that was fraught with consequences of the deepest
moment — all contributed to win for Murat a foremost
position in the ranks of those who hailed the approaching
dawn of Italian liberty. It was his to obsess with
wonder and admiration the imagination of the Italian
people. In 1814 the citizens of Bologna were gazing
with amazement at the horse's head which, as the symbol
of Freedom, adorned the Neapolitan flag. In Calabria
" Gioacchino " is still a name to conjure with, and at
Naples you may see popular prints in which, side by
side with the exploits of Roland and the Knights of
PREFACE vii
the Middle Ages, are depicted — with a plentiful lack of
proportion — certain episodes in the career of King Murat.
Finally, the circumstances of his death shed the aureole
of martyrdom around the figure of this warrior, this
paladin, whose life at Naples was devoted to the ideal
of " an Italy united and free."
Such is the superficial aspect of the matter. If we
look with a closer eye, if we study more carefully the
part which Murat played, it will be evident that, even
from the Italian point of view, he cannot be regarded
as the leading champion of national independence.
Whatever apparent enthusiasm he may have manifested
for the cause of liberty was not inspired by any lofty
desire for the renaissance and federation of a disunited
people ; he knew not the burning zeal which patriotism
imparts. He came to Italy as a stranger, and his sole
aim in fostering the ideal of Italian unity was to afford
himself a means of gratifying his ambition and exalting
his vanity — that vanity which the party of Freedom
always knew how to exploit for the advancement of
their cherished aims.
It mattered little to Murat personally whether
Tuscans, Florentines, Romans and the rest should unite
and form the powerful federation which present-day
Italy exhibits. It was rather that in that movement,
in which he was but a follower, he deemed that he would
encounter an opportunity for self -aggrandisement, and
for magnifying his own personal importance till it
equalled that of his mighty brother-in-law ; a case of
the frog and the bull. But all men were not blind in
the matter. Some there were who were clearsighted
enough to recognise the personal character of the King's
aims and some who were independent enough to declare
what they saw. In 1814, while Graham was expressing
amazement that an alien king should manifest so much
zeal for Italian freedom, Pepe, the pale-mouthed apostle
viii PREFACE
of Liberty, was wrathfully complaining that he mani-
fested by far too little.
In 1815, when his aims had become more apparent,
Murat, in his progress through the states of Northern
Italy, was not welcomed, save in the case of a few towns,
with anything approaching the same ardour that had
greeted him the year before. He essayed to revive
enthusiasm by the proclamation of Rimini ; but his
efforts were received with coldness and distrust. Times
had changed. To the first spontaneous outburst had
succeeded the sober and reflective mood. Murat had
been weighed in the balance. Once again the Tarpeian
Rock was found in close proximity to the Capitol.
But in what light are we to regard the King's con-
duct if we look upon it exclusively from the French
standpoint ? Here no evasions will serve, no excuses can
be advanced. For five years he refused to obey his
brother-in-law, for five years he thwarted his plans and
carried on an underhand warfare against him, till at last
he emerged as an open and avowed traitor to his Emperor
and to France. What sufficient reasons can be adduced
to account for his defection ? What apology can be
offered for his falling away ? Surely, none at all ! Did
he pretend, forsooth, that he was sovereign lord of his
kingdom, and of his own actions ? He knew well enough
the hollowness of such a claim. Had not Berthier, as
far back as 1809, enjoined upon him, in a memorable
phrase, "to be his people's King but his Emperor's
viceroy." The real position could scarcely have been
more clearly indicated. It meant that if he found the
mantle of obedience too heavy or too trying for his
shoulders, he was at liberty to avow it to the Emperor
and go his way ; there were plenty to take his place.
But even though his grievances against the Emperor had
been real, was he free to go back on his word, to trample
duty under foot ? Could he, a son of France, turn his
PREFACE ix
back upon his country in her hour of deepest need ?
" When Murat's honour is at stake," said Campochiaro
to Graham, " his own interests count for nothing." A
careful examination of the King's conduct in 1814 would
rather suggest a reversal of the proposition.
Such being the state of affairs, it will not be sur-
prising to learn that the relations between the brothers-
in-law were bitter, acrimonious and strained almost to
breaking point. On the one side there was Murat, im-
patient of control, endeavouring to free himself from the
suzerain's yoke ; on the other there was the Emperor
administering, in his irritation, stern and sometimes
cruel rebukes to his recalcitrant subordinate. Many a
time it needed the persuasive intervention of the diplo-
matic Caroline to ward off from her husband a punish-
ment that would have meant nothing less than deposition.
Nay, in 1811, even her intervention would possibly not
have sufficed to parry the blow had it not been that
circumstances were arrayed on her side. To arrive at a
just appreciation of the crowning act of treason, to place
the finger on the motive which induced Murat gradually
to relinquish the French policy with which he had
entered on his kingly duties in favour of an alliance
with the Coalition, we must follow the development of his
restless mind, we must weigh his hopes and fears, we
must realise the hypnotic fascination that the prospect
of conquering Sicily exercised upon his imagination.
Then, on the other hand, we must bear in mind his dis-
appointment, his disillusionment at the abortive result of
the Sicilian expedition, and his readiness to give ear to
other counsellors — counsellors who, at first, but whispered
a few words about independence in his ear, but who, by
their ever-growing influence, at length prevailed upon
him, piqued as he was and shaken in his allegiance by the
domineering and high-handed proceedings of Caroline,
to dissociate his cause formally and violently from that
x PREFACE
of France. Whatever the feelings which animated Murat,
his fellow-countrymen of 1815 considered that his role as
leader of the Risorgimento added no lustre to his renown,
nor is their judgment likely to be reversed by his com-
patriots of to-day.
In addition to the usual documentary sources avail-
able in France — sources already discovered and made use
of by my predecessors — I have had recourse to numerous
documents in the Archivio di Stato at Naples, and to the
richly furnished files of the Societa Napolitana di Storia
Patria. Wherever I have had occasion to prosecute my
task, I have met with the most flattering courtesy. At
the Austrian Archives and the British Record Office I
have had access to many documents of first-rate import-
ance. For final mention I have reserved the name of my
friend Monsieur le Commandant Weil, whose indefatigable
researches have left scarcely anything to be gleaned by
those who come after him. For those who design to
study this period his work must always remain authori-
tative. If, however, I shall be deemed in the following
work to have contributed a stone to the edifice of
scholarship, I shall have reason to congratulate myself.
To Murat 's two treaties with Austria I have devoted
particular attention. They give the key to his conduct
in 1814, and I should be especially glad if my hypothetical
text of the agreement of the 8th January were to induce
the possessors of the official document — supposing it still
to exist — to hand it over to the public to whom it right-
fully belongs. The care which I have brought to the
performance of my task has not blinded me to the
ephemeral nature of my conclusions. In the present con-
ditions of historical research, when not a day passes but
some new work is published, some hidden document un-
earthed, it would indeed be a bold man who would dare
to claim finality for his achievement.
A. E.
CONTENTS
PART I
PACK
I
II. EARLY DIFFICULTIES 30
III. MURAT IN PARIS 51
IV. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION .... 66
V. THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS ... 89
VI. THE TWO DECREES 134
VII. THE KING JOINS THE ARMY . . . • I?5
PART II
VIII. MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH . . . 20O
ix. MURAT'S DEMANDS 255
X. TREATIES AND ARMISTICES WITH AUSTRIA AND
ENGLAND 318
XI. MURAT AS KING OF ITALY . . . -347
XII. THE AWAKENING ... . 4<32
XIII. THE FINAL HAZARD . . . 454
APPENDIX . .... 499
INDEX 505
GENEALOGICAL TABLE Compiled by MR. THOMAS
VADE WALPOLE .... facing page 504
ILLUSTRATIONS
JOACHIM MURAT, KING OF NAPLES, MARSHAL AND HIGH
ADMIRAL OF FRANCE (Photogravure) . . . Frontispiece
From an engraving by RuOTTE after GROS.
TO FACE PAGE
JOACHIM MURAT AND HIS WIFE CAROLINE BONAPARTE, KING
AND QUEEN OF NAPLES ....... 26
From an engraving by CHOUARD after a drawing by LAFOND.
Pius VII 36
From an engraving by G. BALESTRA after C. V. CAMUCINI.
EUGENE BEAUHARNAIS 92
MADAME MERE 122
THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT (NAPOLEON II.) . . . .132
From a painting probably by DAFFINGER, in the possession of
Dr. AUGUST HEYMANN of Vienna.
NAPOLEON 1 156
From a miniature — artist unknown. In the possession of the
Emperor FRANCIS JOSEPH I.
PRINCE CLEMENT METTERNICH, CHANCELLOR OF STATE . . 208
From a painting by JOSEPH AXMANN, in the possession of the Imperial
and Royal Court Library, Vienna.
LIEUT.-GEN. LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH-BENTINCK . . 226
From an engraving by H. R. COOK after Sir THOMAS LAWRENCE.
PAULINE BONAPARTE 256
From a pastel in the possession of Mr. JOHN LANE.
JEAN JACQUES REGIS DE CAMBACERES 268
From a painting by BAILLY after a bust taken from life by ROLAND.
JOSEPH FOUCHE, DUKE OF OTRANTO 300
FRANCIS I., EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA 320
COUNT VON NEIPPERG 348
LORD CASTLEREAGH 404
CARDINAL FESCH, UNCLE OF NAPOLEON 456
CHARLES MAURICE DE TALLEYRAND-PERIGORD . . . 468
xiii
NAPOLEON
AND KING MURAT
PART I
CHAPTER I
THE "PROMOTION"
The signing of the Treaty — The hopes of the Grand Due de Berg — Spain—
The Emperor's letter— Murat's disappointment — Early causes of dissension
between the Emperor and Murat — The Emperor's precautions— Murat in
Paris— The Emperor's commands— Murat's departure — His journey and
arrival in Naples— His first acts as King— Financial and political troubles —
The Napoleonic Code — The taking of Capri — The Sicilian expedition— The
plot between Fouche', Talleyrand and Murat — The Emperor's unconcern —
Caroline : her hopes, her claims and her disappointments — Her attitude in
government affairs — Saliceti — He abandons the Queen's party — Early troubles
between Caroline and Murat— The King begins to grow jealous.
BEHOLD at length the moment of recompense
had arrived. Spain was conquered and, if
not pacified, was at all events subdued.
Who then was to possess her ? On whom
should the Emperor bestow so splendid a gift but on
the man who had borne the burden and heat of the
conquest ? A Marshal of the Empire, and Napoleon's
Lieutenant-General in Spain, Murat was already, in a sense,
the possessor of a kingdom. Before him the members
of the Junta cringed low, and the rabble of Madrid
trembled at his nod. Had he to reckon with any com-
petitors for the vacant throne ? Of a surety, no ; since
A
4: >:•';-' NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
all Napoleon's brothers and all his sisters had received
their share of the conqueror's liberalities. Caroline
alone, despite entreaties, tears, cajolery and indignation,
had as yet failed to obtain for her husband the crown,
the genuine royal crown, which they had so long and so
ardently coveted.
But at length his turn had come. Over and above
the incontestable rights which his brilliant services in
Spain had won for him, Murat possessed, or so indeed
he believed, the Emperor's formal promise of the throne.
" When as Grand Due de Berg he was commanding at
Madrid in 1808, he undoubtedly had hopes of obtaining
the crown of Spain, and even persuaded himself that he
had the Emperor's promise to that effect. It was to
bring matters to a head that he had provoked a rising
in the heart of the capital which he forthwith repressed,
but in a manner so remarkable that his conduct on that
occasion can only be ascribed to widely different motives
from those which he alleged as the grounds of his action.
It is improbable that the Emperor definitely promised
Marshal Murat the crown of Spain ; it is more likely
that he gave him a few vague words of encouragement
which Murat doubtless interpreted, after his fashion,
in the flattering light of his own ambitions." *
Be that as it may, the matter was already settled in
Murat 's mind when, on the 5th May, he received the
letter which the Emperor had written to him two days
earlier at Bayonne. " I intend," so the missive ran,
" that the King of Naples shall reign at Madrid. Let
me have a reply immediately saying what you think of
this, for the thing must be done in a day. You will
say that you would rather remain with me ; but that
is out of the question. You have several children, and,
moreover, with a wife such as yours, you could absent
yourself if war should summon you to my side, for she
1 Beugnot, Mhnoires.
THE "PROMOTION" 3
is well able to be at the head of a Regency. Further,
let me tell you, the kingdom of Naples is far prefer-
able to that of Portugal, since Sicily will be united to
it ; you will then have six million subjects." 1 The
Emperor had already thought out the details of the ad-
justment that would be rendered necessary, and, even
at this stage, he was so confident of Murat's acceptance —
an acceptance he would be in a position to force upon
him if occasion demanded — that he had already com-
pleted a draft treaty. On the 5th May we find him
sending word to Champagny saying that a list of the
Due de Berg's property would have to be sent to the
Minister of Finance.2 Napoleon was already begin-
ning to carry out his schemes regarding Naples and
Murat.
As he read the Emperor's letter, Joachim beheld the
collapse of his hopes. Nevertheless he had not yet de-
veloped into the recalcitrant King of Naples of later
years, and it was with true soldierlike obedience that he
replied forthwith : " Sire, I am in receipt of your Majesty's
letter of the 2nd May, and the tears stream from my eyes
as I answer it. Your Majesty would have truly divined
the wishes of my heart had you bid me remain at your
side. I ask it, nay, I implore it as a favour greater than
any I have ever received at your hands. Familiar as I
am with your acts of kindness, accustomed to see you
every day, to admire you, to worship you, to depend
upon you for everything, how when I am alone and com-
pelled to rely on my own resources shall I ever succeed
in acquitting myself of duties at once so onerous and so
sacred ? I do not consider myself capable of the task.
I beseech you therefore to suffer me to remain with you.
Power does not invariably denote happiness. Happiness
is only to be found in affection, and happiness was mine
when I was with your Majesty.
1 Correspondence, 13,810. * Correspondence, 13,081.
4 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
" And now, Sire, that I have given expression to
my grief and to my desires, I must go no further, and I
place myself unreservedly at your commands. Never-
theless I will avail myself of the permission which you
grant me of choosing betwixt Portugal and Naples, and
say at once that my preference goes to the country in
which I have already held command and in which I
could most usefully serve your Majesty. Yes, I prefer
Naples, and I must inform your Majesty that at no price
could I accept the crown of Portugal.
" If I may be allowed to give expression to yet another
wish, it is that I may remain as long as possible with
your Majesty."
What an effort it must have cost him to write these
lines, and how his feelings against his brother-in-law must
have increased in bitterness as he indited, in language of
forced effusiveness, his acceptance of so mean a realm.
To have fostered dreams of the throne of Spain, of the
empire of the Americas, and now to be compelled to
accept with gratitude this mutilated remnant of a king-
dom, part of which only he could call his own, while the
acquisition of the other part — if, indeed, he ever won it —
was only to be compassed at the cost of such infinite
trials and vexations ! After all, what manner of man
was this Joseph — what greater title had he to Spain than
he, Murat, whose lieutenancy had enabled him to gauge
all its treasures, all its worth ? In his heart there was
generated a sense of bitterness against his overlord, of
mortification at being compelled to play a subsidiary
r6le, and at being forced to submit to what he conceived
to be an act of gross injustice. With monumental self-
conceit Murat regarded himself as a personage of only
slightly less importance than the Emperor himself, whom
he never forgave for the pettiness of the crown allotted
to him. " One would imagine," Napoleon once said,
speaking of Murat and Bernadotte, " that I had usurped
THE "PROMOTION" 5
their place," and Murat, as we shall see, well merited
the shaft.
Though, however, Murat accepted his new kingdom
with mortified reluctance, we must not conclude that
Napoleon bestowed the gift with alacrity. Far from it !
It was a sacrifice which circumstances imposed upon him,
from which there was no escape. All his brothers had
been provided with kingdoms. His other sisters, even
the most insignificant of them, had all been suffered to
pluck a more or less important branch of the Imperial
tree. Yet Caroline, to whose merits and cajolery the
Emperor was not insensible, had only received as her
portion — or her husband's portion — that very unimposing
fragment of the Germanic Federation known as the
Grand Duchy of Berg. Is it then to be deduced that
Napoleon had made up his mind to confer upon Joachim
only what he was strictly obliged, the irreducible
minimum, and, even that, with reluctance ? It may
have been so. Doubtless there were considerations to
which the Emperor with his customary care and insight
had given full weight. Murat, with all his brilliance on
the field of battle, was no administrator. His conduct of
the affairs of his Duchy, which offered a finished example
of legal and systematic pillage, had demonstrated this to
the full. He was no statesman. He lacked the breadth
'of view, the penetration, and the unwearying patience
"that such a role demands. His disposition, on the
contrary, was restless and impetuous, the vainglorious
nature of his ideas was reflected in the extraordinary
magnificence of his costume, and, though the Emperor
may as yet have had no inkling of his coming acts of
tiv.ichery^ his sagacity doubtless enabled him to foresee
the efforts he would make to rid himself of the yoke.
In the case of the Bonapartes their brother was doubtless
prepared to show great indulgence. But Murat was not
a blood-relation, and Napoleon's attitude towards him
6 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
grew harsh and unsympathetic. Here there were no
ties of kinship to wirp his vision, and the Emperor saw
Murat as he really was ; he saw, that is to say, that
at the back of the man there was nothing that denoted
the King.
From these early divergences there was destined to
spring a long series of quarrels. The kingdom, grudgingly
bestowed and churlishly received, was fated to be the
cause of a latent hostility, a smouldering enmity, between
the two men, and to bring about a sequence of disagree-
ments and bickerings, which, carefully fostered by all
the enemies of France, those of the North and those
of the South, finally culminated in that notorious and
deplorable rupture which perhaps brought both of them
to ruin.
So heavy, so unlooked-for was the blow, that Murat
was laid low with sickness. On the 22nd May, he was
compelled to take to his bed. This was the first of those
famous " attacks of fever " which were henceforth to
announce with singular regularity the salient events of
Joachim's reign, particularly his conflicts with his brother-
in-law.
The Emperor, at Bayonne, immediately addressed
himself to the task of restricting Murat's opportunities
for mischief. In the first place he had recourse to Joseph,
and in the second to a treaty. Prior to his departure
for Naples, Joseph, who had kept his people waiting two
years, formally proclaimed a Constitution. It was in all
probability drawn up from beginning to end by the
Emperor ; at all events it betrays unmistakable evidences
of his handiwork. " The Emperor guarantees the inte-
grity of the Constitution which he has drawn up in
conjunction with His Majesty, King Joseph, for the
Kingdom of Naples and Sicily." 1 The date of this
Constitution was the 20th June, and it was published
1 Moniteur Universel.
THE "PROMOTION'3
at Naples on the 4th July, being preceded by a proclama-
tion of King Joseph's, in which he declared, rather late
in the day perhaps, that he was desirous of putting the
finishing touch upon his work.1
Thus Murat's hands were tied. It meant that matters
could be thrashed out with him, and that it would be
possible to dictate to his Minister what measures should
be submitted to him for signature. Murat himself was
still ill, or only convalescent, and, the direction of affairs
in Spain having been taken over by Savary, he went off,
like any little rentier, to take the waters at Bareges,
whither he proceeded by way of Bayonne,2 leaving the
battle concerning his future throne to be waged by others.
True, he had left a most capable substitute behind him,
"a substitute far more able than he to extort concessions
and to parry unfavourable suggestions. We refer, of
course, to Caroline. A vigilant defender of his preroga-
tives, it was at Bayonne that she began to foster those
dreams of power to which she clung for eight years
without ever succeeding in satiating her hunger for
dominion. It was, in fact, to Caroline much rather than
to Gallo that Champagny had to address his observations
and Napoleon his commands.
However, concessions were few. Napoleon's plans
were laid down ; there remained no alternative but
acquiescence. It was to his wife that Murat owed his
Jdngdom and to his wife alone. In order that none
might be in ignorance of it the Emperor caused the
following to be inserted in the treaty : " This Princess \
(Caroline) who, by virtue of the present cession, made
chiefly in her favour, establishes her descendants upon
the throne. . . ." s Then followed the treaty drawn up
in terms of such great precision that every disputable
point, every possible contingency seemed to be provided
1 Diario di Nicola. * Moniteur Universe!.
3 Treaty of Bayonne, Article III.
8 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
for and regulated in advance. That it did not absolutely
exclude the possibility of hair-splitting disputation will
become evident as our narrative proceeds ; nevertheless,
taken as a whole, it provided a solid corner-stone in the
future relationship between the two countries. In its
composition Napoleon brought into play all the force
and decision of his character. The conditions which he
laid down were so clearly defined that against them
Murat and his advisers subsequently found it useless to
rebel. At the same time, this very display of autocracy
proved a violent element of disruption. It dealt Murat
such a rude blow, it inflicted so deep a wound upon his
amour-propre, that between Joachim and Caroline all pos-
sibility of cordial agreement was immediately destroyed.
The King's jealousy of his wife dates from the Treaty
of Bayonne. The Emperor had been pleased to demon-
strate that his power alone sufficed to make Kings and
Queens of the members of his own family ; but the
demonstration dealt a heavy blow at Murat 's pride, and
Murat, though he submitted, never forgot.
When, on the I3th July, he received from Gallo the
text of the newly-signed treaty, Joachim's first words
were significant. " Nothing the Emperor could have
done," he said, " would have given me greater satisfaction
than the favour he has just conferred on Princess Caro-
line." * He had been struck in his tenderest part — his
vanity ! This fact is the real explanation of all that
followed. It is true that when subsequent troubles
began to arise in his relations with the Emperor we shall
find Murat saying that the fever was upon him when he
agreed to sign the Treaty of Bayonne, and that now he
was well again there were a number of things to which
he regretted having given his consent.2 f His letter to
Gallo of the I5th July clearly indicates that, with the
1 Memoirs of the Due de Gallo,
1 Archives des Affaires Strangles.
THE "PROMOTION" 9
exception of a few matters of detail, such as the proposed
reduction of twelve regiments of twelve squadrons to ten
and the pay of the Neapolitan foreign-service contingent,
Joachim was quite ready to accept the Treaty as a
whole. 4 " Finally," these are his words, " though I am
urging you to obtain the best terms you are able, it
will none the less be necessary to submit to all the con-
ditions on which the Emperor stands firm." l For
example, Murat instructs his minister to obtain the
Emperor's views on the question of national colours and
to " request him to assign us our own special flag. En-
deavour/' he says/' to arrange for white. So long as this
matter remains in abeyance the country will imagine it is
to be absorbed by France " 2 Already he was showing
signs of his incipient " separatism." Whence he was
to derive the funds necessary for the maintenance of his
army and navy is a question to which he did not trouble
himself to find a solution. But there was one thing
which he placed in the forefront of nil his requirements,
and that was independence. Side by side with the
tricolour standard of Napoleon Bonaparte must float,
and that without delay, the standard of Joachim
Murat.
The Treaty was signed and ratified. It was therefore
meet that the good folk of Naples should be informed
forthwith that King Joachim Murat was henceforth to
preside over their destinies. On the 2ist July, Gallo,
who was at Bayonne, forwarded to Ricciarcti, the Nea-
politan Secretary of State, the text of the King's first
proclamation to his subjects, with the request that it
should be transmitted to the several departments. He
also sent a copy of the treaty, apologising for not sending
the original, " a bulky volume bound in embroidered
velvet and enclosed in a large silver casket engraved
with the Imperial arms and ornamented with cords and
1 Memoirs of the Due de Gallo. * Idem.
io NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
tassels of gold." l The messenger reached Naples on the
3ist July, and the Secretary of State immediately sent
word to the Council, to whom were recited the King's
Proclamation to his subjects and a letter announcing
that he would arrive in Naples about the I5th August
to celebrate the Emperor's birthday.2
In consequence of the indisposition which prevented
Murat from proceeding to take up his duties as King,
Napoleon, on the 23rd July, had sent orders to Mare*chal
Perignon, who had been appointed governor of Naples,
to set out immediately so that he might be at his post
on the 5th August, or earlier if possible. His instructions
were to take whatever measures were necessary for
carrying on the government pending Murat 's arrival.8
Perignon reached Naples on the I3th. Next day he
summoned a Council of Ministers, by whom his authority
was formally recognised. The command of the army
was handed over to him by General Reynier. In this
manner the succession was secured and the transfer of
the various offices of State duly carried out.4 Henceforth
the lazzaroni could cry " Vive le roi Joachim ! " to their
hearts' content.
Though Caroline had been busily engaged on the
Treaty at Bayonne, Murat had not been idle — albeit his
activities took a different form. His illness had not
prevented him from giving orders at Diisseldorf for
everything possible to be moved, particularly the horses.
Nothing was left behind. It was all done with such
unblushing callousness that the Emperor himself was
obliged to call Murat to order. " The news that reaches
me from the Duchy of Berg is unsatisfactory,^ he wrote
on the 30th July. " Your agents are packing and sending
everything across the river. Your stallions and brood-
1 Gallo to Ricciardi. Naples. Archi-vio di Stato.
1 Diario di Nicola. 8 Correspondence, 14,225.
4 Report of Neapolitan Ministers. Archives Nationales.
THE " PROMOTION " u
mares are filing in one long line across the Tyrol. Is it
worth while to be so eager about trifles ? Such conduct
is ill-judged, and has a bad effect on the public/' ^>
The Emperor returned to Paris on the I4th August.
There he found Joachim, who had at last recovered from
the effects of his " Spanish " complaint. At the Tuileries
the same evening he gave him a terrific rating on the
matter of the Grand Ducal horses. Murat, in consterna-
tion, could find nothing to reply. On the following day,
however, he sent the Emperor a letter in which he en-
deavoured to prove, in language of verbose humility,
how utterly incapable he was of the misdemeanours of
which His Majesty had so roundly accused him.2 But
this was a minor point. The Emperor despatched Beugnot
to Dusseldorf to investigate matters and to set the affairs
of the Duchy in order. Beugnot's eyes were considerably
opened. He drew up a report and sent it to the Emperor.
From Joachim it elicited a number of indignant recrimi-
nations but not a single valid excuse. On the eve of
his departure for Naples he wrote a further letter, in
which he bitterly complained that he had been called
upon to render an account of his deeds, although as a
Sovereign he was entitled to perfect liberty of action.3
Joachim appeared to hold the view that to rnl^wa*; to
Indulge in unmeasured and unscrupulous rapacity, and
itwHI be interesting to observe how far he applied this
theory of government to the administration of his new
kingdom.
The Emperor was back again in Paris, and Joachim
had received his instructions. There was therefore
nothing to hinder the latter from setting out. He con-
sidered it advisable, however, before making his adieux to
play the obsequious and submissive vassal, and would not
1 Lecestre. Unpublished Letters, No. 332.
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Naticmales.
* Idem, August 22, 1808. Archives Nationalcs.
12 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
leave until he had informed himself of Napoleon's wishes,
" since he was anxious to avoid taking any course of
action that would be calculated to bring him into dis-
favour." He therefore accompanied his letter with a.
list of requests. There were not a few of them. To
begin with he applied for the command of the Imperial
Troops in Rome, ,and demanded that Miollis should be
made subservient to his orders. He asked for instructions
regarding the attitude he was to adopt towards the
Pope. He also wished to know whether he ought seriously
to entertain the idea of attacking Sicily when a favourable
opportunity presented itself. Was he, he went on, to
attempt to retake Capri and Ponza ? Should he raise
fresh troops ? There were, in a word, seventeen questions
or petitions.1 With childlike simplicity he laid bare his
hopes and his plans for increasing his power in the world.
Of the real labour involved in organising a kingdom,
of the genuine spade-work required for the successful
creation of a sound and prosperous polity, he recked not
the slightest. But a vast army, a reconquered Sicily, a
base on the Ionian Sea, the control of the Papal States,
such were the objects of his ambition.
A single letter from the Emperor sufficed to dissipate
these ingenious plans as though they had been so many
soap bubbles. "" I have," he wrote, "given you the
command of my Neapolitan forces. . . . You cannot see
the Pope until he has recognised you. Before raising
fresh troops you must find the money to pay them.
There is nothing to be done with regard to the Archi-
pelago, as we are on friendly terms with the Porte." 2
Thus all his aims received their quietus. There was no
command in Rome ; nothing to be done in the Archipelago ;
no raising of fresh troops ; and, last but not least, not
a word about Sicily. The Emperor refused to show his
1 Murat to Napoleon, August 17, 1808. Archives Nationales.
1 Correspondence^ August 18, 1808, No. 14,260.
THE "PROMOTION" 13
hand.' Of all Mural's hopes not one remained. Naples
was riis and nothing more, and with Naples he had to
rest content. Such was the Emperor's decision, and
Murat, as might be expected, set out in high dudgeon.
The Emperor had laid down the limits of his sphere of
activity. No sooner, however, had he reached his own
kingdom than he set about transgressing the Imperial
commands, and, having regained possession of Capri,
commenced, with scarcely an interval, to make prepara-
tions for the conquest of Sicily. Whether in the North
or whether in the South, all Joachim's plans were lacking
alike in method and in moderation, and they all had but
one object — the glorification of their author. When it
subsequently became certain that the much-coveted Sicily
was not to be his, he turned his hungry gaze northwards
to the Papal States, finally to extend it to the whole
of Italy.
On the 2ist August, Murat informed the Emperor
that he was about to take his departure, and on the
following day he quitted Paris. He reached Turin on the
evening of the 27th,1 and on the 2gth he received the
deputation that had been selected to welcome the new
king on behalf of the people of Naples. Resuming his
journey next day, he saw Eugene at Milan, Miollis at Rome,
and at Terracini he met Saliceti, who had hurried thither
to greet him.2 At Portella, on the evening of the 5th, he
gave an audience to the representatives of the province,
and on the 6th he reached A versa, where he received the
Ministers and Ambassadors, finally arriving at Naples in
the course of the same day. His reception was magnifi-
cent ; enthusiasm was at white heat. Everywhere there
were statues and decorations. In the Place di Foria,
where he was presented with the keys of the city, a
triumphal arch had been erected in his honour. The
1 Gallo to Ricciardi. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
1 Diario di Nicola.
14 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
streets were gay with bunting and thronged with people.
Wild cheering broke from the multitude as he rode by —
a moving mass of plumes. But whether it was due to
disdain or to a desire to reproduce the effect of the
Emperor's famous grey overcoat, the rest of his attire was
a plain marshal's uniform. On the 7th he announced to
the Emperor that he had taken possession of his kingdom,
and on the 8th, after a solemn Te Deum, he assumed his
royal duties.
First and foremost in Murat's mind was the desire to
establish his authority over his own domains. He could
not endure the thought of being perpetually kept on the
alert by the English. Capri must certainly be attacked.
How gloriously it would usher in his reign, he thought,
if he could win back at the very outset the island which
had defied Joseph for more than two years, and which
even the people of Naples had come to regard as an
English possession. The conquest of Capri would be a
gain, a substantial gain, both in territory and prestige ;
but it would be more than that. It would be a first step
towards the fulfilment of a design on which the King had
set his heart. That design was the reintegration of the
kingdom of the Two Sicilies. He calculated that if he
could inform the Emperor of the success of the Capri
enterprise he would be certain to sanction an attack on
Sicily. Murat therefore wasted no time. On the 8th
September, just two days after his arrival, he informed
Napoleon that he had sent spies into Capri. "I am
sanguine of being able to announce to your Majesty before
long that the island has been recaptured." 1 Nor did he
miss the opportunity of slipping in a reference or two to
his favourite project, the expedition to Sicily and to the
insurrectionary movement it was hoped to excite there.
" It would," he added, " be a great misfortune for me
if Your Majesty were to withhold your sanction for the
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationals.
expedii
THE "PROMOTION" 15
lition, since, from the day of my accession, the
people of Naples have regarded it as certain to take place."
To this first application the Emperor replied, on the
1 8th, as follows : " The capture of Capri would have a
good effect. It would be a particularly happy way of
marking your arrival, and at the same time produce the
desirable result of inspiring the English with apprehensions
regarding Sicily. I should be entirely agreeable to the
Sicilian expedition taking place this winter, but it would
first be necessary to find out what forces the English have
in the island and the number of troops you would require." l
This meant a free hand as regards Capri, but nothing
definite concerning Sicily. Murat was not disheartened.
He would risk the Sicilian adventure — some day. So
eager was he to set to work that, without waiting for the
Emperor's reply, he sent off another letter, on the 20th, in
which he announced that he had determined to risk a coup
de main on Capri. His preparations proceeded so rapidly
that, on the^rTTOctober, General Lamarque's flotilla was
able to open the attack. The plan of action was bold
almost to foolhardiness. Joachim himself played no
part in the actual fighting, but, taking up his post on
the Punta di Campanella, contented himself, after the
manner of Homer's heroes, with encouraging the assail-
ants by word and gesture. On the i8th, Lowe sur-
rendered, and the King of Naples won his first and
final triumph.
Elated with his victory, intoxicated with the acclama-
tions of his people, Murat was eager, as he always was,
to follow up his success, just as, in days gone by, he had
pursued the enemy as they fled in hopeless disorder from
the field of Jena.
Capri having been won back for Naples, Murat im-
mediately turned his attention to Palermo. He made
public references to the matter, hurried on his preparations,
* CorrcspondftuCi No. 14,339.
16 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
mobilised his troops, and put his artillery en route.1 On
the 28th October, ten days after Lowe's capitulation,
the scheme had so far developed that the French Am-
bassador sent home word that the King was about to
leave for a tour in Calabria. " It is indeed pretty freely
rumoured that an attempt will shortly be made to effect
a landing in Sicily. Two regiments are already on the
move from here. The King, in my hearing, touched
on the matter in public. The project, in fact, is no
secret here in Naples, and the King's departure is daily
expected." 2
The Emperor on his side appeared thoroughly to have
made up his mind to sanction the enterprise. As early
as the 25th October, before the news of the Capri success
had reached him, he was holding out hopes. " Sixteen
ships of the line, ten frigates and four good-sized trans-
ports could easily set sail from Toulon this winter and
proceed to Reggio, where they would be able to safeguard
the transport of twelve or fifteen thousand men to Sicily.
Let me have your plan of campaign. How many gunboats
and sloops have you to carry out the landing ? " 3 It
would seem that for a moment the Emperor was for-
getting with what sort of an individual he had to deal,
forgetting that Murat was one of those men who always
possess, at least in imagination, whatsoever is necessary
for the realisation of their dreams. He declared that he
would collect twenty thousand men at Scilla, and that
he had all the gunboats, feluccas and small craft requisite
for the crossing. The Emperor lost no time, for on the
1 7th November he instructed Decres and also Clarke to
write to the King for details of his preparations and of
his plan of campaign, as well as for the number of vessels
available, and the name of the port in which he intended
to assemble them. He even fixed an approximate date
1 Diario di Nicola. * Archives des Affaires £trangtres.
8 Correspondence , No. 14,411.
THE "PROMOTION" 17
for the expedition. It was to be the end of December
or the beginning of January.1
Joachim needed no stimulus. Preparations were
pushed forward with redoubled energy. Large bodies
of troops were marched into Calabria. Murat himself
was announced as being on the point of setting out to
supervise the completion of the preliminaries and to
assume the direction of operations.2 His mind was set
on the expedition, and he was particularly anxious that
it should take place, the more so as Monteleone, his
Ambassador in Parisr had announced to him, in a cipher
dispatch dated the 3rd December, that there was some
talk of peace being concluded between France and Eng-
land. " It is rumoured," he stated, " that Sicily may be
ceded to Ferdinand, and though, in view of the repeated
assurances of his Majesty the Emperor, I myself attach
no importance to these stories, I think it my duty to put
you on your guard." 8
What, then, were the Emperor's real intentions regard-
ing the proposed expedition ? Was he, or was he not, dis-
posed to sanction it ? No one gainsaid the easiness of the
task ; no one disputed that the hour was propitious for
carrying it out. Joachim, in great elation over his success
at Capri, was burning to add to his laurels. What a
rude awakening it would have been for him had he really
known what was in the Emperor's mind ; had he realised
that he was a mere puppet ; that the conquest of Sicily,
which he fondly looked upon as at once so easy and so
near, was but a nise to divert the attention of the English
and so relieve the pressure on the French forces in Spain
and Portugal. Beyond all doubt the Emperor was not
in favour of the plan, and, despite all his fair words to
Decres, he knew in his own mind that it would not come
1 Correspondence^ No. 14,480-14,482.
* Gallo to Monteleone, November 29, 1808. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
' Monteleone to Gallo, December 3, 1808. Archivio di Stato.
B
18 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
to pass. He had already too many baffling problems
on hand to think of adding to his difficulties. Beset with
anxieties in Spain, where at the moment his forces were
scarcely increasing their renown, uneasy concerning
Austria, where the horizon was dark and menacing, he
had little enough to encourage him to embark on fresh
adventures. He knew, however, the extent to which
Murat might be beguiled, and resolved to turn his vanity
and stupidity to good account. When, therefore, he
dangled Sicily before Joachim's eyes as the brightest
jewel in the crown of Naples he was actuated by one sole
motive, and that was to draw the enemy thither. In
his instructions of the 22nd October, as well as in his letter
of the i Qth to Fouche, the Emperor dwelt upon the same
theme : the English must be drawn to Sicily by the
apprehension of losing the island. With that end in view
troops were put under arms at Naples and sent into
Calabria. Murat hoped to find the island free from
British troops ; Napoleon that it would be filled with them
to overflowing.
On arriving at Naples, Joachim's first and principal
concern was the extension of his territory. Nevertheless,
circumstances demanded that he should give his attention
to questions of civil government and endeavour to master
the details of the administrative system. At the very
outset Murat found himself at issue with the Emperor
at all points. His administrative incapacity, his egre-
gious tactlessness fanned into flame the discord that was
smouldering between them. Notwithstanding the finan-
cial embarrassments which were the perpetual burden
of his complaints, Murat embarked on a measure for
increasing the facilities for female education. This
immediately brought upon him the following rebuke from
the Emperor : " Before setting up educational establish-
ments and other institutions of the kind, a task which
might with advantage be deferred till a subsequent and
THE "PROMOTION" 19
more favourable opportunity, see that my troops are
paid the arrears that are owing to them ? " l Further
offence was given because the news of the taking of Capri
was conveyed to His Imperial Majesty through the
medium of the Neapolitan Minister for Foreign Affairs.
' This sort of proceeding is ridiculous," said Napoleon.
" Capri having fallen to my troops, the intelligence of
its capture should have been brought to me by my own
Minister for War, to whom you should have furnished the
details." 2 Yet again, the Emperor was created a Knight
of the Order of the Two Sicilies, " at the same time as
Eugene, the Prince Borghese, Berthier, Lannes, Cam-
baceres and Foucher" (sic). He refused the distinction
on the ground that it had not been offered to him before
the others.3 The order was also conferred on certain
French officers, whereupon he was informed that the
Emperor did not approve of distinctions being bestowed
upon soldiers of his without his permission. Murat was
obliged to express regret.4
But there were graver indiscretions than these on the
King's part, and they provoked correspondingly sterner
remonstrances from the Emperor. Murat had undertaken
to make the Napoleonic Code operative in his kingdom.
Nevertheless he betrayed an inclination to procrastinate,
alleging un preparedness on the part of his judges, laying
stress on the time that would be required for the work
of translation, a work which he purposely caused to be
delayed. At last he sent the Emperor a version embody-
ing modifications by Ricciardi. Napoleon searched its
pages in vain for the Law on Divorce, and forthwith
despatched from Aranda the following comminatory
epistle :|" The most important section of the whole Code
is that which relates to divorce. It is, in fact, the very
1 Correspondence, No. 14,485. f Correspondence, No. 14,436.
8 Monteleone to Gallo, January 31, 1809. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
• Murat to Napoleon, January I, 1809. Archives Nationales.
20 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
basis of it. You must not tamper with it in the slightest ;
it is the law of the country. I would sooner Naples were
in the hands of the ex-King of Sicily than permit the
Napoleonic Code to be mutilated in such a fashion/^.1
It was in vain that the Neapolitan magistrates drew the
King's attention to the difficulties that would attend the
enforcement of the Code. A few preferred to resign their
posts rather than attempt to administer the new law.
But Murat recognised that the time had come to bow to
the Emperor's will, and on the 27th October he reluctantly
brought himself to write in the following terms : ' Your
Majesty will find enclosed a copy of an Order in Council
decreeing that the clauses of the Napoleonic Code relating
to Divorce shall be fully enforced from the date on which
the Code is promulgated, that is to say, the ist January
next. Your Majesty's Code will therefore undergo no
modification of any sort in my realm." 2 On the other
hand, he introduced measures which displayed an ex-
traordinary degree of shortsightedness. On the 2ist
October, immediately after the Capri success, thinking
to gain a reputation for magnanimity, he issued an order
authorising the return of the exiles and removing the
sequestration on the property of the Sicilian Emigres.3
Instantly there came a sharp reprimand. " I have seen
orders issued by you which are completely devoid of
common sense. You are simply inviting reaction. Why
recall these exiles ? Why restore their property to men
who are actually in arms against you ? You must take
immediate steps to rescind the measure." 4 Six days
later Napoleon gave detailed instructions regarding the
property to be sequestrated. The list of owners included
the Due del Infantado. " I am told," he said, " that
1 Correspondence, No. 14,519.
8 Murat to Napoleon. Archives NationaUs.
1 Moniteur Universe/.
* Lecestre. Unpublished Correspondence, November 12, 1808.
THE "PROMOTION" 21
half the kingdom belongs to these Spanish grandees ; " l
and he made, through his Ambassador, a request for an
inventory of all such property.2
There was, however, one cause which served beyond
all others to kindle the Emperor's wrath. This was
that Murat, himself a monument of administrative in-
competence, never missed an opportunity of imputing
fault to Joseph. Because he had found no funds in the
Exchequer he imagined that he could din into Napoleon's
ears a querulous and incessant indictment of his pre-
decessor's management of affairs. As early as the loth
September he was becoming " increasingly cognisant of
the unsatisfactory state of the country's finances," while
on the 28th, fired with indignation at the criticisms on
his conduct of affairs in Spain, which had reached him
from Paris through the medium of Caroline, he fired
off two letters to the Emperor without waiting a single
day. These productions constituted a thoroughgoing
impeachment of Joseph's administration. " About five
millions of other monies have been paid to the various
Ministers ; there are still fourteen millions of arrears,
fifty millions of debt, six millions in notes of hand,
fourteen of consolidated debt at five per cent., and three
million florins to be paid to Holland. Such is the de-
plorable condition of our finances. It will be difficult
for your Majesty to believe that, despite the counsellors
of ability who surrounded him, King Joseph should yet
have failed to establish his government on a working
basis." 3
To these complaints the Emperor returned no answer.
He was no stranger to the deplorable condition of the
Neapolitan finances. He was aware of it before Murat,
1 Lecestre. November 18, 1808.
* Correspondence du Ministre des Affaires £trangeres. Archives
Nationals.
s Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationalcs.
22 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
and, though he may not have been acquainted with the
exact figures, he was sufficiently familiar with the general
situation to know in what brazier the gold had been
melted. But Murat was King of Naples now, and it was
his business to set his house in order. Joachim's next
move was to put forward his financial embarrassments
as an excuse for reducing the rate of interest on the
public debt from five to three per cent. With unex-
ampled ingenuousness he confided his intentions to his
brother-in-law. To perpetrate follies at Naples, to accuse
his predecessor Joseph of every possible administrative
ineptitude, was not enough for Murat. He must needs
propose with colossal effrontery that the Emperor should
countenance the violation of the very Constitution which
a few months earlier, at Bayonne, he had solemnly
pledged his word to uphold. This brought matters to
a climax. For the first time since his accession Murat
hears the note of menace. " I have your letter," says
the Emperor, " as well as those of your Minister. I have
guaranteed the public debt as inscribed in the memorial
of the Constitution, and I intend that it shall not be
tampered with in any shape or form. I insist on your
proclamation being revoked as contiary to the stipulations
which I have sworn to maintain. I must also make
known to you that I am extremely annoyed at the state-
ments which are perpetually appearing in your decrees
reflecting on the King, your predecessor. He had all
the difficulties to contend with ; you are reaping the
fruits of his labours, and you ought to be eternally grateful
to him. I am vexed to see that you recognise so im-
perfectly the extent of your obligation to me, and the
grave impropriety of your conduct. As for the individuals
at the Court of Sicily who are acting in hostility to me,
you must confiscate their property, or I shall seize it
myself as an indemnity for all that I have disbursed on
the Kingdom of Naples. That Kingdom already costs
I
THE "PROMOTION" 23
me several millions. It would have been better to
employ the proceeds arising from the sale of these pro-
perties for the purposes of paying off the public debt
rather than reduce the rate of interest. It is not with
stupid and ridiculous phrases that one changes the face
of Empires." l
In order that the whole matter might be categorically
laid down, he commanded the French Minister to present
official notes on all the points in dispute : on the public
debt ; on the removal of the sequestration on the property
of the Sicilian Emigres, which was to be reimposed on
the 20th January following, at the latest ; on the funds
expended on roads and education ; on the Napoleonic
Code, which was to be introduced in its entirety, including
the enactments relating to divorce.2 There were thus
altogether four notes.
Murat first of all received the Emperor's letter of the
I5th December. In the circumstances he had no choice
but once again to bow to the storm, to accept the harsh
lesson. Chafing at the restraint, he replied oa the 2nd
January in the following terms : " Sire, I am in receipt
of your Majesty's letter of the I5th. Your heart never
dictated expressions which, since you refer to me as the
most ungrateful of men, have also rendered me the most
unhappy." At the same time he strongly denied that
he owed anything to Joseph — gratitude least of all. To
bow to the will of the Emperor was one thing ; to cringe
to Joseph quite another. " Sire," he went on, " I shall
never be ungrateful either to your Majesty, to whom I
owe all, or to King Joseph, to whom I owe nothing." 3
On the 7th January he received the notes from the French
Embassy and delivered himself of the opinion that
Napoleon was under no necessity to convey his instructions
through his Ambassador or to make them the subject
1 Correspondence , No. 14,570. * Correspondence, No. 14,559.
* Murat to Napoleon, January 2, 1809. Archives Nationales.
24 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
of an official note.1 But the lesson went home. Little
by little matters resumed their ordinary course. On the
I5th January 1809 he sent the Emperor a copy of his
decree regarding the property of the Emigres, and en-
deavoured to win his way back to favour. Henceforth
he acted with greater prudence, and endeavoured, though
not with conspicuous success, to avoid the necessity of
rescinding his own enactments. But at the moment
circumstances were in his favour. The Emperor had
need of his services, and by playing the attentive and
obsequious subordinate, Murat succeeded in obliterating
the effect of his rebelliousness and once more regained the
Emperor's goodwill.
Agar affirms that it was the discovery of a plot, in which
Talleyrand, Fouche, and Murat were jointly involved,
that, in the first instance, brought about the estrange-
ment between Napoleon and his brother-in-law.2 It
appears that the conspiracy was directed towards putting
an end to the empire in the event of Napoleon losing his
life in Spain. We are told that the Emperor, on learning
of the matter from Eugene, suddenly put a stop to opera-
tions in Spain, and hastened with all speed to Paris.
The plot, although it may not have assumed the form
indicated by Pasquier,3 undoubtedly did exist, since, in
the course of the year 1811, the police discovered among
the papers of Ayme, Murat's chamberlain and confidential
agent in Paris, nineteen letters referring to the matter
in the King's own handwriting. Napoleon too made
an unmistakable allusion to it at Saint Helena. " He
(Murat) had plotted with Fouche, prior to my second
ma
triage."
It does not appear that the strained relations between
1 Murat to Napoleon, January 7, 1809. Archives Nationales.
2 Comte Murat, Murat, Lieutenant de FEmpereur en Espagne.
8 Chancelier Pasquier, Memoirs.
4 Gourgaud, Journal in'edit de Sainte Helens.
THE "PROMOTION" 25
Murat and the Emperor originated with the discovery of
this intrigue. In the first place it did not come to light
until after the difficulties between them had already
arisen, since, at the earliest, the Emperor could not have
been cognisant of it until the beginning of January 1809.*
Yet as far back as the I5th December 1808, we find him
sending strongly- worded complaints to Murat, and even
these were the outcome of a long series of previous dis-
agreements. How, moreover, did it concern the Emperor
what took place after his death ? What did it matter
whether Talleyrand or another succeeded to his inherit-
ance ? He had no heir, he could not found a line, and
since he had bestowed on every member of his family a
royal or princely position, why should he trouble himself
with considerations concerning a future of whose un-
certainty he was well aware ? Wherefore should he grow
anxious concerning plans whose success or failure de-
pended on the chance issue of the battlefield ?
The key to the whole position is to be found in the
circumstances in which Murat came to be placed upon the
throne of Naples. Napoleon installed him with reluctance,
and it was with reluctance that Joachim accepted his
crown. Both men were dissatisfied— the one because he
had bestowed so much ; the other because he had received
so little. Murat's hopes had soared to great heights.
They had materialised in a petty kingdom. He was dis-
contented, and made no effort to dissemble his feelings.
He displayed his administrative incompetence, and though
Napoleon knew of his shortcomings beforehand he became
worried and impatient when every day brought him a
fresh reminder of them. His own mind was capable of
carrying out the vastest designs with the minutest atten-
tion to detail. No wonder that he grew exasperated
1 See Napoleon's letter to Caulaincourt (Lecestre, No. 397), in which the
Emperor writes : " When you are reading this I shall be in Paris." This was
the first intimation of his departure.
26 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
at seeing a country of a few million inhabitants so grossly
misgoverned. Why then, he asked himself, should he
pander to a man who after all was not of his blood ? Why
not bring him back at once into the narrow way ? The
King was not at Naples to contravene his orders, and if
he continued his present unsatisfactory line of conduct,
then the Imperial system demanded that he should be
rudely called to order.
Caroline thoroughly shared her husband's disappoint-
ment with regard to the role that had been allotted them ;
but being at once more astute and less vain than Murat,
she not only dissembled her mortification but even made
a considerable parade of gratitude. Reaching Naples on
the 25th September, some days later than Murat, she was
greeted with equal manifestations of enthusiasm. But
no sooner had she arrived in the capital than she put aside
all display. Determining that though Joachim wore the
crown she would wield the sceptre, she willingly resigned
to her husband the picturesque concomitants of sover-
eignty. While, white-plumed and white-sashed, Murat
was dazzling the populace with his gorgeous uniforms,
or indulging in the pleasures of the chase resplendent in
his sixteenth-century hunting costume, his white-plumed
bonnet d la Henri IV. and his yellow boots,1 Caroline was
industriously attending to the routine of government and
giving audiences to Ministers of State. From the day she
arrived in Naples she made up her mind to make her
influence felt in the councils of the nation, and this
influence she hoped would swiftly become predominant.
Before long it grew evident that she possessed the secret
of making herself the centre of a party and of strengthen-
ing the bonds between herself and her adherents. First
and foremost among those whom she gathered to her
support was her compatriot Saliceti, their common
ambition furnishing, it may be, the grounds of a mutual
1 Archives des Affaires £trangtres.
I.afond,jt., <it It. Cluntbarii, sculft.
JOACHIM \HK\I AMi HIS WIFK < AKOI.INK BONAl'ARTK,
KING AM) QUKKN OF NAIM.KS
THE "PROMOTION" 27
attraction. Whatever the reason that dictated it, her
choice could not have been more fortunately exercised.
Saliceti, the Minister of Police, owed his power and
prestige not to the favour of the Emperor, but to the
immense popularity attaching to his name in Italy.1
Whether the duties which he now assumed appealed to
his ambition or his dilettantism is impossible to determine,
but, whatever his motives, Saliceti accepted the thankless
office with alacrity and became the confidential agent of
the Queen. So rapidly did his credit at the Court increase
that, on the 30th November 1808, the French Ambassador
was writing in the following strain : " Monsieur Saliceti
is apparently obtaining great influence ; there seems
indeed no one in the King's party of sufficient weight to
counterbalance him." a Thus jealousy soon took root.
Murat knew — all too well — that Caroline's position was
clearly determined by the Treaty of Bayonne. He felt
that though his kingdom had been tossed to him as alms
to a mendicant, he had suffered enough indignity, and that
now, at any rate, he ought to be master. He therefore
began to regard his wife with increasing suspicion. His
outbursts of temper were numerous and violent, and
before them, little by little, Caroline had to give way.
Matters had gone so far that precisely two months, to
the very day, after her arrival at Naples the French
Ambassador was sending Napoleon a report on these
early trials which his sister had to undergo. " The
Queen," he wrote, " receives very few people. In the
morning she is very busy in her own apartments. As a
general rule her whole conduct, even in her relations with
the King, is marked by a reserve that is both rare and
remarkable in so young a princess. It might be thought
that the excellent titles she possesses to take part in the
affairs of government as heiress presumptive to the
1 Mtmoires cCune inconnue.
1 Archives des Affaires fctranglres.
28 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
throne had given rise to a shadow of suspicion in the mind
of a prince jealous for his authority ; but, as a matter of
fact, she meddles so little in affairs of State, she acts with
such studied caution and reserve, that those who may
have been desirous of making capital for themselves out
of every transient misunderstanding which their eaves-
dropping brought to their notice, appear thoroughly
baffled and disconcerted by the prudent reserve which
she displays." l Caroline's real plight, her trials and her
vexations, may easily be discerned through the thin veil
of courtly dissimulation. To be thrust aside, to have her
sphere of activity limited to the discharge of domestic
duties, scarcely coincided with the aspirations that had
animated her in Paris. That her exceptional intellectual
capabilities should be disregarded, that she should be
suffered to take no part in shaping the destinies of the
nation, that, despite the paltry bickerings which daily
marked her intercourse with her husband, she should be
compelled to display a dignified and unruffled countenance
to the world, all this acted like gall upon her sensitive
and imperious nature.
Thus at the outset we find Joachim on terms of
hostility, first with the Emperor on questions of policy
and administration ; secondly, with Caroline, with whom
his quarrel derived an added bitterness from the twofold
circumstance that it was unceasing and unavowed.
Doubtless Murat was the creature rather than the creator
of the circumstances. With a recklessness that was a
part of his nature he went out of his way to make a
parade of the weaknesses of his character. So prodigious
was his vanity that he would not admit that any man was
his superior in ability. Just so long as Napoleon's star
was in the ascendant, just so long as Napoleon remained
the dispenser of dignities and kingdoms, Murat yielded
him a servile allegiance ; but no sooner did evil days dawn
1 Archives des Affaires £trang$rcs.
THE "PROMOTION" 29
for the Empire than he hastened to play the Judas, and
denounced as a criminal the very man whom he had once
almost worshipped as a god. But, as the Emperor used to
say, he was, when all was said and done, a bete, and in his
foolishness we shall find him employing shifts that deceive
none but himself. We shall see how he was duped by all :
in his domestic relations by Caroline ; in his public life
by his favourites La Vauguyon and Ayme, by his Ministers
Zurlo and Maghella, and by his soi-disant partisans, until
to his crowning shame he finally fell a victim to the
machinations of the Austrians and the English.
CHAPTER II
EARLY DIFFICULTIES
The fall of Saliceti — Murat's Ministers — Ambassadorial Questions— Rome
and Murat — The Emperor's silence — His orders of the i6th March 1809 —
Why the Emperor chose Murat — The Roman Question — Saliceti's prepara-
tions— The King sets out for Rome — Asks permission to go to Austria — The
Emperor's refusal — Murat's mortification — The English Expedition — Murat's
departure for Rome — His hurried return to Naples — The King and Queen set
out for Paris — Difficulties with the Empire before and after the Roman
expedition — Dissensions with the Queen.
WHEN he arrived at Naples, Murat found but
few on whom he could rely for initiation
into the duties of kingship. All the French
Ministers had taken their leave, either be-
cause they had elected to follow the fortunes of Joseph in
Spain or because they had received the Emperor's com-
mand to return to France. With a single exception,
therefore, Murat found no coadjutor of the front rank to
pilot him through his difficulties. That exception was
Saliceti. Now Saliceti was far from being destitute of
talents, and he owed it to his abilities quite as much as
to accident that he was able to obtain the simultaneous
control of two of the most important offices in the
government — the Ministry of War and the Ministry of
Police.
But the Emperor was vigilantly watching the course
of events. He noted the growing influence of the Minister
and judged it proper to intervene. Whether he honestly
believed the allegations to which he gave expression in
his dispatch to Champagny, and sincerely credited Saliceti
30
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 31
with being the principal organiser of a system of contra-
band, or whether the charge was merely a pretext to
justify the removal of a Minister whose increasing im-
portance he regarded as possibly fraught with future
danger to himself, is perhaps open to doubt. This much,
however, is beyond question. He knew his Murat, and
recognising how vain and, withal, how weak he was, he
judged it expedient to keep him under his own control.
Therefore it was that he took matters into his own hands
and demanded the dismissal of the Minister for War.
On the 20th January, Joachim advised the Emperor
of Saliceti's resignation, and Saliceti himself wrote to him
as follows : "A letter from the Duke of Padua informs
me that it is the desire of Your Royal and Imperial
Majesty that I should resign my position as Minister for
War. I have the honour to inform Your Majesty that
your orders have been obeyed. I have this day tendered
to the King of the Two Sicilies not only my resignation
as Minister for War but also as Minister of Police." *
But when rumours associating him with traffic in
contraband became rife, Saliceti, alleging private business,
hurried away to Paris to meet the charge.2
All this was little calculated to smooth Murat 's path.
From the very commencement of his reign his efforts to
gather advisers around him had been unsuccessful. Of
Neapolitans there was no lack ; but Frenchmen there were
none. Not knowing whither to turn, he was continually
imploring the Emperor's assistance to- resolve his diffi-
culties. On the 1 8th December he explained that the
offices of Finance and the Interior were both vacant.3
Accordingly, for the former he proposed Agar, who had
been his chief adviser in the Grand Duchy of Berg. He
made the suggestion with diffidence, but with the hope that
1 Saliceti to the Emperor, January 20, 1809. Archives Nationales.
1 Diario di Nicola.
3 Murat to Napoleon, December 18, 1808. Archives Nationales.
32 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the Emperor would have at length forgotten his distrust
of the man. For the Interior he put forward Zurlo,
Ferdinand's ex-Minister, and the very personification
of intrigue. On the 20th January he bade farewell to
Saliceti, and " could think of no one to take his place." *
Napoleon remained dumb. No reply having reached him
by the 2nd February, the King proposed that General
Belliard should become War Minister. If the Emperor
disapproved, Murat would have no alternative but to
appoint a man who had given rise to a good deal of dis-
satisfaction, to wit, General Reynier.? We may gauge to
what extremities Murat was reduced from the fact that
Saint Martin Delamotte, the Senator, who arrived in
Naples and was presented to the King on the 6th January,
was forthwith included in the catalogue of possible
Ministers. He was indeed proposed for the Interior in
the list which Murat sent to the Emperor, together with
his report on the Army, on the 4th February.8
By the 25th February his perplexities seem at length
to have been removed. Reynier was Minister for War,
Zurlo held the portfolio of Justice and Public Worship,
Agar that of Finance, while Pignatelli was Secretary of
State. If Saint Martin was denied the Interior, the post
would be filled by Carignano.4
On the other hand, the discovery of comfortable and
lucrative sinecures for Caroline's friends and his own
demanded less consideration. In a letter from the
French Ambassador we are told that " La Vauguyon,
the King's aide-de-camp, who arrived here two months
ago with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, was shortly
afterwards made a Colonel, and has now just been gazetted
a General of Brigade,"5 There was even some talk of
1 Murat to Napoleon, January 20, 1809. Archives Nationals.
2 Archives Nationales. 3 Idem.
4 Murat to Napoleon, February 25, 1809. Archives Nationiles.
6 Letters from the French Ambassador, March 3, 1809. Affaires
£trangeres.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 33
appointing him and General Compare to Captaincies of the
Guard, with a view to their acting as adjutants to the
Colonel-in-Chief. Three months later it was currently
reported that they had been promoted Generals of
Division. Happily the rumour was devoid of foundation.
On the 23rd April the Sieur Longchamps was created
Superintendent of Theatres ; a month later Arcambal,
a Councillor of State, was made Intendant of the Royal
Household, and, on the i6th August, Daure, who had
filled the post of War Commissioner at San Domingo,
became a Councillor of State, Director of Reviews and
of Military Conscription, finally to receive, on the loth
September, after a brief trial of Reynier as War Minister,
the portfolio of War and the Marine.1
If in the task of government organisation Murat's
progress was slow and unsatisfactory, it was far otherwise
with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
other powers. Murat was vastly concerned with his
prestige, and it flattered his vanity to have official con-
nections with foreign countries. Scarcely had he mounted
the throne when, on the nth September 1808, he caused
his Ambassador Monteleone to be presented, with his
new credentials, to the Emperor, while Monteleone him-
self introduced the Duke di Mondragone, the future
Neapolitan Ambassador to Russia.2
This ceremony accomplished, Joachim, assuming all
the punctilio of a monarch of ancient lineage, professed
himself astonished that the Emperor should have per-
mitted his Ambassador to remain so long without his
formal credentials, and requested that they might be
forwarded without delay.3 Napoleon, responding in true
princely fashion, immediately complied.
The next event was the appearance at the Court of
Naples of the Envoy Extraordinary of the Principality
1 Moniteur Universe/. a Idem.
* Murat to Napoleon, September 20, 1808. Archives Nationales.
C
34 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
of Lucca. The Russian Ambassador, Count de Bibicoff,
had been expected since October. In December Mares-
calchi announced that the Chevalier Tassoni had been
appointed Italian Charge d' Affaires at Naples.1 The
Russian arrived on the 2Qth January 1809 and Tassoni
a few days later.
And so the Court filled up, nor was it Murat's fault
that the process did not go farther. He sent a repre-
sentative to Austria, but Austria did not return the
compliment. For incurring this rebuff he received a
reprimand from the Emperor. Further, he requested
permission to renew relations with Denmark, a permission
which Napoleon readily granted, though not without
remarking on the expense that would be entailed.
Thus Murat gradually assumed his place in the world
of reigning monarchs. He was at once so unsophisti-
cated and so vain that he was never for an instant visited
by any suspicions of the incongruity of his position, and
it was with perfect self-assurance that he referred to the
other European sovereigns as his brothers, and continued
to behave towards them with a familiarity which, in
some quarters, had once savoured of bad taste.
With one personage only were his relations marked
^ by frigidity, and that was with his neighbour the Pope.
In obedience to the Emperor's commands he refrained
from visiting the Sovereign Pontiff when passing through
Rome on his way to Naples. Since then the difficulties
of the situation had become aggravated. He had also
to refuse the Pope's annual present of a taper. At
present he could not tell what turn events were about to
take in that quarter ; for Napoleon who, irritated with
his brother-in-law, had left his letters unanswered, at
length sent him not a reply but a command. On the
8th March he ordered him to get ready a division to
1 Marescalchi to Monteleone, December 8, 1808. Naples. Archivio di
Stato,
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 35
proceed to Rome with the object of relieving Miollis.
On the 1 6th these orders were confirmed through Clarke,
who was instructed to give particulars of the troops
required.1 At length, on the 5th April, he took Murat
into his confidence and revealed to him the part he was
to play. " I have given orders," he said, " that stern
measures are to be put in force at Rome, and that that
hot-bed of insurrection is to be destroyed. Moreover,
it has been discovered that messages have been passing
to and fro between the agents of the Court of Rome
and the English, which prove that the Pope has been
exerting his influence to produce unrest in Italy. On
receipt of this letter send forward some troops to the
frontier, in order that, when the moment arrives, they
may be thrown with lightning rapidity upon Rome.
I am giving similar orders in Tuscany. I intend Saliceti
to remain in Rome to act as adviser to Miollis, who will
form a fresh Government. You may state it as a fact
that the Pope will remain a Bishop and meddle no more
in temporal affairs." Thus then we have Murat openly
at war with the Pope, and general-in-chief of the Imperial
troops whose objective is Rome. What, it may be asked,
were the considerations that weighed with Napoleon in
selecting Joachim for the command ? Did he assume
that because the Pope had refused to recognise him as
king, Murat was entertaining hostile intentions against
His Holiness ? Did he thus think to compromise him in
the eyes of the Pope ? What end would it have served ?
Did he calculate that the prospect of temporal aggrandise-
ment would blind him to the somewhat inglorious char-
acter of his mission ? Or was it in order to remove all
subsequent difficulty from Eugene's path ? None of
these hypotheses is tenable. The Emperor wrote to
Murat in the following formal terms : " I have given
orders that the troops of my Papal States should be
1 Correspondence, 14,911. 2 Idem, 15,018.
36 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
incorporated with my Neapolitan Army. You will
command the combined forces, as the army of Italy has
work to do elsewhere." J Napoleon's intentions thus
become clearly manifest. Murat was appointed to the
supreme command in Rome because the army of Italy
and its chief were already hard pressed by the Austrians.
Seeing, therefore, that he could dispose of the services
of a man so eminently adapted to the task, the Emperor
would clearly have been guilty of an error had he tied
Eugene's hands and compelled him to relinquish the
operations upon which he was engaged. Though we
may allow that he was not altogether uninfluenced by
the consideration that the treatment Murat had received
at the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff would considerably
add to his zeal in humbling the Papal pretensions,
Napoleon did not greatly concern himself with his brother-
in-law's ideas about the matter. Murat had to obey, that
was the whole of the business ; and Murat obeyed.
Preparations for the Roman expedition were actively
begun. On the I5th April Saliceti returned from Paris.2
Two days later he set out with Maghella, the Prefect of
the Naples police, to organize a government at Rome,
the Pope having been deprived of all voice in public
affairs.3 Azzia was also of the party. Evidently the
hour was not propitious, for on the 28th Saliceti returned
to Naples, having effected nothing. No one had displayed
any desire to assist him. At this point commands stop
short, and for three weeks the Emperor gives no sign.
The menacing outlook in Austria and Eugene's retirement
upon the Piave were engrossing his whole attention. For
a moment he seemed almost inclined to give Murat the
supreme command in Italy.4 No sooner, however, had'
1 Correspondence, 15,018.
2 Moniteur Universel. 8 Diario di Nicola.
4 See Correspondence , 15, 144 and 15,150. These letters conclusively prove
that on the 3oth April the Emperor was in favour of giving the command of
I'irs VII
<;. Rates era. satlpt.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 37
events taken a more favourable turn than the stream
of letters began to flow once more. On the I2th May
the Emperor wrote from Schoenbrunn to announce the
fall of Vienna,1 and again, on the lyth, he sent a letter
to Joachim explaining his wishes regarding the special
conference at Rome in which Miollis and Saliceti were
to take part.2 At length, on the 28th, after having
instructed Eugene to inform the King of Naples of his
junction with the Grand Army, Napoleon himself sent
further orders to Murat regarding the occupation of the
Roman States. To assist his own movements he added,
" I think, in view of the general situation, it would be
well for you to stay on in Rome, at least for a time, in
order to be near Upper Italy." 3
Murat, who received Eugene's dispatch on the 6th
April, was already in possession of the Emperor's letter.
There seems to have been nothing to hinder him from
setting out for Rome at once in obedience to his instruc-
tions, and, as a matter of fact, the date of his departure
was publicly announced as the nth June,4 the following
notice being inserted, at his own command, in the
Monitor e : " The King, after inspecting the light cavalry
and a portion of the household troops, set out for Rome
accompanied by the latter." 6 The announcement was
false ; Joachim was still in Naples, and remained there.
The official explanation of this hitch, this unexpected
delay, in carrying out the Imperial commands was an
offensive movement on the part of the English. This
was merely a pretext to deceive the multitude. The
real explanation was that Murat had decided to disobey.
Murat, who had only accepted Naples with reluctance,
the army to Murat. That this, however, was merely a momentary idea is
shown by the fact that he wrote next day to Eugene urging him to follow up
the enemy.
1 Correspondence, 15,193. * Idem, 15,225.
8 Idem, 15,271. * Diario di Nicola.
6 Moniteur Universe!, June 22, 1809.
38 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
saw in the war with Austria a possibility of exchanging
his kingdom for ore of greater importance. With the
inordinate self-complacency that was characteristic of
him, he wrote to the Emperor on the 25th January saying :
" It has been repeatedly rumoured for some time past
that I am leaving Naples in order to become King of
Poland or Emperor of Austria." 1 In this case, no doubt,
the wish was father to the thought, and, conceiving that
the campaign might have a far-reaching effect upon his
own destiny, he followed with feverish anxiety the
minutest details in its progress. On the 28th April he
learned, even before the Emperor himself, that Eugene's
army was in retreat. He immediately applied to Napoleon
for an active command. He wished, he averred, to
supersede no one, but begged that his application might
receive favourable consideration. On the 5th May we
find him still anxious to curry favour, for on that date
he proclaimed an embargo on all vessels anchored in
Neapolitan waters, and summoned all Neapolitan subjects
in Austria to return to their country. These measures
were purely spontaneous, for Napoleon had never made
any such request. In spite of his denials, the report
spreads throughout the city that Prince Eugene's non-
success will compel " our Murat " to take over the
command of the Army of Italy.
The 8th June came, but still no summons ; so Murat
seized the occasion of the Emperor's victories to send
him, together with a letter congratulating him on his
successes, a formal request for permission to join him.
This time he varied the pretext. Lannes was no more, and
he was anxious to fill the gap that Death had made.2
His whole letter was a petition pitched in humble strain,
for he recognised that if ever he was to get away from
Naples it must be now. His eagerness led him to com-
mit himself to somewhat imprudent statements. " The
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationales. f Idem.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 39
country," he said, " is tranquil, and nothing is to be
apprehended from the English." This was undoubtedly
rash, for, on the 8th June, when he received the Emperor's
letter requesting his presence in Rome, we find that,
though he could leave Naples well enough when his
destination was Vienna, his departure was quite out of
the question when his destination was the Papal States.
This letter of official congratulation and semi-official
petition was far too important a document to be entrusted
to an ordinary courier or estafette. A deputation,
consisting of the cream of the Neapolitan nobility, the
Due de Saint Theodore, the Due de Campochiaro, the
Marquis di Sara and the Prince di Calobrano — the latter
bearing the precious missive — must needs be commissioned
to convey it to Vienna. But they bore with them some-
thing besides the letter. Murat in his anxiety to create
a favourable impression on the Emperor sent him a
Persian casket adorned with a representation of the
Triumph of Constantine, " a genuine and highly considered
work of art which could belong to no one more appro-
priately than to Your Majesty." 1 By this means he
hoped to secure a welcome for the Ambassadors and
their petition. He must also have confided his hopes
of success to his friends, for rumour was already busy,
and on the 8th June Nicola was writing as follows :
' To-night the deputation starts for Vienna. . . . King
Joachim will go to rule another kingdom, and we shall
have a new sovereign here."
The letter and the deputation reach Schoenbrunn on
the iyth June, and once again the Emperor brings Murat 's
dream-castles toppling to the ground. " I have received,"
he writes, " Your Majesty's letter of the 8th June. . . .
I should very much like to have you with me ; but,
in the circumstances, it is desirable that you should not
absent yourself from Naples. On another campaign,
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationalts.
40 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
when matters are thoroughly quiet in your quarter, it
will be possible for me to summon you to the Army." 1
On the I7th there came a further letter from the Emperor
bidding him " urge forward affairs in Rome." 2
Thus Murat was compelled to remain in Naples, and so
farewell to all his hopes ! Few men would have dared to
nourish such aspirations, and yet, considering the amazing
vicissitudes of fortune that marked the times, such pre-
sumption need scarcely excite our wonder. His mortifi-
cation was extreme, and, though he dared not disclose
his feelings to the Emperor, he readily took advantage
of the diversion most opportunely afforded by an offensive
movement on the part of the English to relinquish to
others the task of effecting the Emperor's work at Rome.
While he was at Naples waiting for a reply to his letter
of the 8th June and making ready to set out for Vienna,
the English, to whom no one had been giving a thought,
Murat least of all, suddenly showed themselves off the
coast. On the morning of the 24th, Naples awoke to
learn that Ischia and Procida had been attacked by an
Anglo-Sicilian squadron. On the 26th, a proud day in
the annals of the Neapolitan navy, an attempt was made
to break through the English lines. The Ceres, a frigate
commanded by Bausan, succeeded in running the blockade
and reached Naples, battered but triumphant. Murat
went on board immediately, removed the cross which he
himself was wearing, and, with his own hands, pinned it on
Bausan 's breast.
The efforts of the English to foment insurrection at
Cape Miseno were completely fruitless, and nothing came
of the enemy's attempts, aided and abetted as they
were by traitorous confederates, to bring about a rising
on the occasion of the Feast of Saint Peter and Saint
Paul.3 The people remained unmoved. After the seizure
1 Correspondence, 15,372. * Idem.
3 Diario di Nicola.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 4I
of Procida and Ischia, the English squadron was obliged
to return to Sicily. Equally abortive was the attempt
to land troops in Calabria. On the 5th July an official
notice was placarded in the streets of Naples stating that
on the arrival of the forces under General Partouneaux
the English had retired to their ships, taking with them
a hundred prisoners.1 On the 28th all danger was past.
The English even abandoned the two islands they had
captured. Only a few hostile warships remained to keep
a look-out in the bay, adding to the Emperor's birthday
celebrations the unexpected attraction of a harmless
naval engagement, while the King in the Riviera di
Chiaia was reviewing his troops, then, for the first time,
arrayed in their brilliant Hussar and Polish uniforms.2
The British cruisers having disappeared, Murat again
turned his attention to Rome. In obedience to Napoleon's
reiterated commands, he kept pouring French troops over
the border, also sending, at his brother-in-law's express
request, a few Neapolitan regiments, knowing full well
that the coffers of the Papal States would provide the
wherewithal to pay them.
Apparently the Emperor's commands were punctually
carried out, since he wrote Murat from Schoenbrunn re-
cording his satisfaction. On the I5th October he sent
word that peace had been concluded with Austria, while
Caroline received a personal letter in which he said, " I
have made peace with Austria 3 and I am setting out to-
night for Paris. If you were nearer and the season not
so far advanced, I should persuade Murat to come there
for a couple of months. But you could not arrive before
December, and that is a dreadful month, particularly for a
Neapolitan. The visit to Fontainebleau must therefore
be put off for another year. Be assured of my constant
desire to afford you proofs of my affection."
* Diario di Nicola. ' M«***r Universal.
» Correspondence, 15,953- * /Am* I5>952>
42 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
These amiable letters reached Naples during the
second fortnight in October. Either Murat misunderstood
their import, or was still sore over the disappointment of
his hopes regarding Austria, for he manifested little eager-
ness to respond to the Emperor's appeal. However, on
the 8th November, Saliceti left Naples for Rome, preceding
the King, who left at five o'clock on the following evening
accompanied by Pignatelli.1 Reaching Rome at seven
o'clock on the evening of the loth, he proceeded to the
Borghese Palace. On the nth he saw the Authorities,
held a review of the troops, and paid a visit to the fortress
of St. Angelo.2 During his brief visit he was continually
occupied with the necessity of appointing a governor, and
he deemed that in Saliceti he possessed a man who was
endowed with every qualification for the post. It may
be that he was desirous of availing himself of the oppor-
tunity to reward his services, though it is more probable
that he hoped to rule in Saliceti 's name. The fact that
he considered himself a fit and proper person to administer
the affairs of any country renders such a theory at least
possible. At length, on the i6th, he departed for Gaeta
to essay a coup de main against the islands of Ponza.3 On
the evening of the igth, however, Naples was startled to
learn that the King had unexpectedly returned to the
capital, and the report ran through the city that he was
about to start for Paris. This time it was not an empty
rumour. On the morning of the next day but one every-
thing was in readiness for the journey. All kinds of
conjectures were rife to explain the motives for the visit.
According to some people, Murat was going to reign else-
where, while Naples was to become a French province
under the governorship of Beauharnais. This was flatly
denied by others, who affirmed that Murat had merely
1 Diario di Nicola.
2 Murat to Napoleon, November II, 1809. Archives Nationales.
* Idem, November 16, 1809. Idem.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 43
been invited to the fete which Napoleon was to hold on
the 2nd December at Fontainebleau l in honour oi the
King of Saxony. All that was known for certain about
the matter was that the King, with the young Due de
Regina and another of his chamberlains, was passing the
time very comfortably and unconcernedly, when suddenly
a messenger arrived in hot haste bearing a small packet
from Paris. Dismissing his chamberlains, the King broke
the seal, read the letter, grew thoughtful, put his hand
to his brow, strode up and down the room after the
manner of one beset with grave perplexities, commanded
his carriage to be got ready to take him to Naples,
and then began forthwith to prepare for a journey to
Paris.2
What was in the mysterious letter and who sent it ?
Was it a reply to questions relating to Napoleon's letter
of the I5th October, which Caroline had asked for ? Was
itj one_ol -those semi-official notes that Fouche so often
sent to his friend Murat when he considered the latter's
interests demanded it ? Or did it come from the Emperor
himself ? Whatever its nature the matter was pressing,
since the very moment he reached Naples he gave orders
for everything to be ready for his departure on the next
day but one. Caroline herself proposed to set out as
well, though the weather was terrible and the Volturna
had inundated the country. At seven o'clock on the
morning of the 2ist November the King took his departure.
He travelled incognito as the Count of Calabria and, as
the official explanation of the journey, it was given out
that the King and Queen were desirous of personally
offering their congratulations to the Emperor upon t
memorable triumphs that he had won in the course
his recent campaign.3 The same day the Queen ga
1 D ' 'o di Nicola * Diario di Nicola.
• G*Do to Monteleone, November 21, 1809. Naples. Archivio c
Stato.
44 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
audiences to the members of the Diplomatic Body and the
chamberlains of the palace, and in the evening set out
in her turn.
It must not be supposed that any real cordiality
prevailed between the two brothers-in-law. It is true
that Napoleon's need of Murat's services brought about
a settlement of many minor differences that had come
into existence shortly after the latter's accession ; never-
theless, the fundamental causes of estrangement still
remained ; nay, they grew daily more formidable. On
the one side there was Joachim ever burning to play
the mighty monarch ; on the other, the Emperor just as
constantly compelled to keep him in his place. Though
as yet no divergencies on questions of foreign policy had
arisen to widen the rift, abundant occasion for dispute
was, in the meantime, afforded by the internal adminis-
tration of the country. Murat had been a Marshal of
the Empire. He was essentially a fighting-man whose
thoughts and dreams were eternally centred upon soldiers.
Alas ! in his kingdom soldiers were few ; wherefore he
strove by successive and not unsuccessful encroachments
to increase their number, a policy which constantly
brought upon him expressions of disapproval from the
Emperor. As early as the i6th December 1808, the latter
had instructed the French Ambassador to prevent any
Frenchman transferring his services to Naples without the
Imperial sanction, and whenever such a thing did occur
to interpose a formal protest.1 The King of Naples was
anxious to have four hundred Frenchmen to form a
Royal Guard and desired to select them from the Imperial
regiments. " Make him understand," was Napoleon's
answer, " that such a thing is out of the question. Tell
him that I returned a like refusal in the cases of the
Kings of Spain and Holland, but that to him, as to
them, I will allot four hundred worthy conscripts who will
1 Correspondence, 14,572.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 45
learn discipline in his service." * On the 24th January
1809 there was renewed trouble. "Write," said the
Emperor to Champagny, " and tell my Ambassadors in
Naples and Holland that they must devote all their
attention to preventing any Frenchman quitting my
army or taking service elsewhere except with my express
permission. You will inform Monsieur di Gallo that I
am particularly annoyed with the King for having enticed
Frenchmen to attach themselves to his army without
orders from me. They must return to their posts without
delay." But openly to beg troops of Napoleon and
then, when the request was refused, to resort to underhand
means to win them over, did not suffice for Murat. On
the yth March he set up a system of conscription by
which two men were selected for the colours out of every
thousand inhabitants.3 The measure was sanctioned by
Napoleon * and applied by Murat with such vigour that
at the end of a month the process of enrolment was all
but complete.6
Thus far the means to which Murat had resorted to
increase his army and to add to the magnificence of his
regal state had been, if not strictly defensible, at all events
disguised. But such methods did not operate with
sufficient rapidity to satisfy the King's impetuous nature.
Had it been within his power he would have conjured
armed legions from the bowels of the earth. As it was,
his army, despite every device to augment it, failed to
attain the limits of his desires. Why, then, he asked
himself, should he not take advantage of the Emperor's
present generous mood (this was in May 1809) and go to
work in the open. Hitherto he had tampered principally
i Correspondence, 14,674, Napoleon to Clarke, January 10, 1809.
« Idem, 14,733. Napoleon to Champagny.
1 Moniteur Universel.
* Correspondence, 14,944- Napoleon to Murat, March 22, |l
• Moniteur Universel.
46 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with the common soldiers or with officers of inferior rank.
Henceforth he determined to extend the process of cor-
ruption to their leaders. This new tactical departure
was first applied in the case of a foreign regiment stationed
in the heart of Calabria. Overtures were made to the
colonel to which he apparently lent a friendly ear, since
his regiment, which set out from Naples eight hundred
and fifty strong, could, a month later, muster no more
than one hundred and fifty men.1
A proposal was next made to the colonel of the regi-
ment of La Tour d'Auvergne to the effect that he should
recruit as many men as possible and then share them
with the King's Guard. But he did not prove amenable
to persuasion. Indignant at the suggestion that had
been made to him, furious at the desertion of his men,
he dashed off a formal complaint to Clarke, which the
latter transmitted with some very strong comments to the
Emperor. " The practice," he observes, " is apparently
carried on too openly for the Neapolitan government to
be in ignorance of it." 2 So flagrantly did this illicit
recruiting proceed that scenes of the most amazing
description were enacted in the most public manner.
During a review of the Neapolitan Guards, La Vauguyon,
who had recently been appointed to a colonelcy in the
regiment, had a very hot dispute with the lieutenant-
colonel of the loth French regiment of the line, because
the latter, who had observed some of his own men among
the Guards, called upon them by name and summoned
them to quit the ranks. However, the affair subsided,
since Murat immediately undertook to reinstate the men
in their old regiment.
During the whole of this period the Emperor had
addressed no reprimand to the King of Naples. The
1 La Feuillade to Champagny, July 31, 1809. Archives dcs Affaires
angtres.
8 Clarke to the Emperor, October 26, 1809. Idem.
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 47
sole expostulation was contained in a memorandum sent
by Champagny to the French Charge d'Affaires on the
5th November, requesting him to lodge the necessary
protests in connection with the irregularities in the
Auvergne regiment of which its colonel had complained.
The reason of this silence was that the Austrian campaign
was engrossing his attention, and that, where the fate
of an Empire was at stake, the loss of a few soldiers
was a matter of minor import. But with the restoration
of peace, the hour of reckoning was to come, and it was
in Paris, not in Naples, that Joachim was to undergo
the castigation his delinquencies deserved.
But there were other points at issue, and these related
to finance. If Murat, dissembling his dissatisfaction,
had unprotestingly acquiesced in the arrangement re-
garding the duchies, the disposal of which the Emperor
reserved to himself, it was merely because the Imperial
intentions were so clearly laid down in the Treaty of
Bayonne that no evasion was possible. On the 23rd
January, Napoleon sent word to Naples that he was about
to give effect to the provisions of the treaty which related
to the founding of the said duchies.1 Nevertheless it
was not until the 15 th August that Napoleon, then at
Schoenbrunn, issued a decree for the " foundation and
endowment of four duchies in the kingdom of Naples
to be designated the duchies of Reggio, Gaeta, Taranto,
and Otranto, the occupants of which were to be respec-
tively Oudinot, Gaudin, Macdonald, and Fouche.2 But
by an error he fixed the amount of the endowments at
80,000 francs for each duchy, and this proved a fruitful
source of future dissension.3
Disputes crop up regarding the money owed by Naples
to the Imperial Treasury. The repayment of the funds
1 Champagny to Gallo. Affaires gtrangtrcs.
1 Archives des Affaires fctrangtres.
1 The Treaty of Bayonne assigns to each duchy a revenue of 60,000 francs.
48 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
that had been advanced hangs fire ; the debt grows
larger every day. Instead of payment, Murat proffers
his one and only argument, the argument which he em-
ployed on every possible occasion, and which was summed
up in the words " No money ! " He even went further,
and, assuming the offensive, declared through his Finance
Minister that it would be necessary to subject the claims
of France to careful scrutiny, that the figures submitted
were open to question, and that certain expenditure had
been unfairly charged to Naples. He added that he himself
had numerous claims for compensation to present. He
broke off the discussion in right royal fashion by stating
that he would take an opportunity of laying his claims
before the Emperor. Of that discussion Paris was to
be the scene.
The continual reproofs addressed by Napoleon to the
King did not produce any rapprochement between
Caroline and the latter. Individually they were pained
at the Emperor's remonstrances, but their mutual attitude
underwent no modification. So far was Caroline from
seeking to offer comfort to her husband that she looked
elsewhere for her allies. It was at this juncture that
La Vauguyon and his friends appeared on the scene and
that Saticeti quitted it. Whether he was supplanted by
the newcomers, whether he had fallen into disfavour, or
whether he found it impossible to get on with men with
whom he had so little in common, who grated on him so
that he is said to have exclaimed, " What could one make
of her with such popinjays about her ! "—all this is some-
what in doubt. Nevertheless whatever the answers to
these questions may be, affairs at Rome provided Saliceti
with a convenient excuse for withdrawal, and it is possible,
though not certain, that his first departure for Rome
synchronised with the termination of his relations with
the Queen.
His departure and the cessation of his influence appear
EARLY DIFFICULTIES 40
to have had no effect in dispelling Murat's jealousy
Matters soon reached such a pitch that the Queen, who
was practically a captive in her own palace, had recourse
to the French Ambassador in order to put before her
brother a picture of the circumstances in which she was
placed, and what a picture it was ! " Until latterly,"
writes the Ambassador, " I had, in common with the
whole Court, the honour of seeing the Queen at fairly
frequent intervals. Indeed, she held receptions almost
every day. For the last month, however, Mondays ex-
cept ed, we have had no opportunity of paying our respects
to her for more than a moment. Such is the will of the
King, who grows daily more anxious that she should live
in still stricter retirement. It was her custom of a morn-
ing to receive a few people, particularly those of French
nationality ; but the King does not approve of these
receptions, and the Queen has been expressly forbidden
to continue them. Her Majesty is so little mistress of
her own actions that she may not have a woman to take
luncheon with her. She passes her days in solitude with
her books, her music, and her needlework. The measures
taken by Your Imperial Majesty on behalf of the Prince
of Lucca still further increased the King's jealousy, which
since then has reached the proportions of an obsession,
the result being that the Queen's most innocent actions
are interpreted by him as forming part of a plot to obtain
the upper hand in the Government." 1 __
" Jealousy regarding his position," wrote the Am-
bassador again on the 30th June, " is the King's one defect,
but in this respect he is impelled to the point of violence
in his attitude towards the Queen. The latter is therefore
probably awaiting an opportunity of seeing Your Imperial^
Majesty. . . ." 2
1 La Feuillade to Champagny, June 8, 1809. Archives des Affaires
1 Idem, June 30, 1809. Idem.
50 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Here were definite charges, and they demanded an
explanation. Champagny, probably on the Emperor's
instructions, inquired of the Ambassador by what means
he had been able to possess himself of such information.
" I was instructed by the Queen herself," replied the
latter, " and my two dispatches of the 8th and the 30 th
June, Numbers 124 and 141 respectively, were not tran-
scribed until they had been read through to the Queen
from beginning to end. I had two audiences of the
Queen before sending Number 124, and two more before
sending Number 141."
Thus Caroline took up a definite stand. She appealed
to her brother for protection against her husband, and she
forwarded her appeal through the official channel. But
the Emperor was too fully occupied to listen to her com-
plaints. He appeared, on the contrary, to take Murat's
part since the French Ambassador, with whom the King
had been on bad terms since the discovery of his collusion
with the Queen, quitted Naples on the 22nd August 1809,
scarcely one month after the voicing of Caroline's griev-
ances. The Queen was thus left without a defender.
But to send messengers hieing along the road betwixt
Schoenbrunn and Naples with missives of reproach or
conciliation would have been to supply food for gossip.
The Emperor preferred to postpone the matter till he had
the belligerents beneath his own roof, where his eye could
discern how the matter lay, and where his word was law.
Thus it was at Paris that he was to listen to the recital
of their grievances and restore peace between them.
CHAPTER III
MURAT IN PARIS
The King's journey-Rumours at Naples-The Neapolitan finances-The
marriage council— Murat's demands— Commercial Questions— Contreband
trade— Murat goes home— His journey and arrival in Naples— Prepares to go
to Calabria— Counter-instructions— The Emperor's letter— Murat's reply— He
again sets out for Paris— His arrival— Visits Clarke— His anxiety to leave—
The Sicilian Expedition assured— Murat's departure— Caroline remains in
Paris.
IT was a long journey from Naples to Paris and,
upon a road, already thickly covered with snow
and ice, which lay across the precipitous barrier of
the Alps, Murat was pressing forward at top speed,
continually urging his postilions to further efforts. Eleven
days after his departure from Naples crowds were lining
the streets of Paris to witness his arrival. It was ( on the
ist December, at four o'clock in the afternoon, that he
drew up at the Tuileries and proceeded to take up his
quarters in the Pavilion de Flore.1 It was the occasion
of the Emperor's birthday celebrations. On the 3rd
December he was present at the singing of the Te Dewn
in the cathedral, where he appeared in the full dress of a
French Prince and a High Admiral of the Empire. On the
following day he went to meet Caroline, who had been in
such haste to arrive that she had outstripped all the
members of her suite. Scarcely giving herself time to
discard her travelling-dress, she appeared at five o'clock
in the evening, a few hours after her arrival, at the fetes
given by the city of Paris in honour of the coronation.
1 Monteleone to Gallo. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
51
52 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
She too had a good eye for dramatic effect, and knew how
to time her appearance on the public stage. Overcoming
her fatigue she was present the same evening at the
brilliant ball held in the Emperor's honour, and on the
I2th she and her husband both took part in the hunting
party and ball which Berthier had organised for Napoleon's
entertainment at his chateau of Grosbois.
The rumours of a coming change that had been
current in Naples while the King and Queen were still
in their capital gathered strength after their departure.
The abruptness of their leave-taking seemed to lend the
colour of truth to the various conjectures. The Nea-
politan imagination swiftly rearranged the map of Europe.
Berthier would be Viceroy of Spain, Bernadotte of Por-
tugal, Joseph would reign in Italy, and Murat in Illyria.1
The rumours had been sufficiently persistent to reach the
ears of Joachim before his departure. When, therefore,
he had seen the Emperor and regained assurance regard-
ing the stability of his throne, he immediately sent the
following dispatch to Pignatelli : " I arrived here on the
3oth November in good health. Do not be alarmed by
malicious reports. There will be no change of any kind
in my kingdom." 2 Thus the apprehensions of the
Neapolitans were allayed, and they were able to await
with equanimity the arrival of the dispatch which, ten
days later, Champagny forwarded to Grosbois by the
Emperor's instructions. It denied the rumour that the
King was to be transferred to another kingdom, and
authorised the statement that no change threatened the
throne of Naples.3
Murat 's serenity was restored. But permission to
remain at Naples by no means implied liberty to play
fast and loose with the Imperial system, and Napoleon
1 Diario di Nicola.
8 Murat to Pignatelli. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
3 Champagny to Grosbois. Affaires Etrangtres.
MURAT IN PARIS 53
took advantage of the fact that his brother-in-law was
within his grasp to lay down the law regarding the points
in dispute and to compel him to acknowledge the justice
of the Imperial claims.
In order to be certain of his facts, the Emperor had an
interview at Fontainebleau with Roederer, Joseph's ex-
Minister, and asked him for information on thirteen
definite questions regarding the Neapolitan finances.
In the course of a detailed report which Roederer handed
in on the 4th December,1 it was stated that when Joseph
left Naples the total revenue amounted to 61 million
francs, while the expenditure aggregated 15,393,912
francs, including a sum of over 2^ millions for the
maintenance of the French army. There was, there-
fore, no scarcity of funds in the national treasury.
Roederer 's report was followed two days later by a
statement from Gaudin which contained the assertion
that the sums due in respect of the duchies had not been
paid into the coffers of the Legion of Honour in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty of Bayonne, adding,
however, that the King would take the opportunity of
discussing the whole matter with the Emperor.2 But
Murat betrayed little eagerness to broach such delicate
topics. On the i6th December, Napoleon left Paris for
Trianon, and still the King had not broken silence. Every
day he had to go to Trianon ; every day he carefully
avoided any discussion of the matters in question. At
length Napoleon perceived that Murat was determined
to say nothing despite his boasted intention of personally
discussing matters with the Emperor. He therefore took
the initiative himself, and it was to Caroline, most invalu-
able of go-betweens, that he voiced his complaints regard-
ing Murat's non-observance of the Treaty of Bayonne.
Joachim was by no means at a loss for specious arguments.
1 Roederer to the Emperor. Archives NationaUs.
8 The Minister of Finance to the Emperor.
54 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
He affirmed that he had loyally fulfilled his obligations 1
and that if there remained a balance still unpaid the
fault was not his but the war's, adding that peace would
bring with it additional sources of income. Yet, on the
27th December, without any sense of the incongruity of
such a request, he asked Napoleon's permission to add the
Swiss regiment to the number of his own troops. This
time Napoleon found it impossible to restrain his indigna-
tion, and without a moment's interval he dispatched a
stern and uncompromising reply. "I am in receipt of
Your Majesty's letter of the 27th," said the Emperor, "and
I insist that your liabilities, whether to the Treasury, to
the Legion of Honour, or to the Crown, be rigorously dis-
charged. Germany having been pacified, Your Majesty
must lessen your expenditure by diminishing the number
of your recruits, for a country's strength depends rather
on the quality and loyalty of its soldiers than on mere
numbers." Apparently he was anxious to drive the
lesson home, for three days later the Emperor wrote to
Champagny urging him to do everything in his power
to impress on the King of Naples that, unless the debts
were mid, steps would be taken to recover the amounts
due. u" Tell him," he concluded, " that the country is
nothing but an expense to me, and that I am incensed
at not being paid what is owing to me/J Accordingly,
on the 3rd January, Champagny addressed two notes,
one to Grosbois at Naples, the other to Monteleone in
Paris, demanding that Joachim should discharge his debt
to the Emperor. Murat, by no means anxious to comply,
undertook that a special messenger should be sent to
Naples with an account of the claims made by the Imperial
Treasury against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with
instructions to obtain detailed information regarding the
matter.
Next day Napoleon, his patience completely exhausted
1 Murat to Napoleon. Affaires £trangtrts.
MURAT IN PARIS
55
by this subterfuge, wrote to Champagny as follows :
" Inform the Neapolitan Ambassador that the amounf
owing to the French Treasury has been established beyond
question, and that there is no need to verify it, since it
was money advanced in France. The other liabilities
date from the time I handed over the country. Tell him
further that steps must be taken for an immediate settle-
ment, or that it will come to this, that I shall give orders
to my generals to obtain satisfaction by active means.
Tell him also that obligations entered into with me are
sacredly binding, and that I have the power to exact
their fulfilment even from the mightiest princes ; that
the payment of these debts is a necessary preliminary to
settling the finances of the Public Treasury, the Legion
of Honour, and other establishments ; there must be no
endeavour to gain time, the matter must be terminated
at once." l
On the arnyjiLof this letter, Murat's
kumTand he
so loudly about discussuigjthejnatter with the Emperor
^
his cusTxmTary proteTrtf^s¥Tarofine^ \ As the result of an
In^fvTe^whlcrrsnV had with Tier brother on the isth
January, she succeeded in obtaining for her husband
permission to state his case and the promise that he should
not be harshly dealt with. On the morrow, the Queen
having impressed upon him the dangers of prevarication
and the futility of open revolt, Muniiejrj^^
he Always endeavoured. _ to ejdxicate himself
from a difficult situali^rPSire/' he said, "Your
iralestTnE^SThaL^troublid me, not so much because
of the pain their fulfilment would inevitably inflict upon
me, but because of the evidence they afford of your dis
1 Correspondence , 16,118.
56 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
pleasure ."M However, he proceeded, and with perfect
justice, to point out that the arrears on the duchies should,
in accordance with the Treaty of Bayonne, figure at
sixty thousand and not eighty thousand francs ; and
further that the claim was in respect of six duchies,
whereas two were to be reserved till the conquest of
Sicily. He also advanced some justifiable criticisms on
other points.
Napoleon, appeased by Caroline and tranquillised by
the excuses and explanations offered by Joachim, for-
warded to Champagny his brother-in-law's letter, ac-
companying it with the following instructions : "I am
sending you on a letter from the King of Naples. He will
have to arrange matters with you. It seems to be the
fact that there are only four Neapolitan duchies, and
that the other two are Sicilian. It also appears correct
that the amount of the endowment is in each case sixty
and not eighty thousand francs. You will look into the
documents. ... I am anxious for a formal arrangement
in order to avoid friction with the King of Naples. You
will proceed clause by clause and arrange such terms that,
although I do not want the money to-morrow, my brothers
and brothers-in-law shall understand that what they owe
me they do owe me." 2
Once again Murat's hopes were shattered. He had
been looking forward to discussing the Neapolitan debt
with the Emperor, to putting forward pleas for com-
pensation, and all his representations had not resulted
in diminishing the sum by a single sou, the only re-
duction allowed being in rectification of an error made
by Napoleon himself. Murat's attitude after this con-
ference was one of mortified dejection, but Napoleon,
thanks to Caroline's unfailing tact and serenity, showed
no resentment.
1 Murat to Napoleon. Affaires £trang$res.
2 Lecestre. Unpublished letters.
MURAT IN PARIS 57
This controversy took place early in January, and it
may explain the ardour with which Murat supported the
Russian alliance in the Council which was held on the
27th of that month, an ardour which was stimulated
both by Caroline and Fouche. He could not, moreover,
have failed to feel nattered at finding himself, as it were!
the mouthpiece of a party and at being asked for advice
by a man from whom he had hitherto received nothing
but commands.
No sooner did he find himself restored to the Emperor's
good graces than he began to renew his importunities.
It happened that some English merchandise had recently
been seized, and that, instead of being burnt, it had, by
the Emperor's authority, been exposed for public sale in
Naples. The proceeds of course went to the Neapolitan
Treasury. This was naturally a considerable windfall for
the national exchequer. No sooner, however, had the
Emperor given permission for this slight relaxation of
his regulations than Murat evinced a desire to give free
entry to all merchandise destined for Italy and France.
Did he imagine that the Emperor would be blind to the
consequences that would inevitably ensue from such an
act ? If merchandise were allowed to circulate in France
and Italy, would not the licences, which Murat requested
should be as unrestrictive as possible, ensure considerable
profits for the kingdom of Naples from the opportunities
for illicit trading to which they would give rise ? Murat
continued to display a lordly disregard of trifles. Let
Napoleon only grant him his licences and trading permits,
let him but raise the continental blockade in his favour
and that of his country, and he would then condescend
to allow that the Emperor had some little regard for him.
But from the very beginning Napoleon had seen the
snare and had no intention of doing him so great a favour.
He was, however, so far willing to humour him that on
the 8th February he consented to sign a permit allowing
58 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
goods confiscated prior to that date to be introduced,
under certain restrictions, into France.1 Almost im-
mediately smuggling began to be practised on such an
extensive scale that, first on the 28th February and again
on the i6th March, the Emperor was obliged to impress
upon Champagny the necessity for " a strict enforcement
of the regulations."
From this first visit to the Emperor Murat had failed
to gather the expected fruits. So far as military and
financial matters were concerned he had been compelled
to retreat all along the line. Only in one respect was the
situation satisfactory : the Emperor appeared at last
disposed to undertake the expedition against Sicily,
since, with that object in view, he was about to give his
Minister for War certain preliminary instructions regard-
ing the French troops in Naples. This afforded him the
means of soothing his wounded amour-propre with the
thoughts of the glorious and profitable role he would play
in the forthcoming invasion. True, nothing had as yet
been definitely decided. The possibilities of the enter-
prise had yet to be investigated. But this was a task in
which Joachim was in his element. His ^military in-
_stincts andjnspersonalanjy/tion combjng^^
his best^effortls to achieve success. The mobilisation of
is forces was carried out with efficiency^ and-<iispatch.
o^ ensufe"a fnumphant issue for the
nrat shouldjiie^^
am it
is probable that Caroline, between her husband and whom
the Emperor had brought about a reconciliation during
their Paris visit, had by this time gained some portion of
that ascendancy which her own exceptional endowments,
reinforced as they were by the iron will of her brother,
were inevitably destined to win for her over a mind such
1 as Murat's. In Paris, it may be, Caroline made a more
1 Archives des Affaires fctrangeres.
MURAT IN PARIS 59
careful study of the vagaries and weaknesses of her
husband's character, and that, realising with greater
precision than hitherto jiow^morbidjvas his vanity an<
bow profound his ineptitude^ she recognised tHe"TmfT^f
policy it would be necessary to follow if she and Murat
were to remain in undisturbed possession of their kingdom.
While Joachim was busily engaged in fitting out his
expedition, while he went off to the wars on his own or
other folk's behoof, she, remaining at her all-powerful
brother's side, succeeded, by the skill with which she plied
the arts of diplomacy and adulation, in securing the
honours and the guarantees for which she craved. Hers
it was to act as mediator, to stand between her husband,
of whose capacity for imprudent action she was uneasily
conscious, and her brother whom she credited with little
inclination to deal indulgently with her " pauvre Murat."
Her plan of campaign consisted of the conspicuously
feminine devices of artifice and ambuscade, and the result
of her manoeuvring was to prove advantageous to all
concerned. Her husband was able to leave Paris with a
mind at rest, for his representative possessed more skill
than he could boast of.
Joachim quitted Paris on the ist February at three in
the morning and arrived at Turin on the 5th. There he
wrote to the Emperor and proceeded in due course to
Rome, where he reviewed the troops, dined with Miollis,
and visited the theatre. Thence he went on to Cardito,
where he had arranged for a great hunting expedition to
take place on the I3th. His object was to time his return
to Naples for the I4th February, the anniversary of the
day on which the French troops had entered the city with
Joseph at their head, in the year 1806. His home-coming
was marked by imposing state. Preceded by his principal
officers, and surrounded by troops, hewa^greeted byjte
lazzaroni with cheers^halJhe^ojicEIaa^^ for in a^
than two days Naples was en fete.
60 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
There was a gala performance at the San Carlo to which
invitations were issued by the Marshals of the Palace.
The streets were illuminated and the fountains ran wine.
The King was home again ! And from the, perhaps not
wholly disinterested, manifestations of delight which
greeted his return, it might have been imagined that his
people had come within an ace of losing him. From the
moment of his arrival those whose position enabled them
readily to acquire information, became aware that his
mission had proved a fiasco. People had been hoping
that His Majesty had obtained some modifications or
concessions regarding the arrears of pay due to the French
troops. The dismal truth was that not only had his
representations proved of no avail but that they had even
aggravated the burden under which the country was
already labouring.1 There was consequently little enough
cause for congratulation, slender enough excuse for a
triumph, and the accounts which the sensitive and vain-
glorious Murat gave to his intimates of the Emperor's
high-handed procedure must have been plentifully
seasoned with bitterness.
His home-coming was opportune. There was some
talk of the disembarkation of four or five thousand men
in the Calabrias. He considered it expedient to proceed
to the spot under the pretext of taking action against the
brigands. The 22nd February finds him at Capua where*
" he has to review the Neapolitan Artillery." 2 He was
soon back again in Naples. On the 24th the news of the
projected marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise filled
the Neapolitans with amazement. Napoleon the nephew
of Marie Caroline ! What then will become of Joachim ?
Anxious as ever to hurry on the preparations for his
expedition, Murat made ready to set out for Calabria.
1 Bibicoff to Count Romanzoff. Archives Nationales.
* Moniteur Universe!. The Diario di Nicola, notwithstanding its careful
record of all the King's doings, makes no mention of this journey to Capua.
MURAT IN PARIS 61
The news of his intended departure got abroad in the
city, but whether the object of his journey was to make
a tour of his dominions, to chastise the brigands or to
prepare for the conquest of Sicily, was an open question.
On the 2nd March he had made up his mind to begin his
journey, and wrote to Pignatelli, his Secretary of State,
as follows : " Having determined to make a tour of
Basilicata and the two Calabrias, I purpose that the
Ministers of War, the Interior and Finance should ac-
company me in addition to yourself. Inform them that
my equipages are leaving to-morrow and that they should
send on their horses with mine. You will also dispatch
your own, if you have any." Thereupon he held a
review of the French and Neapolitan troops and sent
forward a detachment of his bodyguard.
But despite the fact that troops had been dispatched,
that he had bidden his ministers hold themselves in
readiness to set out, and that his coaches and horses had
been sent on in advance, Murat remained in Naples. For
on the 3rd or 4th March he had received a letter from
Caroline confirming the news of the approaching Austrian
marriage, and telling him that he would be summoned to
Paris almost immediately to attend the ceremony. On
this point he did not remain long in suspense, for on the
morning of the gth there arrived an express bearing the
letter which Napoleon had written on the 26th February,
requesting him to be in Paris by the 2oth March.1 There
was nothing for it, therefore, but to recall his troops from
Calabria.2 He did not acknowledge receipt of the in-
1 Diario di Nicola, ii. 518. " Un corriere arrivato questa mattina ha
recato la notizia ufficiale del conchiuso matrimonio dell' Imperatore colla
figlia dell' Imperatore d' Austria e fu Maria Teresa Borbone ... e la
chiamata subitanea del Re Gioacchino a Parigi, che partira fra tre o quattro
giorni."
» The letter which the Emperor wrote to Murat on the 26th Februa
the letter of which Murat acknowledges receipt on the I2th March. 1
not to be found among the Correspondance, But in view of the fact
Napoleon wrote on the 26th February to Jck6me, Eugene, the Grand Duche
62 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
vitation until the I2th, thus allowing three days to elapse
before starting on his journey. Possibly he was expecting
to receive further instructions from Caroline. The latter
had remained at the Tuileries until half-past eight in the
evening of the I2th. She had sent several -messages to
her husband. The last, which would probably have
reached Naples on the i2th, no doubt convinced him of
the necessity of complying with the Emperor's invitation,
and indicated the line of conduct he was to pursue in the
difficult situation in which he would be placed.
That Murat 's visit to Paris was regarded as certain to
take place is evidenced by the fact that besides Napoleon's
official letter and Caroline's recommendations, his former
associate, Fouche, who had supported him in his opposition
to the Austrian match, transmitted to him, through the
new Ambassador Campochiaro, a formal summons to
present himself in Paris without delay. " A Minister,"
wrote the Ambassador, " to whom His Majesty particularly
recommended me, has strongly urged me to write to the
King — dispatching the letter if necessary by special
messenger — advising him in his name to be in Paris with-
out fail for the celebration of the Emperor's wedding."
That Fouche openly allowed his name to be associated
with these counsels can hardly be explained save on the
supposition that he was in possession of some knowledge
of an exceptional nature. Is it possible that Murat, in the
heat of his denunciation of the Austrian marriage, had
given Fouche to understand that he contemplated dis-
obedience in the event of the Emperor inviting him to
attend the nuptial celebrations ? The fact that he post-
poned his departure till the I2th, although the official
notification had reached him as early as the gth, lends
of Tuscany and the Prince Borghese, and also that the courier reached Naples
on the gth and not on the I2th, there is no reason to suppose that the
Emperor, then on the best of terms with Caroline, did not write to Murat
at the same time as to the other members of his family.
MURAT IN PARIS 63
colour to this hypothesis. But on the i2th he did at
last send off his reply. " I have just received," says he,
' Your Majesty's letter commanding me to be present
at the solemnisation of your wedding. Never, Sire, was
order obeyed with greater pleasure. Nothing could
legitimately prevent my being present on so important
an occasion. . . . I am leaving here immediately and hope
to be with Your Majesty by the 20th." *• No sooner was
this letter sealed than he started for France. With such
lightning rapidity did he travel that his journey passed
unnoticed. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 20th
he arrived in Paris, having been eight and a half days on
the road. The Emperor had left the capital at three
o'clock, but Joachim immediately dispatched a messenger
to inform him of his arrival. Murat betook himself
straight to the Pavilion de Flore. His mind was harassed
by vague misgivings. " These matrimonial plans,"
thought he, " may have induced Napoleon to modify
many of his schemes ; his ties with the House of Austria,
his new kinship with Ferdinand and Marie Caroline may
put a stop to his projects for invading Sicily, and have
brought about a rapprochement as a result of which I
alone shall go to the wall." Seeing that he had been just
about to set out for Calabria in order to complete the final
arrangements for his cherished expedition, he was eager
to learn how the land lay and on what probabilities he
could reckon. Pending his departure for Compiegne
on the 22nd, he spent the intervening day in collecting
information. His trusty Fouche was not exactly in a
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationaks. The very terms of Murat's
reply sufficiently confirm the supposition that the letter which he received
from the Emperor was identical with those written on the 26th February to
Napoleon's other relatives. The concluding sentence of the Imperial letter,
viz " I am sending you word by this letter so that nothing may lawfully
prevent your being in Paris by the 2Oth March," is quite in accordance with
the reply sent by Murat, who knows of nothing that could lawfully prevent
his leaving Naples and being in Paris by the 20th March.
64 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
position to afford him much enlightenment ; he therefore
had recourse to Clarke, the Minister for War, who was
cognisant of every movement of the Imperial Forces.
Clarke probably had no information and could only pass
on the question to the Emperor, and this he did imme-
diately. The next dav Napoleon wrote to Clarke from
Compiegne, saying : " Tell the King that I am willing to
carry out the expedition against Sicily, but that it cannot
be done without increasing the number of troops, a'nd that
it will be necessary to provide for the needs of such
additional forces." This set Joachim's mind at rest ;
the Austrian marriage scheme had not caused Napoleon
to modify his original plans, and the expedition was to take
place after all.
But when he reached Compiegne a grim reception
was in store for him. ,In the course of an^interview which
began with reproachgs q,nd ended in fury.NappleonT in 9.
storm of passionthreatened tb^Ji^
head cut off. Muraitherefo^^
iar as possible his stay in a place where his self-respect and
his vanity were thus incessantly outraged. On the 24th,
two days after his arrival, we find him giving expression
to the great regret he felt at being called upon to re-
linquish his soldiers. Was it, he asked, the Emperor's
intention to destroy at one stroke the brigade which had
cost such pains to organise. And there followed a torrent
of vows and protestations. His plight, it must be confessed,
was an unhappy one. Everything helped to irritate and
embitter him. The demand that he should give up his
troops, the refusal of the licences which he had persistently
demanded, the rumours from Naples which hinted that
an arrangement had been arrived at with the Court of
Palermo and obscurely suggested that there was some
idea of restoring Naples to Ferdinand, completed his
unrest. At the end of a fortnight he could contain him-
self no longer and appealed to his brother-in-law for leave
MURAT IN PARIS 65
to return to Naples. Receiving no response, he repeated
his appeal next day. Still the Emperor vouchsafed no
answer. Murat grew nervous and irritable. On the 8th
he presented what he termed his " final demands." These
comprised proposals for an understanding in the matter
of the debt, the suppression of certain offices of state, as
well as requests for the promised licences, for permission
to make commercial treaties and to send Ambassadors
to Vienna and St. Petersburg ; ,jthejvhole set out in so v
disconnected and^extea^a&ant ^-.manner as to sugggsl
the randorri^beffations^i a disoFd^redmtelHgencej The
climax of his sufferings was caused by this constant refusal
of the Emperor to admit him to his presence, though he
caused himself to be announced every day. Anxious
though he was to return to Naples, Murat was thus com-
pelled to champ and chafe at the bit and to wait shame-
faced and humiliated till the Emperor was pleased to
make a sign, to linger there in full view of a crowd of
courtiers and sycophants among whom he numbered
enemies in abundance, with the disagreeable conscious-
ness that every one of them knew of his disgrace.
On the iQth his trials came to an end. At last he
obtained leave to return to Naples. He lost no time on
the road, for he longed to be home again. He too would
fain be surrounded by flatterers who would fawn upon
him, by counsellors who would mislead him. He sped
back at a gallop. Eleven horses dropped exhausted
on the road. Only eight days were occupied on the
journey, and those eight days included twenty-four hours
in Florence. It was at one o'clock in the afternoon of the
27th April that he entered Naples quite unostentatiously
in a post-chaise drawn by six horses and preceded by a
single outrider. So swiftly had he travelled that every
one was taken by surprise ; French Charge d'Affaires,
ministers, soldiers and general public. But he was home
once more, back again at last where he alone was master.
CHAPTER IV
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION
Previous plans — The Emperor authorises the expedition to be carried out —
Murat's delight — His departure — His progress through Calabria — Preliminary
skirmishes — Napoleon's measures to prevent the expedition— The crossing —
Grenier's position — The King's proclamation — He returns to Naples by sea —
The Emperor's indignation — The proposals of 1811.
IT was true then ; Sicily was to be conquered at last !
After two years of waiting Joachim had returned
from his last visit to Paris with the definite assurance
that the expedition should take place. But in what
light did the Emperor regard the matter ? It was not
the first time that he had thought and spoken of Sicily.
But to effect its conquest had never been his desire, and
it would have been strange had he developed such a
wish merely to please Murat, whom it was far from his
intention to humour. The fact isjbhat Napoleons-had
glways regarded jicilv as a means oLdrawing the^enemy^
and it was ever when he found himself more than usually
hard pressed by the English that he discovered the
necessity of directing his efforts to Sicily, his object
being to compel the enemy to come to its defence and
so diminish their strength elsewhere. Th^ enterprise
wifhJ^g^Tld, a»d to^
sEouIcTbe viewed as forming part of his str
Great Britain. ^oL that conflict which had the
Europe for itsJpaJJie-gFeundJriHri Gibraltar to St Peters-
burg. THs~"view of the matter enables us the better to
un3erstand the nature of the complaints addressed by
66
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 57
Napoleon to Murat after the non-success of his attempt
and makes it evident that Murat's landing in the island
never formed part of the Emperor's intentions
As long ago as the 24th January 1808, when he had
undertaken the expedition for the revictualling of Corfu
Napoleon had taken great pains to persuade Joseph to
prepare to throw an attacking force into Sicily under
cover of Ganteaume's squadron. The reason was that
since taking possession of the Ionian Islands, ceded to
him by the Treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor had been
unwilling to allow Corfu to be wrested from him. To
lose it, he said, would be the greatest misfortune that
could befall him. To Joseph he gave lengthy instructions
of a strictly secret nature.1 He also sent two dispatches
to Decres within a day or two of one another. " If,"
he said, "the English endeavour to oppose the pro-
visioning of the Seven Islands, let Joseph be ready,
the expedition will take place." As it turned out no
attempt was made to dispute the landing of the
immense quantities of stores which Napoleon had sent
to Corfu. The proposed invasion of Sicily had there-
fore no longer any raison d'etre, and it was consequently
abandoned.
A few months later, Joachim ascended the throne
of Naples. His accession was marked by the vigorous
offensive policy which resulted in the retaking of Capri.
After this success he openly demanded that Sicily should
be attacked. It happened that, at the moment, his
wishes in this respect were by no means calculated to
prove unwelcome to the Emperor. The rer.ri]ftesrftnr.ft nf
Q Portugal made it "highly desirable to
^a:iid an attack on Sicily would, it was
thought, prove admirably adapted to the purpose. The
Emperor therefore held out every encouragement to
Murat, and at the same time endeavoured, by causing
1 Correspondence, 13,480.
68 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
rumours of the projected expedition to be circulated in the
public press, to excite alarm in England. Simultaneously
he made a request, through Clarke, for Murat's plan of cam-
paign, and commanded Decres to transmit orders to the
Toulon squadron to hold itself in readiness to put to sea.
Further he instructed Molitor and Boudet to proceed with
their divisions to Lyons, possibly with the intention of
sending them on to Toulon. Imminent, however, as the
expedition appeared to be, it was once again fated not to
take place, and though Napoleon urged Decres to discuss
the details of the plan of attack with the King, he post-
poned it without so much as fixing even an approximate
date for its execution. He sufficiently revealed the
object he really had in mind when he declared j| My
aims are twofold. In the first place I wish to see whether
such an expedition is really practicable, and in the second
I am anxious to divert the English forces and tp put them
off the scent in regard to a more important task I have
in mind for my Toulon squadrorjuj This was all that
came of the expedition^ 1808.. The Austrian campaign"
^hiCh was abouTTio open was" destined to postpone for
some two years all considerations for carrying out an
attack on Sicily. It will thus be seen that on two occa-
sions when desirous of diverting the activities of the
English the Emperor had recourse to this Sicilian scheme.
In Joseph's time matters went no further than the dis-
cussion of a plan of attack. In Murat's, troops were
actually set in motion. Notwithstanding his enthusiasm,
Joachim's experience ought to have given him an insight
into the real nature of the Emperor's intentions. As a
matter of fact the English occupation of Sicily was a
gain rather than a drawback to the Imperial plans. If
the English were driven from the island it would in-
evitably result that the forces, already too numerous,
by which the Emperor was opposed elsewhere, would
be strengthened by the addition of the Anglo-Sicilian
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 69
contingents. Moreover the blow would be powerless to
affect the British navy, and it was the navy that was
engaging Napoleon's attention, since by it alone could an
attack be made on Corfu and Toulon. This being the
case, there would be little advantage in fighting for the
possession of an island which, seeing that it had already
been allotted to Naples by the provisions of the Treaty
of Bayonne, could not in any case revert to France.
Certainly the mere desire to humour Murat's wishes
would have afforded a very inadequate motive for a
further sacrifice of French blood which was already
flowing abundantly enough in Spain. Such at all events
was Napoleon's view. He was perfectly willing to make
a demonstration against England, but to go further and
to sanction an attack, though in all probability it would
have proved successful, formed no part of his intentions,
for the simple reason that such a policy would have been
opposed to his interests.
Unfortunately Joachim, who neveL_saw very cl
ijifp things did n6t doubrtSr a mo^nentth^t^e^X
tion would be carried out. He deemed that his reputation
depended upon the success of the enterprise, and his
anxiety led him into a series of misunderstandings and
disputes, first with the French generals and then with
the Emperor himself, that only left feelings of bitterness
and resentment in their train.
At Paris, Murat, having received formal permission to
carry the matter through, submitted his plan of action. He
was far from wishing to avail himself of the Toulon fleet,
which he feared might rob him of the glory of the
undertaking by making a direct attack on Palermo. He
therefore laid an alternative scheme before the Emperor,
which, as it coincided with a plan he himself had formerly
drawn up, readily gamed his approval. ' The key to the
position," Napoleon had once observed to Joseph, " is
not Palermo but Faro. All depends on the line of
70 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
communication." x The line of communication it would
therefore be necessary to seize, but for that troops were
needed, and in troops Naples was not rich. French
troops, however, would be sent to the front on condition
that they were commanded by French generals.2 To
this the King saw no objection. Whether the attack
were made by Frenchmen or Neapolitans mattered
little to him, if made it were. No sooner was he back
again in Naples than he eagerly began his preparations,
finding in the task some solace for the successive rebuffs
and humiliations to which his brother-in-law had, he
considered, compelled him unjustly to submit. As early
as the 3oth April he ordered the publication in the press
of a statement announcing his coming departure for
Calabria. Every one knew what that meant. In Naples
the expedition was discussed as though it were certain
to be carried out. " They say that King Joachim has
made up his mind about it and that he is leaving for
Calabria on Saturday next (5th May)." 3 Similar rumours
had been current in Naples before that, but now, on the
13 th May, matters really seemed to be coming to a head.
On that day the King himself was reported to have
spoken with much frankness and confidence regarding
the conquest of Sicily, which he publicly announced as
sure to take place. It was added that he had already
prepared his plan for landing the troops, and that with
twenty thousand men he was confident that Sicily could
be won.4 The explanation of this attitude of assurance
was that, the day before, the French Charge d' Affaires
had handed him a letter from the Emperor which doubt-
less conveyed the latter's approval of the proposed plan.
To Grosbois he confided with enthusiastic expansiveness
the minutest details of his schemes, affirming that once
the crossing was effected, Sicily was won. Nevertheless
1 Correspondence, 13,480. * Idem, 16,388.
3 Diario di Nicola. 4 Idem.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 7i
there was a fly in the amber. In a communicative
moment the King mentioned to the Charge d'Affaires
that certain of the leaders appeared infinitely more
impressed by the dangers of the expedition than by its
advantages. It would thus appear that, even before
he left Naples, Murat had some opposition to contend
with. However, nothing could restrain him. He had,
he asserted, proved himself successful in undertakings of
a far more arduous character than the one now in hand,
and on the i6th May, at two o'clock in the afternoon,
he commenced his journey, having given orders to the
Ministers of the Interior and of Finance, as well as to his
Secretary of State, Pignatelli, that they should bear him
company.1 This journey, so at least he thought, would
be nothing more nor less than a triumphal progress
through Calabria and Sicily, and he publicly announced
that within a fortnight he would be master of the
whole island. Like the soldiers of the Grand Army
his men carried in their knapsacks the gala uniforms
in which Joachim proudly imagined he was going
to review them at Palermo in the full glory of
triumph.2
^^a^hjof^xtraordinary rajridity. suchjLs Murat atone-
w£s_ca£aJkleof pejio^ininj^ brought him to Lagonegro
onthe i7thT\!ay> He visited the fort, made a triumphal
entry into the town, proceeded to the church and left
again half an hour afterwards at the gallop. Thence by
tracks that were scarcely visible he went on, via Castro-
villari, to Cosenza, where he arrived at four o'clock in the
afternoon of the igth. " The whole countryside had
come in crowds to see him. A considerable body of
troops had been brought up to line the route, and attended
by a numerous suite he rode past in a rich costume not
a little resembling a herald's. He was mounted on a
* Murat to Pignatelli. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
* Diario di Nicola. 3 Me*ite*r Umventl.
72 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
spirited steed which he reined in with grace." * He then
awaited the arrival of his ministers, who were coming along
steadily by easy stages. With great pomp and much
display of gorgeous attire he gave audience to the various
military and civil authorities. He held reviews of troops
in dazzling uniforms, set the town, which was illuminated
in his honour every night,2 in a whirl of gaiety, and
left again on the 24th for Nicastro. The townsfolk
accompanied him a great distance filling the air with
shouts of " Long live the King I " 3 Equally great was
the enthusiasm which greeted him at Nicastro. The keys
of the city were presented to him. His progress lay beneath
triumphal arches and the whole place was en fete. Monte-
leone was his next stage, and there again an immense
concourse had gathered together to give him welcome ;
indeed it seemed that people had flocked to see him from
all the country round. There he halted, well content
to flatter his vanity with these popular ovations, and
spent a day in consultation with his ministers and the
principal officers of the expedition, after which he
continued his journey through Calabria, progressing by
fairly easy stages and greeted everywhere with the same
enthusiasm. Proceeding by way of Tropea, Nicotera,
Palmi and Bagnara, he at last reached Scylla, " which he
entered amid the ringing of bells and the booming of
guns, for the British celebrated his arrival by throwing
shells into the town." 4
Joachim had good reason to congratulate himself
upon his journey. JFLverywhere^^ enthusiasm, in
all jt.s varied manifestationgTT^^l^1^
approach and followed in his train; Passing thus for the
first time Through his dominions, the thought that he
was King, that he and none other was the liege-lord of
1 Duret de Tavel, Stjour d"un officier fran$ais en Calabre.
2 Moniteur UniverseL * Idem.
4 Duret de Tavel, Sejour tfun ojficier fran^ais en Calabre.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 73
his subjects, surged up more mightily than ever within
his heart. Like wine the acclamations of the populace
made his hot head reel, and those who were forever at
his elbow breathing in his ear alluring suggestions of
independence and aggrandisement were quick to remind
him that far away in Paris, in the chilly North, there
was an iron hand that kept him under control, a hand
which he ought to sweep aside.
Murat now felt himself a soldier on campaign once
more and free to give full play to his activity. He fixed
his head -quarters near Reggio on the heights of Piala,
where he occupied an attractive wooden pavilion exactly
opposite a beautiful house midway between Faro and
Messina in which General Stuart had taken up his abode.
All day long aides-de-camp and orderlies would be coming
and going. Physical exercises and drills of every kind
were continually indulged in. He frequently held re-
views under fire from the guns of the British squadron
which did but little damage. Meanwhile the army was
being organised and prepared for the conflict. It was
split up into three divisions : the first, under General
Partouneaux, occupied a position to the right of Scylla ;
while the second, commanded by General Lamarque, was
on the left. The central division, consisting of the
Guards, the reserve and the Neapolitan contingent, was
in charge of Generals Dery and Cavaignac (the former
commanding the Guards), and was stationed in Scylla
itself.1 All three divisions were under the supreme
control of General Grenier, who had received his appoint-
ment from the Emperor. Before beginning the attack
it was decided to await the arrival of convoys dispatched
from Naples. Few of them came to port, the majonty
being pounced upon by the English, who captured
destroyed them. In the meantime, Murat, hungry 1
popular applause, paid a visit to Reggio, where he was
i Journal frattfais dc Naples, July 9, 1810.
74 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
greeted with the same warmth that he had encountered
on his journey. On his return to the army he learned
that a transport laden with food and ammunition had
reached Bagnara in safety,1 and, next, that another, the
most important of all, had been destroyed by the English
off Amantea on the 26th July.2
On the 1 5th August the Emperor's birthday was
celebrated with great magnificence. The King held a
review of the army on the sea-shore fronting Messina,
defying the English fleet which looked on at the cere-
mony. In the evening he entertained the senior officers
of the land and sea forces to dinner. The other officers
dined with the colonels of the Guard, while detachments
from all the corps were entertained by the Guards them-
selves. The greatest enthusiasm reigned at all these
military banquets, the scene of which was lit up by some
thirty shells which the enemy discharged into the very
midst of the camp. No one was wounded, and it was
by their lurid gleams that the army drank to the health
of the Emperor and his august consort.3 At nine o'clock
there was a magnificent display of fireworks, followed by
a brilliant ball, at which several ladies from Reggio and
other neighbouring places were present. But such oppor-
tunities of distraction were few and far between. No-
thing was done. On one pretext or another the troops
were kept where they were. It was certainly not because
Murat was afraid of a reverse that he postponed the
attack. He considered that he could effect the passage
with the certainty of success and undertook to prove it.
On the 8th September he made an experimental descent
on the island. In two boats he dispatched some thirty
grenadiers of the Guard. Landing in an outlying part of
Messina to the south of the city, they captured a guard-
house, fired off a few rounds and returned unmolested.
1 Moniteur Universe!, a Diario di Nicola.
* Murat to Napoleon, August 16, 1810. Archives Nationaks.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 75
This success the King considered should suffice to con-
vince Grenier of the certainty of victory and to silence
his remonstrances.1 Still^Jte dela^\
risks.. So far from furthering his
plans, the capture of Sicily would have been a positive
drawback. By his recent marriage he had contracted
ties with the reigning dynasty in the island, and what-
ever his real sentiments may have been, appearances com-
pelled him, at all events for a time, to deal gently with
those whose niece he had just espoused. Thus, far re-
moved as he was from the scene, he made his authority
felt. In the first place he sent word from Lille to Clarke
saying that it would be necessary to prepare the kingdom
of Naples against a possible coup-de-main. Gaeta was
to be furnished with provisions and munitions of war ;
its artillery was to be put in order and the whole place
generally made ready to resist a siege of several months.
He also caused Perignon to write to the King on the
matter, and at the same time decided to send an observant
officer to Naples in order to obtain accurate information
regarding the country's resources, and to urge the King
not to attempt the expedition unless he were confident of
the issue. The true significance of this message was
apparent, and Murat, if he had not wilfully determined
to ignore its meaning, could only have interpreted the
Imperial behest as an injunction to withhold the attack
until he received definite orders to strike the blow.
Clarke, on receipt of the Emperor's letter, selected
Colonel Leclerc to proceed to Naples, and dispatched him
on the 26th May armed with His Majesty's instructions.2
Leclerc lost no time in getting to Naples, where he took
up his abode. Fortunately for Joachim's peace of mind,
1 Filangieri, Autobiography.
» Clarke to Napoleon. Archives Nationales.
76 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Leclerc, though he made no secret of his visit, carefully
refrained from disclosing the object of it, for we have it
on the word of the French Charge d' Affaires that " the
purpose of his mission was unknown." l
By a somewhat singular coincidence Leclerc 's arrival
had been preceded by a cipher dispatch which Campo-
chiaro, the newly appointed Neapolitan Ambassador in
Paris, a man of cautious tactics but acute discernment,
with a thorough knowledge of all that went on behind
the scenes, had addressed to the Due de Gallo to inform
him of certain events of grave import. " According to
information that I have received from one of the Em-
peror's ministers," he wrote, "it is not improbable that
His Majesty may at any moment put his veto on the
Sicilian expedition. Ciphers do not always preserve their
secrets, and I therefore refrain from mentioning the name
of the minister in question. The object of his com-
munication was to give me to understand that the
negotiations with England might result in the abandon-
ment of Sicily. Still, notwithstanding the value I attach
to his information as a rule, I cannot bring myself to
give credence to such an idea. The Emperor is negotiating
through Maret without acquainting Champagny with the
real state of affairs. The opinion of the well-informed,
or at least of those who wish to appear so, is that the
general principle adopted will be that of uti possidetis" 2
Here was matter to disturb Murat's equanimity. Le-
clerc's arrival at such a juncture was bound to confirm
Joachim in the opinion that the Emperor was about to
renounce his claim to Sicily, and that he was merely
keeping him there for purposes of his own without
genuinely intending to authorise an attack on the island.
1 Grosbois to Champagny. Affaires Etrangeres*
2 Campochiaro to Gallo, in a cipher message dated Paris, May 22, 1810.
It would appear that the minister in question was Fouch6, to whom
Campochiaro had been specially recommended by Murat.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 77
A further indication of Napoleon's real purpose is con-
tained in a letter which, fearing the effect which delay
or discouragement might have upon Murat, he bade
Clarke write him to exhort him to patience. " The King
will be bound to find an opportunity of invading Sicily
some time during the month. Give him to understand
that I wish him to remain where he is, with his gun-
boats ready to cross the Strait, because by holding the
enemy in check he will
Further doubt could not be entertained by Murat as
to the part he was being made to play ; it was evident
that his mission was merely to hold the enemy in check.
As for the conquest of the island — a consummation on
which his hopes had been centred for two years past,
hopes which he had not hesitated to share with his
friends, his Court, his army and his whole kingdom —
it seemed as though he would have forever to abandon
the idea of bringing it to pass with Napoleon's sanction.
Thus then we have Joachim, with his valorous head-
strong nature, called upon to acquiesce in an order to
ground arms when he was actually face to face with the
foe. Behold him, with his ambitions fostered by the
cunning flatteries of a whole party in the state, with his
head turned by the triumphant reception that had been
accorded him in the Calabrias, forbidden to grasp the
easy prey so temptingly offered by Sicily lying there
before his very eyes. Imagine the feelings of the man
who, when he was leaving Naples, boasted to all and
sundry that he would be crowned at Palermo and be
home again within a fortnight, and who was now to be
compelled to submit to the humiliation of returning home
with diminished head after the manner of one who had
suffered defeat. The King's whole being revolted at the
prospect. Napoleon might command, Grenier and the
French officers might refuse to obey orders, Murat was
78 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
determined to cross the Strait. Why should he not suc-
ceed ? He could dispose of a brave and splendid body
of troops, he knew how to lead men on to victory, the
experiment of the 8th September had convinced him that
the English fleet was powerless to hinder his passage.1
Let him but have the command, let him get across with
his men at the back of him and victory would be his.
His mind was made up ; all that remained was to await
a favourable opportunity for putting his resolve into
execution. That opportunity soon came. On the
1 7th September a gale blew up from the south and com-
pelled the British squadron to take shelter in Messina.
Then suddenly, towards evening, with one of those rapid
changes which are so characteristic of the weather in the
Mediterranean, it became calm again. The pilots hastened
to inform Murat that the conditions were favourable for
effecting the passage. The necessary orders were given.
At four o'clock in the afternoon all the troops wrere com-
manded to hold themselves in readiness. The French
divisions under Partouneaux and Lamarque, as well as
the Neapolitan Royal Guard under Dery were stationed
on the Punta del Pezzo and occupied the hills between
Torrecavallo and the village of Catena. The Neapolitan
division, with Cavaignac at its head, consisting of foreign
troops and the Corsican regiment, was drawn up between
Reggio and the battery at Pentimele. Its mission was
to draw off the enemy by proceeding to a point south
of Messina while the main body was to carry out the
attack on General Stuart. At eight o'clock in the
evening, the weather still appearing favourable, the order
was given to embark. In consequence of Cavaignac's
distance from the main body, these instructions did not
1 It seems certain that the success which attended the attempt of the
8th September had a decisive effect on the King's mind, and that from that
moment he thought that as the crossing of the Strait was an easy matter, he
had only to order the attack and the island would be won.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 79
reach him till half-past nine. The troops, however, were
all got on board during the night and were ready for
the passage. According to the official version the French
divisions, becoming becalmed, were unable to make any
progress. His Majesty remained on board his ship, con-
sumed with the liveliest impatience and vainly longing
for a breeze to come and fill his sails ; the most absolute
calm prevailed until morning.
Meanwhile Cavaignac's division, which had put off in
boats under the command of Caracciolo, the captain of a
frigate, was heading for Scaletta. Not having received
any counter-instructions or observed any signal of recall l
it held on its way. Driven slightly out of its course by
a breeze from the south-west, which increased in force
as the coast of Sicily was approached, it finally touched
land at San Stefano, a spot some three miles to the north
of that for which they had intended to make. No sooner
had he effected a landing than Cavaignac began to march
on Messina. Information of the landing having been
conveyed to Stuart, the latter immediately sent forward
his cavalry under Campbell's command to meet the
invaders. The Sicilian villagers, who had spread the
alarm far and wide, seized whatever weapons they could
lay their hands upon and assisted the English general
to repel the foe. At the same time a portion of the
English squadron put out from Messina and endeavoured
to attack Cavaignac's flotilla. The weather, however, had
suddenly grown calm again and they were obliged to
content themselves with an ineffective cannonade.2
Cavaignac now perceived that he was unsupported, and,
observing with amazement that the French army had
1 Orloff alleges that orders had been given to Cavaignac's division to
return if they noticed any rockets sent up from the tower at Pialo.
said that the officer whose duty it was to make these signals dropped
to sleep and did not wake up until daybreak.
* Grenier's report.
80 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
not quitted the shores of Calabria, gave orders to fall
back. Owing to some inexplicable misunderstanding
thirteen of his boats had already started for home, with
the result that part of his forces were necessarily left
behind and fell, with their colonel, Ambrosio, into the
hands of the English. The remainder managed to get
on board and, the wind being in their favour, succeeded
in regaining the Italian coast. The English and Sicilians
celebrated their victory with much ringing of bells, and
hung up as a trophy in the Cathedral of Messina the
colours of the Royal Corsican regiment which they had
captured.1
Such was the official story ; but none of those who
took part in the expedition, whether French or English,
ever attached the slightest credit to it. Every one in
the camp knew of the strained relations existing between
Grenier and Murat. Some hinted, and a few openly
asserted, that the expedition would never come to pass
because the Emperor did not mean that it should. It
was even stated as a fact that Grenier had orders in black
and white to prevent it. He was merely there to sup-
port the King in making a demonstration, but not to
carry out his orders if he really intended to effect a
landing. " It is certain," says an Italian officer, " that
not only Grenier, but also the other three French generals
Lamarque, Partouneaux, and Pactod, displayed mighty
little eagerness with regard to the expedition." Grenier 's
report, therefore, which appeared in the Moniteur was
merely the official dishing-up of the event. What really
took place ? No document concerning the matter has
come to light, nor did Grenier send the Emperor any
message giving the true reasons for the Sicilian reverse.
Nevertheless it may be possible to reconstruct the course
of events by taking stock of the various rumours that
were persistently circulated about the matter in the
1 Guardione, Gioacchino Murat in Italia.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 8r
Army It was said, and the hypothesis seems more
than plausible, that the moment Murat gave orders to
the French divisions to embark he was confronted with
formal objections on the part of Grenier. In the mag-
nificent Royal Barge in which Joachim had seated
himself with his general staff around him, a violent alterca-
tion was said to have taken place, in the course of which
the general declared that he had explicit commands
from the Emperor forbidding that the expedition should
take place.1 Furious that the venture should have been
brought to nothing, and that he had lost Sicily, indignant
that the Emperor should thus hold him in leading strings
as though he were a child, Murat forgot all about
Cavaignac's division which was laboriously making its
way towards the island. When at length he did re-
member it, it was too late to act. It may have been,
indeed, that he was animated by a desire to demonstrate
to Grenier and the Emperor how practicable, how easy
an enterprise it was, and that he therefore suffered
Cavaignac to hold on his way. At all events his delight
1 The version of the story which Pignatelli Strongoli gives in his Memoirs
(MJmorie, pp. 63-64) will not bear examination. " The King," he says, " spent
the whole night on board a boat from Reggio, having sent on shipboard half
the expeditionary forces. But not being able to make up his mind with a
promptitude similar to that displayed by Caesar when he invaded Britain,
and noticing a certain hesitation and lack of cohesion in his generals, he
let the hours slip by until day began to dawn, when seeing the English
ships, great and small, putting out from Messina, he caused the signal for
a retreat to be given to the detachment that had landed in Sicily."
How could Murat have been unable to make up his mind when, at four
o'clock in the afternoon, every one was certain that the attack was to take
place ? How could Cavaignac's division have been ordered to start, seeing
that it was the most distant of all, without similar orders being given to the
other divisions? How could Murat have continued in a state of indecision
from ten at night till four in the morning? Lastly, how was it that he only
made up his mind what to do when half the troops had started, as Pignatelli
himself says ? Was it not rather that when he had seen some of the troops
go on board, Grenier refused point blank to go any farther in the matter,
and that it was this that occasioned the famous scene in the Royal Barge
which ended in Murat's giving way ?
F
82 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
was so great that he had been able to prove the possi-
bility of effecting the conquest, that when Cavaignac re-
turned to the camp he embraced him and made him a
grand commander of the Westphalian Order.
The problem of concealing the truth of the matter
from the Neapolitans at home was one of no little diffi-
culty. Still, though the matter was bound to leak out
through one channel or another, it was thought that it
might be possible to gloss the affair over in such a manner
that it might yet redound to Joachim's honour. If only
Grenier could be prevailed upon to maintain silence, no one
need know that this abortive attempt of the i8th Sep-
tember had been anything more than a preliminary ex-
periment designed to exemplify the ease with which the
enterprise could be accomplished. Grenier evidently
promised to say nothing, since in none of his letters to the
Emperor is any reference made to the dispute between
himself and the King. The latter also carefully abstained
from addressing complaints to Napoleon, since they might
have compelled Grenier to defend himself by putting
forward awkward explanations in the course of which the
real purpose of the attack would have become apparent.
Both sides therefore had grounds for reticence, and in
the end Joachim's vanity emerged unscathed from a
very difficult situation, since the notion to which currency
was given was that some difference of opinion having
arisen between the King and the French officers as to
the practicability of the undertaking, the King had suc-
ceeded in demonstrating that his view of the situation
was the correct one. Such was the version which the
Queen gave of the matter to the French Charge d' Affaires
in an interview she had with him on the 2gth September,
she then asserted that the expedition would have been
brought to a successful issue had not the King en-
countered insuperable difficulties in his own camp. '' The
French generals," she added, " were persistently opposed
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 83
to the enterprise; from the very outset they regarded
t as too hazardous, and did everything in their power
to discourage and discountenance it. In these circum-
stances," the Queen went on, " the King had no choice
but to abandon the project ; nevertheless, before break-
ing up his camp and withdrawing his forces, he was
anxious to demonstrate the possibility of carrying out
the attack. This was the meaning of the debarkation of
a Neapolitan division at Scaletta." Whether the Queen
genuinely believed this version of the case, or whether
Murat had sent her a confidential letter explaining the
fall his pride had sustained, it is impossible to determine.
Certain it is that the story as she gave it involves contra-
dictions and inconsistencies.
On the 26th September the King himself circulated
general orders among his forces in which he stated that
theexpedition had been postponed, but that the Emperor's
object had been attained. " You have," he said, " solved
an important problem. You have proved that the
enemy's fleet cannot prevent the passage of the strait
and that Sicily will be conquered whenever we decide to
make a serious attack."
A few days later, deeming, it is said, that this pro-
clamation was insufficient, he conceived the idea of
printing a circular in which it was to be explained that
the Sicilian expedition had enabled His Majesty to raise
the blockade of Corfu, to give some practice to his naval
forces and to form an estimate of their capabilities and
that the King was highly pleased with the superior
courage which they had displayed in the face of the
English fleet.1
The failure of the expedition rendered it impossible
for him to remain in Calabria, and it became necessary
to decide what was to become of the troops since they
were not to be allowed to fight. Joachim was little
1 Diario di Nicola.
84 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
inclined to pay heed to Napoleon's orders. If the Em-
peror's object was to hold the English in check, well and
good ; but let him not jeopardise Murat's prestige in
attaining it. The King now decided that if he and his
troops were to be denied the opportunity of displaying
their valour he would go home to Naples, and seek in
the homage and adulation of his people some solace for
the gibes and jeers which he had been compelled to
endure from the French. The 22nd September found him
at Reggio. He remained there three days, and left on
the 25th for Scylla, and then on the 28th took ship at
Pizzo.1 The determination to perform the journey from
Calabria to Naples by sea was remarkable considering the
risks he ran from the English fleet. Nor did any one
suspect him of such an intention, since, for days past,
relays of horses had been held in readiness at different
stations along the road through the provinces. But it
would have been too much for his royal vanity to bear
to reappear in the guise of one who had suffered defeat
in regions through which, a short time before, his progress
had been one long triumphal march. Rather than confront
the coldness or hostility of the crowd Joachim preferred
to face the dangers that threatened him at sea and the
possibility of being pursued by the English. On the
3rd October he landed in the neighbourhood of Salerno
and proceeded on horseback to Portici.2
If the King of Naples was displeased with his brother-
in-law, his brother-in-law was not a whit less displeased
with him. Napoleon no sooner learned of the tenour of
Joachim's general orders than, recognising that they
meant the ruin of his plans against England, he gave
orders to Clarke to write about the matter. " Give the
King to understand/' he said, " that I strongly dis-
approve of his general orders announcing the postpone-
ment of the Sicilian expedition. He says that my object
1 Moniteur Universel. a Diario di Nicola.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 85
has been fulfilled, but he makes a mistake in talking about
my plans without authority from me. My purpose was
to carry out the invasion of Sicily, and as Sicily is still
unconquered it follows that my purpose is not fulfilled
Tell him that I regard his inaccurate statements con-
cerning me as most extraordinary, and that I am sur-
prised that he should have broken up his camp at Reggio
without my orders, when I intended to keep the troops
there through the winter; whereas now the English
will take themselves to Corfu, to Spain, and add to
their forces at Cadiz, while the army which I now
have in the Kingdom of Naples will serve no further
purpose." 1
A few days later he himself wrote to Joachim in tl
following terms : " All the troops that the English were
intending to dispatch to Sicily were diverted to Portugal
as soon as the terms of your general orders became!
known. Though you desired to return to Naples, there
was nothing to compel you to give out that you were
abandoning the expedition. I had made it clear to you
that I intended my troops to remain in a position to
threaten Sicily until the ist January, but you act without
anyJiind»iiL2rudence.'' Vainly did Murat endeavour to
exculpate himself. ' Your Majesty will perhaps regre
having inflicted unnecessary pain upon me by writing
that the reinforcements which the English were sending
to Sicily had proceeded to Portugal in consequence of
my general orders. The order announcing the postpone-
ment of the expedition was dated the 23rd September, and
the Moniteur of the igth of that month contained the
news that reinforcements to the number of seven thou-
sand had left England for Portugal and had already
reached their destination. Evidently, therefore, my
general orders are not responsible for the fact that these
reinforcements, which from the first were intended for
1 Correspondance, 17,042.
86 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Portugal, did not go to Sicily." l On the 22nd December
Napoleon further brings him to book concerning the
failure of the expedition, and expresses astonishment that
Murat, having landed one body of troops on the island,
did not push matters to a conclusion.
We do not possess the King's answer to that letter.
What could he say ? Was he to confess that he stayed
behind in Calabria, after having sent Gavaignac across to
Sicily, because of his quarrel with Grenier and the latter 's
refusal to obey orders ? Or was he to put forward the
current fable about demonstrating the facility of effecting
the passage ? Probably, in order to avoid the uncom-
fortable necessity of offering an explanation, he did the
best thing possible in the circumstances and kept silence.
What then of that Sicily on which he had been so
often led to set his heart, Sicily which had been promised
him by the Treaty of Bayonne ? What had become of
the expedition for which he had waited two years ?
Where were his fine dreams of conquest ? All had
dwindled away into a petty inglorious affair, into a few
paltry skirmishes which did not even offer him the where-
withal to feed his vanity. The feeling that, so long as
Napoleon had the upper hand of him, he would never
be King of the Two Sicilies, bred in his heart such bitter-
ness as would be the natural consequence of defeated
ambition and humbled arrogance ;^bujLjt was wounded^
vanity even jnore than disappointed hopes thatjvasjatei
To play suchhavoji_aith_the "King's destinyl
It happened that the moment which Napoleon had
chosen to give his brother-in-law a fall coincided with
the marriage which united him in ties of kinship with
the dispossessed sovereigns of Naples, whose altered
prospects, now that their niece had wedded the Emperor
of the French, were being secretly discussed on every
hand. Since, then, Napoleon appeared to have withdrawn
1 Murat to Napoleon, November 5, 1810. Archives Nationals.
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION 87
his support and to have transferred his influence to his
adversaries, sinc^jtjejejnedjto_be_the Imperial intention
thaj_JJaj^j3^^
ichim bej^i^jtig_Jo£k--ri^^
ratejring into sudx-i&tofcs as might eventually ripen
Into~e5ecti ve all i n ures . ^ Ever on the~~Tobkout forf
an opportunity of finding some ground of complaint
in the Emperor's dealings with Naples, ever urged on
by the crafty suggestions of his Italian counsellors,
Joachim came to the conclusion that an understanding
had been arrived at between Napoleon and Maria Carolina.
His loyalty began to waver. He deemed that the rebuffs
he had received from his brother-in-law had been too
numerous to permit him any longer to remain on his /
side. Driven forward on the one hand by those who, /
for the furtherance of their own aims, played upon what/
they called his chivalrous feelings, held back on the
other by the Queen, Mosbourg and the French partyA
with whom he dared not risk an open rupture, his attitude )
towards the Emperor became at first vaguely disloyal,/
and finally so flagrantly rebellious that Napoleon wad
forced at length to adopt measures of stern repression]
While the enthusiasm which had greeted his progress
through Calabria seemed to encourage the possibility of
playing the King with a freer hand, the Sicilian fiasco
showed him that he counted for nothing in Napoleon's
estimation. He had disobeyed and disobeyed to no pur-
pose, and he was mortified at the reprimands his dis-
obedience had brought upon him. At the same time he
was wroth with the Emperor for having baulked him
of his aims, for having hindered the extension of his
dominions. The ambition to add to his kingdom had
ever been his, but it was no proud consciousness that
he was born to sway the destinies of nations that animate*
him. Rather ^motiyc^^
prompted all Ss^Ttr^sire that Murat should \
88 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
become a name in the world and that the crowd should
acclaim him wherever he went, g^-himself was~olj:he
^ jordej
'
be lookeir'forinroi^^^
of fortune, finds MmselF^TTulerover_jthoje^^ whom
s. His" coun-
sellors knew his wealoiessTanT never failed" to contrast
the power which he actually possessed with the power
he might one day attain. They cunningly dwelt upon
the enthusiasm of the Calabrians, so that, on Murat 's
return from Sicily, Napoleon numbered an enemy the
more.
Thus it came about that, when in 1811 the Emperor
proposed another expedition,1 Murat would hear nothing
of it. It was in vain that Napoleon represented the
favourable nature of the opportunity and affirmed that
a more propitious moment would never occur ; his
inducements fell upon deaf ears. Once the mere mention
of Sicily would have sufficed to send him hastening away
to war ; but now his aims had taken a different direction.
'Others might conquer Sicily if they would. As for him,
since his path to the south had been barred by the
English and forbidden him by the Emperor, he paused
but a moment to consider and then turned his attention
to the north.
1 Napoleon to Murat, May 21, 1811.
CHAPTER V
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS
Renewed dissensions— The Broadbent affair— The Neapolitan debt— In-
crease of the Neapolitan Army— Murat and his Navy— The matter of the
Ambassadors— The rival factions— Birth of the King of Rome— Murat in
Paris — Will the King return to Naples ?
WHEN, in April 1810, Murat returned from
Paris, he was still a prey to discontent.
The prospect of invading Sicily had not
availed to dispel his dissatisfaction, and
he lost no opportunity of embroiling himself with the
Emperor on every conceivable ground. He continued the
policy he had followed in 1809, but his opposition was
henceforth more overt, his acts of disobedience took on
a graver character. Two rival factions now came into
being which, grouping themselves respectively about the
King and Queen, were popularly referred to as the King's
Party and the Queen's Party. As a matter of fact, the
conflict that was to be waged between them was nothing
more nor less than the struggle for supremacy between
the Italian and the French elements in the State. It is
scarcely probable that, at this period, Joachim had any
definite intention of cutting himself adrift from the
Emperor and siding with his foes. He was entirely
unprepared for such a course of action, and nowhere
could he look for such assistance as would enable him
to enter upon a struggle with so formidable a power.
But his ministers were probably more alive to the situa-
tion, more far-sighted than he, and they may have recog-
go NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
^ nised the wisdom of cultivating friendly relations with
foreign powers. The future is ever doubtful, and, though
none could have deduced from the position of affairs in
1810 the final catastrophe that was in store for the
Empire, it was evident that the Emperor, for all his
power, was but a man ; a man, moreover, who ran more
risks than his fellow-mortals, because, being ever engaged
in warfare his life was ever in jeopardy. After his death
what would become of the Empire and its dependencies ?
Since no one could supply an answer to this question,
prudence clearly dictated the advisability of building up
defences and of establishing friendships on which to rely
n the crisis came.
It is perhaps some such considerations as these that
explain the pertinacity with which Murat negotiated his
first commercial treaty. No sooner was he back from
Paris than he entered into an agreement (strictly com-
mercial, of course !) with one Broadbent. As soon as
the negotiations were concluded, Murat, knowing that
the Emperor was bound to get wind of the matter, wrote
him on the nth May as follows : "In virtue of the
licences which Your Majesty has already granted me,
and of the further ones which you promised me at Com-
piegne, I have just authorised my Minister of Finance
to conclude an agreement with an American named
Erode vent, the United States Consul in Sicily, in con-
nection with the exportation of oils from this country." 1
This " Brodevent," being the American Consul in
Sicily, was bound to be in pretty close touch with Eng-
land, and it was no doubt considered that if occasion
offered he might be made to answer the purpose of a
serviceable intermediary, just as, later on in the story,
we shall see what good use was made of the notorious
Jones of Ponza, though he was far from being so favour-
ably situated as Broadbent. Even supposing that this
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationals.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 91
Broadbent affair should never develop beyond the purely
commercial stage, the country could not fail to benefit,
for it would attract money to Naples, and money was
then a rarity in the national coffers. If, moreover, the
Emperor was to be set at defiance the need of money
would be all the greater. That the King's aims in regard
to the Broadbent agreement went farther than he was
disposed to avow, is proved by the following significant
sentence with which Murat concluded his letter to the
Emperor. " I hasten," he says, " to inform Your Majesty (
of the matter, in order to forestall any rumours that may j
awaken prejudice in your mind." What rumours couldj
he have had in view if his intentions had been perfectly
straightforward ? The Emperor was not deceived. Im-
mediately on receipt of his brother-in-law's letter, he sent
orders to Champagny to convey to the Neapolitan
Minister his high displeasure that such an agreement
should have been concluded, and to impress upon him
that no treaty was to be entered into without the Im-
perial sanction.1 After that Murat could scarcely pursue
the matter further.
For the time being the Sicilian expedition monopolised
Joachim's attention and afforded an outlet for his ex-
uberant energy. But no sooner was he home again from
Sicily than he began once more to importune the Em-
peror for licences. Since he was at peace with Africa,
the Porte, the Kingdom of Italy, the Illyrian Provinces
and the Empire, he cried, wherefore send him useless
licences for those countries ? What he i^lrydesir^Uyag
the key totheJooxiP^ntrab^
him thaT^n^Tiewould be content.
needed "licences such as the Emperor granted for
English ports, which were necessary for the export of
his oils." 2 Not content with forty-two further licences
1 Correspondence, 16,496, May 23, 1810.
1 Murat to Napoleon, November 16, 1810.
92 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
that were granted him, he made an additional demand
on the 2ist December, requesting permission to enter
into commercial relations with divers hostile ports.1 To
have thus failed to realise the extravagance of his de-
mands Joachim must have grossly deceived himself or
have been grossly deceived by others. £jThe Empire
itself offered abundant facilities for his trade, and it was
quite unnecessary to seek additional outlets in Sicily or
America?"] Whatever reasons, therefore, may have im-
pelled Murat to put forward his demands, Napoleon acted
with undoubted wisdom in meeting them with an un-
qualified refusal. Other difficulties follow. Joachim
petitions for the readjustment of his frontiers on the
Italian side. The petition is dismissed.2 There is
trouble between Naples and Paris over the cotton duties
and over the duties imposed on colonial produce, which,
in the Emperor's view, was all contraband. Murat
attempts to involve Perignon and Grenier in the dispute,
but they refuse to be drawn. The outcome of the matter
is that Champagny instructs the French Charge d' Affaires
to demand that the orders concerning the importation
of colonial produce should be carried out at Naples with
the same stringency as elsewhere,3 and Murat is com-
pelled to submit.
These successive disputes all contributed to excite
the Emperor's suspicions, and from this time forth he
betrayed little inclination to repose confidence in his
brother-in-law. When it became necessary to revictual
Corfu, a task which had always properly fallen to the
lot of Naples, Napoleon, professing mistrust of Joachim's
willingness, had recourse to Eugene, whom he instructed
to send an agent to Ancona and Otranto to make the
necessary contracts with the suppliers.
1 Murat to Napoleon, the same letter.
2 Napoleon to Eugene, August 10, 1810.
3 Champagny to Grosbois, November 29, 1810. Affaires £trangtres.
EUGENE BEAUHARNAIS
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 93
These, however, were incidents of secondary import-
ance. In all essential matters the struggle became fierce
and acrimonious, and Murat abated none of his pre-
tensions save when he was absolutely driven into sub-
mission. He grew conveniently oblivious of the Treaty
of Bayonne. That was an affair of long ago, and there
was nothing in those days to which he would not have
put his signature in order to procure himself a throne.
True it was that hitherto his defections had been of
minor importance, but the day was to come when he
would repudiate the most vital of his obligations — the
ties which united him to France.
On the 1 8th June Champagny completed a draft
agreement relating to the Neapolitan Debt, which Napoleon
had instructed him to draw up on the I5th January.
The Emperor, having discussed the matter with his
Minister and satisfied himself that the proposed terms
offered sufficient protection to the French Treasury,
sanctioned the opening of negotiations, and on the 23rd
June 1810 Champagny and Campochiaro at last put
their hands to an agreement in which the amount of
the Neapolitan indebtedness to France was formally
assessed at five million francs. To meet this liability,
the Neapolitan Government undertook to issue five hun-
dred Treasury Bills of ten thousand francs each, repay-
able in five years, and bearing interest, as from the
ist January 1810, at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum.
Thus a satisfactory settlement appeared to have been
arrived at. But Murat was by no means to be relied
upon. If he had accepted the Emperor's ruling and
signed the agreement, he had done so with reluctance
and because no other course was open to him. But to
sign an agni^nejil^^
^ To avoid the latter unwelcome necess
e^mrlenced the recital of his woes " It is," s
" with unmingled reluctance that I have to bnng t
94 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
position of my country's finances before Your Majesty's
notice. Your Majesty will doubtless feel surprise at the
enormous deficiency which the figures reveal, and appre-
hension at the progressive increase that deficiency must
inevitably show unless a prompt remedy be applied in
the direction of diminishing the expenditure on the one
hand, and of increasing the sources of revenue on the
other." l This jeremiad was followed by a refusal to
meet the demands of the French agents. No money
was to be had at Naples. It was now four and a half
months since the agreement had been signed, and not
a single payment of any description had been made.
Wearying at length of a state of things that bade fair
to endure for ever, Napoleon instructed Champagny to
communicate with his Charge d' Affaires. He wrote as
follows : " The French paymaster in Naples was in-
structed to press for the fulfilment of these several pro-
mises, but up to the date of the last advice received by
His Excellency the Public Treasurer, he had not suc-
ceeded in obtaining either an instalment of the arrears
due to the French troops, or a refund of the money
advanced by the French Treasury to pay the Neapolitan
troops, or even the delivery of the bonds in respect of
the five million francs." 2 Grosbois therefore must needs
lodge a Note.
The Note was delivered, but it brought forth no
response. On the I2th December the Bills were still
hanging fire, and the French Treasurer signified his re-
fusal to sanction any further advances to Naples save
under express commands from the Emperor. That very
day the Marquis di Gallo handed in a belated reply to
Grosbois' note. His Majesty, it affirmed, had not over-
looked the matter of his liabilities to France. The
Treasury Bills were already made out, but the King was
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationales.
2 Champagny to Grosbois. Affaires £trangtres.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 95
now desirous of wiping off the debt by means of supplies
furnished to Corfu. Truly there was no undue inclina-
tion to hurry matters at Naples.
The cause of all these more or less overt refusals was
pretty readily apparent. Murat did not pay because he
was anxious to keep his money for himself. With him
funds were only too scarce. However, the money which,
in spite of his promises, he was so reluctant to hand
over to the Emperor, he was about to squander reck-
lessly on the establishment of his army. That was the
object to which all the country's resources were to be
devoted. On the 3ist October, aghast at the magnitude
of his expenditure, he was foolish enough to forward
Napoleon a list of the troops composing the Neapolitan
army. The comparison of his forces as at the ist August^
1808, when they numbered no more than 17,405 men,
with their extent on the ist October 1810, when they
had reached a total of 40,154, sufficiently indicates how
greatly he must have exerted himself in order to bring
about so vast and rapid an increase in his army. The
Emperor was quick to send a reply. " I have just made,1*
said he, " a careful examination of your Finance Minister's
report, and I perceive that your difficulties arise from the
fact that you are foolish enough to maintain an army
of 40,000 Neapolitans who cannot be of any use to you.
If instead of 40,000 you had no more than 15,000 or
20,000, you would find your resources abundantly suffi-
cient." i He accordingly counselled Murat to reduce his
army. Next day he received a further communication
from Murat, and replied with similar advice. These, how-
ever, were precepts that the King was little inclined to
follow. On the contrary, he continued to avail himself
of every possible opportunity to increase the number of
troops about him. When Napoleon called on him 1
furnish a force for service in Spain, he contributed such
i Napoleon to Murat, November 12, 1810. Correspondence, 17,128.
96 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
a collection of undisciplined ne'er-do-wells that the
Emperor gave orders for them to be turned back on
the first opportunity, as he did not wish to encumber
Catalonia with undesirables who would only serve to
swell the number of brigands. Napoleon required no
more soldiers from Naples. This, however, was not enough
for Joachim, who wished to bring home those that were
already there. He took advantage of the complaints
that were made regarding the desertion of some to de-
mand the return of the rest. " I must once more put
before Your Majesty my request for the recall of such
of my troops as are at present in Spain. So long as
they are there it is impossible to prevent them deserting.
Here there are no desertions at all." Five days later
he was back again on the same theme. " The only means
of dealing with these desertions is to send the men back
again from Spain to this country. Here I have not a
single deserter/' l No means came amiss to him for
adding to the number of his troops. In his impatience
he even proposed to the Emperor that he should enlist
in the service of Naples the foreign regiments of La
Tour d'Auvergne, of Isembourg as well as the First
Swiss regiment. He first broached the matter towards
the middle of the year 1810. The attempt fell through.
But Murat would not accept defeat. He reopened the
question in a letter which he instructed his War Minister
to write in November of the same year. Once again the
Emperor refused to hand over to Naples regiments that
were receiving their pay from France. Napoleon, in fact,
had now just begun seriously to occupy himself with the
increase that had been taking place in the Neapolitan
army. The figures had aroused his attention, and he
made a request for a detailed statement of the forces
at Joachim's command. On the 5th December he wrote
to the King of Naples, through his War Minister, order-
1 Murat to Napoleon, October 31, 1810. Archives Nationaks.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS „
ing him to submit a monthly report of his Household
Troops and of Neapolitan forces generally. The Minister
was instructed to point out that Murat was the only
one of the allied princes regarding whose forces the
Emperor did not possess detailed information. The
Emperor also adopted another and a surer means of
arriving at the truth about the matter, for he caused
inquiries to be made by an agent of his own who, on
the ist January 1811, reported that the total number
of Neapolitan troops, exclusive of the Guard, was 30,380,
that the Guard consisted roughly of 3000 men, and that
the five regiments on active service accounted for a
further 6092. Murat therefore had told the truth.
Now that he possessed an army of his own, where-
fore, he asked himself, should he endure a foreign force
within his kingdom ? It was in order to be free, to be
his own absolute master, that he had imposed on him-
self so many weighty sacrifices, and now he deemed it
high time that the French army should quit. The
Sicilian expedition had shown him that he exercised no
real control over it, that he was but its nominal chief.
Its real master was not in Naples. What then, he
inquired, were these soldiers doing there, encumbering
his kingdom, resisting his orders, hindering his plans,
thwarting his cherished aims ? So far from being useful
auxiliaries, they served but to remind him of the bondage
in which he was held and from which he was making
desperate efforts to shake himself free. He looked upon
them as a prisoner upon his warders. " Joachim," wrote
a contemporary, " exasperated at the non-success of his
Sicilian expedition, kept complaining of the obstinacy he
had met with on the part of the French generals, and
seemed to behold in the French army, to which he owed
the integrity of his frontiers, nothing but an instrument
employed by Napoleon in order to keep him in thrall."
1 Gallois, Histoire de Joachim Murat.
G
98 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
It was not long before Murat essayed to free himself
from the bonds of his oppressors. He had returned from
Sicily on the 3oth October, and the very next day he
dispatched a letter to Napoleon requesting that either the
French forces should be maintained at the cost of the
Imperial exchequer or that their numbers should be
reduced. To this demand, which Murat supported by
an appeal to Clause II. l of the Treaty of Bayonne, Napo-
leon, his mind pretty well made up as to the value of
the Neapolitan troops whom he referred to as brigands,
made answer that if he withdrew the French army, the
English would immediately seize the opportunity of
attacking Naples, and that then he would be put to the
trouble and expense of sending them back by forced
marches to repel the invaders. In this view of the
matter it was quite impossible for Murat to acquiesce.
" Your Majesty," he replied, " does the Neapolitans an
injustice in imagining that twelve thousand Englishmen
would suffice to drive me from my kingdom. I am
unable to share your opinion, and I have been, and now
am, every day in a position to estimate their worth.
Suppose, however, that your twelve thousand English
were more resourceful and more brave than the eighteen
thousand who were occupying my islands fifteen months
ago, when I only had twelve thousand to pit against
them ; and suppose they succeeded in satisfying every
one that they were more than a match for all my Neapo-
litans, they would assuredly never convince Your Majesty
that they could defeat twelve thousand Frenchmen.
Now there are at present twenty-five thousand French
troops here. If then you will relieve me of all but ten
thousand, I will guarantee that there shall be no neces-
1 The clause in question provides that " the number of French troops in
the kingdom of the two Sicilies shall be reduced, at the King's request, as
the organisation of the Neapolitan Army approaches completion and the
tranquillity of the country appears assured."
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 99
sity for you to hasten by forced marches to my rescue."
It was useless. Napoleon's mind was made up. The
French army should remain in Naples. How little he
could look for support to Murat's army is demonstrated
by the fact that on the 6th October he had asked for a
single battalion of seven hundred men for Corfu, and
that on the I2th November not a man of them had
left Naples. It happened that on that very day Napoleon
received Joachim's report concerning his forty thousand
fighting men and his request for the withdrawal of the
French army. There must have been a touch of irony
in the letter which the Emperor wrote to Clarke that
day, to judge by the latter's reply. " Your Majesty
enjoins me, in your orders of the I2th inst, to inform
the King of Naples that you are at a loss to understand
how it is that in the whole of his army he cannot discover
seven hundred men to take up garrison duty in Corfu."
In withholding money to maintain and increase his
army, Murat had been guilty of a grave infringement
of the Treaty of Bayonne. It was therein stipulated
that from 1809 onwards the King should launch
two battleships and two frigates every year. On the
22nd May 1810, Champagny wrote to Grosbois to remind
the Neapolitan Government of their treaty obligations ;
but to this admonition no heed was paid. Since Joachim's
accession, indeed, there had been much ado to find the
time and money to complete a single vessel of seventy-
four guns, to wit the Capri. The King being away in
Sicily at the time, the launching ceremony devolved
upon the Queen, who adroitly arranged that it should
take place on the I5th August in honour of the Em-
peror's birthday. Owing, however, to the untimely
appearance of some British warships in the bay this
plan had to be abandoned, and it was thus not until
the 2ist August that, with much pomp, in the presence
of the Queen, the Princes and Princesses, Marechal
ioo NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Perignon and many other distinguished spectators, the
first Neapolitan vessel of the line successfully took the
water. This effort was followed by an interval for
repose. Highly satisfied with the Capri, the Emperor
requested Murat to lay down some vessels of superior
fighting capacity. He himself was in the throes of recon-
structing his navy, and was anxious for Joachim to second
him. He broached his idea in the first instance to Decres,
whom he asked for information as to the possibility of
building a couple of three-deckers, one to carry seventy-
four guns and the other eighty, at Naples or Gastella-
mare. " I should then," he said, " be able to count on
three vessels by next year." A few days later he wrote
in similar terms to Murat asking him to inform him
whether such a programme could be carried out.
It was apparently considered in Naples that the
Capri ought to satisfy the Emperor for a long time to
come. " It seems," wrote the French Charge d' Affaires
to Champagny, " that there is no intention of building
the ships of the line and the frigates which, in terms of
the treaty, should be ready to put to sea on the
ist October 1811. I have occasionally mentioned the
matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but I have
only been met with vague replies, from which, however,
I was intended to gather that, owing to lack of funds,
they were in great difficulties as to how they were to
fulfil the requirements of His Majesty the Emperor.
That was all the satisfaction I could obtain." It is not
surprising, therefore, that Murat replied in the negative
to Napoleon's last request. On receiving his answer,
Napoleon immediately expressed his astonishment that
as they had built a frigate they should be unable to
turn out a battleship. However, he modified his pro-
posal and requested that Naples should build one vessel
for France and one for herself. By the end of 1811 she
would thus have in her harbours a Neapolitan and a
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 101
French ship ready for service. These, with the vessels
that had already been previously completed, would make
three ships of the line and a frigate— the nucleus of a
fleet. Murat was careful not to meet this proposal with
an unqualified refusal. A downright negative would
have revealed his policy too plainly. He replied that
the shipbuilding potentialities of the Neapolitan yards
did not apparently permit of their laying down any-
thing larger than a frigate, adding, however, that if it
were found in any way possible to undertake the con-
struction of a battleship, Napoleon's wishes should be
complied with. The rest was silence. After some lapse
of time Napoleon reiterated his demand, this time through
the medium of Decr£s, but without obtaining any tangible
result. Murat was determined not to yield. Neverthe-
less he could not, in this instance, advance the lack of
funds as his excuse, for the Emperor was willing to pay
—and in advance. Naples would have been the gainer
by the arrangement, but Joachim was in no mind to
show himself obliging to his brother-in-law. Napoleon
could quote the Bayonne Treaty to his heart's content,
Joachim cared not a jot. All his energies were centred
upon his army, the instrument of his freedom ; com-
pared with that all other considerations were as nothing.
These refusals, masked or overt, to do the Emperor's
bidding had their reason : Murat was trembling for his
thrcne. He saw himself thrust forth from Naples, and
sent, at the Emperor's will and pleasure, to rule another
kingdom, or even compelled to sink into the inglorious
position of a mere pensioner. The fate that had lately
befallen the King of HoUand had not failed to make a
deep impression on his mind. In every act of the Em-
peror he imagined he saw a threat if not indeed the
preliminaries of its execution. The withdrawal of the
French Ambassador, Monsieur d'Aubuisson, occasioned
him great distress, and was regarded by him as the
102 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
unmistakable precursor of a coming rupture. " It is my
intention," wrote Napoleon to Champagny, " merely to
retain a Charge* d'Affaires at Naples. On several occa-
sions the treatment accorded to my Ambassador has
been wanting in correctness, and I mean to suppress the
Embassy altogether. The Secretary to the Legation,
who is at present acting as Charg6 d'Affaires, will be
officially appointed as such." It was in these cir-
cumstances that Hue de Grosbois was accredited to
Naples.
At the same time as he reduced the status of his
representative at Murat's Court, Napoleon refused to
authorise the King to send the Prince de Torella to
Russia in the capacity of Ambassador. Joachim, yield-
ing with reluctance, commanded Torella to remain in
Paris in the character of an ordinary visitor. Never-
theless, he regarded the circumstance as affording a further
proof of Napoleon's displeasure. These two matters, the
reinstatement of a French Ambassador at Naples and
the coveted permission to send Ambassadors of his own
to foreign Courts, were destined to form the burden of
reiterated importunities. When he was in Calabria it
was given out that the Emperor had refused to receive
the Duchesse de Campochiaro with the marks of dis-
tinction due to the wife of an Ambassador. Busily
engaged as he was with arranging the details of his
projected attack on Sicily, Murat yet found time to write
to the Emperor on the subject. The letter was dated
from Scylla and ran as follows : " Sire, Monsieur
d'Aubuisson was never received by me in a manner
unbecoming his rank, and if he was never invited to
dinner or admitted to any special privileges, this was
entirely due to the fact that, in a letter which Your
Majesty sent me from Vienna, I was expressly enjoined
not to hold receptions of the Diplomatic Corps more
often than once a month. If, Sire, Your Majesty will
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 103
send an Ambassador to Naples, he shall be treated with
every consideration. Send a worthy man and I pledge
my word that Your Majesty will never receive any com-
plaints." Precisely what he meant by " a worthy man "
is not very easy to determine, but he would probably
have been well content with a counterpart of the com-
plaisant Perignon, the Governor of Naples. However,
the application met with no success, for the Emperor
had no intention of sending an Ambassador to Naples.
Moreover, he instructed Champagny to send a curt refusal
to Gallo, who had sought permission to dispatch diplo-
matic missions to St. Petersburg and Vienna. " Tell
Monsieur di Gallo," he wrote, " that the King of Naples
would be putting himself to useless expense in main-
taining embassies at Vienna and St. Petersburg. No
good purpose would be served by it." 1
After the departure of the Russian Minister, who
left on the I5th July 1810, the Court of Naples was so
denuded of foreign representatives that Grosbois drew
the following melancholy picture of it. " Our corps
diplomatique now consists of three : Count Benkendorfi,
who is acting as Russian Charge* d'Affaires pending the
arrival of Monsieur d'Alopeus, and the Charge's d'Affaires
of Italy and France. This reduction is, if I may venture
to say so, by no means popular at the Court here, and
what gives rise to equal discontent is the modesty of the
titles borne by these political representatives." More-
over two of them, the French and Italian, were, so to
speak, members of the family, so that the Russian was
in reality the only genuine foreigner amongst
Soon, it is true, he was to be replaced by a full-fledged
Ambassador, Monsieur d'Alopeus. When, however t
Emperor refused to allow the Prince de ToreUa 1
sent as Neapolitan Ambassador to St. Petersburg, the
Russian Government retorted by withdrawing Monsieur
1 Napoleon to Champagny, Correspondence, i6,754-
104 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
d'Alopeus. Murat considered this as clear proof of
Napoleon's desire to bring about his downfall. " Sire,"
he wrote, " extricate me from this dilemma by some
means or other. It is impossible for me to continue in
this manner. The rumours that are current here (these
were rumours that he was about to leave Naples) are
disheartening everybody, since no one gives them the lie.
The fact that the two Ministers whom I had appointed
as my Ambassadors to Russia and Austria are still linger-
ing in Paris, added to the Russian Minister's recall, lend
colour to these reports and lead people to regard the
outbreak of war with Russia as a certainty. I beg you,
Sire, to take my position into consideration ; I have
done nothing to forfeit your favour." He next began to
find fault with the French Charge d' Affaires, who, he
averred, was not a dignified representative of his country
and lived with a light o' love. He concluded with
another appeal for an Ambassador. Five days after-
wards he returned to the charge. " Sire," he wrote,
" I implore you to appoint an Ambassador or Minister
Plenipotentiary for my Court. Such an appointment is
a matter of absolute necessity, for so unwearying and so
unprincipled is the campaign that is being waged against
my Government that in the end you may be brought to
entertain doubts of my loyalty." He was prepared to go
further, for on the Qth we find him writing yet again :
"If, to my great regret, Your Majesty decides not to
appoint an Ambassador to Naples, I shall request you
to permit Monsieur de Campochiaro to return home, so
that I may derive some benefit from his knowledge of
affairs and devotion to my interests." l
Happily, Murat did not find it necessary to engage
in the conflict, for all at once the Emperor, who had
hitherto refused to accede to the wishes of his brother-
in-law, wrote him as follows : "I have told you again
1 Murat to Napoleon, November 5, 1810. Archives Nationales.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 105
and again that there was no need for you to maintain
Ambassadors in Russia and Austria, that you spend
money senselessly. As for myself, I am now going to
send you a representative." He had, in fact, just the
day before given orders from Fontainebleau that Baron
Durant, Minister Plenipotentiary at Stuttgart, should be
transferred to act in a similar capacity at Naples.1
Thus Murat had his way on one point. It was not,
however, without good reason that the Emperor, who
had up to then been so strongly opposed to sending an
Ambassador to Naples, finally determined to reverse his
decision. The menace of war with Russia, which from
this time forth began to gather shape, was not without
its influence on his attitude towards Naples. It would
certainly be most undesirable that those who were scanning
the course of events should observe that such a coolness
had sprung up between the two countries that their
diplomatic relations were strained almost to breaking-
point. Would it not afford an opportunity for comment,
perhaps for something more than comment, to those
active and watchful foes who were forever seeking, by
every means in their power, to bring about the Emperor's
isolation ? But looking at the matter simply from his
own point of view, Murat was a force that Napoleon
could scarcely afford to do without. And could he, if
it came to the point, leave his Empire exposed to one
whose policy, if not avowedly hostile, was at all events
sufficiently dubious to render it necessary for the garrison
of French Italy to keep a lookout towards the South
instead of turning their attention to the North. The
Emperor put no confidence in his brother-in-law, and the
reasons which impelled him to seek a rapprochement in
that quarter must have been serious indeed. The war
with Russia, long since regarded as inevitable in Paris,
was to enable the King to bring pressure to bear indirectly
1 Archives des Affaires EtrangZres.
106 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
upon Napoleon, and it was solely because the latter had
need of Joachim and his Neapolitan contingent that the
Emperor approached him with a moderately good grace
and acceded to some of his demands.
That did not satisfy Murat. So apprehensive was he
of losing his throne that, notwithstanding the guarantee
implied by the promise of having a French Minister at
Naples, he dared not believe in the possibility of retaining
his throne so long as his ambassadors-designate to
Austria and Russia had not assumed their functions.
' The Court of Vienna," he wrote his brother-in-law,
" has just officially notified us of the appointment of
Monsieur le Comte de Miura (Mier) as Minister Pleni-
potentiary at the Court of Naples. The Prince de San
Angelo has doubtless asked Your Majesty to sanction his
departure for Vienna. I beg Your Majesty to grant his
request ; for since, up to now, no objection has been made
save on the score of expense, I may point out that it
will cost me no more to maintain him in Vienna than in
Paris. The same applies to the Minister whom I have
accredited to St. Petersburg. Your Majesty has per-
mitted the King of Westphalia to send his Minister here
(Baron Hoeffling was the Westphalian Minister at Naples) ,
and your continued refusal to allow my Ambassadors to
proceed to their posts gives me proof that you have no
longer the same confidence in me and that my existence
as King of Naples is but precarious. The thought that
I have forfeited your confidence causes me great distress,
and I am prepared for whatever may take place." 1
V^^-XheBS^in Murat's judgment everything pointed to_his
^_downfalL_ He looked upon himself as irrevocably banished
from the Emperor's favour, and, like Louis, cast down
from his throne. Until the date of the King of Rome's
christening he was fated to remain a prey to constant
anxiety, to be haunted by the hideous nightmare of
1 Murat to Napoleon, January 2, 1811. Archives Nationals.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 107
being exiled from the country to which he had come in
triumph with his family and his friends. In his struggle
with his brother-in-law he seemed to foresee his own
defeat and to feel the ruthless clutch already at his throat.
For two years he had kept up the fight, but his efforts
had all been in vain. With all his puny force he had
striven without avail to cast off Napoleon's suzerainty.
He was too eager for power to content himself with
being, in Berthier's phrase, a " viceroy/' too ambitious
to be satisfied with the position of a subordinate. He
must needs figure among the foremost, and as second to
none. Threats and admonitions had alike proved un-
availing. Now, however, he believed he had a presenti-
ment that his hour had come. Louis' fall appeared to
him of evil omen. His own turn, he deemed, would
come next. Louis was Napoleon's own brother, but
between himself and the Emperor — whom, moreover, he
had always thwarted — there existed no such ties of blood.
Napoleon's exactions he looked upon as affording proof
that he at last meant to drive him forth from Naples.
As for submitting and ruling in accordance with the
Emperor's dictation, this was more than he could bring
himself to do. He meant to be free, to bend the knee
to no one. In August 1810, being able to endure the
strain no longer, he wrote to Caroline to confide in her
all his trials and all his longings. It would be impossible
to improve upon the picture which Murat has given of
himself in that letter. " I will make an attempt, my
gentle Caroline, to reply to your letter of the 3rd. You
are perfectly right in all you say, and I assure you that
you have thought of nothing which has not formed the
subject of long and earnest consideration on my part.
The line of conduct that I have pursued, as well as the
feelings which inspired it, have shown that I have always
seen eye to eye with you. . . . We can but be brave
and act according to our lights and then await the issue
io8 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with calmness, preparing ourselves to support with resig-
nation whatsoever it is not in our power to prevent. At
present the Emperor is overwhelming me with burden-
some conditions, compelling me to put my signature to
an unjust treaty and to acknowledge a debt that is
unjuster still. He curtails my revenue, crushes my
trade, paralyses my industries, commands me to under-
take a ruinous expedition, orders me to build a fleet,
hampers my trade and commercial relations with foreign
countries, and, in a word, renders it impossible for me
to bear the enormous burden which he lays upon my
shoulders. He issues decrees with a high hand, gives
his orders at Naples just as he does in Paris, and when
the time is ripe and when, in obedience to the dictates of
caprice or policy, he decides to oust me from the throne,
the Due de Cadore will prepare just such another pompous
report upon the King of Naples as he drew up concerning
the King of Holland. That, my dear one, is what I
shall make every effort to avoid, both for your sake and
for that of my dear children.
" I know that the Emperor has a perfect right to
insist that his system shall be carried out, and that it
is our duty to consult him on every important step,
political or non-political, that we may have to take ;
but he should be our Mentor, not our Master. Kingship
does not consist in obeying orders (on nest pas Roi pour
obeir). Again, how could he have announced to those
peoples whose destiny he has confided to princes of his
own family, that it was the duty of these same princes
to set the welfare of France above the welfare of those
over whom they rule ? What the aim of such a maxim
could be I truly cannot conceive. Alas, ma chere Caroline,
I could keep on fault-finding forever, but no useful pur-
pose would be served by it. Let us rather have patience,
and see to it that no real fault can ever be imputed to
us, and await with resignation whatever issue it may
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 109
please Providence to ordain for us. I have determined
to fulfil whatever the Emperor may desire, now or here-
after, and when the load becomes more than I can bear
I shall beg him to take it upon his own shoulders." l
He would perhaps have been inclined to relinquish a
throne which involved so many trials and vexations had
it not been for the support which he found among certain
members of his entourage. His glory was magnified,
his ambitions were fomented by men who urged him
forward as though to storm a redoubt, men who never
let slip an opportunity of putting a false construction
on the Emperor's actions, of making them the subject
of subtle comments craftily designed to impress Murat
with the belief that Napoleon was really his foe, and to
convince him that they were fighting for his good when
in reality they were striving solely for their own. These
men were the Nationalists.
Long before Murat came to Naples. the_ideas and
watchwords imported^into~ Italy by the French~qrTr>jgg_
~of the Revolution had inspired a rpoyempnt in that
1 country whose_ainis__were summed up in the jwords
""""j^reedom " and "A United Italy." Averse from em-
ploying any but peaceluTmethods for the furtherance of
their objects, they hoped to bring about the triumph of
their cause by establishing a general union, a common
understanding, amongst all whose hearts were fired by
patriotic ideals. It was this movement that brought the
secret societies into being. The Freemasons and the
Carbonari united within their fold all who were zealous
for the common cause, and thus it was that high and low,
powerful and weak, found a place within their ranks. An
English resident in Catania, writing in the year 1806,
says, "There exists in Upper Italy a society whose members
are animated by the lofty aim of bringing about the
1 Lettres et documents pour servir a I'histoire de Joachim Murat. Vol. I.,
Introduction.
no NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
independence of Italy. This society, which has already
been in existence for several years, and of whose members
many have assumed the republican garb and the repub-
lican mode of speech, secretly hold that Italy should be
governed by a single ruler, and that the constitution
should partake, as far as circumstances will allow, of the
characteristics of a limited monarchy." 1
The union of French Italy was well calculated to
secure the approbation of the patriotic party, since by
welding together in one homogeneous whole all the petty
states of the North, it had accomplished the most delicate
of the tasks involved in the realisation of their ideal.
It only remained now to bring together the two great
divisions of the peninsula, that is to say, the French
provinces in the North and the kingdom of Naples in
the South. This done the whole of Italy would acknow-
ledge one supreme ruler. It was a matter of small
moment to the patriots whether that ruler were an Italian
or a foreigner, provided only he were his own master.
Thus Cassetti, an emissary in the employ of the Free-
masons, was introduced by Queen Maria Carolina to
Stewart, the English General, who provided funds for
distribution among such of Murat's Ministers as were
deemed to be able to use it to good advantage and to
be in a position to promote the cause of Italian Freedom,
as they termed it. English gold was apparently regarded
by them as a valuable recruiting agency, and it seems
probable that many who played a part in the propa-
gandist work of 1813 and 1814 freely availed themselves
of the means thus offered of winning adherents to their
cause. Even in 1809, when an English fleet was threaten-
ing Ischia and Procida, certain members of the Masonic
societies put themselves into communication with
Stewart.2 The negotiators on this occasion may have
1 Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy.
* Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS HI
been none other than the Cassetti, to whom reference
has been made above, and his friend Bianchemani.
Whether it was they who entered into a plot with the
English General to bring about a popular riot on the
Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, under cover of which an
attempt was to be made to effect an entry into Naples,
cannot be stated for certain, though there is nothing
to discredit the theory.
It was to Murat that the patriots now turned their
attention. As a satellite of Napoleon he had at first
been regarded by them with natural suspicion. Maturer
acquaintance, however, revealed that he was by no means
the rigid and redoubtable overseer that their imagination
had conjured up, and they discovered that he had a con-
venient way of putting upon the Imperial commands an
interpretation consonant with his own interests. The
defects of his character, the readiness with which he
suffered himself to be influenced by others, swiftly be-
came apparent, and those who were brought into close
contact with him soon learned to take his true measure.
Realising at once how weak was his will and how insatiate
his ambition, they decided that, since their policy de-
manded a figure-head, Murat would well suit their pur-
pose. He possessed the handsome exterior which stirs
the enthusiasm of the common people, he boasted a
military reputation that was second to none, and he had
proved himself pre-eminently endowed with physical
courage. "B^Jlig vanif^knew no bounds^and upon his_
tuTthey peTsuadedJiinL
thatjjis viilgar^«mbrtiens^were the promptings of an.
It was to prove all too easy a task
to exploit his dissensions with his brother-in-law and to
implant in him the belief that he was the victim of un-
told injustices, till at last all that was low-bred and
contemptible in his nature — all the aubergiste in a word
12 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
— became apparent in the attitude of sullen hostility
which he displayed to the sovereign whom he hated but
.ared not disobey. Admirably adapted as he was to be-
ome the tool of the Italian Cabal, the completeness of
:he ascendency which they succeeded in establishing over
him remains matter for astonishment. They it was who
onstantly succeeded in creating discord betwixt the
Cing and Queen, who inspired the unfortunate terms in
which Joachim replied to his brother-in-law's commands
and remonstrances, and, finally, it was owing to their
machinations, exercised at first in questions of minor
mport, but later in matters of the deepest moment,
hat a harmless disagreement grew into an open and
elentless war. TheJ^ayen of hatred that these men
ontrived to instil intoMuraFTlnind was
ause o
Who the men were who exercised such a far-reaching
influence on the destinies of their country history does
not disclose. They are never mentioned by name. In
spite of this reticence on the part of the historians, we
can conjecture with tolerable certainty the identity of
some of the prime movers. The work which was finally
accomplished was not conceived and carried out in a
moment, and if we project our gaze forward to the year
1814 we may throw a light upon matters that would still
remain shrouded in obscurity if we limited our investiga-
tions to what had only become manifest in 1810. Thus
we may legitimately infer that such men as Colletta,
Pepe, Carascosa, Zuccari, Paerio, Lecchi, and many others
besides, whose names became prominent when events
reached their climax, had been among those to whose
labours that climax was due. By the light of the work
which they wrought we are able to identify the men
who strove long and faithfully in the cause of union, but
whose brief hopes of victory were doomed to be quenched
in the cold disillusionment of death. To their sons they
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 113
bequeathed the fire that had inspired them, and to their
sons they handed on the task of rearing once more, upon
a durable foundation, the edifice to which they them-
selves had vainly set their hand. That such men
should find pliant instruments in Murat's Ministers is
not to be marvelled at. Zurlo, for example, who was
totally indifferent as to whether Joachim or Ferdinand
was King of Naples so long as he held the power for
which he hungered, was scarcely the kind of man to
offer any strenuous opposition to their plans. Nor was
Maghella, who sold his services to the English — and to
the patriots too, perhaps — likely to prove a serious
stumbling-block. Of all those who wielded any influ-
ence over Murat, the French alone were to be feared.
They held the power, they had invaded the sacred soil,
they had imposed their hated tyranny on the rightful
possessors. In the struggle that was to be waged against
them no quarter was to be given, no armistice allowed,
till the intruders had been thrust successively from the
palace, the kingdom, and from the peninsula itself. To
this end all and each of them devoted their energies to
the most multifarious activities. Never did the King
evince displeasure or reluctance in obeying the mandates
of his Imperial Master but they hastened to turn the
incident to account. No sooner did they begin to gain
an influence over the mind of Joachim than they reso-
lutely set to work to bring about a cleavage between
Naples and the Empire. The Neapolitans are an im-
pressionable race, and it was by means of externals that
they first sought to influence them. It happened that
the means for so doing were supplied to them by Napoleon
himself. He raised an objection to the French military
titles being used in Naples. " We are," he observed,
" forcibly impressed with a sense of incongruity when
we are told, for example, that Monsieur La Vauguyon,
who a year or two back was nothing more than a captain
H
H4 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
in the French army, is now dubbed a colonel -general."
That difficulty was easily adjusted. Murat changed the
titles immediately. On the 2Oth September, two days
after the Sicilian reverse, the title of Capitaine des Gardes
was substituted for that of Colonel-General. " I further
propose," he added, " that, in future, generals of division,
brigadier generals, and adjutant commandants shall be
known as lieutenants-general, marechaux de camp and
adjutants-general." Joachim or his advisers were not
slow in turning this incident to further account. " Sire,"
he said, " the same uniforms are worn at the Court of
Naples as at the Court of Your Majesty, the same flag
floats about our vessels, we wear the same tricolour
cockade. I am aware that this ought not to be, and,
in order to anticipate your wishes in the matter, I have
already introduced some modifications in the matter of
the uniforms, but I cannot adopt a new flag or a different
cockade without your sanction. I therefore beg, Sire,
that you will decide as to what national colours it would
be proper for me to assume." Whether or not the
necessary permission was granted, Joachim signed a
decree on the I4th March proclaiming the new national
colours, which were henceforth to be white, blue, and
purple. As regards the flag the ground was to be sky-
blue, the royal arms were to occupy the centre, while the
extremities were to be decorated with a double border
consisting of equal squares of alternate blue and white
so arranged that the squares were separated from one
another by the pale blue ground. These colours had
been selected for the following reasons : Amaranth or
purple was a favourite colour of the King's ; white de-
noted union with France ; sky-blue was the original
national colour. The innovation gave rise to consider-
able comment. "It is imagined," says Nicola, " that
this flag is a symbol of national independence." A week
later, 'just after the promulgation of the decree, he adds,
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 115
" All sorts of fanciful ideas are current in connection with
this change of flag, some people stating that it is a pre-
liminary to casting off the French yoke." By slow
degrees the work of separation continued. As we have
seen from the letter he wrote to Caroline, Murat seemed
to have made up his mind in advance to the loss of his
throne, and the Sicilian reverse brought about a change
in the nature of his conflict with the Emperor. Hitherto
he had either performed the orders which came to him
from Paris with obvious reluctance, or he had devised
excuses for shirking them altogether. But from this
time forth he began to take the offensive. He pre-
scribed laws the tendency of which was undisguisedly
" separatist " ; he issued orders that were demonstrably
hostile to French interests ; and although these measures
at first related to matters of small importance, they were
destined to go on increasing in gravity till they culminated
in High Treason. Murat was no longer a French prinfiT
seated on the throne of Naples ; but " II Gioacchino,"
as fervent a Neapolitan as any of his subjects. This
metamorphosis he owed to the influence of the party
who had gained his ear and to the spirit of rebellion with
which they had inspired him ; to the injustices — or what
he deemed to be such — inflicted upon him by the Em-
peror, to his ambition, his vanity, and all the evil passions
of his heart which grew and flourished under the fostering
influence of the Italian Cabal. Such a change could not^
go unremarked, and the course of events at Naples
attracted considerable notice. The King had his par-
tisans ; they were many, but obscure. He also had his
detractors ; they were few, but distinguished. The
Neapolitan element was, of course, wholly attached to
Murat. An endeavour was made to represent him as
the champion of the nation against French aggression.
The French party, on the other hand, tended to become
alienated from the King and regarded him as too prone
n6 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
to take sides against his country. Gradually there
emerged two opposing factions. There was the Neapo-
litan or Nationalist group, with the King as its leader, on
the one side ; on the other was the French party, who
wished to be led by the Queen, for at Naples it was
Caroline who was the representative of France and the
Imperial line.
Remote as he was from the scene of these events,
Napoleon was aware of everything that passed. He knew
what went on in the Palace ; the dissensions of the King
and Queen were no secret for him ; nor was he ignorant
of Joachim's grandiose ambitions, his revolutionary dis-
courses, or the scornful tone which he adopted regarding
every one and everything that was French. His emis-
saries supplied him with abundant evidence, and there
were some matters upon which even his official agent, the
French Charge d'Affaires at Naples, deemed it his duty
to report. Despite his " correspondance satirique " (the
term is Caroline's), Grosbois was far too keen a psycho-
logist not to have detected what it was vainly attempted
to conceal from him. He quickly realised in what direc-
tion the Queen's wishes lay when, putting aside her mask
one day, she asked him to let her know immediately the
Emperor instructed him to make any representations to
the Neapolitan Government, and to take no official steps
until he had done so.1 Furthermore, he was cognisant
of the views that the King was in the habit of expressing
in conversation, for the subject-matter of his remarks
was repeated to him, and he was thus afforded convincing
proof of Joachim's efforts to sever his connection with
the French party. Equally clearly he saw through the
endeavours that were being made by the members of
Murat's entourage to bring about the rupture.
The Emperor, who, as we have said, was not unaware
1 Grosbois to Champagny, Naples, September 24, 1810. Affaires
Etrangtrcs.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 117
of the tenour of Murat's speeches, nevertheless refrained
from writing to him. He must, however, have voiced his
complaints to his intimates, since a variety of reports
reached Joachim's ears. He heard tales of the Emperor's
choler, rumours that his kingdom was to be annexed to
the Empire, that the Kingdom of Poland was to be re-
established and that he was to be its ruler — if he proved
himself able to subdue it. On the 2nd April 1811, an
event occurred to set the spark to Napoleon's wrath.
" I have just received," he writes to Champagny, " the
King's decree of the 2gth February prohibiting the export
of cotton. gfitH forJiis AmbassgJ£^jjDfl IgU M™ that
£escjndhisord£r immediately
- f
therwisethan inaccordance withmy w
Empire as a whole. Tell him plainly ^hat, unless
he cnangesTiis methods, I shall take possession of his
kingdom and put it under a Viceroy, like Italy. Tell
the Minister of France that the King is not acting as he
should, and that whenever the Continental system has been
departed from, I have not spared even my own brothers,
and that I should be still less inclined to spare him. ..."
As far as Murat was concerned it was no surprise fdF
him to learn that Napoleon was dissatisfied with his
conduct. All his paid agents sent him daily accounts
of the Emperor's moods and utterances. He felt that a
storm was gathering, and knew that if it burst there
would be an end to the Kinglet of Naples. As early as
October 1810, letters reached him from Paris which gave
him positive information that the Emperor had thoughts
of uniting Naples to the Grand Empire.1 The blow had
to be parried ; the question was, how. Only two alter-
natives were open to him. He could bend the knee to
the Emperor and put the best colour he could upon his
action, or he could boldly lift up his head and front the
1 Grosbois to Champagny. Affaires fctrangtres,
n8 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
storm. The first course was easy, for he could count on
the services of one of the Emperor's nominees, to wit,
Perignon, the Governor of Naples, for PeYignon, though
he may have been the Emperor's man, was Murat's man
at least as much. It was not that he was by any means
aware of all the plans of the King of Naples — the King
of Naples scarcely knew what they were himself — but
that he was prepared to acquiesce with tranquil indiffer-
ence in all that was brought to his notice concerning
them. The aims of the Italian Cabal — be what they
might — never ruffled his equanimity. So far as he was
concerned, governing Naples meant pocketing his large
emoluments, a process which he carried on with no
qualms of conscience. Such was the apologist whom
Murat decided to select to convince the Emperor of the
loyalty of his acts. " The forthcoming departure of
Marechal Perignon has caused a sensation here," wrote
Grosbois. " There are endless conjectures as to the
object of his journey, and the secret mission with which
he has been entrusted. It is generally considered that
Marechal Perignon has been instructed to acquaint His
Imperial Majesty with the uneasiness felt by His Sicilian
Majesty touching the rumours which are going the round
to the effect that the Kingdom of Naples is to be merged
in the French Empire."
But Murat himself has revealed to us the object of
this secret mission. " Sire," ran the letter he addressed
to the Emperor on the 5th January 1811, " M. le Marechal
is proceeding to Paris. I have entrusted him with no
specific mission to Your Majesty ; I have merely charged
him to make perfectly unequivocal replies to any ques-
tions Your Majesty may see fit to put to him, and if,
Sire, you will condescend to question him, your feelings
towards me will once more be such as you were wont to
entertain." l
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives Nationalts.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 119
Perignon's apologetics did not apparently have the
mitigating effect expected from them, for the sternness of
Napoleon's attitude to his brother-in-law remained un-
altered. Rumours of annexation continued to arrive
from all quarters, and Murat recognised the necessity
for playing a cautious game. It was at this juncture,
when the way seemed to lie more clearly before him,
when his ambitions appeared to be gathering shape, that
he felt the need of his new allies, the Italian patriots,
to conciliate his opponents and confirm the waverers.
Whether he could count on the support of all the
" Italians " is doubtful, but so his advisers gave him
to understand. He now began to look upon himself as
the soul of the Nationalist party. Though he forbore as
yet to treat with the Emperor as an independent sove-
reign, he nevertheless considered himself strong enough
to dare a struggle if the necessity arose. If Napoleon
meant to give effect to his words and to deprive him of
his throne, he was convinced that he would only have
to give the word in order that the Emperor should dis-
cover that he had at his back the entire Neapolitan
nation, united as one man for the defence of their King
and the liberties of their country. Some such ideas as
these were animating Murat in the discussion which he
had with Durant, the French Ambassador, when they
met for the first time in Rome.
" His Majesty, after expatiating warmly and at length
on the manifold ties which united him to His Imperial
and Royal Majesty, proceeded to speak to me of the
loyalty of his subjects, a loyalty which had been strengthened
by the rumours of annexation, the only apparent effect of
which had been to rally more firmly than ever round the
Throne a people tenacious of their independence, &c.,
&c. . . ."*
1 Durant to Champagny, March 27, 1811. Affaires £trangires. The
words in italics are underlined in the letter.
120 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
It was therefore no loner with a French Prince and
Napoleon had
withJke-4Qng- of aples, who wasjagjnuch a Neapolitan^
\as-44s^ own lazzaroni. _Hjs kingdorn might still be a
vassal state, but the King~considered that " the affection
of his subjects " rendered him supreme in his own realm
and enabled him to cast off all personal allegiance to
the Emperor. But he could not divest himself of un-
easiness concerning the fate which his formidable brother-
in-law was holding in store for him ; and in order to
relieve himself from further anxiety, he wrote to him on
the 1 5th March as follows : "I am no longer able to
resist the desire to see Your Majesty. Am I alone of
your loyal friends to be denied the pleasure of being
among the first to behold your illustrious offspring ?
No, Sire, the thought is unbearable to me, and I venture
to ask your permission to spend a fortnight in Paris,
as I can permit myself this brief absence without the
slightest risk. I shall await your commands with im-
patience."
Such a visit would afford him the opportunity of
discussing by word of mouth matters to which he did
not dare refer on paper ; he could attempt to explain
his change of attitude, his Neapolitanism, so to speak,
and his recent reforms (the change of flag had taken
place just before this letter was written). On the morn-
ing of the 26th March an express messenger brought
him the great news : the King of Rome was born !
That evening Murat attended a performance at the San
Carlo theatre, where he caused the event to be announced.
He appeared to be delighted, and commanded the Due
de San Teodoro to set out that very night to offer his
congratulations to the Emperor and Empress. But
whether it was due to the Queen's advice, to that of
his Italian counsellors, or to his own impatience, he
countermanded the order, and at midnight resolved that
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 121
he would go himself. Next morning at seven o'clock he
was en route for Paris, accompanied by General Dery.
Twenty-four hours later he was at Rome. There he
saw Durant, to whom he delivered himself of much
exuberant eloquence, laying great stress on the prestige
he had acquired in his kingdom, and revealing the appre-
hensions under which he laboured regarding the Em-
peror's supposed scheme for annexing Naples. At
midday on the 2nd April he reached Lyons. Resuming
his journey at six in the evening, he at last found himself
in Paris at eight o'clock in the evening of the 3rd. " His
Majesty," we are told, " proceeded direct to the Palais
des Tuileries, and dined with the Emperor, to whom his
arrival afforded the greatest pleasure. Thereafter His
Majesty went to pay his respects to Madame Mere and
the Princesse Pauline, and finally betook himself to the
Palace in the Rue Saint Honor£ which had been set
apart for him during his visit." l
If any importance was to be attached to public report,
Murat's fears were not without foundation. When on
his way to take up his diplomatic duties, Durant heard
the same disquieting tales repeated throughout Italy,
but nowhere so persistently as in Naples. In Paris,
Campochiaro, the Neapolitan Ambassador, was seized
with alarm. " The rumours of war," he wrote to Gallo,
" and of the incorporation of Naples in the Empire, the
talk about our King filling the new throne of Poland, at
first vague enough, had by the end of March, and par-
ticularly after the birth of the King of Rome, obtained
an alarming degree of credit." He alleged indeed that
Champagny had already addressed him in terms that
were lacking in correctness. The attitude of Napoleon
himself seemed to afford grounds for uneasiness. In a
conversation which he had on the loth April with the
Russian Colonel Tchernycheff, Alexander's aide-de-camp,
1 Campochiaro to Gallo. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
122 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
who had arrived with a letter from his sovereign, the
Emperor inquired whether Alexander Roumiantzoff and
Tchernycheff himself credited him with the intention of
re-establishing the Kingdom of Poland. The Russian
confessed to thinking that the Emperor was harbouring
some such idea in the back of his mind against the day
when he should have no other war on hand. Whereupon
His Majesty declared that the notion was inconceivable,
and referred to it as a great " gaucherie," since by con-
stantly telling him the same thing they might at length
bring him to entertain the idea of making the attempt.1
Such was the state of affairs when Murat reached
Paris. Caroline, who knew her brother better than he,
and discerned the ramifications of his policy with greater
perspicacity, was not a whit less anxious. In reply to
the Emperor's invitation to come to Paris, which the
Comte de la Briffe handed her on the 5th April, she sent
a letter in which, while expressing her thanks to Napoleon
for his kindness, she pleaded her recent miscarriage as the
reason which compelled her to decline. Notwithstanding
this, the united testimony of all who were about her at
the time was to the effect that her health was excellent.
The real reason of her refusal was that she dared not
leave Naples, not knowing when, if ever, she would return.
" I learned, from a source which left no room for doubt,"
writes Durant, " that the Queen was violently disquieted
at the manner in which all these annexation rumours
were gathering form and substance." The King's letters
did nothing to diminish her anxiety ; they had indeed
the contrary effect. On the 6th May she resolved to
unburden herself to the French Ambassador. " She
questioned whether her departure at a time when the
King's absence had already added force to the rumours
which were disturbing the country would not have
regrettable consequences. For a long time the Queen
1 Jatischeff. Alexandra et Napolton i".
MADAMK MKRE
Front the collection of A. M. Bi oat/ley, Esq.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 123
had dismissed the rumours of annexation which had
reached her ears, but now they began to proceed from
so many sources and were so uniform in tenour that
the King's silence did not reassure her. The thought
of leaving Naples, never perhaps to return, of being
separated from her children, of leaving them behind in
a country where she feared that trouble might break
out any day, occasioned her so much pain and bitter-
ness, that either she could not conceal from me what
was in her mind or forbore to make the attempt. But
she was above all anxious that I should share her views
regarding the kingdom, those views being that if it be
the Emperor's intention to incorporate it with the Empire,
the process should be carried out with care and circum-
spection, since otherwise the tranquillity of the country
might be imperilled and the ever active designs of the
Sicilians and the English be assisted." l
About her, every one is ill at ease. All eyes are
turned towards Paris. The King was supposed to have
departed for a few days only, and behold his absence
already exceeds all anticipations. Rumours of the
strangest and most varied description are going the
round. Some say that Poland is to be made into a
kingdom for Joachim ; others that he is to have the
command of the Spanish troops ; while all unite in
affirming that Naples is to be incorporated with the
Empire. Officers of State are scared ; ministers are
seized with panic, and send Murat letter upon letter,
what time the worthy lazzaroni, careless of what is
passing, receive all these reports with the same equa-
nimity, recking little by what name their ruler may be
called, whether it be Gioacchino or " Nasone."
According to the Queen, Murat thought to be absent
but a few days. He finds himself caught in his own
trap. Once in Paris, to leave again is impossible. The
1 Durant to Champagny. Affaires £trangires.
124 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Emperor has him and intends to keep him, and his first
letters hold out little promise of an early return. Vainly
he reiterates day after day his wish to go back to Naples.
It cannot be. Even his Ambassador Campochiaro
acknowledges that the thing is out of the question.
" Although," says he, " the King is sensible how neces-
sary his presence is to reassure his subjects, who view
his absence with distress, he is obliged to defer to the
will of the Emperor, and to abstain from making arrange-
ments for his return until His Imperial Majesty judges
that the time is ripe." l Vain too were the expressions
of alarm which a number of Neapolitans forwarded from
the kingdom to their friends and relatives in Paris, and
which added fuel to the King's uneasiness. The Em-
peror was inexorable. Equally nugatory were the tidings
sent by courier or estafette between Naples and Paris.
Ayme" arrives with a sheaf of dispatches ; Cariati is sent
off with papers for His Majesty. It is all of no avail.
At last comes a ray of hope. The King writes to Naples
early in May that he will quit Paris immediately after
the baptismal ceremony, and that he will be in Naples
before the end of June. It was therefore the Emperor
who had ordained how long he should stay and when
he should depart. What a bitter draught for the un-
happy Murat ! But there was no cure for it ; he simply
had to smother his rage, wait for orders and obey them.
Monotonous and interminable the days dragged on.
Continued rumours of annexation were bewildering his
brain. They reached him from every quarter : from the
Court, from Paris, from Naples, and from other sources
as well, for all the foreign ambassadors were keenly
watching developments, apprehensive of fresh crises in
the world of politics. Suddenly a change came over the
situation. On the nth May Campochiaro sent a dispatch
to Gallo in which he sounded the fanfare of triumph,
1 Campochiaro to Gallo, April 24, 1811. Naples. Arcknrio (K State.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 125
and announced that the King would henceforth be
visited by no misgivings regarding the stability of his
position. Murat, overjoyed at being able to retain both
his kingdom and his liberty, hastened without losing a
day to send the good news to his Queen. His letters
set her mind completely at rest. He also forwarded a
dispatch to his Minister, from the length and exuberance
of which we can gauge the state of mental torment from
which he had emerged. It also was a paean of victory.
" I am aware," he wrote, " of the base attempts that
have been made to provoke unrest in my capital and
among the good folk of my provinces. I know that, in
order to spread abroad a feeling of insecurity, ridiculous
rumours have been promulgated in which the incorpora-
tion of this country with the Empire and the re-establish-
ment of the Kingdom of Poland have been declared to
be imminent. It would argue considerable obtuseness
not to see that such reports are merely a clumsy plot
on the part of the English. A man must be blind or
totally ignorant of the political situation if he fails to
perceive that England's only means of extricating herself
from the impossible position into which the Emperor's
policy has forced her, lies in the chance of rekindling
hostilities on the Continent. But whatever hopes she
may have entertained in this direction have been frus-
trated by the alliance between France and Austria. She
has therefore been compelled to bring her nefarious policy
to bear upon Russia. She hoped, and the hope has to
some extent been justified by the event, that success
would crown her efforts if she laid stress on the annexa-
tion of Naples and the re-establishment of the Kingdom
of Poland, for the annexation of Naples would inevit-
ably involve the necessity of rinding another kingdom
for its ruler, and by putting forward Poland in this
connection the British Cabinet felt confident of setting
Russia in arms, since Poland could only be meddled
126 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with at the price of a war with the Czar. Such is the
origin of all these ridiculous rumours. That they have
not completely failed to produce the results anticipated
by England is proved by the fact that Russia has put
herself in a posture of defence, and that France has
been compelled to take precautions against a sudden
attack. It now seems plain, however, that the aims of
England have been recognised in their true light, and
that the two Great Powers are on the eve of an entente.
How, moreover, could it be imagined that a man of the
Emperor's genius would fail to see that before over-
turning monarchies which he himself had established, or
founding fresh ones, it was his duty to consolidate the
work he had already achieved. How could it fail to
strike any one that the geographical position of Naples
and the peculiar temper of its inhabitants would render
its incorporation anything but an advantage to the
Empire ? Who could entertain any doubt that on the
peace of Naples depends the peace of the rest of Italy,
or imagine that such obvious facts had escaped the keen
eye of the Emperor ? Was not the last war a case in
point ? With the Viceroy forced back on the Adige and
the Emperor on the right bank of the Danube, the whole
of Italy would have been ablaze — the case of Spain
would have been re-enacted — had not the King of Naples
remained at his post. Then again, what a juncture to
select for the Emperor to effect such a change ! His
armies have just evacuated the whole of Portugal and a
part of Spain. The English, puffed up with these early
successes, are about to concentrate all their efforts on
the Peninsula, and Massena's retreat has just given fresh
hope to the Spaniards. Is it likely that the Emperor
would transfer the seat of war to the Vistula with a
formidable army within six days' march of his frontiers ?
The situation is at all events such as to necessitate the
Emperor's remaining at the centre of his own dominions,
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 127
and who, such being the case, would undertake the
command of his forces ? What General would take it
upon himself to direct the operations of an army destined
to take the field against Russia ? Not one ; for we are
all convinced that neither his troops nor success can be
commanded by any save the Emperor. All the Em-
peror's energies, therefore, should be devoted to the main-
tenance of peace and the conservation of his possessions.
Above all he must avoid a continental war, for by such
a policy alone can England be brought to her knees.
Twelve months' fighting in Europe would retard for ten
years the dealing of that crushing blow at England from
which the Emperor's policy has left her no escape. Such,
Monsieur le Ministre, is the true state of affairs. Make
it plain in word and deed.
" In conclusion, I give my word that no annexation
shall take place so long as my subjects maintain the
attitude I have caused them to take up. Only let my
Government follow (the italics are Murat's) my lead with
courage, and the Nation's freedom and happiness are
assured." l
What had happened to account for such a song of
triumph ? Could it be that the " scene " to which every-
thing pointed as inevitable when Murat went to Paris
had actually taken place, and that Murat had emerged
from the struggle with his colours flying ? Such is the
construction which Campochiaro puts upon the matter.
' The untoward events in Spain have been occupying
the Emperor's attention, and the example thus afforded
of the efforts which a nation will put forth to retain its
freedom, have naturally produced a certain reluctance to
wound the susceptibilities of a people so violently attached
to their rulers as the Neapolitans. The possibility of a
rupture with Russia, and the unlikelihood of any support
being forthcoming from the Court of Austria, were con-
1 Murat to Pignatelli, May 12, 1811. Archivio di Stato.
128 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
siderations hardly calculated to lend force to the policy
advocated by the Due de Cadore, which consists in
threatening the political existence of every power in
Europe.
" The King of Naples alone had the courage to act
like a true friend, and to address His Majesty the Emperor
and King in direct and forcible terms. The policy of
restoring confidence to the various powers who had
become alarmed by fresh forebodings of change and
conquest has carried the day. The King adduced argu-
ments to show that the interests of France lie in the
direction of consolidation, and that the best way of
achieving that end is to reassure the allies." l
The inference thus appears to be that it was in the
course of a conversation between Murat and the Emperor
that the former, warmly pleading his cause and that of
his brother monarchs, convinced Napoleon of the risks
that would be incurred by a seizure of Naples, and suc-
ceeded by the energy with which he put his case in bring-
ing the Emperor to adopt his policy. A comparison of
the dates of the letters sent to Naples leads to the con-
clusion that the decisive meeting between the Emperor
and his brother-in-law took place about the loth May,
when, overcoming Napoleon's obstinacy, the King ob-
tained not only the promise that his departure for Naples
should not be long deferred, but also the assurance that
the integrity of his kingdom should be maintained.
It was unquestionably about this date that Joachim
received from Napoleon assurances which restored to his
heart as well as to Caroline's a calmness to which they
had long been strangers. It is only necessary to compare
the letter he wrote to the Queen early in May telling her
that he would be back in Naples before the end of June,
with his Ambassador's letters of the I2th May and his
own of the same date, to make it clear that the dis-
1 Campochiaro to Gallo, June 7, 1811. Naples. Archivio di Stato.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 129
cussion took place between these two dates. If more-
over Murat, writing on the I2th May, made no mention
of the date of his return, the reason was that the Em-
peror in his interview with him had not arrived at any
determination, for, writes the King, " he left me perfectly
free in the matter." But principles had at all events
been settled, particularly the continued existence of his
kingdom. That was the main point.
But is it to be taken for granted that the interview
was characterised by the expostulatory tone on Murat's
part to which Campochiaro appears to allude ? There
are only his words to support the idea, and it is well
known that neither Murat nor his adherents ever failed
to colour the truth when their interests demanded such
a process. It may be that in viewing the incident afresh,
and from the Emperor's standpoint, a different light will
be thrown on the matter. Napoleon (and the Neapolitan
Ambassador confirms it) gave Murat by no means a frigid
reception, since on the very evening of his arrival he
invited him to dinner. On the 6th April, moreover, they
went hunting together in the Foret de Saint Germain,1
a diversion which was repeated on the i6th, when they
were joined by princes, marshals, generals and " several
ladies of the court." During the whole course of his
visit Murat performed the functions of a Grand Admiral,
and it was he who presented Admiral Truguet and
Colonel Bertrand when they came to take the oath of
allegiance. Finally, the crowning and convincing proof
that no coolness was shown by Napoleon to the King of
Naples is furnished by the letter which the Emperor
wrote to Caroline on the 20 th April.
" MY SISTER, — I love to associate you with all the
happy events of my life, and it is my desire that you
should be godmother to the son whose birth has filled
1 Monittur Universal.
130 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
me with delight. The existence of such a bond between
my sister and my son will be a source of great pleasure
to me, and it will afford the King of Rome an additional
claim to your affection. Accept the assurance of the
tender regard and profound esteem with which I remain
Your Majesty's affectionate brother.1
That is scarcely the sort of language that would be
indulged in by one who harboured the dark design of
depriving Murat of his kingdom. Except as regards the
permission to depart, all the evidence tends to show that
while in public Murat, with his sentries at his gate and
his escort round his carriage, was certainly treated as a
King, he was in private equally regarded as a friend.
" Everything went off in the most peaceable manner
possible," says Campochiaro. ' The Emperor never had
a single day of ill-humour, and apart from the anxieties
that were weighing on his mind, the King, during the
whole course of his stay in Paris, had every reason to
congratulate himself on his visit."
Let us now revert to the period of Joachim's arrival.
On the 3rd April, at eight in the evening, Murat was at
the Tuileries. It was a time of trouble. The Emperor
was grappling with the Russian crisis, and next day
sent the following order to the Due de Feltre. " The
nine regiments of cuirassiers which I have in France are
to hold themselves in readiness for active service, as
well as the two divisions of carabineers, it being my
intention to create four divisions of heavy cavalry. . . .
In Germany I have six regiments of light cavalry. These,
with ten thousand cuirassiers, four thousand dragoons
and four thousand Guards, make up a cavalry force of
thirty-four thousand men." Was it in his mind to give
the command to Murat ? With him nothing was im-
possible. The same day he sent a letter to Clarke telling
1 Correspondancci 17,638.
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 131
him to order all the generals and colonels of the army
of Germany to proceed to their posts.1 He also wrote
to Davout in Hamburg as follows : "I sent you word
that if occasion required you would have to throw your-
self with the utmost rapidity upon Dantzig. But we
have not yet reached that stage, I imagine." Two days
later he wrote a letter to the Emperor Alexander demand-
ing an explanation of his military preparations. With
the possibility of war breaking out at any moment, it
is not a matter for astonishment that he should have
entertained the idea of keeping Murat at his side, for
it was to him par excellence to whom choice, possibly
even necessity, would point as the man to strike the
first blow with his cavalry. At an hour when Napoleon
was ordering every man to his post, it would certainly
have been ill-advised to send his brother-in-law uselessly
careering on the road to Naples, when every minute
might bring the tidings that the long-expected war had
been declared at last. He therefore detained him, not
indeed as a prisoner whose sentence was still under
consideration, but as a soldier of whose skill he might
avail himself in the execution of his immediate plans.
This would account for the length of Murat 's stay and
for the Emperor's attentions to him and his Queen.
About the 26th or the 27th of April, however, counsels
of peace appear to have prevailed in the Emperor's
mind, and on receipt of reassuring intelligence, he brought
the army of Germany to a standstill.2 On the 7th of
May, his uncertainties had practically disappeared.
" The messages from Russia," he wrote Davout, " are
full of assurances from the Emperor Alexander of his
desire for the continuation of peace and the maintenance
of the alliance. There appears therefore to be no ground
for crediting Russia with any desire to commence hos-
1 Correspondence.
a Letter to Clarke. Correspondence, \ 7,604.
132 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
till ties." Since the contingency of a war with Russia
seemed thus finally removed, there was nothing to pre-
vent him from suffering Joachim to take his departure.
It was at this moment that he had his decisive interview
with the King, but tar from receiving advice from the
latter or listening to his upbraidings, it was in all prob-
ability he that assumed the lead in the conversation,
and gave Joachim the guarantees for which he asked,
and which a leader of men like Napoleon could not have
withheld from so brilliant and indispensable a coadjutor.
It was his incomparable genius as a cavalry leader that
won for Murat. the Emperor's permission to go back
to Naples, though that permission was subject to the
formal undertaking that he would return at the first
summons.
Murat 's confidence was restored as soon as he was
assured that his sojourn in Paris was to be merely tem-
porary. He therefore accepted with pleasure the Em-
peror's invitation of the I5th May asking him to
Rambouillet, whither he set out that very same day.1
It is possible indeed that he would have still further
prolonged his stay, had he not received on the i8th
dispatches from Agar, Zurlo and Maghella, couched in
such panic-stricken language that he decided to make
request to the Emperor for permission to depart im-
mediately.
" My departure," he said, " cannot interfere with
your plans, while it may restore confidence among my
people." 2 Napoleon, who had no longer any reason for
refusing his permission, gave a most favourable recep-
tion to Joachim's request. Not only did he grant him
leave to depart, but even told Bassano to censure Durant,
his newly appointed Minister at Naples, though the
latter's sole fault throughout the whole business had
1 Campochiaro to Gallo, May 16, 1811. Naples, Archivio di Stato.
* Murat to Napoleon, May 19, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
THE IHKK «>K KKIUISTADT (NAPOLEON II)
f-'roni a painting, probably ly Daffingcr. In the possession of
/V. August Heymann of I 'lenna
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS 133
been to read the situation too clearly. The 2Oth May,
the day preceding the Emperor and Empress's departure
for Cherbourg and Rochefort, he spent with them at
Rambouillet. After bidding farewell to Napoleon he
returned to Paris at night, and on the 22nd May, as soon
as it was light, commenced his journey to Naples,
CHAPTER VI
THE TWO DECREES
The King arrives in Naples — His state of mind — The Decree of the I4th
June — Its effect in Naples — The Emperor's rejoinder — Durant's procedure —
The Kingretracts — Neapolitan opinion — The "affaire Daure" — The Emperor's
attitude — Will Murat keep his throne? — Dismissal of La Vauguyon— The
Queen's departure — Position of the King — His humiliations — He obeys the
Emperor — Gae'ta, the naval contingent, finances — Relations with England —
The Queen's mission in Paris.
" f • CHOUGH no explanation of the circumstance
is forthcoming/' wrote the Ambassador of
France, " it is nevertheless a fact that the
m King has returned from Paris in a state of
irritation, which the anti-French party lose no opportunity
of fomenting. This irritation is at present only reflected
in matters of trifling importance, but one cannot help
fearing that it will extend to affairs of deeper moment." l
The King's ill-humour is not difficult to explain when
it is remembered that he had been much more a prisoner
than a visitor in Paris, and that for several days every
one there had looked upon his departure in the light of
a phenomenon. " An event has taken place here that
has caused the greatest sensation ; the King of Naples
has departed without waiting for the christening of the
King of Rome. The circumstance has given rise to
much speculation, and some people go so far as to imagine
either that there was a quarrel between the Emperor and
the King, or that he was compelled to leave because the
English had effected a landing and were marching on his
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, June 18, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
134
THE TWO DECREES 135
capital." l What a contrast was afforded between his
departure, which had all the appearance of a flight, and
his entry into Naples ! " The King arrived this morning
at nine o'clock," wrote Gallo to Campochiaro on the
30th May. "^The guns proclaiming_His Majesty's return
earoused me^enthusiasfrT of the
The " spontaneous illuminationtKus
announced in advance is a quaint touch, but its quaint-
ness did not worry Gallo, and it was his master's pleasure
that all should know of the enthusiasm displayed by the
inhabitants of the capital on the occasion of the happy
and unlooked-for return of the King, and the transports
of joy and delight with which the news had been received
in the provinces." 2
Though the enthusiasm may have been indebted for
its keenness to the imaginative flourishes of the minis-
terial pen, it must be confessed that the warmth with
which his Court welcomed his return, and the flattery that
was lavished upon him, formed a marked contrast to the
chilling aloofness displayed towards him by the satellites
of Napoleon. The champions of national independence,
whose ideals, if they did not embrace a united Italy,
at all events aimed at freeing their country from the
foreign yoke, lost no opportunity of making him feel the
irksomeness of the bonds by which his brother-in-law
held him in thrall. The moment was a favourable one
for their purpose, and " the King's mind was unceasingly
fed with false ideas of independence, which he eagerly
absorbed." 3 The attempt was made to convince him —
and the endeavour met with prompt success — that the
French were his enemies. Though to carry their point
the Nationalists had to wound their sovereign's most
1 Campochiaro to Gallo. Naples, Archivio di Stato.
2 Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples. Archivio di Stato.
' Durant to Bassano. Archive: des Affaires Atraitgtres.
136 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
intimate susceptibilities, this did not give them pause ;
and while they dared not strike at the Queen herself,
they did not hesitate to aim high, and to impute every
species of delinquency to those who enjoyed her patronage
or possessed her affection. Even while the King was in
Paris, Maghella, his Prefect of Police, who was at once
the tool of the English and the Italian Nationalists, sent
him an insidious message. " We have now come to be
told that the Regency will be provisionally entrusted to
the Queen, who, it is further stated, may be summoned
to Rome to act as Governor-General. Your Majesty will
at once recognise the source of this information." * This
source was, of course, none other than Daure, the lover
and the agent of the Queen, and the man who mono-
polised the control of the Police, the War Office and
the Navy. It was therefore decided to make every sort
of complaint against him as soon as the King reached
home. There would be no difficulty in instigating the
fiery Murat to take measures which, though ostensibly
aiming at Daure alone, should be subsequently employed
as a weapon against the French in general. Only a day
or two after his arrival, Murat's animus against the
Emperor had grown so strong that on the 7th June he
decided to do away with the office of Governor-General
of Naples. It was not that he had any personal grudge
against Perignon ; that is clear, for he sent him, through
Campochiaro, a letter and a packet, the latter containing
His Majesty's portrait, the former his thanks for services
rendered in his capital. Unwittingly making himself the
tool of the Italian Cabal, he thus asserted, in the presence
of those whom he imagined to be his devoted supporters,
that independence which he held so dear. Meanwhile,
his advisers had completed the drafting of the decree
1 This document, which is to be found in the Archives Nationales^ is
unsigned, but the writing is so similar to that of Maghella, that there can be
no doubt regarding its authorship.
THE TWO DECREES 137
which, according to Murat, was to rid him of " the French-
men who aided and abetted the Queen in her intrigues
(Daure, the Longchamps, Montrond and the rest)," l
but which according to its framers would be a first
decisive blow at French influence. At length the decree
was ready, and the following were its terms : " All
foreigners holding civil appointments in our Realm must,
in terms of Clauses 2 and 3 of Article n of the Con-
stitution, lodge an application for naturalisation between
the date hereof and the first day of August next. Such
persons as shall have failed to comply with this regula-
tion shall be regarded as having voluntarily resigned
their appointments."
Murat was so impressed with the idea that he was
being made to say more than he intended, that for
several days he kept the decree in his pocket, though
it was quite ready for publication. But when the repre-
sentations of the Nationalists became urgent, his scruples
dwindled and his hesitation vanished. Vainly did the
Queen endeavour to prevent the publication of the
decree. On the I4th June its terms were already known
to a few, and on the I5th the King, only too well aware
of the effect such a measure was likely to have on the
Emperor, and being anxious to forestall an outburst,
sent off a copy to Paris. Bassano, with whom Campo-
chiaro was in close touch, was to be the mediator in this
delicate business, and the decree was to pass through his
hands before it reached Napoleon.
" By command of His Majesty," wrote Gallo to the
Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, " I hasten to send you
a copy of his decree in order that you may immediately
and in confidence make it known to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs before there is time for any wrong colour
or insidious interpretation to be put upon a measure
which is, in reality, so thoroughly in accordance with the
1 Mf moires cfune inconnue.
138 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
intentions of His Majesty the Emperor." l On the follow-
ing day, the i6th, the process of promulgation began at
Naples. " I send you my decree regarding the foreigners
in its final form," wrote the King to Pignatelli. " Send
it on to my Ministers and inform the Minister of Police
that it is my intention to have it printed and published
in all the newspapers." The same day it was forwarded
to the heads of the Executive, and finally, on the
1 8th June, it was inserted in the Monitor e of the Two
Sicilies. What arguments were adduced to justify it ?
If Murat was to be believed, the French who were in
Naples were scarcely of a sort to enhance the credit of
the kingdom. ' Your Majesty will doubtless receive
numerous and conflicting accounts regarding this measure,
but you will appreciate them at their true worth when I
tell you that two -thirds of the Frenchmen in this country
are either bankrupt or hopelessly in debt, and that having
been obliged to flee from France, they are for the most
part living here under assumed names, and that, apart
from eight or ten persons whom I brought with me, all
came in the train of the army, and only remain in this
country because they are able to find means of existence
here which they would not easily discover elsewhere." 2
Thus, with the exception of the eight or ten privileged
persons, the French, according to Murat, were so many
canaille and quite beneath the Emperor's attention. " I
see no likelihood of difficulty," added Murat, " save in
the case of those who hold ministerial appointments or im-
portant positions at Court. They do not and cannot show
any reason whatever for claiming exemption from the
necessity of becoming naturalised. How could I, in fact,
repose any confidence in men under whose protection I
lie down to sleep, if those very men hesitated to adopt
the new country which I have been called upon to adopt
1 Gallo to Campochario, June 15, 1811. Naples, Archivio di Stalo.
a Murat to Napoleon, Castellamare, June 18, 1811. Ajjaires Jitranglres.
THE TWO DECREES 139
myself ? Should they refuse, these men of distinction
who find it impossible to cease to remain your subjects
will be given back to you. I trust that Your Majesty
will approve of a measure which is in absolute harmony
with the Constitution of which you are the guarantor,
and which you have officially called upon me to ad-
minister."
This then is clear. If Murat left his subordinates to
decide the fate of the small fry, he himself intended to
compel the members of his court and his ministers to
become naturalised, though he well knew that none of
them would consent. Thus for him once more the matter
was purely a personal one. With the general body of
Frenchmen he scarcely concerned himself at all.
It might have been thought, however, that a measure
directed solely against civilians would fail of its effect in
respect of the very persons whom the King was most
anxious to assail, since Daure the War Minister, and
Lanusse the Grand Marshal of the Palace, were both
soldiers.
But Murat had no intention of concealing his purpose.
On the i6th June, " when dinner was over, the King,
addressing himself to General Exelmans, and asking him
what sort of opinions were being expressed regarding the
decree, added that every one attached to his Court,
particularly those who held the principal offices of the
Crown, ought to make their choice immediately, and
that he should not regard them with favour if they
hesitated." l Not only therefore were they called upon
to submit to the decree, but they were required to do
so with alacrity. Such was not their view of the matter,
and the most highly placed among them never wavered
for an instant. No sooner was the decree published
than the Minister of Finance (Agar), the Minister of War
(Daure), and the Chief Equerry (Exelmans) all declared
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, June 1 8, 1811. Affaires £trang}res.
140 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
that it was asking more than their lives. The most
defiant, the first to proclaim his opposition to the decree
and to set the example to the rest, was General Exelmans,
who did not hesitate to tell the King as he pointed to
the words Honneur et Patrie on the Cross of the Legion
of Honour which adorned his breast, that if he re-
nounced the one he would lose the other. Accordingly,
on the 22nd June, he had decided to say farewell, as
also had Lanusse, the Grand Marshal. There was not
a Frenchman among them who did not avow his desire
to leave Joachim's service, and General Grenier, in con-
versation with the King, did not conceal the regrettable
effect which his decree had produced, and the unanimity
with which the French would follow the example of the
Chief Equerry and the Grand Marshal. Whether Murat,
having escaped for a space from his anti-French advisers,
realised in a rare moment of lucidity the extent and
gravity of his proceedings we cannot say, but it is at all
events the fact that after confiding in Grenier the pain
which the Frenchmen's decision had caused him, he
decided to adopt milder measures. Exelmans and
Lanusse were not destined to go. " It is confidently
stated that many others will be similarly exempted, and
that as a result the sole effect of the decree will be to
remove those whose conduct has given just cause for
complaint." x Everything therefore appeared to be
settling down. Murat would be free to satisfy his anger
or his jealousy, and expel at his own good pleasure
Caroline's counsellors and friends. For the French in
general then there was no occasion for uneasiness ; the
decree, enforced against a few, would not affect the
majority. Even at this date there had been explanations
with General Dery, who was to remain because he was a
soldier, and urgent appeals to Baudus, who was staying
on because he had been all but begged to do so. Clearly
1 Durant to Bassano, June 24, 1811. Affaires £trang2res.
THE TWO DECREES 141
then there was nothing sternly immutable about the new
regulation. It would be twisted to suit every require-
ment. The French could breathe freely ; the mountain
had brought forth a mouse.
At Naples " the stir was considerable. Many Neapo-
litans, not perhaps the best-in ten tioned, are making much
of their victory," 1 and although the King's measures may
not in his mind have exceeded the importance of a Court
intrigue, the men who inspired them and possibly drew
them up, took care that the public should labour under
no uncertainty regarding their scope. The Neapolitans
who had not the entree to the palace looked upon the
whole business as an anti-French demonstration and a
grave affront to the Emperor. Opinions on the subject
were all the stronger on account of the eagerness of the
anti-French faction to drive home their advantage. On
the igth June, the day after the publication of the decree,
" Zurlo summoned to the Secretairerie all who belonged
to Sicilian families. He told them that the King had
taken their case into consideration, and had decided as
a preliminary token of clemency to grant them a subsidy ;
that he was their King, their ruler and their father, and
that he looked upon them as his subjects, and that, as
such, they ought to be acquainted with his intentions
regarding their island." 2 One can imagine the applause,
the shouts of " Viva il Re " which greeted this pronounce-
ment, and particularly the mark of royal generosity with
which it was accompanied. There had been no difficulty
in convincing Joachim that a little generosity (which
would cost him little since the expenses would be paid
out of the money due to France) would win him the
affection of a large section of his subjects and their
friends, and prove another point to the good for the
anti-French movement.
1 Durant to Bassano, June 22, 1811. Affaires Etrangtres.
' Diario di Nicola.
142 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
All were anxious to take advantage of the crisis for
the furtherance of their own aims. While some were
animated by the heroic but premature longing for a free
and united Italy, there were others who merely looked
upon Murat as an instrument for bringing about the
downfall of France, an object to which they ignobly
lent their aid in return for the money or the promises
of her enemies. But all united to set him up against
the Emperor, though taking care to protect themselves
against any untoward consequences that might ensue.
" The King deceives himself indeed regarding the state
of the country," writes Durant, "if he imagines that he
is strong enough there to dispense altogether with the
co-operation of France. This absolute confidence in the
Neapolitans, this excessive tendency to place exclusive
reliance on their zeal and ability, ought to have been
the result of time, of a long period of preparation. By
his precipitation the King has incurred the risk of further-
ing interests that are quite inimical to his own. For if
we look at the matter carefully, what grounds for security
are offered by the men on whom he leans, or by the
country itself ? Can he doubt that the English and the
Court of Palermo have agents here who are incessantly
at work, and who are in collusion with all sorts and
conditions of people from the most influential (an allusion
to Zurlo and Maghella) to the very lowest ? It is but
a few days ago that two sloops belonging to the royal
fleet, cruising off the Sicilian coast, were taken by their
crews into one of the ports of the island. There is no
doubt about this occurrence, and it is a proof not only
of the activity but also of the success with which the
Neapolitans may be seduced from their allegiance." l
Durant was right, but he could not alter the course
of events. Though Murat, when discussing matters with
Grenier on the 23rd June, recognised that his decree had
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, July 9, 1811. Affaires £trangircs.
THE TWO DECREES 143
overshot the mark, he did not modify his conduct. His
" camarilla " had him in their grip, and the pusillanimity
which he had manifested in the early application of the
original decree determined them to resume their sub-
terranean tactics. " An attempt is being made in some
quarters to stir up trouble between the King and Queen
with the special object of exciting the King's jealousy of
his Consort's influence, a jealousy which sometimes causes
him to treat her in a manner that is scarcely just or
kind." * Joachim's attitude now underwent a complete
and instantaneous transformation. The French, who
had been congratulating themselves on being out of
harm's way, were now exposed to the full fury of the
storm. " Despite all assurances to the contrary, despite
the undertakings of the King himself, no mitigation was
proposed or discussed at the Ministerial Council, and the
decree holds good in all its rigour." 2
The whole Court was now in a ferment, and the issue
of the struggle between France and her foes was awaited
with keen anxiety. Though none could foretell with
certainty, all felt instinctively how the day would go.
The King's ardour blinded his caution, and he was too,
stupid to appreciate the realities of the situation. What"
though he was hastening to his own doom, the path was
strewn with so many seductive lures, that he scarce
allowed himself breathing space ere he began to rush
more blindly than ever towards the fascinating but fatal
mirage of Independence.
decree of the Emperor brings him suddenly to the
ialt. " Whereas our Decree of the 30 th March 1806
provided that the Kingdom of Naples should be con-
sidered as part of the Grand Empire, and whereas the
Prince its Governor is a Frenchman and a high dignitary
of the Empire, owing his accession to and maintenance
1 Durant to Bassano, July 4, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
a Idem, July 9, 1811.
144 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
upon the throne solely to the efforts of our people, we
decree as follows : —
" All French citizens are citizens of the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies, and the decree of the i4th June last
shall not be applicable to them."|
Though the thunders of thefmperial wrath were soon
to break on Murat's head, the relations between Paris
and Naples were so far amicable enough, and had been
since Joachim's return. Campochiaro's reports were per-
fectly satisfactory. At the very last audience he had had,
their Majesties had referred to his Sovereigns, and re-
marked how pleased they were that the King had arrived
home in safety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, too,
was still well disposed, still " confidential " towards
Campochiaro. As a matter of fact the Emperor was
far too busily engaged to seek a quarrel with Murat.
Russia, who was contemplating an alliance with Eng-
land, was engrossing his attention. He scented war, and
was anxious to be well armed for the struggle.
First of all he requested Murat to concentrate certain
forces (consisting in all of twelve battalions) in one or at
most two camps under the command of a French General.
This move was in reality only a preliminary stage in a
far-reaching scheme which he had devised. Three " corps
d'observation " were to be reorganised, and the " Corps
de 1' Ocean " was to be distributed among three camps,
one each at Boulogne and Utrecht, and the third in the
neighbourhood of Emden. These camps were to be
formed between the I5th August and the ist September.
The next orders concerned Naples. ' You will receive a
decree," he wrote to Clarke on the 24th (the decree went
forward the same day) " disbanding the army of Naples
and forming a ' corps d'observation ' for Southern Italy.
This corps will be under the command of General Grenier,
and will consist of a division and three brigades. Its
headquarters must be fixed in as healthy a spot as possible
THE TWO DECREES 145
between Naples, Capua, and Gaeta. It is to be under
the sole command of General Grenier, who will corre-
spond with you direct and take his orders from you. It
shall not take any part in policing the country, nor shall
it be under the control of any officer in the service of
Naples. You will notify the King of my decree, and
explain to him that, being under the necessity of con-
centrating all my troops, I have disbanded the army of
Naples and formed a ' corps d'observation ' under General
Grenier, and that I shall allow this force to remain in
the kingdom of Naples until such time as I am assured
that its presence can be safely dispensed with. As long
as it remains within the kingdom of Naples the corps
shall be fed, paid, maintained, and clothed at the expense
of the Neapolitan Treasury. You will write to General
Grenier informing him that this corps, which must be
stationed somewhere between Naples and Gaeta, must
be ready between the ist and I5th August to proceed
whithersoever its services may be required." 1
While thus occupied with the reorganisation of the
army, the Emperor had also been turning his attention
to the navy. He stated that the camp at Boulogne
would have to be reinforced, and that it was possible
that he would make a descent upon England. With
1 Correspondence, 17,849. It has been alleged that the order of the 24th
June had its origin in the irritation felt by the Emperor against Murat. But
the King's decree could not have come to Napoleon's notice until the 27th
June, or at all events there is nothing to prove that Napoleon knew of it on
the 24th. Now all the measures supposed to have been taken by the Emperor
on the 6th July, as so many safeguards against the King of Naples, had already
found a place in the letter of the 24th June. On the other hand, the purport
and terms of the letter of the 24th are perfectly easy to understand if we
revert to the general reorganisation scheme as outlined above, which at this
moment was absorbing the attention of Napoleon. It therefore manifestly
follows that these decisions of his did not in the least imply any resentment
against Murat. Not until he learnt of the decree of the I4th June did the
Emperor adopt stern measures against his brother-in-law by giving orders
(which he did not do in the letter of the 24th June) for the occupation of
Neapolitan strategic positions.
K
146 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
these ideas in view he sent a message to Naples on the
26th June (the mildness of the letter was in singular
contrast to the orders which he usually gave) requesting
that the King should endeavour to furnish his naval
contingent. Such was Napoleon's indulgent and peace-
able frame of mind when Joachim's decree was placed
in his hands. One can readily picture the amazement
and fury of the Emperor. At what precise moment it
entered his mind to issue his decree of the 6th it is not
possible to determine. There is no document in existence
to-day which throws any light on the matter. A vague
trace of what was coming is discernible in a report from
Bassano to Napoleon concerning the latter 's right to the
throne of Naples and the right of French citizens to be
publicly employed there without the obligation of taking
out papers of naturalisation. This was on the ist July,
and for five days there was not another word. But on
the sixth the Emperor made up his mind. " Send General
Grenier," he wrote to Clarke, " a duplicate of the command
I have given for the disbanding of the army of Naples
and the formation of a ' corps d'observation ' under his
orders, and inform him that whatever opposition may
be offered by the King of Naples, all the French are to
receive their orders from him (Grenier). Say that the King
of Naples appears to be yielding himself up to the sugges-
tions of the enemies of France, and that I have already
pointed out to him the madness of his acts. Tell General
Grenier to see to it that a garrison is put into Gaeta and
the possession of the place secured, without however
allowing his object to become apparent. He must im-
press upon the French and all who form part of the
Guard that they are still French and regarded by me
as such, and that by Imperial decree French citizens
are also citizens of Naples. He must lend his aid to
my Minister, and second him in extricating the King
from his present false position. The King must be told
THE TWO DECREES 147
that if his conduct continues to be so far removed from
that which duty and gratitude alike impose upon him,
he will be sternly called to order. General Grenier must
speak firmly, and support my Minister as being in com-
mand of an army corps, and not as a subordinate." l
Simultaneously Bassano sent Durant the decree of
the 6th July, and caused the necessary protests to be
formulated at Naples. " It is the will of His Majesty
that you should express his dissatisfaction to the Marquis
di Gallo and the other ministers in touch with the King.
You will also give the Minister of Police to understand
that he is suspected of being implicated in the intrigues
of Queen Caroline (of Sicily) and of advising the King
in such a manner as to bring about his overthrow.
" His Majesty is in general displeased with the direc-
tion given to affairs. Orders are being sent to General
Grenier to bring the troops together, whatever the King's
views on the subject may be, and to take steps to have
them well in hand. In all probability His Majesty's
commands will be quietly submitted to at Naples, but
in the event of there being any grumbling or murmurs
of resistance, you could spread the report that twenty
thousand men were marching on Naples from Italy." 2
Theset dispatches, which were handed to a trustworthy
messenger, reached Naples on the i6th. Durant received
his about three in the afternoon, and immediately hurried
off to see Gallo. In the course of a prolonged interview
" he explained the various just causes of complaint that
the King's behaviour had afforded the Emperor, and set
forth the reasons which should induce the King to return
1 Corrcspondame, 17,894. Vide letter from Clarke to Grenier (July 7,
1 8 1 1 ). Archives Nationales.
1 Bassano to Durant, July 7, 1811. Affaires Strangles. The minute of
the Archives is erroneously dated the 8th. This despatch of Bassano's
certainly reproduces, to some extent literally, orders that had been issued by
the Emperor, whose letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs is unluckily no
longer extant.
148 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
to a line of conduct more in harmony with his obli-
gations, his interests, the welfare of France, and the
invincible determination of His Imperial Majesty." l
Gallo undertook to see Joachim next day, but when
the next day came Joachim was " in a high fever " and
refused to listen to a word on any subject whatever.
The Minister would come in the morning and return to
the charge in the evening, but his efforts were vain. For
three days the door was shut against everybody. No
one was supposed to see the King, neither Durant nor
Gallo, nor Daure the Minister of War ; one person only
retained access to him, and that was Zurlo. Was he
his counsellor ?
Murat, though he had refused admittance to Gallo
when he came with the French note, knew very well
what that note contained. If he was not acquainted
with the precise wording, he was at all events aware of
its general tenour. The reports which he received from
his emissaries Ayme" and La Vauguyon no doubt informed
him how he was regarded by the Emperor. Neverthe-
less, he was utterly disconcerted at Napoleon's measure
of the 24th June providing for the creation of a " corps
d 'observation " for Southern Italy, notwithstanding that
the measure had been inspired by no hostile intentions
against himself. His state of mind suggests the guilty
unrest of the evildoer forever on thorns lest his crime
be discovered. This new departure " gave rise to con-
jectures which seemed to fill the Court with the liveliest
apprehensions — apprehensions which were apparently
increased by the terms employed in the order appointing
General Grenier to the command of the French division
stationed within the kingdom." 2 It was in vain that
1 Durant to Bassano, July 16, 1811. Affaires Etrangfrcs.
2 Benkendorff to Roumantzoff, July II, 1811. Archives Nationals. The
new arrangements made were dispatched to Murat by Clarke on the 2;th June.
The orders therefore reached Naples about the 6th or yth July.
THE TWO DECREES 149
Campochiaro, after an interview with Bassano (who was
grossly deceiving or grossly deceived), sent word that
the latter had assured him of the Emperor's complete
approval of the decree.1 His letter addressed to Gallo
reached Naples on the 22nd July, too late to afford
Murat even a momentary gleam of hope. In terrified
expectation of the blow that was hanging over him, and
anxious to conceal his agony of mind from the Court,
he fell back on his sovereign stratagem and shut himself
up with " an attack of fever."
Everything comes to an end, even such a comedy as
this, which it would have been too ridiculous to prolong,
and Murat on the 2oth July at last made up his mind
to reply to the note and the complaints which Durant
had delivered. The interval had afforded him ample
time to look about for excuses, but whether it was that
his efforts in this direction were in vain, or whether it
was that the hearts of those to whose advice he had in
the beginning lent a willing ear now failed them and
that they no longer dared to persist with insinuations
which they felt might bring both the King and them-
selves to ruin, his letter, for all its wealth of phrase and
deprecatory eloquence, was utterly destitute of any
reference to fact.
" How Sire ! " thus the letter ran, " shall men always
contrive to make you doubt the loyalty of my senti-
ments ? Must I be forever condemned to act in fear
and trembling, when all my thoughts and all my deeds
have but one aim, which is never to do aught to hamper
your vast plans, but, on the contrary, to second them
with all the energy at my command ? And what crime
can Your Majesty find to lay at my door ? Examine
my record for twelve years past, scrutinise my conduct
from the day I came to Naples : I defy my enemies
1 Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, July 12, 1811. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
150 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
one and all to cite a single action inconsistent with
your policy. Yet calumny speaks, and Your Majesty
heaps disgrace upon your brother-in-law, deprives your
lieutenant of the command of your troops, holds him
up to the French as an enemy to France, while by your
decree of the 6th you give to the French an advantage
for which some of them did not ask and which others
are unworthy to receive. Ah Sire, if Your Majesty but
desires to be rid of me, seek not for pretexts to work
your will. More than once I have told you in writing,
oftener still I have declared it to your face, that if Your
Majesty needs me not, you have but to say the word,
and the King of Naples will cease to be a hindrance in
your path. Sire, I was stricken with the fever immedi-
ately after I had replied to the Prince de Neuchatel,
and I seize the first moment of respite to tell you of my
grief, to tell you that you have killed me, that you have
lost your best friend, and that my conduct was never
such as to compel me to look for treatment so cruel as
this. No sooner had the decree arrived here than copies
were distributed far and wide. They will doubtless fall
into the hands of the Diplomatic Corps. I know not
whether Your Majesty will rejoice, but to-day the King
of Naples is a byeword among the French employees
and ex-contractors, and will soon be a byeword to the
country. So there is an end to my part in the play ;
nevertheless I shall continue till my last breath to be
as I have ever been — your most faithful friend. I can
write no more, my heart is too heavy." l
Such was all the fight he made — he who had boasted
of his iron will, and had declared when he last left Paris
that if Napoleon intended to take any steps to thwart
him he would find out with whom he had to deal. So
thoroughly certain did he feel that his entourage would
desert him if he fell, so keenly sensible was he of being
1 Murat to Napoleon, July 20, 1811. Archives Nationals.
THE TWO DECREES 151
in the Emperor's grip, that he forgot all his fine speeches.
" His people's love, his soldiers' bravery, the loyal attach-
ment of his friends" — all these resounding phrases and
pompous sentiments which he had been accustomed to
parade so proudly, were whittled down into inglorious
excuses.
Who but Murat — la Bete, as Napoleon called him —
could have regarded the decree as inoffensive ? How
could one imagine for a moment that Napoleon would
suffer naturalisation to be made obligatory in a vassal king-
dom ; Napoleon with his notorious sensitiveness regarding
all that appertained to the French name abroad ! And
what Frenchman would want honours and titles on such
terms ! Murat 's painful awakening was the penalty of
his stupidity. To imagine that everything became him,
to constitute himself the arbiter of the destinies of the
realm, might perhaps be expected of his headstrong
swaggering nature ; but if he lays a hand on the struc-
ture, even unconsciously, then let him beware, for he
who reared it brooks that none but he shall take a single
stone from its place !
Thus Murat was compelled to abate his ambitions
of independence, and once again found that he wasjw
fiw ^(friV, Following his usual craven tactics, he threw
overboard his allies of yesterday, and sought a rapproche-
ment with the French party. He had " one or two con-
ferences " with the Minister of Finance, in which the
Queen took part, for he was depending on her to smooth
over the difficulties with his brother-in-law. The result
of these conferences was a note for Durant and a decree
for the French. The note, which contained a copy of
the decree, spoke of the " proofs of the unwavering
devotion " which the King was desirous of maintaining
towards the Emperor. It explained " how seriously His
Imperial Majesty had been misled by the statement that
the French were subject to unfair treatment in the king-
152 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
dom of Naples and that it was desired to rid the country
of them." It pointed out that " the decree of the I4th
June did no more than carry out to the letter Article n
of the Constitution of the Realm." " So far," it con-
cluded, " are the French from being the victims of
injustice, that the majority of appointments are held
by them. Of the six government departments three are
controlled by Frenchmen, while the greater number of
the executive offices and of the principal posts at Court
are in their hands." 1 The following is the decree : —
" Whereas in accordance with Clause 3 of Article n
of the Constitution our Decree of the I4th June last
provided that no foreign subject should hold an appoint-
ment within the Realm unless he became naturalised,
and whereas in accordance with the views expressed by
His Majesty the Emperor, our august brother and brother-
in-law, and with the statements made in his name, it is
our wish not to regard French subjects as foreigners,
and whereas we eagerly avail ourselves of this opportunity
of presenting to His Imperial and Royal Majesty the
tokens of our deference and of our desire to perform
whatsoever may be pleasing to him and of affording a
further proof of the sentiments which we have ever enter-
tained towards France and its people, we enact as follows :
" The provisions of our decree of the I4th June last
are not applicable in the case of French subjects." 2
At the same time as he commanded Durant to plead
his cause with the Emperor, Murat also charged Campo-
chiaro to add his say in the matter. To the latter Gallo
was ordered to point out that Joachim was extremely
surprised at the unfavourable manner in which his decree
of the I4th June had been received by Napoleon. Only
people who were endeavouring to work him ill could
1 Gallo to Durant, Naples, July 20, 1811. Archives NationaUs.
* Archives Nationales.
THE TWO DECREES 153
have thus blackened his character to His Majesty. The
King immediately decided on a further decree, of which
he forwarded a copy. "It is the King's wish," said
Gallo, " that you should proceed at once to the Due de
Bassano's and hand him the decree and the note of to-day's
date (the note to Durant), at the same time assuring him
in the most emphatic manner possible of the King's
desire to do all in his power to regain the Emperor's
regard/' l
But all these conferences and, more particularly, all
these surrenders had exhausted Murat. He was at the
end of his tether when he signed this new decree, which
afforded public and glaring proof of the utter hollowness
of his authority. On the night of the 2ist July, the
King, " who was suffering from an attack of fever," pro-
ceeded in a closed carriage to Capo di Monte.2
The strained relations betwixt Naples and France had
left no one indifferent. At Court the two hostile parties
confronted each other ; in the city the partisans of either
party grew every day more desperate. In the army the
Royal grenadiers came to blows with the French soldiers.3
The ambassadors were eagerly watching the progress of
the struggle.
The note presented by Durant, the orders given to
Grenier, followed by Murat 's attitude of dejection, revived
all the old rumours concerning the annexation of Naples.
In the Chancelleries the report was current that the days
of Murat 's sovereignty were numbered, and that the
Emperor himself was coming to drive him from the
kingdom. " There are some people who pretend to
know," wrote Menz to Metternich, " that Napoleon will
shortly go to Milan. If it were so, we should have to
look for some great measure in Italy destined perhaps
to unite the various races of the peninsula under one
1 Gallo to Campochiaro, July 20, 1811, Naples. Archivio di Stato.
* Diario di Nicola, 3 Idem.
154 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Government. It is thought that the King of Naples
would be appointed Viceroy of an Italy thus united.
Such an event would necessarily involve changes in Ger-
many with regard to Prince Eugene." l
The Neapolitan rumours were not devoid of founda-
tion. To judge by certain passages in his letter of the
20th July to the Emperor, Joachim himself deemed that
the game was lost. But when the first moment of de-
jection was passed, and he felt that the blow was not
going to fall immediately, he took heart once more and
began to hope for the best. This reaction, however, was
accompanied by immense indignation against those whom
he considered responsible for the terrible days through
which he had passed. The terror and the panic he had
suffered were the measure of his fury against them.
Daure and his friends, at whom he had intended to strike,
had escaped him, and in so doing had all but succeeded
in driving him from his throne. With what rabid hatred
therefore did he make up his mind to pursue them. Still
he could bring no actual proofs against them, and the
Emperor's decree left him unarmed : one method alone
remained, and that was to turn his back upon them.
" The King," writes Durant on the 4th August, " will
not give up the idea, or at all events wishes to appear
convinced, that the first move of the French party and
their determination to resist his decree were due to sug-
gestions on the part of the Minister of War, M. Daure,
of the Grand Marshal, of the Chief Equerry, and of M.
de Longchamps. The Minister of War is therefore in
utter disgrace. He has not seen the King three times in
the last fortnight." 2 To keep them thus in disgrace, to
forbid them the palace and to force on them the resigna-
tion he so longed to bring about, was undoubtedly a
step in the right direction. But he was willing to pay
1 Mcnz to Metternich, Naples, July 26, 1811.
2 Durant to Bassano. Archives des Affaires £tranglres.
THE TWO DECREES 155
any price to the man who had the audacity and skill
to bring forward accusations supported by proofs, irre-
futable documentary evidence, such as would enable him
to confound his enemies and cast them forth with igno-
miny. As luck would have it, he had at hand the very
man for his purpose. This was none other than Maghella,
who had been a subordinate of Daure's at the War Office.
Whether Maghella was the tool of the English or of the
Italian Cabal, or whether his proceedings were merely
dictated by commonplace motives of self-interest, cannot
be determined. But whatever the object he had in view,
he succeeded, as a result of adroit and cautious investiga-
tion, in bringing to light certain letters that had passed
between the Queen and Daure. A chivalrous man would
have scorned to make use of such documents. They
were of a very intimate description, and left no room
for doubt concerning the sort of relationship that existed
between the writers. But to Maghella it mattered not
at all that by divulging their contents he would be
bringing dishonour on the Queen, for the letters, in
addition to affording proof of Caroline's guilt, also con-
tained convincing evidence of " the efforts that had been
made to induce Napoleon to transfer the crown to his
sister." 1 He therefore placed the incriminating corre-
spondence in the hands of the King. Disorder now
reached its climax. Scenes of the most violent descrip-
tion were enacted almost before the public gaze. Murat,
already far from well, was seized with a fever of so acute
a nature that fears began to be entertained for his reason.
M. Baudus and one or two others were obliged to inter-
fere. The Queen wept copiously, explained matters as
best she could, and denied, or ascribed to the machina-
tions of her enemies, whatever did not admit of explana-
tion. Report even had it that " Murat snatched up a
couple of pistols and went to seek out the Queen, saying
1 Mttnoirts (Tune incmnut.
156 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
that he had made up his mind to kill himself since he
did not wish to live on in his dishonour. So ungovern-
able was his frenzy that one of the generals present told
him that he would have to be put in irons like a
madman." l
So great was the scandal, so terrible the King's
fury, that this time he fell genuinely ill. When the
1 5th August came he was still so ill that, despite his
anxious desire to celebrate the Emperor's birthday with
as much brilliance as possible, " his extreme weakness
did not allow him to hold the reception he had intended.
It was as much as he could do to don a uniform and take
his stand on the balcony to watch the soldiers of the
Guard as they passed by on their way to parade." 2 At
length the longed-for day of vengeance came. " The
King has just commanded that M. Daure be called upon
to resign the portfolios of War, the Marine, and the
Police." 3 The previous day he had had a stormy inter-
view with Lanusse, the Grand Marshal, who was no
doubt implicated in the letters discovered by Maghella,
and accepted his resignation. " Despite the fact that
his wife was pregnant, Lanusse was compelled to quit
the palace within twenty-four hours," 4 though he re-
mained a few days longer in Naples. It is probable
that had he wished he might have been restored to
Joachim's good graces, since the King, through Mosbourg,
offered him the command of the Household Troops. But
Lanusse, mistrusting the constancy of the King's favour,
elected to depart.
As for Daure, his offices had been torn from him
with every circumstance of harshness. Murat had
ordered the Chief Judge to demand the return of all the
1 Diario di Nicola.
2 Gallo to Campochiaro, August 16, 1811, Naples. Archivio di Stato.
3 Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 17, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
* Diario di Nicola.
THE TWO DECREES 157
letters which Her Majesty had written to him, and the
demand was at once complied with. Daure, though the
terms of the Emperor's decree made it impossible for
him to be expelled the country, quickly determined on
his course of action. On the i8th he set out by night for
France without a passport.
He possessed full knowledge of the secret influences
that were at work in Naples. Though not in the councils
of the Nationalist caucus, his official duties as Police
Minister and his relations with the Masonic Lodges had
acquainted him with the undercurrents of the Italian
policy. He was fully cognisant of the part which the
Nationalists desired the King to play, as well as of the
latter's eagerness to listen to their suggestions. It was
therefore urgent that Joachim should neutralise the effect
of Daure's statements by being the first to gain the
Emperors ear, and, since he was unable to write himself,
he lost no time in dictating and dispatching the follow-
ing letter :
" I have jusjt accepted the resignation of General
Lanusse, the Grand Marshal of my palace, and have also
relieved M. Daure of his official appointments. I hasten
to inform Your Majesty of the matter in order to fore-
stall the misrepresentations which these two men, who
owe their fall to delinquencies of the most serious personal
nature, will endeavour to substantiate, attempting per-
haps to avail themselves of the prestige of the French
name to vindicate their conduct. Sire, these men have
wrought me a grievous wrong. The intrigues of M.
Daure have destroyed the peace of my palace and my
capital. He it was who brought me to the brink of
death and then pretended that my illness was affected.
He aimed at forming a party against me in the State,
and would have deprived me of all that I held most
dear ; and, though his efforts in that respect were far
from attaining the success he had the effrontery to look
158 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
for, Your Majesty has possibly in your hands the proof
that they have not been entirely ineffective. On the
other hand, it is impossible for me to view the departure
of General Lanusse without regret, for while I always
entertained a great regard for him, heaping benefits upon
him without stint, he on his part had long shown himself
genuinely attached to me. I would fain believe that he
was merely led on by the treacherous allurements adroitly
held out by a thoroughly unprincipled man. I still feel
an interest in his welfare, and I commend him to your
generosity." *
He then proceeded to announce the provisional ap-
pointment of Tugny as Minister of War and the Marine,
of Maghella as Prefect of Police, and of Exelmans as
Marshal of the Palace. " I am deeply grieved at my
inability to write you myself," he added in his own
hand.
Thus the prime object was accomplished. He had
secured the first word with the Emperor. The letter
having been sealed and dispatched, Joachim did not let
the grass grow under his feet. On the evening of the
1 7th the French Ambassador received word from Gallo
that the King wished to see him next day at Capo di
Monte. There, attired in his dressing-gown, Murat ex-
plained to Durant " that his reasons for accepting the
Grand Marshal's resignation, and for depriving M. Daure
of office, were so special and so peremptory that his
action would receive the Emperor's unqualified ap-
proval/' 2 As a third precaution, Gallo was instructed
to write to Campochiaro in order that " if the two ex-
ministers and their partisans attempted to conceal their
misdeeds and to gain support on the pretence that their
resignation was a result of the decree regarding the
1 Murat to Napoleon, Capo di Monte, August 17, 1811. Archives
Nationalcs.
a Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 8, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
THE TWO DECREES 159
naturalisation of foreigners holding official appointments,
such misrepresentations might be the more readily dis-
pelled." Gallo enumerated the official reasons for
Daure's dismissal. They were " negligence in police
management, failure to communicate with the requisite
promptitude certain events, the disclosure of which was
of paramount importance, conniving at a system of
peculation at the War Office, a system which he had
allowed to be established and from which he himself
had derived profit. Lastly, it was alleged that under-
hand dealings and intrigues were constantly employed
by M. Daure to win a degree of influence which it did
not consort with the King's duty to allow him to obtain,
and to which it was unbecoming in a Minister of State
to aspire." l But with this official statement of the case
Gallo was crafty enough to slip in a confidential letter to
Campochiaro, in which he laid bare the plain truth and
disclosed the real nature of the reasons that had led to
Daure's undoing.
Murat, who was anxious at all costs to ward off the
Emperor's wrath, or rather the consequences of it, was
not content with piling up precautions against Daure's
possible disclosures. He felt that he would have to face
the music, and on the 24th he ha.d made up his mind
how to act. He informed Napoleon that he was recover-
ing from the fever, and that he was giving orders for the
horses purchased on the occasion of his last visit to Paris
to be kept up at Parma or Bologna. There they were
to remain until the Emperor made known his intentions
regarding the war. " I am happy to advise Your Majesty
that I am able to set out should it still be your desire
that I should take the field." So great was his desire
to propitiate Napoleon and benefit himself, that, with
the idea of parrying every objection in advance, he
1 Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples, August 19, 1811. Archivio di Stato^
Naples.
160 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
added that he could leave Naples without risk, " for,"
said he, " the English can effect nothing." *•
How immeasurably delighted he would have been if
the Emperor had summoned him to his side ! But it
was not to be. Daure had just arrived in Paris, and
despite all Joachim's precautions he had seen the Em-
peror and given him a circumstantial account of what
had been going on at Naples. The eyes of Napoleon
were thus completely opened to the secret aims of the
Italian party, and the designs harboured by the Cabal
which held Joachim in its leading strings. He now knew
beyond all doubt — for he had been given chapter and
verse for everything — what kind of aims were in men's
minds at Naples, what deeds were afoot and what hopes
were entertained there. But after all Daure could add
nothing save in the way of detail and confirmation to
what Durant had already observed so keenly and de-
scribed so well. " It appears to me that the King is
led away in a manner that is to be ascribed either to
inordinate vanity or to connections and counsellors of
questionable loyalty. His entire confidence is shared by
M. di Zurlo, M. Maghella and the Due di Campochiaro.
M. Agar is vouchsafed a hearing, and, so far as appear-
ances go, M. di Gallo is still in command of his depart-
ment, but they have no real voice in the conduct of
affairs, and are unable to counterbalance the secret
influence of those whose names I have mentioned, and
who, by frightening the King with the spectre of "a
French party " or "a Queen's party," have long since
persuaded him that the only means by which he can
maintain his independence is by strengthening the bonds
between himself and the Neapolitan nation.
" It is the King's constant anxiety to be in a position
to treat (with the Emperor) as an independent power,
1 Murat to Napoleon, Capo di Monte, August 24, 1811. Archives
Nationales.
THE TWO DECREES 161
and to appear to the eyes of Europe as no longer subject
to that compelling force to which nevertheless he would
not dare refuse obedience. Seeing that all the advice
he receives is given with the object of fostering such
aims, the Neapolitans and others who have for a long
time past harboured some sort of vision of a United
Italy have no difficulty in hurrying him into acts of
imprudence." x
This report of Durant's was confirmed in detail by
Daure, who quoted names, fixed dates, and threw light
upon the various machinations. Hating Maghella with
all his heart, he eagerly made accusations against him
by which the Emperor did not fail to profit. Probably
Caroline's letter arrived at the same time as Durant's
report, corroborating Daure's account and confirming the
truth of his charges. Those were black days for Murat
(28~3oth August). Everything was against him. What
could his empty protestations, his unsupported excuses,
avail against facts which, conclusive and definite as they
were, derived additional weight from the confirmation
received at the hands of the Emperor's sister and the
Ambassador of France.
No sooner had Napoleon learned of his brother-in-
law's conduct than he sent him a letter of which we
now possess but a fragment. ' You are surrounded^ by_
.^men who hold France in detestation
is to work, your ruin. I Ijaje^waTned ^oj
Everything yon write contrasts too
YOU do." *
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 18, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
* Napoleon to Murat, Compiegne, August 30, 1811. This letter was
read by Lord Castlereagh before the English Parliament on the 2nd May
1814, with falsifications introduced by the Abbe Fleuriel but certified by
Blacas as being a true copy of the original.
It would not be inappropriate to quote here the version of these events
which Norvins, formerly in charge of the police at Rome and well posted in
all that took place at Naples, has included in his " Portefeuille de 1813."
L
162 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Napoleon did not limit himself to addressing rebukes
to Murat. He began to take measures against the men
whom he knew to be hostile to France. Though he did
not possess proofs of sufficiently convincing a character
to enable him to bring about the downfall of Zurlo,
Maghella and Campochiaro, he was at least aware that
in the heart of the capital of the Empire Murat possessed
an agency for the collection and transmission of secret
information. At its head was La Vauguyon, one of
Joachim's aides-de-camp. If " by special permission "
—as Bassano put it later on to Campochiaro — La Vau-
guyon had been authorised to make his home in Paris,
it was because the Emperor considered that the subject
matter of his clandestine communications with Naples
merely related to such topics as would form suitable
pabulum for Court gossip, and that it was in no way
calculated to affect the course of his country's policy.
Finding that he had misjudged the matter, Napoleon
acted promptly, and on the 27th at four in the morning
La Vauguyon quitted Paris " with the utmost secrecy,
leaving all his effects behind him." Secrecy is indeed
the word, since, when Campochiaro learned of the matter
three days later, he was so utterly taken aback that all
The following, according to him, was the wording of Napoleon's letter:
" CoMPifcGNE, August 30, 1811. — I have already made known to you what I
think of your conduct. You are surrounded by men who hold France in
detestation and who are aiming at bringing about your downfall. I gave you
useful advice some time ago, and I shall see by the way you act whether you
are French at heart. It is no use your writing to me unless you have some-
thing important to ask of me. Remember that I only made a King of you in
the interests of my system. Make no mistake about the matter. If you cease
to be a Frenchman you will be nothing to me. Continue to correspond with
the Minister for War. "
If the wording of this letter is compared with that of the instructions given
to PeVignon on the i6th September, viz : " His (Murat's) position on a throne
to which the Emperor only promoted him in the interests of France and the
Empire might be compromised," we shall discover a similarity of language
which imparts singular weight to the text quoted by Norvins.
THE TWO DECREES 163
he could do was to write to Naples asking distractedly,
" where has he gone ? Who told him to go ? Why did
he leave ? " x The following day he had a prolonged
interview with Maret and Savary, who merely informed
him that by the Emperor's orders the Due de Rovigo
had commanded La Vauguyon to leave immediately.
" As to the motives for this action/' added the ministers,
" they ought to be known well enough to General La
Vauguyon." On arriving at Capua the latter found
Mosbourg awaiting him with orders to proceed no farther.2
On Murat's behalf he was offered the command of the
Neapolitan forces in Spain, which he refused. While
with every sign of displeasure at this refusal the King
had his name struck off the list of comptrollers of the
army, he secretly caused him to be told to join him on
the first favourable opportunity, and left him in con-
tinued enjoyment of " his not inconsiderable emolu-
ments." 3 Such was the treatment that Murat meted
out to his friends or those who served him ; and thus
La Vauguyon was banished from Naples, not because the
Emperor had demanded it but because Murat deemed
the measure calculated to win him favour. La Vauguyon
was thus the first to pay the penalty of the King's mis-
deeds. Maghella's turn was to come next, and Zurlo,
to whose counsel Murat had inclined his ear, came
perilously near to losing his place also.
La Vauguyon's expulsion was but a preliminary
measure. ^Napoleon had now made up his mind,that Mnral
should come to heel ,~^M^thajtji2lone should entertain
"any doubt tnat"Kaples MongedJaJranrpi and to-Erasce
"atoneT On tne ibth September came the following
1 Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, August 30, 1811. Naples, Archivio di
State.
2 Durant to Bassano, September II, 1811. Affaires Strangles.
5 Mier to Metternich, Naples, September 20, 1811. Archives au-
trichiennes.
164 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
orders : Grenier was commanded to throw a battalion, two
if necessary, of the 22nd Light Infantry into Gaeta. He
was to quarter his troops there and, "if he deemed it
necessary, to set up a French Governor." 1 P6rignon
received word that he was to start next day to resume
his duties as Governor of Naples, where the interests of
His Majesty the Emperor demanded his presence. At
the same time he was given secret instructions in which
thp.jfollowing passage occurs.
n " His Majesty has beheld with deep regret the line of
action recently followed by the King, and believes that
he recognises therein the direct influence of the anti-
French faction who are themselves suspected, on no
inconsiderable grounds, of acting in obedience to orders
received from the Court of Palermo and the English.
You are authorised to assure His Majesty that the
Emperor is in no way desirous of incorporating Naples
with France, and to point out to him that had he enter-
tained such an intention he would have made no secret
of it ; that as a matter of fact he contemplates no such
object, since no further process of incorporation is neces-
sary to make Naples part of the Empire. You are to
state that it suits the Emperor's purpose that the King
should reign at Naples, but that the Emperor cannot
overlook the fact that he is Emperor of Naples and its
Suzerain, just as he is Overlord of Italy, which is equally
a part of the Empire. Finally, you are to add that the
only result of these needless alarms would be the multi-
plication of pitfalls for himself, and that nothing but
such conduct as his fear of imaginary dangers might
lead him to adopt, could in any way prejudice his tenure
of a throne on which, as he himself is aware, the Emperor
has placed him solely for the benefit of France and the
furtherance of Imperial policy.
' These considerations should underlie your dealings
1 Clarke to Grenier, Paris, September 16, 1811. Affaires £tranglres.
THE TWO DECREES 165
with the Neapolitans and the French who are resident
in Naples, and you should neglect no means of convincing
them of the very real nature of the risks that any de-.
parture from these principles would lead them to incur. "|
Finally, orders were sent to Durant, who also received
a copy of the instructions which had been given to Grenier
and Perignon. " It is not likely that the King will be so
imprudent as to display any opposition to the Emperor's
will." If, however, any resistance were offered and "a
formal refusal were to result, Durant was under orders
" to announce that he was commanded to leave Naples.
If you do return/' added the Minister, " the Emperor
intends to inform the Senate of the King's conduct, to
make known to France that he had excluded all French-
men from a city which they themselves had conquered,
that he had insulted the colours beneath which he had
had the honour of fighting in the days before French
blood had won him his throne, and that he was therefore
King no longer." 1
The ultimatum was clear and concise. Let the King
refuse to throw open Gaeta to Grenier and all is over
with him. Considerations of a rpilitary _ natiire. Jiad
hitherto led Nnpoleo^to_deaj gently with Miirat, _hilL Jie.
by nmfieans ready to allow these considerations to
involve him In the loss of a kingdom. He had humoured
Joachim to the utmost limit which his imperious nature
would brook, but that his vassal should push his
separatist principles beyond that limit by disseminating
notions of liberty and independence he was not going to
allow. It was now* no longer a question of_pjdinary'
disagreements or minoFTr^arhps nf""rtisrip1in
EmperorTiad lull proofthat Joachim
dasting_ptt nis authority, and he at l)nceresolved_j£
<*c7ush himT The King should obey, or refuse at hisperil.
1 Bassano to Durant, Compiegne, September 17, 1811. Affaires
166 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Murat did not delay making his submission till
Grenier and Durant had received their orders, or till
Perignon had returned to Naples. The Emperor's letter,
which reached Naples about the loth September, struck
terror into the heart of Joachim. What could be done,
if indeed it were not too late to do anything, to avert
the storm once again ? There was but one means at
hand, the means that great crises always brought into
play, and that was the intervention of Caroline. None
but she was capable of approaching Napoleon and using
such speech to him as would ward off the blow. She
alone could find the way to her brother's heart, that
brother who would suffer anything from his own flesh
and blood. Vainly did Maghella (who knew that the
departure of the Queen, on whom he had brought recent
and almost public dishonour, would inevitably bring
about his own ruin) attempt to induce the King to alter
his decision. Nothing could shake his purpose. He felt
that this alone could save him from immediate disaster.
Little recked he what befel one who had served him,
favourite though he were, if his crown were in danger.
Caroline herself set far too high a value on that crown
not to forget the shame and humiliation she had recently
been compelled to suffer. A Queen before everything
else, a Queen she meant to remain, and all other con-
siderations went by the board when her position was at
stake. Nay, this very journey gave her her revenge.
She it was now who held her husband's fate in the palm
of her hand. She it was to whom he had to come as a
suppliant begging her to convey to the Emperor his
excuses and his promises of repentance. She it was to
be who would speak in the Great Man's ear such words
of accusation or defence as would bring her foes to ruin
and secure the rehabilitation of her friends. By her
departure she became the arbiter of the King's fate, of
the fate of her friends and foes. It was a great part to
THE TWO DECREES 167
play, and Caroline, like every woman to whom power
was dearer than anything else in the world, revelled in
the joys of her vast though transient authority.
By the nth September peace had been restored
between Joachim and his wife. The compact had been
sealed. All was to be forgotten. In return she was to
go to Paris with assurances of her husband's submission
and to promise his acquiescence in any measure if only
he might be left in possession of his Kingdom. That
day, therefore, Murat wrote to the Emperor as follows :
" Sire, the position in which we are situated is so painful,
and it is so difficult to convey to you an idea of the true
state of affairs that I have determined to persuade the
Queen to proceed on a visit to Your Majesty. She leaves
the day after to-morrow. I beg Your Majesty to give
credence to all she will tell you of my sufferings, and how
impossible it is for me to carry out all the behests that
Your Majesty has caused to be transmitted to us. I am
still hoping that Your Majesty will restore me to happi-
ness by allowing me to live at your side." l
The letter was written but not sent. For what then
was Murat waiting ? Did he hesitate to stake his all on
this single card instead of attempting armed resistance,
or were the Italian party, whose overthrow would be
assured if the Queen were to go, plying their last desperate
arguments to prevent her departure ? Four days later
the King at last made up his mind. On the I5th he
despatched a messenger to the Emperor with a letter
" announcing that the Queen had decided to go to Paris
to have the pleasure of greeting and embracing him once
again." 2 Joachim sent word of the matter to the Diplo-
matic Corps, to Durant, to Benkendorff and Mier, the new
Austrian Ambassador. The tidings were thus officially
1 Murat to Napoleon, September II, 1811. Affaires £trangb-es.
1 Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples, September, 15, 1811. Archivio di
Stato, Naples.
i68 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
confirmed. Mier was too recent an arrival at Naples
'to understand why a sick woman should thus hurriedly
depart on a journey. But Durant, whose information
was complete about what went on in the Palace, was in
no such uncertainty. "It is because the King desires
it," he said. " He did not show the Queen the letter he
received a few days ago from the Emperor, but he did
not disguise from her that its tone was stern, and it
is clearly because of what it contained that he decided
to send off the Queen on this mission." x
Besides the letter to Napoleon, Murat's messenger
was the bearer of instructions for Campochiaro. As the
latter might, if necessity arose, be called upon to support
the Queen, it was right that he should be posted in the
objects of her visit, at least, the official objects. Gallo
therefore wrote as follows : " Her Majesty is leaving on
the 1 7th, the day after to-morrow, and the King will
accompany her as far as Gaeta. She will travel by easy
stages without fatiguing herself, and will in due course
see about bringing her journey to an end at Compi£gne,
or wherever His Imperial Majesty may happen to be.
Besides her domestic staff, she will only take with her
Mesdames de Cassano and Exelmans, Messieurs d'Angri
and Arlincourt, as well as Commandeur Janvier and
Mademoiselle de la Vernette.
" The King hopes that by personally visiting His
Imperial Majesty the Queen may be able to dispel all
the shadows which have been engendered in the Em-
peror's mind to the prejudice of the perfect mutual
confidence and unclouded friendship which the King
both desires and deserves to inspire. Her Majesty the
Queen is thoroughly acquainted with the King's senti-
ments, as well as with every detail of home and foreign
policy. She has a knowledge of all the questions,
economical or political, that may have been the subject
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, September 16, 1811. Affaires A'trangtres.
THE TWO DECREES 169
of controversy between the two Courts. She is aware of
the demands that are made by France and she knows
the Kingdom's resources, and above all, she understands
how greatly desirous the King is of giving His Majesty
the Emperor proofs of his gratitude, loyalty and affec-
tion. Her Majesty the Queen is therefore perfectly
competent to explain and justify the conduct and senti-
ments of the King on all points and to supply the answer
to whatever unjust doubt, question or prejudice may
have taken shape in the mind of His Imperial Majesty.
The King says that he hopes by this means to win back
the Emperor's confidence and to recover for himself that
peace of mind and body from the absence of which he
has for some months past suffered so acutely." l
At seven o'clock in the morning of the igth Caroline
left Naples, Murat going with her as far as Capua. She
gave out to everybody that she intended being absent
about two months, a statement she repeated to Norvins
on reaching Rome. She arrived in Paris on the
2nd October at one o'clock in the afternoon. " Her
Majesty alighted at the palace of His Eminence Cardinal
Fesch, where a suite of apartments had been made ready
for her until such time as the Emperor, then absent
from Paris, should send orders regarding Her Majesty's
place of residence. No sooner had she arrived than she
hurried off to St. Cloud to see the King of Rome, coming
back immediately to seek repose after her journey." 2
While hoping the best from Caroline's mediation,
everybody considered Murat 's position highly precarious.
Mier, Austria's new Ambassador, had all but abandoned
his journey. The official in charge of his baggage train,
" misled by false reports," had inquired of Menz, the
Austrian Charge d' Affaires, " whether he ought to con-
1 Gallo to Campochiaro, September 15, 1811. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
2 Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, October 2, 1811.
170 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
tinue his route." 1 The rhodomontades of the King and
his ministers were of no avail. Equally vain was the
explanation which Gallo gave Mier that " since the army
of Naples has become a national army, there is no longer
any need for Grenier's troops, which have accordingly
been disbanded." 2 The Austrian Ambassador was not
deceived. From the moment of his arrival the weakness
of Murat's position had been glaringly evident to him.
" The hope is entertained that the Queen may be able
to avert the tempest that threatens to overwhelm the
King. If she does not succeed it is all over with the
Kingdom of Naples. When one knows Napoleon's char-
acter one can scarcely deceive oneself about the matter,
and once he has set his heart on the union (of Naples
and France) I don't think any one will be able to divert
him from his purpose, particularly as I do not see what
there is to hinder such a measure. Armed resistance
would be the height of folly, since the general opinion is
that the King could place no certain reliance on his army,
made up as it is in large measure of French and foreign
officers." 3
Perignon arrived on the 4th October, and his appear-
ance put a final stop to Italian bluster. Obedient to
instructions, " he declared — and he cared not who heard
him — that it was no part of the Emperor's plan to unite
the Kingdom of Naples to the Grand Empire . . . that
the Emperor had no desire to interfere in the internal
administration of the country, but that so far as its
foreign policy was concerned, that policy must be and
always remain subordinate to his own. He added that
the King should not forget that he was a French Prince
and a Grand Dignitary of the Empire, that he owed his
position as King to the Emperor's generosity and that
1 Menz to Metternich, Naples, August 30, 1811. Archives Natioiiales.
* Mier to Metternich, Naples, September 20, 1811.
* Idem.
THE TWO DECREES 171
the predominance of France was an essential condition
to his maintaining it, and lastly, that as the Emperor
had conferred that dignity upon him so also he could
take it from him again. Deeply humiliating as these
speeches must have been to the King, they do not appear
to have inflicted any grievous wounds on the amour
propre of the Neapolitans." l
However harsh the treatment Napoleon proposed to
mete out to Murat, " the latter appeared to have made
up his mind unreservedly to bow to his will." 2 Never-
theless he experienced a final pang when he learned that
he would have to allow Grenier to enter Gaeta. He sent
for Durant, and after showing him the letters he had
written to General Grenier giving his consent to the
entry of the French troops into Gaeta, he expatiated on
the unhappiness of his position, and expressly asked him
to announce his determination to relinquish the Crown
unless the Emperor gave him back his esteem and ceased
to overwhelm him with humiliations, complaints, and
unreasonable demands. But he gave way on all points.
Grenier might enter Gaeta or any other place in the
kingdom. Bitter pill though it was to swallow, he
acquiesced in Pe"rignon's return to Naples, and showed
himself accommodating in all questions relating to the
naval contingent. Vainly since June had Napoleon dis-
patched note after note to Naples to urge expedition in
the dockyards in order that the provisions of the Bayonne
Treaty might be carried out. Fear now stimulated
Murat into promptitude. " He displays an anxiety to
carry out to the full all the obligations imposed upon
him by the Treaty." 3 The consequences were the ap-
pointment of a commission to inquire into the means of
increasing the shipbuilding capacity of the nation ; the
1 Mierto Metternich, October 10, 1811.
a Durant to Bassano, September 28, 1811.
8 Durant to Bassano, September 28, 1811. Affaires £trangercs.
172 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
certainty of being able to lay down more vessels ; the
dispatch of Lafosse, a naval engineer, to Paris ; the
fitting out of the battleship Le Capri and the frigate La
Caroline, on which work was carried on day and night ;
the drafting of Neapolitan crews to Toulon for service
in French warships. Matters went on apace.
Though the blow which overwhelmed Murat in Sep-
tember sufficiently explains the completeness of his sub-
mission at the time, its prolongation postulates a further
cause, for his recuperative powers were rapid. This
further cause was none other than Caroline. For, not-
withstanding that Joachim's ambition and vanity may
have tempted him to embark once more on his Italian
adventure, his wife, who grasped the situation, was able
to prevent him from making a false step which at that
juncture might have involved him in irreparable disaster.
Her arrival in Paris had already modified the position
of the King. Campochiaro, the Neapolitan Ambassador,
who was among those in the King's confidence and whom
Durant in his dispatches or Daure in his explanations
had represented to the Emperor as an enemy of France,
was sent home to Naples. He quitted Paris on the
gth October,1 scarcely a week after Caroline's arrival,
without being accorded an audience and without pre-
senting his letters of recall.
Although by Campochiaro 's disappearance from the
scene Murat lost a valuable friend and informant at
Paris, it was an immense gain to his cause to be rid of
a man whose presence had become unbearable to the
Emperor. Caroline now had the field to herself, and
was able to bring into play that aptitude for diplomacy
with which Nature had so conspicuously endowed her.
While therefore in society and before the world she
studied to make the most of her feminine attractions,
1 Caracciolo to Gallo, Paris, October 9, 1811. Naples, Archivio di
State.
THE TWO DECREES 173
she was ever labouring quietly and unostentatiously to
fulfil the long and difficult task of restoring peace betwixt
her husband and her brother. Numerous were the in-
structions and reports she sent home to Naples. In
them she gave her orders with minuteness, and loftily
indicated to the abject Murat the line of conduct he
should follow. Slowly and surely by her resolution and
tactfulness, her perseverance and charm, she attained the
object at which she aimed, and cleared away the clouds
that had darkened the brow of her all-powerful brother.
Though the full measure of his old affection may not
have been won back by her for Murat, she at all events
produced in his mind such feelings of favourable con-
descension as would pave the way for the Soldier King
to reconquer by his worth as a fighting man the for-
feited favour of his master.
Pending the arrival of the sovereigns, Caroline went
again to Saint Cloud to see the King of Rome and sought
distraction in the f£tes and balls, some of which were
given in her honour. On the nth November the Emperor
and Empress returned from Holland. No sooner had
they reinstalled themselves at Saint Cloud than she
hurried off to visit them. Eager to pay her court " she
went every day to Saint Cloud." In due course
she was invited by her august brother to take up
her quarters in the Pavilion de Flore at the Tuileries,
whither she proceeded on the 23rd with the Duchesse
de Cassano and the Prince d'Angri.1 Her letters, of
which at first Joachim had made but scanty mention,
became increasingly reassuring. " It appears on the
whole that the letters written by Her Majesty the Queen,
after she had had the satisfaction of a personal interview
with the Emperor, have in no small measure added to
the King's confidence and sense of security." * Thus she
1 Caracciolo to Gallo, Paris, November 25. Naples, Archivio di Staio.
3 Durant to Bassano, Naples, December 2, 1811. Affaires £trangtres.
174 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
gradually repaired the rift. To Murat, who desired that
questions should be put respecting the sequestration
imposed by Napoleon's orders on the Farnesian property
in Rome, she replied that she had already taken the
initiative in the matter, and that the Due de Bassano
was to deal with the affair.
Whether she would be able to prevail on the Emperor
to renew his correspondence with the King was a doubtful
question. Murat boldly answered it in the affirmative, but
the matter was at least questionable even for those who
were most closely in touch with the Emperor. Durant
himself considered the " re-establishment of direct com-
munication with His Imperial Majesty as only a remote
possibility." 1 Nevertheless, Caroline succeeded in bring-
ing about a general improvement in the situation, and
her efforts were so highly appreciated by her husband
that he freely sanctioned an extension of her stay in
Paris instead of requiring her to return to Naples. Her
services were far too valuable to admit of his dispensing
with so useful an intermediary, particularly as the
rumours of war with Russia were gathering strength
every day, and none would be so able as she to lay his
offers of service before the Emperor.
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, December 13, 1811. Affaires EtrangZres.
CHAPTER VII
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY
Napoleon and the Neapolitan agitators— Maghella dismissed— The King
hesitates — His departure — Dissensions between the King and Queen — The
Neapolitan contingent— Grenier evacuates Italy — The King desires to leave
the Army — His demands — He returns to Naples.
WHEN, in September, the Emperor came to
look closely into the affairs of Naples, he
quickly recognised that the King was in-
capable of carrying on unaided such deep-
laid machinations against him. He knew his Murat,
and before the matter was definitely reported to him
he had divined that some secret but powerful influence
was at work urging him to take up a position of
hostility to France. His interviews with Daure put
the matter beyond doubt, and he resolved to strike
at the offenders. As a result La Vauguyon was
expelled, Campochiaro sent home to Naples, and Ayme
shut up in prison at Vincennes on a charge of stealing
diamonds.1 These were the first to suffer. As for the_
rest it was not so easy to demonstrate their guilt. The
Emperor would have proofs, and patiently set to work
to collect evidence. Caroline knew better than any one
who the plotters were, and the various degrees of their
1 Ayme, a confidential agent of Murat's, had a similar post in Paris to
La Vauguyon's. He was supposed to keep his master aware of all that went
on at Napoleon's Court. He was arrested by Savary's men and thrown int6
prison at Vincennes on the pretext that he had been concerned in stealing the
diamonds of the Crown of Spain and the celebrated Peregrine Pearl.
175
176 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
responsibility. The persons next aimed at were nearer
to the King, for it was indeed among his immediate
entourage that he found those pernicious counsellors who
urged him to set himself in opposition to France. But
worse remained behind, for actual members of the Govern-
ment, ministers holding office, and these not the least
important, were the most active in filling his poor brain
with chimerical ambitions of liberty and independence.
The King's two confidants, the men who engaged his
largest measure of trust, Zurlo the Minister of the Interior
and Maghella Chief of the Police, had sold themselves to
the enemy.
" Zurlo has the reputation of being a man of great
capacity. He was Finance Minister in Ferdinand's time.
Many people look on him with suspicion, and it is even
rumoured that when he entered the King's service it was
with the secret permission of the ex-Court. However,
the King has a high opinion of his character and
integrity.
"It is more particularly by artfully exploiting the
King's imagination and by pandering to the dreams of
the glory and renown which he hopes may be his in the
years to come, that Monsieur de Zurlo has succeeded in
winning His Majesty's confidence, and I have, unfortu-
nately, every reason to believe that he uses the advantages
of his position in a manner no less incompatible with the
Emperor's wishes than with the real interests of his King
and country.
" Monsieur de Maghella has brought himself into
prominence by services of a different order. He has
been most industrious in drawing up his reports, and
showed an exclusive personal devotion to the King at
a time when the Ministry of Police was in the hands of a
man whom His Majesty considered particularly attached
to the Queen (Daure)." l
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, February I, 1812* Affaires Etrangtres.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 177
The Emperor was in no need of Durant's reports to
enable him to identify the individual in question, and his
official representative only confirmed information which
had already reached him through less formal channels.
With his usual perspicacity he divined all that lay hidden
beneath the veil of ministerial reticence ; the treasonable
counsels, the war that might have been openly declared
against him had a favourable opportunity presented
itself. On both men, therefore, he was ready to out-
pour the vials of his wrath. But Caroline, furious with
Maghella and indignant at the way he had gone to work,
had been especially vehement in her denunciations of his
conduct, and for the moment the Emperor deemed it
advisable to crush Maghella alone.
He therefore requested Bassano to send him a report
concerning the Police Minister at Naples, and on the
strength of this document, the conclusion of which had
been dictated in advance, the Emperor signified his in-
tention of causing it to be announced to Maghella through
M. le Baron de Durant that he would be required to return
to France within a fortnight of the date of the notice.
These intentions were swiftly put into execution. Next
day Napoleon wrote to Maret as follows : —
" Send word to my Minister at Naples and tell him that
I have decided to recall Maghella, who has been acting
as Minister of Police at Naples, and that he must demand
that this individual shall leave Naples for France within
forty-eight hours under pain of arrest. You will tell
Baron Durant plainly that the Sieur Maghella is charged
with plotting against the safety of the Empire, and that
he has been acting in collusion with the English with a
view to bringing about a rising on the part of the so-called
patriots in Italy. He is to say nothing to the man
himself, but he must assume a firm tone and insist on
Maghella leaving Naples immediately." *
1 Lecestre, unpublished letters, No. 926.
M
178 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Thus it was not a fortnight, but barely forty-eight
hours, that Maghella was to be allowed to prepare for his
journey. Bassano handed Durant Napoleon's orders
concerning the man " whom His Majesty looked upon as
the ringleader of the intrigues which were intended to
stir up the Italian patriots, as they called themselves." l
But apparently he did not despatch his missive with
the promptitude that had been expected, since Durant
only saw Gallo on the 22nd March.2 R6gnier had
already sent Maghella his orders to return to France,
and Durant 's official message to Gallo did not arrive
till after the due time. Murat, when informed by
Maghella that he had been recalled, had just had one of
his usual feverish attacks, which returned with redoubled
severity when he heard about the French Minister's
communique. Not daring to write to the Emperor on
so delicate a subject, he confided his troubles to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whose support he knew
he could count, and begged his aid and protection for the
fallen Maghella. " The Chief Justice of the Empire gave
orders that M. Maghella should return to France within
a month. His departure had already been arranged when
M. le Baron de Durant notified my Foreign Minister that
' this Frenchman ' would have to leave in forty-eight
hours. I will not conceal from you the pain that such
orders, so communicated, have caused me. However,
M. Maghella leaves to-night, and I will only tell you that
I shall find it difficult if not impossible to fill his place.
Monsieur Maghella performed the divers duties that were
entrusted to him with zeal, fidelity and integrity, and
therefore it is that I commend him to your generosity
and beg you to take his part. I shall be under the
greatest possible obligation to you for whatever kindnesses
you may show him. I greatly trust that the Emperor
1 Bassano to Durant, March 2, 1812. Affaires j&trangtres.
2 Durant to Bassano, March 23, 1812. Affaires £trangtres.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 179
may see his way to reconsider his decision and to allow
M. Maghella to re-enter my service." x
His fever and his fury notwithstanding, Murat took
good care not to disobey. It was on the 22nd that
Durant made his announcement, and Maghella, cashiered
there and then (for it was not Murat 's way to support
his friends when he felt .thajJie wasjn peril himself) had
to give place to Campochiaro. By a decree of the 24th
the latter was " provisionally entrusted with the port-
folio of the Police." 2 Thus Maghella quitted Naples, but
before he set out he spent his last day with Murat at
Portici.3 There the latter probably impressed upon him,
as he had upon La Vauguyon, the necessity for waiting
with prudence and serenity the dawn of better days.
The Emperor's charges against the ex-Minister of
Police were not without foundation, for Campochiaro 's
first act was to seek out the French Minister at Naples
in order to tell him about " a secret correspondence that
had been established with Sicily through the medium of
the Police Department," and to inquire whether he might
allow it to continue.4 The wary and far-sighted Cam-
pochiaro meant to forearm himself against any other
Imperial outbursts that the future might have in store.
But the correspondence was far too compromising as far
as Maghella was concerned, and " without waiting for a
reply to the question which had been referred to Paris,
Campochiaro persuaded the King to give orders that the
1 Murat to Bassano, Naples, March 26, 1812. Affaires £trang£res.
a Moniteur Universcl.
3 Durant to Bassano, March 28, 1812. Affaires £trangeres.
4 Durant to Bassano, March 28, 1812. Affaires £tran$res. In a
memorial intended to vindicate his conduct which Maghella sent to Austria
after 1815, he himself recognised that in 1812, when he was removed from
office, everything was ready for entering into relations with the English in
Sicily, and that the Emperor's summons put a stop to all for the time and caused
Murat's understanding with England to be deferred till 1813. (Maghella,
Compendia della mia vita : an unpublished document for a knowledge of
which I am indebted to the kindness of Commandant Weil.)
i8o NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
correspondence should cease entirely." l It was destined
to be resumed later.
There remained Zurlo, whose fall was universally
expected. " It is said," wrote the Austrian Ambassador,
" that Maghella was recalled by the Emperor to France
at the Queen's request, and that Zurlo, the Minister of
the Interior, who is universally detested in the country,
will also be deprived of office in obedience to orders that
have been received at the Palace. 2' Mier and his in-
formants had gone too far. It was not so easy to find
a pretext for getting rid of Zurlo. He was not a French
subject, and in all probability Napoleon had not yet
settled in his own mind when his departure should take
place. But the time was to come when he too would
have to hand in his papers. Zurlo himself recognised so
clearly the fate that was in store for him that when the
Russian campaign was in progress and Cardinal Firrao
wanted the Te Deum to be sung after the battle of
Smolensk, the Minister interrupted him and said :
" Monseigneur, if these victories go on, it is all over
with you and me." 3 If, contrary to all expectations,
Zurlo maintained his position, his immunity was due to
the weakening of the Napoleonic power, for his downfall
had been resolved upon before the campaign of 1812.
Such were the circumstances and such were the aims,
often divergent and sometimes contradictory, which in-
fluenced Murat as he wrestled with the difficult problem
of determining the line of conduct he should adopt to-
wards Napoleon. Sometim^^verma^tejsdJ
fulnessjafjthe Emp^ror,Jieiriac^ to perform
whatever was require*! ot him, occasionally indeedmoreT
than was required of hirn^ ATTrtirer^times the influence
of the Italian Cabal would regain its ascendency, and he
1 Durant to Bassano, April 8, 1812. Affaires Etrangtres.
2 Mier to Metternich, March 27, 1812.
8 Diario di Nicola.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 181
would seem almost inclined^tp shake himself free Jrom
, Irian
[is mind thus continue
fro jfrom^January^8i2^
-French army.
As the rumours of war became louder and more
definite, Murat pricked up his ears. The doughty cavalry-
man could not hear the call of the bugle without a thrill,
and when Russia began to threaten he quivered with
impatience, longing to lay aside the role of King and be
a soldier once again. As early as the loth February, he
had been anxious to resume his place among the brave
spirits in the French army. But how was he to ask
Napoleon for a command in the Grand Army after he had
been deprived of the command of the French troops in
his own kingdom ?
' The King," says Durant, " repeatedly expressed his
regret regarding this matter, and eagerly added that His
Imperial Majesty had but to say the word, all would be
forgotten, and he would depart with joy and delight.
Every fresh piece of news about the preparations that are
going on makes him tremble with excitement, but it is
particularly when His Majesty hears any reference to the
immense body of cavalry that has already been gathered
together that he burns to set out." l
Durant, as he himself tells us, conveyed what was
in the King's mind to the Emperor. Murat, who either
did not dare or did not wish to write himself, applied to
Paris through the French Ambassador, whom he regarded
as a favourable medium. But since Napoleon vouch-
safed no reply to the overtures made through this channel,
Joachim decided to write himself.2 He received no answer
1 Durant to Bassano, February 12, 1812. Affaires £tranglres.
* This letter of Mural's, which is not extant, must have been dated about
the end of February, since the letter which alludes to it was dated the 22nd
March, and it took ten days for a messenger to get from Naples to Paris.
182 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
from the Emperor. On the other hand, he had letters
from the Queen informing him of the doubts expressed
by her brother regarding the sincerity of the King's
demand. The latter could restrain himself no longer.
Despite the pleas of his advisers, who urged that he
had won glory enough,1 he continued his endeavour to
regain the favour of his brother-in-law. " I have already
written to Your Majesty," he said, " to beg the honour
of accompanying you in the coming campaign. Your
Majesty has not yet deigned to acquaint me with your
decision, and the Queen sends word that you doubt the
sincerity of my request and of any desire to accompany
you. Sire, it is so great that had it not been for the fear
of displeasing you, I should have already put myself en
route ; but Sire, it is only too true that it is my fate to lay
myself open to suspicion and to be regarded by you as no
longer possessing the same heart and zeal to serve you as
in former years. Time was when you would not have
thought of doubting my word. How often have you said,
' I have no real friends but Murat and Berthier ! ' And
now, while you have forgotten me, I think only of you.
Yes, the one thing that torments me is the memory of
your past kindness. Summon me to your side, and then
judge of my sentiments ; ay, bid me come and you will
be convinced that my demand is sincere. Recall your
Murat. Can you go forth to face fresh dangers without
him ? I shall die if you do not bid me come. Never was
I so fain to see you, and to convince you how sincere,
how idolatrous, is my affection for you. Only remember
how J served you in the past and my misery will be at
an end." 2
This letter Murat took the trouble to write himself,
but it was just as unproductive of result as his previous
applications had been. Napoleon remained dumb, and
1 Durant to Bassano. Affaires £trangtres.
8 Murat to Napoleon, Naples, March 22, 1812. Archives Nationales.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 183
the Maghella affair, which was now coming to the fore-
front, was scarcely calculated to make him unbend.
Joachim was beset with apprehensions regarding his
future and devoured by longings to command the cavalry
force of which in his own mind he already looked upon
himself as the leader. But though he was begging and
praying the Emperor to summon him to the Army, he
took care to conceal from his entourage how humble a
suppliant he really was. At Naples he gave out that he
would consent to undertake a command in the army,
but that he would not go out of his way to apply for one.
This he considered would add to his dignity and bring
his condescension towards his brother-in-law into con-
spicuous relief. So clearly was this view of his position
impressed upon his entourage that misconceptions as to
the real nature of the relations between the Emperor
and Murat were general throughout the Chancelleries.
Well-informed as he usually was, Mier himself was at
fault on this occasion. " The King," he says, " is very
anxious to have a command in the coming war, but he is
unwilling to ask for it." l These words were penned by
the Austrian Minister on the 27th March. What would
he have thought of Murat had he known of the application
he had made to the Emperor in February or of his still
more recent petition of the 22nd March ?
Haughty and high-mettle^, as hie, publicly displayed.
hifftselt, Joachrm^injprivate was humble and apple
pril» when sending Napoleon particulars
regarding the Neapolitan contingent for which he had not
asked, he took occasion to revert once more to his request.
" I shall be happy for the rest of my days if you will
suffer your old henchman, your most loyal and devoted
friend, to rejoin his old commander." 2 It was trouble
thrown -away. Vainly did he await the arrival of the
1 Mier to Metternich. Archives Nationals.
1 Murat to Napoleon, Naples, April 5, 1812. Affaires £tranglres.
184 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
post. No answer came. Murat began to grow desperate.
At last he unburdened himself to the French Minister,
and in one of those visitations of sincerity which in his
case sometimes succeeded long periods of moral strain,
he put aside his braggart airs and humbly confessed that
he had twice written to the Emperor to ask that he might
take up his post as a soldier at his side. He further
confided in Durant how fearful he was lest his efforts
should fail. " His apprehension," says the latter, " is
increased by the continued silence of His Imperial
Majesty." * "
On the I4th April he received a letter from Caroline.
Its terms were such that he thought he might safely go to
Paris, and he at once made up his mind to start on the
evening of the i6th, in order personally to explain his
position regarding the matters under discussion. He
was to travel as the Count of Calabria, and intended to
bring the Queen back with him, but, despite the fact that
every preparation had been made, the King did not leave
on the 1 6th. " On the I5th he worked very late into the
night," wrote Durant to Bassano. " Yesterday he was to
review four regiments which were to be included in the
Neapolitan contingent. He was then to hold a Ministerial
Council, which was to be followed in the evening by a
reception of the whole Court. But none of these engage-
ments V$$ fulfilled. The King remained in his own
cabinet till night, and saw no one. It transpired that he
had been indisposed and unable to see his ministers until
after eight o'clock."
This indisposition of the I5th was an evil omen, for
Joachim could never receive bad news without having
an attack of fever. Zurlo, General Carascosa, Poerio,
a Conseiller d'Etat, all three closely connected with the
Nationalist party, had united in urging him not to go.
1 Durant to Bassano, April 12, 1812. Affaires Strangles.
2 Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 17, 1812 Affaires titrangtres.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 185
But the King was impatient, and their counsels would
not have availed to restrain him. However, on the
evening of the I5th, letters had come to hand from the
Due de Carignano stating that His Imperial Majesty had
animadverted in terms of the utmost severity on the
King's conduct. This made Murat pause. Suppose the
Emperor were to receive him with anger ; suppose he
were sent back to Naples ! What an affront for one who
had pretended that he had never begged to be sent for 1
The whole imposture would become as plain as daylight
to every one. Joachim therefore dared not breathe
another word, but, curbing his impatience as best he
could, made up his mind to wait till a formal command
from the Emperor should make him certain of a favourable
reception.
Meanwhile letters from Caroline continued to arrive,
each one more urgent than the last. She even thought
that her husband was already on the road to Paris.
Through other channels the King had got wind of rumours
" which credited him with the desire to create for himself
a personal ascendency, a following of his own in Italy," l
rumours which were said to have reached Napoleon's ears.
He therefore deemed it high time to start. By the 23rd
his mind was thoroughly made up, and he wrote to the
Emperor as follows : " Sire, on the receipt of a message
from the Queen, I immediately despatched my equipages
to Paris, and was about to follow myself when a report
reached me from the Due de Carignano informing me of
the unfavourable manner in which he had been received
by Your Majesty. This report gave me to understand
that you were still prejudiced in your mind against me
and my government. I at once reversed my plans and
sent word to the Queen that I would not leave Naples
until I received first-hand information regarding your
Majesty's final decision. I was awaiting the Queen's
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 26, 1812. Affaires £trangtres.
186 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
reply when I was informed by persons on whom I could
place reliance and who are thoroughly devoted to Your
Majesty, that you had called my loyalty in question,
that you considered me mean-spirited enough to fight
shy of taking any place in the army, and only to be waiting
for a favourable opportunity to present itself in order
to shake off your control and assert my independence.
Sire, these suspicions, for which you have to thank your
own enemies rather than mine, have in a moment given
me back all my energy, all my resolution. I hesitate
to go to you no longer. It shall be in your power to
dispose of me and my alleged plots as you may see fit."
It may perhaps afford matter for astonishment that it
should have taken him so long to convince himself that
the Emperor was cognisant of his ideas and his intrigues.
Certainly the Imperial letter of the 3oth August should
have opened his eyes ; nevertheless, so limited was his
vision that he had readily suffered himself to be deluded
by the Italian Cabal into believing that his manceuvrings
were passing unnoticed at Paris. Now, however, that
" persons on whom reliance could be placed " (was this
Fouche" or Bassano ?) had assured him that Napoleon
was thoroughly alive to his machinations, he became
alarmed, and in order to forestall any orders that might
come and keep him in forced inactivity at Naples, he
acted on the permission implied in Caroline's letter and
hurried away to plead his cause in Paris.
His plan of defence was of the simplest. Knowing
that in the coming campaign the Emperor would be in
need of troops, he placed his contingent — reinforced as
largely as possible — at his brother-in-law's disposal and
made him a humble offer of his own personal services.
" I am going to Paris," he said. " I shall be there within
the week, when I look forward to seeing the Emperor.
I shall offer myself to him heart and soul and place
myself unreservedly in his hands. I shall declare that if
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY
187
he takes the field I will abide at his side, that I mean to
win back his affection and confidence at all costs, and that
I do not intend to return to Naples until I can come back
with such power and influence as his affection and con-
fidence alone can give. I am sending off my contingent,
including more than half my Household Troops. It
will be altogether 11,500 strong. I rely on His Majesty
to do everything necessary to ensure the safety of my
kingdom. I am leaving Marechal Perignon in charge,
and I hope that the Emperor will give him the control
of the ' corps d 'observation ' so that it may be employed
for the efficient defence and policing of my realm. I shall
go into the whole matter with the Emperor. My appeal
will be to his sense of justice and to his kindness of heart,
and I know he will listen to me and give me his approval.
Above all he will not hinder me from going to shed my
blood in order to serve him and advance his glory."
Such was to be his plea, and on the 26th April he
gave a preliminary rehearsal of it to Durant.1
is due not to any conspicuous^astuteness on his part, but
to the fact that circumstances once more"arraved them-.
^selves uirhis sider^jfjtoa^-^gajiaged to extricate himself^
from jj>p m^raT positiop-ki whTch^ie iound himself, he.
wed his good fortuneliFst to the necessities of the Empire^
secondly to tne possession of certain qualities which
at times^rendered his assistance valuable, if
indis-
rpen§able"to thesuccessfu]
is. Twice in the course of this year
IheTbrink of
-me precipice, and on each occasion Russia had proved
jjg^saivationr for had the Emperor been free from mis-
givings regarding the, intentions nf ^Alexander ^ -Murat
ppifLfor-his^rebellioiisness with
Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 26, 1812. Affaires £trangtres.
i88 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
On the evening of the 26th Durant witnessed the pass-
port which His Majesty had taken out in the name of the
Count of Calabria, and the King began his journey. So
certain was he of succeeding in his object, that his aides-de-
camp set out to rejoin him ; first the Frenchmen, Rosetti,
de Rochambeau, and others ; then the Neapolitans,
among whom was Prince de Cariati, who was captain of
a warship with a crew of two hundred men. This same
Cariati it was who was destined to act as intermediary
betwixt Naples and Austria, and who, when Joachim
decided to play the traitor, carried the news of his decision
to Metternich.
On quitting Naples, Murat did not manifest the slightest
intention of relinquishing the management of affairs.
Though his interests as well as his tastes were taking him
away to the war, he had thoroughly made up his mind to
remain ruler of his kingdom. In order to keep the reins
of government in his own hands, he had devised the
following scheme : " The Council of Ministers was to
meet every Thursday as usual, each of its members acting
as President in turn. Business would be transacted
exactly as though the King were present. Minutes of the
proceedings and the result of each sitting were to be
forwarded to His Majesty by the Secretary of State,
who was to despatch a messenger with the portfolio. In
case of emergency the president for the week was to have
the power to convene a special sitting." l
Doubtless in making these arrangements Murat thought
he was avoiding the necessity of appointing the Queen
as Regent. The mistrust of her which Maghella's revela-
tions had engendered in his mind remained as great as
ever, and he did not intend that because he was going to
join his brother-in-law's army Caroline should be left
behind with full powrer to act as she willed. What was
to prevent him, as he cavaliered it along the road to
1 Durant to Bassano, April 30, 1812. Affaires fctrangtres.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 189
Moscow, from administering the affairs of a kingdom
which he now deemed well under control ? Napoleon
ruled the Empire thus, and Joachim, whose vanity led
him to imagine that he too was capable of playing great
parts, thought that whatever his brother-in-law could do,
he could do likewise.
After reaching Paris, however, he changed his mind.
Napoleon probably gave him instructions which he was
unwilling to carry out, particularly with regard to Caroline
and the Regency. Nevertheless, however greatly the
measure may have conflicted with his wishes, he sent a
decree to his Secretary of State before leaving for the army
on the 1 2th May appointing Caroline to the Regency and
giving PeYignon the supreme command of all the forces
in the kingdom. Murat signed the decree with extreme
reluctance, and, instead of having it published in the
Monitore of the Two Sicilies, kept its terms as secret as
possible.1 The French Moniteur, on the other hand,
publicly announced the Queen's appointment. In this
manner Joachim hoped to throw dust in Napoleon's eyes,
and the ruse was successful. The Emperor had already
set out ; he was busy arranging the countless details
involved in the organisation of the Grande Armee and he
was confronted with the Titanic task of dealing with a
body of troops transcending in vastness any that he had
ever before put in the field. When therefore he received
the guarantee that his orders had been carried out and
that Caroline had been duly appointed to the Regency, he
was completely satisfied. But Murat, having allowed the
Emperor to depart with the comfortable assurance that
the Regency would be established, calmly set about
rendering the measure ineffective, and of so arranging
matters that the Queen, though nominally Regent, should
be incapable of exercising the smallest control in the
government of the country. " The command of the land
1 Durant to Bassano, May 26, 1812.
igo NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
and sea forces was in her hands ; she was to preside over
the deliberations of the Ministerial Council and to under-
take the consideration of current business, but as all
matters whose nature required that they should be dealt
with by royal decree were reserved for decision by the
King, she was left without any voice in the appointment
or dismissal of officers of State." l
Thus Joachim remained in command. But Caroline,
who felt herself infinitely more capable of governing than
her husband, could not long acquiesce in the continuance
of such a regime. She arrived in Naples on the 2nd June,*
and after little more than a month had gone by she let
fall words in Durant's hearing that plainly hinted at the
dissatisfaction she felt at the limited scope of the pre-
rogatives conferred on her. On the other hand the King,
not content with the precautions he had taken to restrict
her influence, was, it appears, desirous of maintaining
his control by carrying on a direct correspondence with
each department of the State.3 Evidently the situation
showed no tendency to improve, since two months later
Durant returned to the subject in almost similar terms.
Murat was still endeavouring to insure his ascendency.
He had such a dread of Caroline that he sought to rob her
even of those poor crumbs of power which he had re-
luctantly been compelled to leave her. Of a certainty
the Emperor, had he been acquainted with the whole
state of the case, would have interfered in his sister's
behalf, and have brought his brother-in-law with his
preposterous jealousy to reason. But events of grave
importance were engrossing his attention, and there was
no time now to interfere in matrimonial wrangles and to
adjudicate between a tyrannical husband and a com-
plaining wife.
1 Durant to Bassano, May 26, 1812. Affaires £trangeres.
3 Moniteur Universe!.
3 Durant to Bassano. Affaires Etrangeres.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 191
Napoleon had undertaken a mightier task than he had
looked for, and found it necessary to call up all his re-
sources, for the war on which he had entered demanded
such a huge arra}^ that the Grande Armee was destined
to be entirely swallowed up by it. He was thus com-
pelled to withdraw the " corps d 'observation," with
Grenier at its head, from Italy to join the Grande Armee.
He knew thoroughly well that this meant the extinction
of his authority at Naples and, while Joachim beheld with
delight the departure of his oppressors and London re-
marked with satisfaction that Grenier had taken with him
every soldier on whom he could lay hands, it must not be
imagined that the Emperor was not the first to realise
the consequences of his action. But there was no time to
hesitate or to elaborate schemes. The crisis demanded
that he should act, and act immediately. The reserves
must be called up ; every available battalion must pro-
ceed to the front. When the struggle was over, if Fortune
were still on his side, it would be easy enough to restore
these forces to the places from which he had withdrawn
them. But the immediate task was to save the situation.
Grenier's departure removed the final barrier to Joachim's
ambition. So long as the King had felt himself under the
eye of the French army at Naples, he had not dared to
make a decisive move, for he felt certain of failure. In
1 81 1, despite the goadingsof the Italian Cabal, he had twice
lowered his flag, for he was conscious that the Emperor
was at Paris ready to crush him, while there, before his
very eyes, was the Army of France, a living symbol of
the Emperor's might. But now his heart was light ;
the French had departed, the iron hand was no longer
upon him. From that day forth he determined to be
King of Naples indeed !
For the moment, however, these considerations do not
enter Murat's mind. One thought alone besets him, and
that is the thought of Caroline and the Regency. How
IQ2 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
can he tell that all his precautions will not prove vain ;
who knows but that by some enlargement of her powers
such as he would have given anything to prevent she may
not be reigning in very truth at Naples ? Haunted by
these ideas, which tormented him the more since he could
not unburden himself to the Emperor, his mind was forever
occupied with Caroline ; in the saddle and when he lay
down to sleep her image was eternally before his eyes. He
beheld her enthroned at Naples, wielding the sceptre with
soft and gracious hand, the centre of a powerful party
eager to pay her the homage of their admiration. Once
more there rose up before him the unwelcome vision of
that " Queen's party " which he imagined he had destroyed
once and for all when he banished Daure from the
kingdom. And he, Murat, where was he ? The same
pitiless power which led the whole of Europe captive
held him in thrall, compelled him to endure the hardships
of the campaign, to march eternally in the dreary frozen
night, to mingle in the fray and face wounds and death
— for what ? For a kingdom which perchance a woman
would conquer with a smile ! With these thoughts
constantly upon him his ardour began to grow dim,
his courage to give way. The war to which he had
looked forward with the lofty enthusiasm of a valorous
cavalier, now seemed a wearisome and interminable
affair. Little by little the soldier faded away and the
King took his place. And the King would fain go home
to Naples. In an army that was French in name and
French at heart he could no longer feel at ease. Alien
sentiments set up a barrier betwixt him and his old com-
panions in arms. His ears were not attuned to their
language of submission and obedience. Duty and
discipline were words of which he no longer knew the
meaning. He longed for his Court, his favourites, his
ministers, and above all for his sycophants. If in con-
formity with Napoleon's orders the army as a whole
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 193
yielded to Joachim the homage due to a royal personage,
all those former comrades of his who had fought side by
side with him and tossed about with him from one end of
Europe to the other, treated him with a familiarity that
was by no means pleasing to " His Majesty."
And so it was that Joachim was longing to be home
again even before Moscow was reached. In the fulness
of victory, ere as yet a single reverse had befallen the
Grande Armee, Murat had announced his intention to
depart. As far back as the beginning of October, d'Harlin-
court, one of his aides-de-camp who had returned to
Naples, " was instructed to give out that the King would
probably be home before long, either because a treaty of
peace would happily bring hostilities to a close or because
the army would have to remain for a protracted period
in winter quarters." 1 D'Harlincourt was also the bearer
of letters for the Queen, among them being in all proba-
bility the one which Murat wrote on the loth September
saying that as soon as Moscow was reached he would
abandon the army and return to Naples.
Moscow was taken, and on the I4th September, as the
Grande Armee filed into the sacred city, Murat beheld the
downfall of his hopes. The whole place was in flames,
and the Emperor was compelled to alter all his plans.
So far from Joachim leaving for Naples, his presence with
the army was doubly necessary. Napoleon's refusal to
entertain his proposal to winter at Smolensk and to
reopen the campaign in April 1813 may have stung him
to the point of contemplating disobedience to the Em-
peror's orders. At all events he seems to have made up
his mind to quit the army, even against Napoleon's wishes.
" Mon ami," wrote Caroline," I have just received your
letter of the 20 th September, and am greatly troubled by
it. I can see that you are sad and discontented. I
cannot tell you how distressed I am that it should be thus
1 Durant to Bassano, October 10, 1812.
N
194 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with you. Be calm, mon ami, and beware of throwing
away in a moment all the fruits of so perilous and so
brilliant a campaign. I have been looking forward to
seeing you again with the utmost delight, but your letter
has awakened my apprehensions. Do not lose heart.
Now, when I have been counting on being able to con-
gratulate myself and sharing in your happiness, it seems
as though you are going wilfully to reject and demolish
your good fortune. If my counsel be not too late, I pray
you let your mind be at rest. Come back again to your
wife, to your children, but leave the path open to return
to the Emperor when you may desire to do so." l
From this day forth the King's letters were one con-
tinuous complaint. He wished to return to Naples, and
he meant to have his way, come what might. The thing
became an obsession. Any excuse was good enough,
and one of his reasons for desiring to set out was that his
exploits were unnoticed in the bulletins. The Emperor
showed him every kindness, bore him company on the
march, took his meals with him and generally treated
him with extraordinary generosity. But it was all to no
avail. So terrified was he at the possibility of Caroline
extending her power that he could not forbear telling her
of his apprehensions. The letter, which was intended to
be ironical, only succeeded in being ill-natured.
" My dear Caroline," he said, " I confess to you that
I could not help being astonished at this absolute silence
on the part of the ministers ; if they were not to be
allowed to write to me you should have sent on their
reports, for it is impossible for me to continue in such a
state of ignorance. It is two months now since I had any
official news from Naples. I am indebted for my know-
ledge of Sicilian events to the Paris gazettes or rather
to the Emperor, who had the kindness to hand them on
to me. You have discontinued sending me the Messina
1 Caroline to Murat. Portici, October 16, 1812.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 195
Gazette in order to send it to Maret. If you are not dis-
posed to let others write, well and good, but at any rate
you should write yourself or send on their reports.
" Why should I not be pleased ? You write that my
ministers can look after matters as well as I and that you
are putting my troops through their paces. If that is
so, come and take my place here. Every one would be
delighted. The Russians would be vanquished in ad-
vance, and the bulletins would carry the news of your
brilliant triumphs to every one in Naples and Paris.
They are dumb concerning my small achievements." x
Such were the thoughts that were animating Murat's
mind at a time when it was desperately urgent to combat
the enemy. The retreat began. The King allowed his
forces to crumble away and suffered himself to be caught
napping by Platow. But what cared he ! His thoughts
were not with his troops, but far away in the South, where
he seemed forever to behold — and the vision nearly drove
him mad — Caroline riding by in state along the Riviera
di Chiaia. As he rode back over the snow along dreary
interminable roads with the famished frozen host about
him, he could think of nothing but Naples and what was
afoot there. But once more chance came to his assistance.
At Molodetscheno the Emperor learned of Malet's plot
and was anxious to start for Paris then and there.
Joachim Napoleon, King of Naples, should be his successor.
Alas, had he known of the one consuming desire that
filled his mind, how swiftly would he have altered his
decision. But^ Napoleon had no time now to make a
study oj^Jiis^brailier-in-law. Hgw^ moreover, was he to
expect that one on wJTnjp hpTharf lavighp^Sn^Tarjy jj|-
dulgences should have had in his heart any jentiment
'T)uUJiat atloyalty, any thought save that ofTJdngJiis
duty as asoldier.^lt was an unlucky hour both for him-
'"seTFand the army when Napoleon gave over the command
1 Mural to Caroline. Vinkovo, October 13, 1812.
ig6 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
to Murat. The latter, feeling himself indispensable,
immediately took advantage of the occasion to present
a list of demands, which included the removal of the
sequestration on the Farnesian property, the Principality
of Ponte Corvo, the recall of the too clear-sighted Durant,
and the appointment of the complaisant Perignon in his
stead, and finally trading licences and permission to
suspend the fitting out of ships.
On the 5th December at Smorgoni the Emperor
announced his decision to confer on Prince Lucien,
Joachim's son, the Principality of Ponte Corvo. The
news was transmitted by Defermon on the 3ist December
to Caroline and the young prince. " I have the honour,"
so the message ran, " to inform Your Royal Highness that
His Majesty the Emperor and King has by a decree of the
5th December conferred upon you the Principality of
Ponte Corvo to be held by Your Royal Highness on the
same conditions as obtained in the case of the late Prince
of Ponte Corvo." l
The decree being executed and the Emperor gone,
Murat had matters in his own hands. Retreat without
any attempt at order of discipline was the order of the
day. He openly avowed that his one aim was to get back
to Naples. Every messenger he dispatched bore with him
the same message. Thus Carafa, his equerry, was sent
off from Kovno on the I2th December with the promise
that the King would be home as soon as he had settled
the army in its winter quarters. An estafette whom he
sent from Koenigsberg on the igth of the same month
made a similar announcement. Then again Boccino
left Koenigsberg on the 23rd with letters for the Queen
" expressing his hopes of returning " ; 2 while finally the
King wrote to Pignatelli as follows : "I have received
your letter of congratulation on the occasion of New
1 Defermon to Prince Lucien. Naples. Archives ck la Societa Napolitana
di Storia Patria. * Diario di Nicola.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 197
Year's Day. I appreciate your good wishes for my wel-
fare, but my only happiness is to be with my family and
my subjects, into whose midst I hope soon to return."
At last his departure was fixed. An estafette set out
from Koenigsberg with his letters of the 25th, 26th and
27th ; they clinched the matter. Murat, overcome with
anxiety concerning events at Naples, his poor brain in a
ferment of disorder, made up his mind, no matter what
came of it, what people might think or what commands
he might receive, that he would go then and there and
leave the army to its fate.
Before the Emperor could possibly learn what had
happened Murat was riding desperately along the road
to Naples. The Empire and the Army, what of them ?
The latter might perish and the fortunes of France might
sink in irretrievable disaster, but Murat cared not if only
he could win his heart's desire and find himself home
again in Naples at last.1
1 On receipt of these letters Caroline at once sent Joachim advice inspired
by genuine good sense and an accurate view of the situation. Her husband's
disobedience struck her as being exceedingly grave and well calculated to
bring down upon him the full measure of Napoleon's wrath. She therefore
endeavoured to restrain him by one of those letters which she was continually
having to write. " Mon ami, I have just received by estafette your three
letters of the 25th, 26th and 27th. I am bound to confess that they have
made me dreadfully unhappy. Would you have me believe that you could
surrender to another the glorious role of aiding the Emperor to crush his
enemies, or that you could commit an act so wild as to leave the army before
the Emperor had fixed on your successor? Do you mean to say that you
would come away now, after six months of toil and when the worst time of
the year is over ? No, that I feel sure you will never do. Be of good heart,
mon ami. You would never forgive yourself if you gave up the victory to
another. You assisted with all your might to bring about the initial successes
of the Emperor ; but that is not enough so long as the final issue remains in
doubt. A few more days and the Emperor will be with you again with fresh
troops. Then will come victory and peace. Your bravery will have helped
to bring it about. Your happiness and mine too will be doubly great. Doubt
not that I long for your return if it could be brought about without prejudice
to your future happiness, but I know your heart too well, I am too well aware
of your affection for the Emperor as well as for your own interests, to imagine
198 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
To the Emperor, however, some reason or shadow of
a reason for such conduct had to be given. Ten days
after Smorgoni, Joachim mentioned to Napoleon that he
also was desirous of quitting the army. The next day he
pursued the topic. " It would scarcely be right for me
to remain with the army," he wrote, " when there are only
administrative details to attend to and when the needs of
my country and the wishes of my subjects recall me to
their midst." l On the 4th January he wrote again.
" Sire," he said, " it is not befitting that I should remain
with the army save when you are in command. The
King of Naples could scarcely assume control save with
the full measure of freedom and power so indispensable
to every commander-in-chief." On the 7th he gave notice
that he would hand over the command to the Viceroy
whenever illness or other circumstances should compel
him to leave the army.
As for giving the real reason, he never for a moment
dreamt of that. His motives vary with every letter.
Now it is because certain accusations are laid against
him ; now his enemies are responsible for his " firm
determination." Or else he has the fever and fears that
the jaundice is coming on (which by the way was not un-
likely since with him troubles and fever ever went hand in
hand). But what did it matter ? On the I5th he defi-
nitely announced that he was going, and selected illness
as his excuse. " I have the fever and am in the early
stages of a severe attack of jaundice." Despite the efforts
of Berthier and Eugene, who vainly endeavoured to re-
that your mind could be at peace if he were displeased with you. Therefore
take heart again. I know what your sufferings must be. I share your trials
and troubles, but I conjure you, by the glory which you prize so highly, I
conjure you, I say, to continue to endure them. It will not be for long, I
trust. Adieu, mon ami." (Caroline to Murat. Naples, January 15, 1813.
Affaires £trang2res .)
1 Murat to Napoleon. Stalluponen, December 17, 1812. Archives
Nationales.
THE KING JOINS THE ARMY 199
strain him, he made off without daring to confess his real
intentions to his brother officers. " I am betaking my-
self to the rear of the army," he wrote to Berthier, " and I
hope that by following a regular course of treatment and
taking a little rest I shall regain my health, which has
suffered from the manifold labours I have had to undergo,
and that before long I shall once more be able to assume
the command of the army." Having delivered himself
of this crowning falsehood he departed at headlong speed
for Naples.
PART II
CHAPTER VIII
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH
Napoleon learns that Murat has abandoned the Army — Murat's coldness
towards the Queen — The Moniteur of the 2 7th January — Murat gets wind of
Metternich's designs — His anxiety — He seeks a rapprochement with the
Emperor — He also seeks the protection of Austria — Cariati's mission —
Metternich proposes an alliance — Negotiations with Great Britain — Eugene
arrives in Milan — Murat is furious with the Emperor — The Moniteur of the
iQth June — Murat's note — Durant's ultimatum — Murat gives way — His letters
to the Emperor, Clarke and Berthier — The dispatch from Dresden — Murat
joins the Grand Army — The policy of Metternich — Metternich endeavours to
persuade Murat to join the Coalition or to remain neutral.
NAPOLEON started from Smorgoni on the 5th
December 1812. On the i8th he wrote to
Caroline to inform her of his arrival in
Paris. His letter summed up all that had
taken place during the last few days, and probably made
mention of his decision to confer the Principality of
Ponte Corvo on her son. On the 4th January he wrote
again. The political situation, he said, made it impera-
tive for him to form a Corps d'Observation of Italy, and
he requested the immediate dispatch of a Neapolitan
cavalry regiment 1000 strong, to consist of four squadrons
of 250 men each. The men were to be carefully picked
and well mounted, and were to start within twenty-four
hours. They were to be accompanied by a detachment
of field artillery. Caroline was to furnish their mounts
herself. Napoleon supplying the necessary guns and gun-
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNIGH 201
carriages. This was not all. The Queen was further
requested to send a light infantry regiment in two
battalions. These battalions were to number between
them 1800 men, none of whom were to be under twenty-
two years of age. " Send these troops along the road to
Verona," he said ; " I must have 40,000 on the Adige.
There is not a moment to be lost." l To the Emperor's
first letter Caroline replied with much effusion. She
asked permission to offer him her congratulations on his
safe return, stating how she herself shared in the delight
he must be feeling in embracing the King of Rome once
more after so prolonged an absence. " If, Sire," she went
on/' I had to express to you the full extent of my gratitude
for all the kindnesses you have lavished upon me, I should
weary you with the length of my epistles and even then
leave my tale half told. Still, Sire, you will, I hope,
allow me to express my gratitude not only for the favours
you have just conferred on my son, but also for all that
you have done for the King. Your generosity, Sire,
has still further strengthened the bonds of respect and
affection which unite us to Your Majesty." 2
Napoleon's letter found the Queen in a highly amiable
mood, and ready to do her utmost to carry out his in-
structions. Possibly she was anxious to minimise the
effect of her husband's misdeeds. No sooner, therefore,
did she receive the Imperial commands than she set to
work. On the I7th January the Minister of France
announced that in accordance with a request which His
Majesty the Emperor had forwarded to the Queen direct,
Her Majesty was about to dispatch a provisional regiment
numbering some 3000 men, and that she was drafting
1 Correspondence, 19,421.
2 This letter, which is preserved among the Archives Nationales^ is
undated, but it must have been written about the loth January, when Caroline
had just been officially informed by Defermon that the Principality of Ponte
Corvo had been granted to Prince Lucien.
202 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
some cavalry from Calabria which she intended to add to
the other available mounted droops near Naples in order
to make up a body of horse a thousand strong. That
very day Caroline inspected some of the troops,1 and
four days later, on the 2ist, three battalions of the 4th
Light Infantry were due to leave Capua. Greater zeal
could not have been displayed.
The Emperor was at Fontainebleau, doubtless con-
gratulating himself on the valuable services rendered by
the Kingdom of Naples, when Murat's letter of the I5th
January announcing that he had quitted the army was
put into his hands. Napoleon immediately sent orders
to Eugene to take over the command. " I am vexed,"
he said, " that I did not put you in charge when I left. I
feel sure you would have come back more slowly and that
I should not have suffered such enormous losses. How-
ever, what is done cannot be undone." 2
By next day his indignation against Murat had in-
creased. He had just received a letter from Eugene
stating that he had temporarily assumed command.
" I consider the King's behaviour most outrageous,"
9fticHiie Emi^orTlhJns^j^pIyr^ and I have a very good_
o"~Tria1^ anj^xampleof him by~placing him under^
He is a "first jaman^on tne battie-tield, butjie,
_I5ea jofniethodTl^ iQQralj^r jggj * ' To Caroline
he wrote : " Your husbarid abandoned the army on the
1 6th. He is an excellent man in the field, but weaker
than a woman or a monk when he has not got the enemy
in front of him. He has no moral courage." The same
day he informed Defermon that he did not intend that
the investiture of the King of Naples' son as Prince of
Ponte Corvo should take place until he had taken the
oath in person. Napoleon's wrath appeared to gather
force. On the 26th the Major-General was told that the
Emperor would confirm none of the appointments made
1 Diario di Nicola. a Correspondence, 19,474.
MURAT— BENTINGK— METTERNICH 203
by the King save those which were intended to fill up
vacancies. Finally he wrote to Joachim himself. " I
say nothing to you of my displeasure at your conduct
after my departure from the army, diametrically opposed
as it was to your duty. I will say, however, that all the
trouble arises from the weakness of your disposition. You
are a good soldier in the field, but anywhere else you have
no firmness, no force of character. I suppose you are
not one of those people who imagine that the lion is dead.
If that is what you are counting on, you are making a
mistake. You have done me all the harm you possibly
could since I left Vilna. But no more of that. The title
of King has completely turned your head. If you wish
to retain it, conduct yourself properly."
Stern as this admonition was, the Emperor did not
stop there. He caused the following note to be inserted
in the Moniteur : " Owing to ill-health the King of
Naples has given over the command of the army to the
Viceroy. The latter has had more experience of adminis-
tration on a large scale and enjoys the Emperor's con-
fidence." l The Moniteur circulated from end to end of
Europe, and thus the Emperor's displeasure soon became
public property. This was the first time that any public
reference had been made to the strained relations existing
between the two brothers-in-law.
At the same time Napoleon sent word to Naples,
through his Minister, urgently demanding that the
contingent promised by the Queen should be dispatched.
" His Majesty," wrote Bassano to Durant, " cannot bring
himself to think that the King could possibly give the
troops counter instructions. If, however, such a thing
should happen, His Majesty desires that you should
insist on their leaving. You would have to present a
Note to the Minister and point out how pained the
Emperor would be at such a proceeding. If the King
1 Moniteur Universel, January 27, 1813.
204 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
persisted in his refusal in spite of your urgent representa-
tions, you would at once demand your passports, ex-
plaining your reasons for so doing to the Queen and
Marshal Pe*rignon." 1 Vigorous as they were, these
commands differed widely in tone from those of 1811.
But in those days Grenier was at hand to exact obedience,
and now, amid the demoralisation of the retreat, when
the Empire was beginning to totter, there was nothing
or no one to drive home Napoleon's remonstrances.
Diplomatic Notes were, alas, the sole weapons, and they
had small weight with Murat.
While the Emperor was digesting Joachim's letter of
the 1 5th January, Joachim himself was galloping full
speed for home. It took him just a week to get from
Dresden to Caserta. On the morning of the 29th, Comes,
the courier, who was a few hours ahead of him, came to
announce to the Queen that the King was at hand.2
Caroline immediately sent word to the Secretary of State
that the King would probably reach San Leucio that
night. " His Majesty's Ministers," she added, " have
expressed a keen desire to pay their respects to their
Sovereign, and I have given my sanction to their as-
sembling at San Leucio about midday to-morrow in
order that they may be able to do themselves that
honour. Kindly inform your colleagues." 3 She herself
hurried off to meet the King. The latter, having rested
all the next day, wrote to the Emperor on the 3ist as
follows : —
" I hasten to inform Your Majesty of my return to
Naples. My health has undergone some slight improve-
ment in the course of my journey. Nevertheless, I am
still far from well, though I trust that a little of the
1 Bassano to Durant. Fontainebleau, January 25, 1813. Affaires
a Diario di Nicola.
3 Caroline to Pignatelli. Naples, January 29, 1813. Archivio di Stato.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 205
rest and freedom from strain which I needed so sorely
will soon bring back my health, the loss of which occa-
sioned me the more regret in that it compelled me to
withdraw from Your Majesty's service. I have found
Italy perfectly calm and contented."
When he wrote to the Emperor he was in a decidedly
happy frame of mind. His letter is proof of that. He
was delighted to have escaped from the army with all
its depressing surroundings, and overjoyed at finding
himself at home again in his own kingdom where he
determined once more to resume his role of " grand
monarque." Napoleon's letter had not yet arrived ; the
King's mood was gay. Italy, he said, was calm. But
a change was at hand.
On Thursday, the 4th February, having rested from
his journey, Joachim made a state entry into Naples,
accompanied by the Queen, the princes and the prin-
cesses. An immense throng had assembled to give him
testimony of their deep affection, and he was cheered
to the echo. At the Reclusorio he was received by the
Municipal Council and other constituted authorities.
From Capodichino right up to the Royal Palace the
route was lined by the garrison troops, and it was amid
all this pomp and splendour that the King proceeded to
the Palace. There the Ministers of State and the High
Officers of the Crown were awaiting his arrival. As soon
as the customary greetings were over, the King retired
to rest.1 People who had caught a glimpse of him as
he passed remarked on the peculiar bronze hue of his
complexion, and various stories began to go the round.
Some said that he was suffering from jaundice, others
that he had an open wound in his side.2 His arrival
was the signal for great rejoicings which his flatterers
artfully ascribed to the affection in which he was held
1 Gallo to Carignano, February 6, 1813.
a Diario di Nicola.
206 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
by his people. For three days and three nights the
city was en fete and brilliantly illuminated.
But within his Palace there was waiting for Joachim
something that was calculated to set a curb upon his
vanity. The Emperor's letters to the Queen and himself
had just arrived. The scene underwent a swift trans-
formation. Caroline's conscience, however, was clear, her
withers were unwrung. She therefore took it upon her-
self to reply to her brother. She was, she said, extremely
grieved at the contents of the Emperor's letter, and
while not attempting to palliate the King's misdeeds,
she besought the Emperor to show him indulgence. As
for Murat, we learn from a dispatch sent by Mier to
Metternich that he was deeply incensed, and that being
unable as usual to set a ward upon his tongue, he found
it impossible to dissemble his wrath from the few people
who had approached him since his return. In order to
remove all doubt as to the cause of his displeasure, he
refused admittance to the French Minister Durant. So
furious was he with his brother-in-law that he was for
proceeding at once to extremities. According to Mier,
he had determined to summon the Estates and deputies
of the realm and to have himself proclaimed King of
the Two Sicilies then and there. It was only by dint
of prayers and persuasion that the Queen prevailed upon
him to forego his purpose.1 He voiced his complaints
for all to hear, and waxed furious over the disasters
which had fallen upon France. As for the Queen, who
disapproved of his action in leaving the army as well as of
his speeches and policy, she, says Mier, was reprimanded
for everything she had done during his absence. The
result was that there was great coolness between them.
In his attitude to the Emperor, however, Murat kept
himself within bounds. Despite the intoxicating influence
1 Mier to Metternich. Quoted by M. Weil in Le Prince Engine tt
Murat.
MURAT— BENTINOK — METTERNICH 207
of popular applause, despite his longing to reign as
a free and independent monarch, the Russian disaster
had not availed to destroy the Emperor's prestige in
the mind of the King of Naples. The Emperor was
still a power to be looked upon with awe, too mighty
to be openly defied, and Joachim was more reluctant
than ever to run the risk of losing his crown. When,
therefore, on the 7th February, Durant made a further
application to Gallo for the execution of the Emperor's
orders regarding the troops, he made a show of com-
pliance. In point of fact the King had not the least
intention of meeting the wishes of his brother-in-law or
of parting with troops whose presence he considered
might be necessary for the safety of his own person.
The King did not mean his subjects, or at all events
his friends, to imagine that he was going to rest under
the unflattering imputation cast upon him by the article
in the Moniteur of the 27th January, or that he intended
to take his lesson without a murmur. Even at this date
there were all kinds of whispers in Naples concerning the
bickering between Murat and the Emperor. " They say
that reference is made to the quarrel in the Moniteur . . .
it is also stated that the Marquis di Gallo is starting for
Paris to convey the King's excuses and that possibly the
Queen will go as well." l The rumour that Caroline was
going began to gain ground, so much so at any rate that
Mier announced it as a certainty in a subsequent dispatch
to Metternich. Though Carignano succeeded in persuad-
ing the King that the article in the Moniteur had been
unfavourably received throughout the French army and
that they had thoroughly disapproved of it, Naples enter-
tained a different view. To begin with, Joachim had
not uttered a word. So reserved was his attitude that
even Durant was deceived by the remarkable moderation
with which Joachim received the expression of the
1 Diario di Nicola.
208 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Emperor's displeasure. But the Italian Cabal was busy,
and soon Murat evinced a desire to put forward his side
of the question. On the 2oth February Gallo wrote to
Carignano requesting him by command of the King to
present a Note to the Due de Bassano " with every
regard to prudence and circumspection." Carignano was
first of all to talk the matter over confidentially with the
Due and explain to him that the King considered himself
obliged to act as he did out of regard for his own dignity
and in order to prevent abuses in the future. After these
somewhat cautious prolegomena Gallo dispatched his
note. " His Sicilian Majesty notices with surprise that
the editor of the French journal Le Moniteur permitted
himself to refer to him in his issue of the 27th January
in terms that displayed an equal lack of prudence and
decorum. The King feels confident that such unrestricted
freedom of utterance, tending as it does to impair the
respect due to the monarchy and to injure sovereigns
in the esteem of their subjects, cannot have the approval
of His Majesty the Emperor. With this conviction His
Majesty has commanded the undersigned to request
Monsieur le Due de Bassano to obtain orders to address
a severe reprimand to the journalist in question, and to
inform him that the paper will be prohibited in the King-
dom of Naples if any attacks are made by it upon the
King's Most Sacred Majesty." *
This was an inoffensive mode of reprisal, and the
reason which restrained Murat, in spite of contrary
counsels, from more vigorous action is to be found in
the fact that he was once more impressed by the advan-
tages which in certain circumstances might accrue to him
if he remained on terms of friendship with Napoleon.
On every hand the nations were anxiously endeavour-
ing to throw off the yoke. The fatal web that was
destined to involve the Emperor within its meshes was
1 Gallo to Carignano. Naples. Archi-vio di Stato*
I'RINCK CLEMENT METTERNICH, CHANCELLOR OF STATE
Front a />ainti>ig by Joseph Axtnann
In the possession of the Imperial and Royal Court Library, I ' ienna
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 209
at this time being stretched slowly, silently but surely,
from end to end of Europe. The centre of this web
was Austria, and Metternich the spider who was spinning
the toils. But it was a long and delicate business to
introduce harmony among so many jarring interests, and
in the course of the many exchanges of views that took
place some rumours found their way perforce to Murat's
ears. Through Cariati, who, after quitting the Grande
Arme'e, passed through Vienna on his way to Naples, he
became acquainted at an early hour with as much of the
matter as Metternich was disposed to impart ; namely,
that an attempt was to be made at bringing about a
general peace. But what form the movement was to
take, who was its prime mover and what powers were
to be admitted to the alliance, still remained a mystery,
at all events for Joachim, for nothing in the world would
have induced the Austrian to reveal to him at this stage
the plan which he was pursuing with such grim and
silent tenacity. But fear fell upon Murat's heart. He
was beset by the hideous apprehension that such negotia-
tions might leave him without his crown. The Emperor
had so often expressed a desire to annex Naples that
his brother-in-law deemed he would not be slow to sacri-
fice his kingdom if necessity arose. His apprehensions
were still further quickened by the recollection of what
Berthier had said to him when he left the army to return
to Naples ; which was that he, Berthier, considered him
too true a Frenchman to hesitate to give up his crown
if the interests of France demanded it.1 Murat was far
from regarding this observation as a joke, and considered
that the Emperor had prompted it in order to let him
know what to expect. Napoleon had made no comment
on the note that had been presented in connection with
the article published by the Moniteur. Since the letter
of the a6th January the King had heard no more. Two
1 Mier to Metternich, March 10, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
O
210 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
letters had come for the Queen, but she had not dared
to disclose their contents to the King. All this boded
but little good. Then again there was the mysterious
coming and going of the diplomatists, words exchanged
with an air of secrecy as though some dark project were
afoot, all of which sufficed to awaken Murat's appre-
hensions without letting him into the secret, and at last
drove him to desperate shifts to find out the truth about
the matter. This accounts for his desire to send an
emissary to sound Metternich as to his intentions. It
also throws a light on a note sent by Gallo to Carignano
concerning the departure of Count von Wessemberg on
a mission to London with the object of obtaining the
consent of England to Austria's undertaking the role
of mediator.
" Please be good enough," wrote Gallo on the 3rd
March to the Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, " to make
known whatever reports may reach you regarding the
attempt which Austria seems about to make to mediate
between the belligerent powers. Tell me also if there is
any truth in the rumour that Count Otto will be recalled
from the Austrian Embassy to proceed on special service
to England, whither it is believed Count von Wessemberg
has already been dispatched by Austria to make pro-
posals for a general peace."
So great was the importance attached to this mission
at Naples that Gallo returned to the matter a few days
later.
" The importance of Count von Wessemberg's mission
should make you understand the interest which His
Majesty takes in its result. You are therefore requested
to make known whatever you may succeed in discover-
ing concerning this matter."
Notwithstanding all his attempts at dissimulation,
Murat did not succeed, nor Gallo either, in disguising
his sentiments and apprehensions from the sagacious
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 211
Durant. " The King," says the latter, " informed me
when returning from the chase at Carditello that Prince
von Schwarzenberg had withdrawn his forces, and that
this retreat on the part of the Austrians might have
some connection with their project for taking up a
position of strict neutrality in order to act the more
effectually as mediators. There was a note of approba-
tion in the King's remarks which made an impression
on me, and I noticed it again yesterday in some remarks
made by the Due de Gallo." x
At a ball which took place a few days later at the
French Legation, Murat confessed that he was hampered
by the silence which was maintained regarding him. As
he came to read more clearly into Murat's mind, the
Ambassador expressed himself with greater precision.
" The King is tormented by the uncertainty of his
position, offended at the indifference which has followed
the severity with which he was treated, and mistrustful
of arrangements which he supposes are only kept a
secret from him because they involve his downfall." He
concluded by saying : "If I were to put my own con-
struction on what was in the King's mind, I should say
that what he secretly feared was to see himself left in
the lurch as the result of a final agreement, and that his
mind was running on the question of taking measures
for his own safety."
The end of February and the whole of March were
passed by Murat in a state of great uneasiness regarding
the fate that was to befall his kingdom. If only the
Emperor would give him some sort of assurance that he
was not forsaking his cause he would be reassured, but
this silence terrified him. At last he made up his mind
to take the initiative himself. To Talleyrand and Belliard
he successively communicated his desire of affording the
Emperor fresh proof of an affection of the sincerity of
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, March 10, 1813.
212 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
which he was in his heart convinced, even when appa-
rently wishing to convey the momentary impression that
he doubted it. His greatest satisfaction would consist
in seeing his old comrade of arms " on the field of
honour " again.1 He considered that his request would
thus reach the Emperor without his being obliged to
wound his self-esteem by making a direct appeal. In
vain did he wait an answer. The 23rd March he thought
would have been the turning-point in the matter, but
the 23rd March came and went, and brought with it
no reply from Paris. Murat then determined to persuade
Durant to write, and on the 3oth March Durant came to
the Palace. As a preliminary the Queen had been told
to acquaint him with the misgivings engendered in the
King's mind by the continued silence of the Emperor,
who, it was supposed, was about to negotiate for terms
of peace. Then, intervening himself, he delivered him-
self of a sort of confession of faith. " I have thirty
thousand men under arms ; I shall soon have forty thou-
sand. The safety of Italy depends on my army to-day.
... Do I forget, think you, that I owe my position to
the Emperor or that my destiny is irrevocably bound
up with his ? There is only one path open to me. If
the integrity of Italy is threatened, let the Emperor but
give the word and I will take it upon me to defend her
frontiers. If the Grande Arme'e has need of me, let him
but give the signal and I will be with it in a flash ; only
let him not shut his heart against me, let him show me
the consideration which I need to serve him truly, so
that I may know when I devote my life to his cause
that he at least will not deny me justice.'*
Nevertheless all this fervour did not apparently
warrant a direct appeal to the Emperor. To that Murat
could not make up his mind. At length, however, on the
12 th April, his patience being at an end, he took the
1 Murat to Belliard, Naples, March 3, 1813. Mhnoires de Belliard.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 213
opportunity, offered by the conscription order of 1814
and Napoleon's departure for the army, to write as
follows : —
" SIRE, — After Your Majesty's letter of the 26th
January, after the article which appeared in the Moni-
teur of the 27th of that month regarding my return to
Naples, I considered it my duty to maintain absolute
silence. This rule I was able to carry out so long as
negotiations alone were in question and so long as it
was possible to indulge the hope that these negotiations,
which were in the hands of Your Majesty alone, would
be brought to a favourable issue. But now all hopes
of a peaceful settlement between France and her adver-
saries seem to have vanished. Sweden and Prussia have
placed their entire forces at Russia's disposal. Denmark
is perhaps preparing to follow suit. The invader has set
foot within our Northern Departments. Germany is
alive with unrest. Austria's designs are at least equi-
vocal. Sicily is in the grip of England, who is scattering
her gold, concerting plots, and fitting out expeditions to
destroy the peace of Italy. Lastly, Your Majesty has
just announced to the Empire your intention of going
forth to front fresh dangers. What choice have I there-
fore but to betake myself to Your Majesty and inquire
how I may most usefully serve you ?
" The Moniteur of the 27th January and certain
demonstrations on Your Majesty's part have given rise
to the wildest rumours and conjectures. People con-
sidered that you were treating me as an enemy ; that
I myself was capable of pursuing a policy injurious to
the interests of France. ... It is my belief, Sire, that
falsehoods of this nature are disseminated to work ill to
you quite as much as to myself. They give encourage-
ment to your enemies by leading them to suppose that
those who are bound to you by the closest bonds can
214 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
nevertheless withdraw their allegiance. It is particularly
in Italy that such misrepresentations would be calculated
to have an evil effect were they to gain any degree of
credit. I therefore beg you to put an end to this re-
grettable uncertainty. Let there be no more grounds
for entertaining doubt of your confidence in me than
there are of my affection for yourself and for France.
I am aware — indeed I have ever openly proclaimed it
— that I owe my existence, politically speaking, entirely
to the might of the Empire, but more especially do I
know, and most emphatically declare, that I would
never consent to be King on any other terms. Be
pleased then, Sire, in your turn to make it known that
I shall never lack the protection of the Empire. Thus
may Your Majesty strengthen and augment the confi-
dence of my subjects in their King, thus may you make
it easier for me the more completely to organise my
resources in order to fight for you against our foes and
to bear a hand, if need befalls, in maintaining the peace
of Italy. . . .
" With regard to Italy there are grounds for appre-
hending both trouble from within and invasion from
without. I am unaware what measures Your Majesty
purposes to take for coping with this twofold peril. In
the kingdom of Naples I can, if necessary, mobilise a
force of twenty thousand men, consisting of every branch
of the service. ... I am anxious that Your Majesty
should instruct me how to act in case of eventualities,
particularly if hostile attacks or insurrectionary move-
ments were to take place in any part of the Empire or
in the kingdom of Italy.
" In summing up this long letter I beg that Your
Majesty will favour me with a frank declaration of your
sentiments concerning me. I further beg that you will
indicate how I ought to act in the event of trouble or
invasion in any part of Italy. If you make known to
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 215
me your views, as I venture to hope will be the case, I
will scrupulously carry them out. If, on the other hand,
you leave me without instructions, I shall have no alter-
native but to act according to circumstances, and great
will be my grief if, in spite of my earnest desire to
fulfil your wishes, my endeavours are not crowned with
From this lengthy appeal Murat anticipated a triple
result. He hoped that the Emperor in his reply
would inform him that he would place Naples under
Imperial protection, and if that wish were fulfilled he
would have no further cause for anxiety, for whatever
negotiations took place with foreign powers Napoleon
would be under obligation to safeguard the interests of
Naples : the King would no longer stand alone, he would
once again belong to the Empire, and the bonds that
had for a time grown slack would once more be drawn
tight. That was the essential point. But further than
that, Napoleon's letter, if it came, would, in the eyes of
Joachim and his subjects, obliterate the effect of the
article in the Moniteur. Naples would take it that the
Emperor had made the amende honorable, and Murat 's
amour propre would be satisfied. Thirdly, in offering to
undertake the defence of Italy, his idea was to cover
the country with his troops, though it is possible that
at this time he had not conceived the definite plans
which he freely propounded to Napoleon a few months
later. Murat entertained strong hopes that if France
found herself compelled to treat with the Allies and to
relinquish a portion of her too unwieldy Empire, he
would not be thrown over by the Emperor, who, he
judged, would claim compensation for his brother-in-law
for services rendered. In order to lend weight to his
demands, Murat took a step that had been vainly looked
1 Murat to Napoleon, Naples, April 12, 1813. Archives Nationales.
216 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
for since his home-coming. He gave orders to the third
and fourth squadrons of Chasseurs to leave Nocera, where
they had been brought together, and to proceed to the
Grande Arme*e, there to join the two other squadrons
which had been sent forward by Caroline a few days
prior to the King's arrival.1
Murat's application to Napoleon did not lead him to
neglect other but less avowable means of discovering the
nature of the matters that were forming the subject of
negotiations between the Emperor and Europe. Dread-
ing that he would find himself thrown over, he had
endeavoured to obtain information regarding the question
of Austrian mediation which had begun to be talked of
in the Courts of Europe about the end of February. He
therefore resolved to send an emissary to Vienna, Cariati,
one of his aides-de-camp, being selected for the purpose.
As early as the 26th February he had arranged the
matter in his own mind. " Murat intends to send a
secret agent to Vienna to see whether the political exist-
ence of his kingdom cannot be guaranteed in the general
arrangements which it is thought are about to be made
under the mediation of Austria. The Queen disapproves
of this secret mission, which can hardly fail to come to
the knowledge of Napoleon. Prince Cariati has been
chosen for the task. It is desired to send some one to
Berlin as well." 2 Cariati was to investigate what was
going on, and to ask Metternich for his support on behalf
of Naples in the event of Napoleon showing a disposition
to come to terms. But he bore with him no proposals
for an alliance, no powers of any description, and his
subsequent demands for them were in vain. He was
sent merely " to talk matters over " with Metternich,
to draw the long bow about Murat's forces, and to give
the impression that he was a real power and something
1 Durant to Bassano, April 12, 1813. Affaires £trang2rc s.
* Mier to Metternich, Naples, February 26, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 217
to be reckoned with. Both the pride and the plans of
the King would thus be favoured.
To Vienna and Berlin then Cariati was to go. But
the Emperor had a watchful eye — no passing event
escaped him. A pretext must be found, or his wrath
would immediately descend upon them. The pretext
was invented, and Gallo, through the medium of Cari-
gnano, thus conveyed it to Bassano. " Some years ago
the Orders of the Kingdom of Prussia were bestowed upon
His Majesty. In the last meeting at Berlin His Majesty
the King promised the King of Prussia that he would
place at the latter 's disposal four decorations of the
Order of the Two Sicilies. A similar plan had been
followed in the case of His Majesty and other monarchs.
Now that he is home again the King, desirous of ful-
filling his promise has instructed Prince Cariati, one of his
aides-de-camp, to proceed to the Court of His Prussian
Majesty in order to present the said decorations. At the
same time he has instructed him to inquire of the Comte
de Saint Marsan whether the friendliness which, when
the King of Naples was last in Berlin, marked the re-
lations between France and the King of Prussia was
still maintained. If Cariati receives a satisfactory assur-
ance to this effect, he is authorised to discharge his
commission. In the contrary event he is to continue
his journey on the grounds that he has some duty of a
military nature to perform." With the real object of his
mission thus concealed from the Emperor, Cariati set out
and proceeded direct to Munich. There he was to see
Caracciolo, who would disclose the position which Bavaria
was taking up and unfold the intrigues that were being
carried on by Austria in Prussia, Saxony, and the North
generally. In due course Cariati reached his destination
and saw his colleague. On his return to Naples, Gallo
informed Bassano, still through the medium of the
Neapolitan Embassy, " that when Prince Cariati reached
2i8 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Munich he gained the impression that the King of
Prussia's attitude towards France had undergone a
change and that his conduct politically was such as to
give rise to suspicions concerning his bona fides. In
conformity, therefore, with His Majesty's instructions he
abandoned his mission to this Sovereign, and made an
excuse for going on to Vienna, where he now awaits His
Majesty's commands." l
A little patience, and Murat would have done well.
Cariati had left Naples on the 7th March ; on the gth,
Metternich, who was cognisant even then of Joachim's
hesitating attitude, instructed Mier to invite the King
to say definitely what was passing in his mind and what
his wishes were regarding the future.2 On the gth April,
having received no answer from Naples, where it was
thought that Cariati's instructions would be sufficient to
enable him to give a direct reply, he repeated his request.
This was eleven days prior to his interview with Cariati.
He instructed Mier to speak to the King as follows : —
" In the attitude we are now adopting we may legiti-
mately entertain a desire to acquaint ourselves with
the views of the other Courts. We are quite incapable
of abusing any confidence that may be placed in us.
We are perfectly willing to defend, in our capacity as
mediators, the interests of the King of Naples, and
should like to know his views." Before he had heard
a word from Murat, Metternich was already attempting
to deal with Naples in the manner that had proved so
successful in other quarters. He well knew the King's
ambition and love of power, and artfully sought to con-
vince him of Austria's desire to espouse his cause.
The Austrian Minister must have experienced con-
siderable satisfaction when, only a few days after the
dispatch of his message, he beheld the arrival of Cariati.
1 Gallo to Carignano, Naples, April 6, 1813.
2 Weil, Le Prince Euglnc ct Murat.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 219
Joachim's demands were not so exorbitant. All ,5 he
asked him to do was to safeguard the throne of Naples.
Sicily he gave up. If Austria would but recognise him
as King of Naples and guarantee him in the possession
of his kingdom, he was willing on his side to support
the Austrian policy, if need should arise, with all the
military forces at his command. Thus said Cariati, and
in saying it he greatly exceeded his instructions. The
proof of that is that Metternich, desirous of opening
negotiations then and there, inquired of the envoy
whether his orders were explicit enough to enable him
to treat, and whether he had sufficient authority to con-
clude an agreement ; whereupon Cariati had to draw
back, and avow that such was not the case, merely affirm-
ing that the King's mind was made up. That did
not form an adequate basis for negotiation, and at
Metternich's request Cariati immediately sent home the
officer of the Guard who had accompanied him to Vienna
to ask for full powers. The request bore no fruit, how-
ever, for Joachim, perceiving the prospect of a general
peace receding now that the Emperor was entering
on a fresh campaign, obstinately refused to grant
the necessary powers despite the repeated requests of
Metternich.
Mier received his orders from Vienna on the 27th April.
He looked upon Gallo as too friendly to the French party
to assist the King in involving himself more deeply with
Austria. He therefore decided to await the return of
the King, who had gone on a visit to Basilicata and
the Calabrias. On the 29th Joachim was back again in
Naples,1 and the Austrian Ambassador had a private
interview with him. The King requested him to ask
Metternich for some friendly advice as to what he ought
to say, do, demand and stipulate for, and undertook to
follow such advice in its entirety. He merely claimed
1 Moniteur Universe?.
220 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
that his fortune should be left intact and that the inde-
pendence of his kingdom should be observed,1 but he
carefully refrained from entrusting Cariati with the powers
that Metternich had pressed for. That, however, as it
happened, would have proved a matter of no difficulty.
On the ground that the Prince de Colobrano's health
would not allow of his continuing his ambassadorial
duties at Vienna, it became necessary to appoint a mission
to replace him. This mission was appointed on the
2ist April. At its head was Cariati, who at that very
moment was in Vienna. Such was the message that
Carignano was instructed to give to Bassano in order to
enable Naples to keep an official spy in Vienna. That,
however, is as far as Murat's wishes extended for the
time being, and Metternich was guilty of error if he
thought he was going to enlist him on the side of Austria.
Murat desired no such alliance, and would have had no
reason to desire it, for at the moment Austria had no
power to give him what he asked. What did he wish for,
then, that Austria was unable herself to give him ? What,
indeed, but that on which ever since the failure of the
Sicilian enterprise he had set his heart — to wit, some
compensation for the loss of the island. For three years
his thoughts had lain in this direction, and during that
period his plans had undergone a steady but remarkable
development. The Italian Party, beholding in Murat
the longed-for champion of independence, were continu-
ally stimulating his zeal, and since 1810 he had never
suffered a day to go by without pondering how he might
bring his schemes to pass. His ideas, then, had been
growing vaster and vaster until now nothing short of
the kingdom of Italy would satisfy his ambition.
Joachim Napoleon, King of Italy ! What a title was
that to flatter his overweening vanity ! But how was
he to realise his dreams ? So long as the Emperor had
1 Micr to Metternich, Naples, April 30, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 221
remained all-powerful in Europe, it had been useless to
attempt the project. But now the situation had changed.
It was scarcely probable that conditions would ever prove
more favourable than they were at the moment. The
Italian Party were prompt to turn the opportunity to
account. When Murat came back from Russia, over-
whelmed with obloquy and eager for revenge, the same
individuals that had egged him on in his early quarrels
with the Emperor immediately came to renew their offers
of service. They pointed out that neither France nor
Austria had any troops in Italy, that all the fighting
forces in Europe were massed along the Elbe, that Bona-
parte had been dealt a staggering blow, and that, for-
midable though he might still remain, he could never
again become the master of the world.1 This, then, if
ever, was the moment to attempt the great design which
was to make Joachim master of the Italian peninsula,
and to give him a foremost place among the ruling
powers of Europe.
The question was, whose aid should he invoke in
carrying out so difficult a task ? Not Austria's, for she
was thinking only of herself : to prepare her own forces
for the struggle would tax her resources to the utmost.
But what of Napoleon's natural and implacable foe — the
foe that had unceasingly striven to thwart him, not
seldom with success, whose wealth and military resources
had ever been at the service of the enemies of France
— what, in a word, of England ? To make peace with
England, to obtain the control of Italy, to make the
whole peninsula a single independent State, such were
the aims by which the Italian Party were animated.
Just recently — on the 26th February — Lord William
Bentinck, the British representative at Palermo, had
taken possession of Ponza. Pursuing the policy which
he had inaugurated almost as soon as he arrived, he
1 Colletta. Storia del Reante di Napoli.
222 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
continued to scatter agents far and wide, and they,
making liberal use of British gold, lost no opportunity of
sowing the seeds of insurrection. Joachim himself had
not been spared. In July 1812, during the Russian cam-
paign, the English Minister had endeavoured to bring
about a rising among the Neapolitans and to gain pos-
session of the Chateau of Saint Elmo,1 and after Ponza
had fallen into his hands, he determined to extend the
sphere of his activities. He established three different
sections of espionage, with headquarters at Malta, Vienna,
and Ponza. At Malta was one Concannon, who had
already put himself in touch with Naples. At Ponza
was Major Oswald, " a very intelligent man, who had
been entrusted with the command of the place." With
regard to the agents at Vienna, one of them was to make
a tour of Italy. " He will," it was explained, " see our
friends there, and encourage them to give us their sup-
port ; he will also inquire as to the most suitable form
of government, furnish the names of the leaders of our
party in each town and province, and induce them to
enter into direct correspondence with Lord William
Bentinck at Palermo." 2 That Bentinck numbered
among his emissaries men who had direct access to
Murat is beyond all question, and through them, as well
as through those who urged that Naples should throw
in her lot with England, Joachim received encourage-
ment that by no means left him indifferent. It only
remained to seize a suitable opportunity to bring the
matter to a head. At Ponza, when the non-combatants
were sent back to Naples, Coffin, an English lieutenant-
colonel who had charge of the matter, took occasion to
discuss the general situation with one Bosset, a Neapo-
litan war commissioner, and, while expressing his regret
at the differences which divided the Governments of
1 Diario di Nicola.
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh, March 21, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 223
England and Naples, informed him that Bentinck was
willing that he should act as intermediary in any nego-
tiations that might be carried on with Naples with the
object of establishing a friendly understanding between
the two countries. Bosset conveyed this message to
Murat, who did not suffer the opportunity to slip by.
On the 22nd April, Cerculi, who had a position in the
offices of the Ministry of Police, being in fact a member
of the Minister's confidential staff, arrived at Ponza.
There he saw Coffin, whom he informed that Bosset had
interviewed the Minister of Police, and that the latter,
after having had an audience of the King, had instructed
him, Cerculi, to find out the nature and the scope of
the English proposals. Coffin replied that it was
Joachim's place to make the first move. Cerculi having
observed that the King was anxious to bring his interests
into harmony with those of Great Britain, the English-
man stated that he would apply to Bentinck for instruc-
tions. Armed with this response, Cerculi made his way
back to Naples under the escort of a British man-of-
war.1
The matter was duly reported to Bentinck, who, on
the ist May, sent Coffin permission to continue the pour-
parlers, but even at that early stage laid it down as an
essential condition that Murat should not be recognised
as King of Naples. " While displaying all possible
friendliness towards him, we must," said he, " make him
thoroughly understand that it is utterly impossible for
us to disregard the rights of our allies in Sicily. En-
deavour therefore to prevail upon him to accept some-
thing in compensation. Tell him that it is in his power
to become the Bernadotte of Italy, and that as a guarantee
of good faith he should put Gaeta in our hands." 2 On
the 1 6th May, Bentinck, who had had a conference with
1 Coffin to Bentinck, Ponza, April 23, 1813.
2 Bentinck to Coffin, Palermo, May 10, 1813.
224 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Ferdinand's son, the Crown Prince, instructed Coffin to
submit the following formal proposals : —
" Murat was to declare war on Bonaparte and march
immediately with all his forces upon the North of Italy.
The Allies would effect a junction with him at a time
and place to be determined in due course.
" Murat was to surrender Naples to the King of
Sicily on the following conditions : —
" i. Murat was to have an equivalent.
"2. Murat was to keep Naples until he had obtained
such equivalent."
These proposals were followed by a declaration on
the part of the Crown Prince. " In my Father's name
and in my own," said he, " it is impossible for me to
renounce my right to the kingdom of Naples or to a
proportionate compensation." l
Three days later, in order to bring the matter to a
head, Bentinck sent a letter to Coffin telling him to
inform the King that he purposed coming to Ponza in
a week's time (that is to say about the 28th or 2gth May),
and to request him to send a representative fully em-
powered to act. To Ponza on the 2Qth May there came
not one representative but two — our old friend Cerculi
and a certain Robert Jones, an Englishman by birth, a
Neapolitan by training. Jones, a man of homely manner
and appearance,2 was the bearer of a letter from Murat.
Lord William was late for the rendezvous, and while
awaiting his arrival the two Neapolitans fell to talking
matters over with Coffin. Both sides explained their
position. Coffin referred to his Government's pledge to
Sicily, dilated on the theme of England and Naples
joining forces in Italy, and demanded that Gaeta should
be handed over as a guarantee. As for Jones, he fell
1 Bentinck to Coffin, Messina, May 16, 1813.
8 Colletta, Storia del Reame di Napoli.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 225
foul of England's refusal to give Naples to Joachim, and,
gradually feeling his way, at length laid bare his master's
terms. The King, he declared, would only consent to
give his support to the Allies on the understanding that
Great Britain guaranteed him the possession of Naples
and the Papal States. At last the truth was out. From
that day forth they knew the price that Joachim put
upon his honour.
No sooner had Jones obtained a clear view of the
English position than he sent Cerculi back to Naples
with a letter giving an account of this first stage in the
negotiations. Murat was hardly satisfied, but as these
informal preliminaries scarcely afforded him a pretext
for cutting matters short (Coffin had no official powers
to treat), he sent another envoy to Ponza. This time it
was not Cerculi but Nicolas, the Keeper of the Archives,
who, armed with a commission handed to him on the
ist June by Campochiaro, proceeded to the island to
negotiate with Bentinck concerning an alliance with
England. Among his papers was a copy of the Moniteur
containing official news of the victory of Llitzen. He
was also to refer to Napoleon's successes at Bautzen.
By this means Murat hoped to bring pressure to bear
upon Bentinck.
The official conference between the representatives of
Naples and England took place on the 3rd June. The
Englishman stated that he was determined to uphold
the claims of Ferdinand : Jones and Nicolas replied that
it was impossible for Joachim to relinquish the throne
of Naples ; that his own reputation and consideration
for his children alike forbade him to make any conces-
sion in this direction. However, the discussion went on :
the Neapolitans gave way little by little ; they accepted
the co-operation of the English troops, they even
consented to hand over Gaeta in exchange for twenty
thousand rifles which Bentinck undertook to supply.
226 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Bentinck now submitted his final terms. They provided
that—
1. The claims of His Majesty King Ferdinand to the
crown of the Two Sicilies should be recognised.
2. King Joachim's sovereign rights should also be
recognised, and that he should retain possession of the
kingdom of Naples pending the conclusion of an arrange-
ment satisfactory to both parties.1
Such were the proposals that Nicolas, on board Ben-
tinck's ship the America, departed to announce to the
King. On reaching the Bay of Naples Nicolas went
ashore : Bentinck remained on board his vessel to await,
beneath the very eyes of the Neapolitans,2 an answer to
his latest propositions. On the evening of the 5th
Nicolas returned. The decision was in the negative.
Murat gave vague excuses to Bentinck, and made some
quite irrelevant remarks about waiting for a reply from
Austria. Bentinck, who stated that he was on the eve
of his departure for Spain, remarked that the occasion
was eminently propitious for negotiation, but that he was
less optimistic about the future. Nevertheless before
leaving he formally entrusted Coffin with powers to sign
a convention, which he went to the trouble of drawing
up himself, laying down that not a single word in the
last three clauses should be altered. The following is
the text of the document in question : —
" Provisional agreement entered into by ... in the
name of King Gioacchino and by Lieutenant-Colonel
Coffin on behalf of Lord William Bentinck.
"Art. i. The aim of the present contracting parties
is to secure liberty for Italy and to emancipate her from
the domination of Bonaparte.
" Art. 2. For the attainment of this object the two
contracting parties agree to act together with the least
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh, June 10, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
* Diario di Nicola^ June 5, 1813.
Sir Thos. l.a-ivrtuce, />. R. A., finxt. H. R. Cook, sculpt.
LIEUT.-GENL. LORI) WILLIAM CAVENDISH-BENTINCK
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 227
possible delay and with all their forces as shall be laid
down in the plan of campaign.
" Art. 3. Within ten days of the ratification hereof by
King Gioacchino, Gaeta shall be handed over to the
English troops as a guarantee of good faith, and in the
event of the British Government refusing to ratify the
present overtures it shall be surrendered in the same state
in which it was received.
" Art. 4. The claims of His Majesty King Ferdinand
to the crown of the Two Sicilies shall be recognised.
" Art. 5. The sovereign rights of King Gioacchino shall
be recognised. P ssession of the Kingdom of Naples
shall not be disputed pending the conclusion of an
arrangement satisfactory to both contracting parties."
While Coffin, on Bentinck's instructions, was con-
tinuing to parley with the Neapolitan Government,
Bentinck himself sent a warship to England with a
dispatch for Castlereagh, and asked for authority to
conclude a treaty. He was, he said, convinced that
Murat would shortly accept his terms.1 On the 22nd July
Castlereagh sent him the necessary powers.2
Murat's refusal to accept Bentinck's proposals may
be easily foreseen. Paradoxical as it may seem, the
cause of France had at this epoch no more useful and
effective ally than the British representative at Palermo.
Never had the Emperor received more untiring or more
capable assistance than he was afforded by this English-
man who .was animated by all his country's inveterate
and fiery hatred of Napoleon and of France. It must
not be supposed for a moment that Lord Bentinck pre-
judiced his country's cause by showing narrow-minded
stupidity or useless stubbornness in his conduct of the
negotiations. On the contrary, of all the people who
were brought into contact with Joachim, of all those
1 Wellington, Despatches.
2 Castlereagh to Bentinck. Quoted by M. Weil.
228 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
who were in a position to weigh his actions and to form
an estimate of his character, none saw through his schemes
more completely than Bentinck. From the very outset
he read the King's mind as though it had been an open
book. He beheld all the meanness, all the jdeceit^^all
the craft 6f the iiiarrT^iig^vanity and lus_egoism,_his
^wpj^a^^his^Sy- lnat England, lateron^ was
preserved from entering into dubious compromises, that
the British Cabinet was able to speak its mind plainly
at the Congress of Vienna and elsewhere, that his country
avoided the peace, the inglorious peace of 1814, was in
large measure due to his clearness of vision. At this
moment, moreover, Bentinck saw in Murat an adversary
whom it was the more important to vanquish in that
his aims precisely coincided with his own. He thus
"""described Murat's schemes to Castlereagh. " He (Murat)
hopes that Italy will be given him, he being unable to
conquer it merely with his Neapolitans. It must be
recognised that he is highly popular in Italy. ... He
only broke off the negotiations because he was not
offered as much as he wanted. . . .* I am sure he
will resume them for two reasons. Firstly, because the
victory of Bautzen was indecisive ; secondly, because,
in my opinion, he only broke them off in the hope of
^obtaining further concessions."
Who ever read a situation more clearly than this ?
Bentinck had not been duped. He knew that the excuse
about waiting for a reply from Austria was mere pre-
varication. He knew, moreover, that what the King
desired was Italy, and nothing less. And was he to aid
and abet in handing over Italy to Murat — he, Bentinck,
who for two years had been concentrating all his energies
upon freeing her from the toils of an alien domination !
Italy was the apple of his adversary's eye ; so was
it also of his own. He conceived that Italy, united and
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh, June 10, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 229
independent, would prove an invaluable barrier against
the ambitious encroachments of France on the one hand
and of Austria on the other. Therefore it was that in
order to crush Murat he brought to bear all the stubborn-
ness of his nature, and backed it with the might, material
and moral, that belonged to England, the mistress of
the seas. As to how he went to work, he allows us
scarcely a hint. It is enough that he achieved his object.
Once, however, in a fit of anger, he momentarily let
fall the veil. When Murat and Neipperg jointly put
their hands to the first Austrian treaty, rage took hold
of Bentinck ; that day he disclosed the direction of his
hopes.
" I was always afraid that Neipperg would suffer
himself to become the dupe of the Court of Naples.
The provisions of this treaty are at once impolitic, in-
opportune, and useless. Murat cannot be relied upon.
Not only does this treaty create for us a rival, but it
may make Murat master of Italy. When the Viceroy
has been forced back upon the Alps, the Italians will
be certain to gravitate to his side, whereas, had they
been offered the assistance and protection of England,
this potent force would doubtless have thrown in their
lot with us. A far-reaching national movement in favour
of independence could then have been set on foot, and
the great Italian people, instead of being the tool of
some military tyrant or the unhappy slave of a few
miserable princelings, would have developed into a for-
midable bulwark not only against France but against
Austria as well, and have thus become a further safeguard
of the peace and happiness of the world. I am sorely
afraid that the hour for that has now gone by." 1
Such was the policy of Bentinck. Such was the
reason which forbade him to recognise Murat as the
rightful King of Naples, or to surrender Italy into his
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh, Palermo, January 1814.
\
230 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
hands. It has been said that Bentinck was guilty of
personal spite towards Joachim, that he displayed a
petty cavilling spirit in his conduct of the negotiations ;
but in point of fact his Italian policy was distinguished
by wisdom as lofty, his forecast of the future by clear-
sightedness as accurate, as those of any man of his
time.
So long as the pourparlers with Bentinck were in
progress, the King maintained an attitude of watchful
reserve towards France. On the lyth April and again
on the ist May came demands for troops for the service
of the Empire. To these demands Joachim paid no
heed. When negotiations for a treaty with England
were perhaps on the eve of being brought to a successful
conclusion, and when therefore it was necessary for him
to increase his forces to the utmost limit, it was hardly
to be expected that he would hand over to France troops
which he urgently needed for himself. Still, he could
not afford to break with the Emperor or even to turn
too sullen a countenance upon him. He therefore adopted
a policy of procrastination, now employing phrases calcu-
lated to make him appear the friend of France, now giving
orders which proved that he was just the opposite. Thus
while he forbore to comply with the Imperial demand
for troops, he wrote a letter to Marie Louise which was
eloquent of widely different sentiments : —
" Madame," says he, " Your Majesty has been so good
as to inform me by special messenger, and through the
agency of the Prince Borghese, of the Emperor's departure
for the army. I was absent from Naples when the news
, arrived, and it was sent on to me at Taranto. My
\ delay in thanking Your Majesty is due to this circum-
\ stance alone. Although the news of the Emperor's return
ito the army was not a surprise to me, I was unable to
(repress my keen and profound emotion when I heard of
It. There is fighting to be done, and I shall not be there
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 231
to take a part in it ; the Emperor is going forth to fa
fresh dangers, and I am not summoned to share them.
Such are the feelings which as a soldier, as the devoted
friend of my old general, and as the faithful ally of the
Ruler of the Empire, I cannot help but entertain." He
then proceeded to explain that he was unable to leave
his country, and that he had informed Napoleon of the
fact. ' To go myself or to send my troops would, I am
most thoroughly convinced, involve the loss not only of
my own Kingdom but of the rest of the Peninsula as
well. Anxious as I was to take part in the campaign,
I have been compelled to subordinate my wishes to
these all-important considerations, and only the convic-
tion that nowhere could I render the Emperor more
useful service than where I am, can encourage and con-
sole me for my absence from his side.
" Nothing, however, avails to relieve me of the anxiety
arising from the manner in which he has treated me
since my return to Naples. On several occasions he has
delivered himself of sentiments reflecting small credit on
myself. He has taken measures which implied that he
had lost confidence in me, and which could not but give
me pain. He has laid commands upon me which he
knew it was not in my power to obey. He has given
me none of the explanations which I begged of him.
He has granted me none of the facilities of which I was
in need in order to obtain in France the arms and horses
requisite for his service. He has never discussed his
views with me, never furnished me with any instruc-
tions regarding the policy I should pursue in Italy.
Were I less familiar with the Emperor's genius, or with
the scrupulous care which he himself brings to bear on
every single question, I might justly assume that the
entire direction of affairs at the Tuileries had been in
the hands of my enemies, and that they had acted with
the express intention of creating trouble for me and
232 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
working up grievances with which to confound me on
some future occasion.
"To be in such a position as this is no happy experi-
ence. Nor must I omit to add that it is impossible for
me to hide these matters altogether from my subjects.
Such a state of affairs alarms the loyal, emboldens the
disaffected, and lends encouragement to our common
enemies. I therefore make so bold as to implore you,
Madame, to put an end to so deplorable a situation.
It would be a deed well worthy of Your Majesty to con-
vince the Emperor that he is being deceived regarding
the true state of Italy, and to persuade him to restore
to me the confidence to which twenty years of conspicuous
service in his cause and a loyalty which even injustice
has been powerless to impair, entitle me to lay an indis-
putable claim.
" If the Emperor will but disclose his intentions, if
he will but deign clearly and definitely to make them
known to me, I will use my best efforts to fulfil them.
But isolated acts which seem to foretell that others of a
similar nature are to follow, continually tend to weaken
my position, and are calculated to deprive me of the
power necessary to withstand our enemies ; such acts
compromise my honour and jeopardise my kingdom, and
can but evoke my just complaints." 1
Had Murat been as eager to learn what was going
on in France as he had been to gain information regard-
ing the course of events in Austria, he would not have
\found a grievance in the Emperor's failure to send him
ithe rifles and horses that were " destined for his service,"
rifles for which a few days later he made application to
Ben thick. At this time in fact it was a matter of extreme
cj|ifnculty to find horses for the French troops, and Napo-
Ifcon was doing his utmost to push on the manufacture
oj rifles.
1 Murat to the Empress, Portici, May II, 1813. Archives Nationales.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 233
On the 1 8th May, from Portici, Joachim sent a long
overdue reply to the Imperial War Minister. He said,
though his words were wrapped round with much cir-
cumlocution, that he could not send the Emperor any
troops, but that in the event of Italy being invaded he
would undertake its defence. " I presume," he added,
" that since the Emperor requires me to provide a mobile
army he will dispense me from the necessity of furnishing
any other kind of contingent." As a counterblast to that,
he commanded that every fort in the capital should fire
a salute of one hundred guns in honour of the victory of
Liitzen, the news of which reached Naples on the I3th
May.1
The King was pursuing this policy of blowing hot
and cold as occasion and the needs of the moment might
dictate, when the whole outlook was darkened by the
news, brought him by express messenger, that Eugene
had arrived at Milan. This meant that his plans for
occupying Italy under pretext of defending it were com-
pletely overthrown. His fury knew no bounds. An out-
rage was committed on the Italian Legation at Naples,
but he took no steps to bring the offenders to justice.
Dispatches arrived from Vienna. With a great show of
courtesy, he begged Mier to discuss their contents with
Gallo. To the Austrian Ambassador he was markedly
gracious ; to the French Minister he was all coldness
and reserve. Clarke made another request for troops.
Caroline was obliged to smooth matters over. At a
ball on the 27th May she told Durant that neither Eugene
nor Clarke had succeeded in obtaining a favourable reply
from the King regarding the troops demanded by Napo-
leon. Taking up Joachim's tale of woe, she complained
of the manner in which both the King and herself had
been ignored by Napoleon, and, while recognising that
as far as externals went her husband's conduct was
1 Moniteur Universe I.
234 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
perhaps a little imprudent, she felt confident of being
able to keep him loyal to France if only she had some
message of encouragement to give him.1 On the 5th June
it was she again who wrote to her brother to congratulate
him on his success at Bautzen. " Will Your Majesty
permit me to offer you my congratulations on the fresh
triumphs you have won ? " 2 It happened that on that
very day Durant had handed Gallo a note from the
Imperial Government demanding, in pursuance of orders
given by the Emperor on the I4th May, that Cariati
should be recalled. Gallo at first could not summon up
sufficient courage to show the note to Murat, but after
a lapse of three days he determined to take the plunge.
So violent was the outburst of fury with which Murat
greeted the announcement that his thunders were audible
throughout the palace.3 Cariati, he cried, had orders to
work in concert with the representative of France. In
all cases of emergency he had been definitely told to
seek the advice of the French Minister and to act as he
directed. How, then, could he possibly come under the
ban of suspicion ?
At this juncture there arrived at Naples from the
Grand Army some twenty or twenty-five men belonging
to the Neapolitan Guard. The Emperor had been re-
quested to allow them to return, and had given orders
that they were to be sent home. Their arrival gave
currency to a popular rumour that Naples was no longer
making common cause with the French Empire — that
King Joachim had himself to think of, and could not
take part in the Russian campaign. This was stated to
be the reason why the remainder of the troops were
being brought home.4
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, June i, 1813.
x Caroline to the Emperor, Naples, June 5, 1813.
s Mier to Metternich, June 13, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
* Diario di Nicola.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 235
All this would have merely tended to show that
Murat was actuated by feelings of latent animosity
towards his brother-in-law, had it not been that refusals
of a more downright and uncompromising nature clearly
showed that he intended to turn a deaf ear to his brother-
in-law's appeal for help. On the ist June the Emperor
wrote Eugine telling him to pretend that he expected
to be attacked by Austria at the end of the month, and
secretly to inform Murat to that effect. The Viceroy
did as he was bid, and at the same time announced the
conclusion of an armistice. To Napoleon's wishes
Joachim expressed bitter and peremptory opposition.
"If," he wrote Eugene, " the war which the Emperor
regards as inevitable should come to pass, I will march
at the head of my troops myself. I will not allow them
to be scattered as they are at present among the various
brigades of the army, for nothing is less conducive to
their discipline and welfare." l Never before had he
dared to meet the Emperor with so unqualified a refusal
as this answer implied. Nor had he acted on the im-
pulse of the moment. He had carefully and deliberately
considered his action, and was prepared to abide by the
consequences. A letter which a short time afterwards
he wrote to Clarke was couched in such terms that, had
it been penned in the Empire's palmy days, it would
have brought down Grenier upon him and involved him
in the loss of his crown.
On receipt of Joachim's first letter to Clarke, the
Emperor sent the latter further instructions. " Inform
the King of Naples that I believe Austria to be on the
point of putting forward claims to which France cannot
with honour assent. Thirty thousand men Naples cannot
spare, but I desire that endeavours should be made to
furnish a good division of ten to twelve thousand infantry,
fifteen hundred horse, and twenty-five guns, and that
1 Murat to Eugene, June 18, 1813. Archives de la Guerre.
236 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
they should be in readiness to start for Bologna early in
July, there to await developments. In the event of war
they would march on Laybach : if terms of peace were
arranged they would return to Naples. I desire that the
King should put his troops under the command of a
French general. ... By the I5th July without fail his
division must be in the neighbourhood of Bologna in
order to support the Viceroy, who will then be encamped
on the heights of Laybach. He must say definitely what
he can and what he will do, and he must be given to
understand that any troops which have not left the
country by the beginning of July will not be in the
running. Impress on him especially that cavalry and
artillery are particularly needed, and that if he cannot
make up twelve thousand foot his division should at all
events total twelve thousand men altogether." l
On receipt of this letter, Clarke transmitted the Im-
perial demands to Murat who immediately replied that
the Emperor had already sent him a similar request
through the Viceroy, that he had replied to the latter,
and that, as all this had taken place as long ago as the
1 8th May, the Emperor should by this time be fully
aware of what he, Murat, could and could not do in the
event of the alleged inevitable war with Austria. He
adhered, he went on, to what he had then said. If his
troops were required, he and none other should lead them.
He absolutely would not consent to their being split up
among the various brigades of the Grand Army and the
Army of Spain, where their doings were completely
ignored. In conclusion he stated that he was organising
an army of thirty thousand men with eighty pieces of
artillery, and that he would be in a position to leave
Naples on the I5th of the following month if his services
were required. The letter terminated with a request to
be informed of the Emperor's decision and a protesta-
1 Napoleon to Clarke, June II, 1813. Correspondance, 20,108.
MURAT— BENTINGK— METTERNICH 237
tion of his anxiety to give His Imperial and Royal
Majesty a further proof of his " inviolable attachment." l
The manner in which his designs on Italy had been
checkmated by Eugene's occupation of Milan had sent
the King into an ungovernable rage, but on the 2gth June
an event occurred which served, if that were possible,
still further to increase his fury. On that day he was
handed a copy of the Moniteur of the igth of that month
containing an article headed " Malta," which asserted
that the British flag had been hoisted on the island of
Ponza without a blow being struck and without the
Regent or his Ministers having the least suspicion that
an attack had been intended.2 There is every possi-
bility that the article in question, which had already
been published in the Journal de I' Empire, was intended
by Napoleon as a warning. It is quite possible that at
that date, the igth, the Emperor's spies had made him
acquainted with what was afoot in Ponza, for, although
it is true that the negotiations did not assume definite
shape until the end of May, the continual going and
coming between Ponza, Naples, and Sicily that had taken
place since the 22nd April and during the first fortnight
in May, must have kept too many people busy for the
matter to have remained a secret. Napoleon may well
have known of the affair since, on the nth June, an
English newspaper, The Morning Chronicle, printed an
article on the subject. " It is," said this journal, " with
the utmost surprise that we learn from advices, received
from Sicily under date of the 8th April, that there are
indications that an amicable understanding is in course
of being brought about between Lord William Bentinck
and Murat's Minister at Naples. It has apparently been
agreed that there should be an entire cessation of hosti-
lities between Sicily and Naples, and a letter from Messina
1 Murat to Clarke, June 27, 1813. Archives des Affaires £trangb-es.
* Moniteur Universe/, June 19, 1813.
238 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
dated the yth April states that relations had been re-
established with the islands off Gaeta and Naples, and
that there was a good prospect of profitable trade rela-
tions being thereby opened up with the Continent. How
strange it would be if we were to see another French
Marshal, one moreover who has been raised to the dignity
of royalty, taking his stand among our friends and
allies."
This letter, which is supposed to have left Messina on
the 7th April, must have been a long time on the way
not to have reached London till about the loth June.
It is highly probable that its date was tampered with,
if indeed it ever had any real existence. At all events
it is a somewhat curious circumstance that charges
against Murat should at this time (June 11-19) nave
made a practically simultaneous appearance in the
journals of England and France. Be the explanation
what it may, Murat, as soon as he read the article in
the Moniteur, deemed that the cat was out of the bag.
So unbounded was his rage, says Mier, that he made
himself ill. Anxious to prove to the Austrian Ambassador
how little disposed he was to truckle to the Emperor, he
told him that he had just sent a strongly worded note to
Durant, in the course of which, according to him, atten-
tion had been drawn to the fact that this was the second
time the French Gazettes had gone out of their way
to insult him, and that the next time such an article
appeared he would return the compliment by sending
the French Minister out of the country. Napoleon had
asked for twelve thousand men, but he declared to Mier
that the Emperor had just made a demand for twenty
thousand, and that he had promptly refused.1
How widely the real facts differed from this present-
ment of them will be seen from the actual text of the
note handed by Gallo to Durant. We look in vain for
1 Mier to Metternich, Naples, June 29, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 239
the note of defiance, for the threat to send the Minister
of France about his business. " Monsieur le Baron,"
the document began, " the Journal de V Empire and the
Moniteur Francais of the igth instant contained an
extract from a letter alleged to have been written from
Malta on the 28th May, stating in the most positive, and
therefore in the most insulting manner, that the Island of
Ponza had been surrendered to the Anglo-Sicilian forces.1
This assertion, repeated without comment by the French
papers, has naturally inflicted great pain upon His
Majesty. The King could not possibly ignore the matter,
and he has commanded me to declare to you, Monsieur
le Baron, that the national honour requires that the lie
should publicly be given to the writer of the letter, inas-
much as it would not be right to allow Europe and the
brave Neapolitans who fought with such distinction at
Liitzen, Holkirk, and Wurtchen for their King and his
allies, to labour under the impression that their com-
rades could have tarnished their renown by committing
so base an act of treachery. The garrison of Ponza
fought bravely, but were compelled to yield to vastly
superior numbers. Testimony is borne to the truth of
this statement by the enemy themselves as may be seen
from General Keith's report as published in the Palermo
Gazette of the 8th March.
" His Majesty therefore gave orders that when the
letter from Malta was published in the Moniteur des Deux
Sidles, this declaration should appear side by side with
it in order that the writer of the letter should realise
that though the Kingdom of Naples may still contain
a few adherents of the late dynasty, the nation as a
whole knows how much value to attach to the news, and
that it has no room in its heart for any one so treacherous
as to betray his king and country. In all their thoughts,
in all their prayers, the Neapolitans think wholly and
1 These words are underlined in the letter.
240 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
solely of their King, whose loyalty towards his august
ally cannot be called in question.
" While instructing me to acquaint you with this
measure, the King also commanded me to add that if
the French press makes such flagrant attacks on the
people and Government of Naples, His Majesty will have
no alternative but to direct that articles from these
papers shall not be inserted in the journals of Naples,
and that if circumstances demand it they may be for-
bidden in the country altogether. In thus discharging
myself of His Majesty's behests, I beg you, Monsieur le
Baron, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. —
Gallo."
Gallo also wrote off to Carignano, the Neapolitan
Ambassador in Paris, to apprise him of this important
event. Having related the circumstances and the King's
grief that such charges should be made against the
national honour and the loyalty of his troops, he goes
on to say that the Minister of Police had been com-
manded by His Majesty to insert the obnoxious extract
in the Moniteur des Deux Sidles, adding thereto a note
of which he attached a copy. " His Majesty," he con-
cludes, " furthermore desired that I should send the
enclosed note to the Minister of France. I forward
these papers for your information in order that you may
know how the matter stands." 1
' Thus the terrible warning, the dread announcement
that was to strike terror into Durant's breast, merely
amounted to a threat to forbid the Neapolitan papers
to adorn their columns with extracts from the Moniteur
de France.
Every day seemed to increase the tension between
France and Naples. Napoleon's attitude grew harsher
as he became more fully aware of Murat's hostile inten-
tions. Joachim, who deemed himself mortally insulted
1 Gallo to Carignano, Naples, June 29, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 241
by the Emperor's determination to give the Italian com-
mand to Eugene, grew more resolved than ever to stand
his ground.1 Such was the state of affairs at the beginning
of July when Durant intervened. On the i8th June the
Due de Bassano had sent him categorical instructions
from Dresden. He was to present Napoleon's final and
irreducible demands. The Neapolitan division was to
consist of eight infantry battalions, a thousand horse,
two batteries of artillery, one, mounted, with six guns,
the other, unmounted, with eight. The whole force was
to be on the road to Bologna by the loth July. Failing
this, Durant was to hand in his papers and quit the
place, leaving only his secretary behind him. By the
2nd July Durant had presented his ultimatum, and
Murat changed his front. He realised that the moment
was anything but propitious for cutting himself adrift
from Napoleon. Austria had made no offers of an
acceptable nature ; the pourparlers with England had
come to nought. Bentinck had insisted on the restora-
tion of Naples to Ferdinand as an essential condition of
an agreement, and to this Joachim would not consent.
It was by no means easy to foresee the result of the
struggle between the Emperor and the Coalition. To
judge from Napoleon's successes at Liitzen and Bautzen,
it would seem that the Imperial banners were once more
attended by that good fortune which appeared lately
to have deserted them. In Italy it was held that
Napoleon's present situation was in reality far less
critical than in 1809, when he had succeeded in shattering
the hopes of Austria by the overwhelming defeat which
he inflicted upon her forces at Wagram. With such a
man to reckon with, who could foretell with any certainty
what the future might have in store ? His astounding
genius was capable of overcoming the most stupendous
obstacles, and it might well be that he would yet crush
1 Brunetti to Testi, Naples, July u, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
Q
242 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
this new Coalition by means of some sudden and decisive
stroke that he was then secretly preparing to deliver.
Murat stood alone. England had failed him, Austria
was vacillating : where, then, could he look for an ally
if he decided to defy the Emperor ? Finding no answer
to this question, Joachim, deeming that his best plan
was to humour Napoleon, to watch the course of events
and to follow the lead of the stronger party, resolved
to give way yet once more. On the 3rd July the Queen
gave an audience to Durant. Having delivered herself
of some complaints concerning the statement that had
appeared in the Moniteur and of the Emperor's aloof-
ness, she concluded by giving the Minister to understand
that the King was ready to proceed to whatever part
of Italy the Emperor might desire.1 That same day
she thought it well to explain the King's conduct in a
letter to her brother. Expressing the great regret with
which she had learnt that Durant was under orders to
leave Naples unless the ten thousand men were forth-
coming, she went on to say that the King would march
not only with ten thousand men but with twenty or
thirty thousand — nay, with all the men he had ; that he
would willingly sacrifice his life in the Imperial cause on
one condition, which was that he himself and no other
should command his troops. She next contrasted the
coldness and reserve with which Murat had been treated
with the boundless confidence reposed by the Emperor
in Eugene. Her husband, she said, may have been
tempted in a fit of vexation into some imprudent viva-
cities of speech which had been snapped up and reported
to the Emperor, but she urged that although it was
always the way of the French to become declamatory,
none — as Napoleon needs must know — had hearts more
truly loyal than they. " It is," she went on, " the King's
excessive attachment to you that has made him jealous,
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, July 3, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 243
and his jealousy has put him beside himself. You have
but to give the word, and he will hasten to place his life
at your disposal. He may be fiery, he may be hot-
headed, but you, Sire, know how deep is his affection
for you. Set me free from the anxieties that beset my
mind. A word from Your Majesty, and he would be
at the very pinnacle of happiness. Do but restore to
him your favour, and he will be but too ready to lay
down his life in your cause." l
The following day Murat himself wrote to the Em-
peror at great length. Napoleon had made a further
application for troops, but, said the King, " the treaties
and the country's present situation relieve me of all
obligation to make any addition to the contingent already
furnished. As matters now are, I cannot allow any of
my troops to leave the country unless I myself take
command of them ; but if Italy is threatened or attacked,
I am ready to march with twenty-five or thirty thousand
men whithersoever Your Majesty may deem that my
services would be of use." This is his " irrevocable
decision." After complaining about the favour shown
to Eugene and the manner in which the Neapolitan
troops were ignored in the bulletins and journals, he
went on : " Wherefore, Sire, do you reject my offer ?
You told the French War Minister that my kingdom
could not spare a force of thirty thousand men, but can
Your Majesty suppose that I have lost sight of the
necessity of defending my own dominions ? I can answer
for it that I have not. If I leave with twenty-five
thousand men, the troops which remain and the National
Guard will abundantly suffice to protect the country's
safety. Besides, I can raise fresh levies at once if Your
Majesty supplies the muskets and gives your consent
to the recall of the troops which I have in Germany
and Spain. So long, moreover, as I am in command of
1 Caroline to the Emperor. Archives Nationals.
244 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
an army in the region which Your Majesty appears to
regard as the probable seat of war, I could easily hurry
away to my country's defence if the enemy attempted
to effect a landing on its shores." He next complains
that Napoleon had found fault with him unnecessarily.
He begs that he will recall his services to the Empire,
and read again, with those services in his memory, the
letter which he (Napoleon) wrote to him after his return
to Naples, as well as his letter to the Queen. More
than that, let him remember the absolute silence
he maintained after writing those letters, and then
judge how sturdy must have been the loyalty that
had remained unimpaired in the face of such injustice
as that. " Remember, Sire," he said, " that, as I deem
it, honour requires that I myself should lead the troops
that are to fight for you, and that I may terminate
the high career I have followed beneath your auspices
by losing both my crown and my life, but not at the
sacrifice of my self-respect. Only send me word, Sire,
that you accept my proffered services and your enemies
will behold me once more upon the battlefield, worthy
of you and worthy of myself." l
That, then, was his final reply. His letter was suffi-
ciently vague, sufficiently contradictory of Caroline's, to
justify us in doubting whether he had made up his
mind to go campaigning in the North, as his wife said,
jor whether he intended remaining in the South, as he
appeared to say himself. The whole effusion was inter-
larded with just such a mass of denials, and protestations
of sincerity and devotion, as he never failed to employ
when he desired to obscure the issue and to evade the
necessity of giving the Emperor a straightforward answer.
But with all his talk of leading the Neapolitan troops in
person, of marching to defend Italy from the foe, he
came back by a series of detours to his proposal of the
1 Murat to Napoleon, Naples, July 4, 1813. Archives de /a Guerre.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 245
1 2th April — the proposal that he should be entrusted
with the defence of Italy.
The letter was sent to Dresden by special messenger,
and Murat began his preparations. Certain in his own
mind that Napoleon would be bound to accept his aid,
he put considerable energy into the organisation of his
forces.1 To the command of the three Neapolitan divi-
sions he appointed Carascosa, Pignatelli, and Campana.
He further gave orders that a fourth division should be
formed. This latter was to remain behind in Naples,
while the other three were to set out for Italy. Desver-
nois, Pepe, Carafa, d' Aquino, Filangieri were made
brigadier-generals. As though confident of its accept-
ance, he allowed rumours to spread abroad concerning
his offer to the Emperor to march at the head of his
troops into Upper Italy. It was publicly reported that
the King was about to set out for Verona with twenty-
five thousand men. On the 7th July he told the Due
de Feltre that he was looking forward to rendering
further services to the Emperor at the head of the troops
of His Royal and Imperial Majesty. On the gth he
declared to Berthier that he was perfectly ready to
march. " I have just proposed to the Emperor that
I should proceed to the Adige with twenty-five or thirty
thousand men."
While Murat was endeavouring to secure Napoleon's
acceptance of what he was pleased to term his offer to
undertake the defence of Italy, time had been slipping
by, and the interval granted by the Emperor for the
departure of the Neapolitan troops had at last expired.
On the 6th July Durant had written to Bassano informing
him that unless he received an answer by the loth he
would present Monsieur de Gabriac to Gallo and request
an audience of the King. The appointed day came, but
brought with it no response. Durant therefore betook
1 Mier to Metternich.
246 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
himself to Gallo, with whom he had a prolonged
interview,1 in the course of which he gave notice of his
departure. He then had an audience of the King. The
latter asserted that his letter of the 27th June to the
Due de Feltre was not to be regarded as a refusal, where-
upon Durant stated that the value of his assistance
depended on the promptness with which it was rendered,
and added that he should leave Naples unless a division
was sent to Bologna immediately. Murat protested that
he could do nothing before the 20th or the 25th at the
earliest, but that the delay would be immaterial, since
the troops would go by way of the Abruzzi, and con-
cluded with renewed protestations of his loyalty to the
Imperial cause. Nevertheless the following day Durant
demanded his farewell audience. " If my request is
granted at once," said he, " the insincerity of Murat 's
offer will be proved." In the contrary event, he decided
to wait for instructions from Bassano. The I5th came,
and still he had not had his farewell audience, and, as
Mier wrote to Metternich, it appeared as though he had
made up his mind to remain at Naples till Murat received
an answer from the Emperor.
The King's anxiety was great. It is easy to judge
of his impatience when we bear in mind that, notwith-
standing all his essays in diplomacy, Napoleon still re-
mained his sole support. His advances to the English
had been received with unmingled hostility by Bentinck.
There was no satisfaction to be won from Austria's
mediation, since it was not in the power of Metternich
to give him that " compensation " to the attainment of
which the policy of Naples was at this time exclusively
directed. Truth to tell, relations with Austria had been
of a very humdrum description since Cariati had been at
Vienna. Cariati had informed Metternich that his letters
of credit, which had been sent off by special messenger,
1 Brunetti to Testi, Naples, July II, 1813. Archives Nationals.
MURAT—BENTINCK— METTERNICH 247
would shortly reach him. The said letters, however, were
stopped at Rome and, according to popular report, sent
on to the Emperor Napoleon.1 After this debut, relations
remained uneventful. It may be a fact that on the 29th
June, Joachim, who had just received the fatal copy of the
Moniteur and was exceedingly wroth thereat, caused Mier
to be informed that he and the Queen were impatiently
waiting for an answer to Cariati's proposals,2 though the
said proposals were already ancient history and Metter-
nich had long ago sent his reply. If such was the case,
it was merely an ebullition of temper which went no
further, for the King steadily refused to grant the full
powers demanded of him, without which neither Cariati
nor any one else could move a step.
Thus Murat was still in suspense. He was indeed
awaiting his fate with feverish anxiety. He endeavoured
to find vent for his impatience in reviewing his troops,
which, he observed with vexation, had suffered numerous
desertions. He found it impossible to dissemble his
consuming anxiety, and Durant recorded the symptoms
with the accuracy of a skilled psychologist. On the
26th the long-looked-for letter came at last. " His
Majesty had a protracted consultation with the Queen/'
Next day he conferred with his Ministers,8 and ordered
the following stale news to be inserted in the Moniteur
des Deux Sidles : —
" His Majesty has received an express dispatch from
His Majesty the Emperor informing him that the armistice
has been extended till the I5th August next. The Peace
Congress has commenced its deliberations at Prague."
He hoped therefore that if he left Naples he would
be able to make it appear that he had been summoned
to the Congress.
1 Brunetti to Testi, July II, 1813. Archives Nationales.
* Mier to Metternich, June 29, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
3 Durant to Bassano, July 22, 1813.
248 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
It was, however, to Caroline that the Emperor's letter
was addressed. Its terms were far from gentle. In it
charge after charge was levelled against Murat. It spoke
of his disobedience — nay, his treason, and of his relations
with England. The Emperor showed that he was fully
aware of what had been passing between Naples, Vienna,
and Berlin (thus proving that the real object of Cariati's
mission in February and March had not escaped him) ; he
denounced the connections in which the Neapolitan
Minister at Vienna had involved himself, and brought
against Murat a body of accusations which that
monarch found the more distressing in that he knew
they were well founded. Nevertheless Joachim could
not bring himself to depart.
At last, however, on the 3oth July, his mind was
made up. " Sire," wrote he to the Emperor, " Your
Majesty has not written to me, and your letter to the
Queen has greatly troubled me. But I mean to retain
my self-command. Thinking only of your past kind-
nesses, of the affection you were wont to show me, I
have resolved to hasten to your side. A little while and
I shall once more be in your hands, and if war breaks
out again your foes will see how little reason they had
to count on me as an ally. The Queen, my family, and
my subjects are grieved at my departure. But though
they view the future with anxiety, that anxiety is tem-
pered by the feeling of confidence with which your power
and generosity inspire them. Never cease to trust me,
Sire ; my heart is better than my head ! " l
The same day, together with this short epistle of the
King's, Caroline sent her statement of the case, for Murat
would have been hard put to it to present a respectable
apologia. " Sire," began the Queen, "the letter with
which I was honoured by Your Majesty has greatly
affected the King, and it cannot be gainsaid that certain
1 Murat to Napoleon, July 30, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 249
passages in it were well calculated to give him very con-
siderable pain. I myself could not help feeling deeply
grieved that such statements should have been made
about the King, still more that they should have been
made by Your Majesty, whose lightest word is law to
us. The King is in despair because you did not write
to him direct. A line from you, Sire, and he would have
started for Dresden with a joyful heart ; but the silence
which you have maintained towards him and some of
the references in your letter have wounded him so sorely
that for a space I saw that he was hesitating whether
to go or not. Then the thought that your enemies had
dared to sully his name, the irresistible impulse to find
himself once more at Your Majesty's side, the desire to
afford fresh proofs of his devotion, at length carried the
day, and he is about to begin his journey. His presence
at Dresden will put a stop to the ridiculous reports that
his enemies and Your Majesty's have put into circulation.
' That portion of your letter which referred to Malta
and the English almost put him beside himself. ' How,'
he kept on saying, ' how could the Emperor dream that
I should enter into a compact with England ? How
could he ever doubt that his enemies were my irrecon-
cilable foes ? '
" No, Sire, neither with Malta, nor with Berlin, nor
with Vienna has the King had any treasonable com-
merce : no act of his has been hostile to your interests.
The secret reports to which Your Majesty refers as having
been received from London can only relate to some such
insignificant statements as are occasionally bandied about
between the secret service agents, and I am in a position
to assure Your Majesty that if the King's new Minister
at Vienna was led by an imperfect acquaintance with the
Court there to form some ill-judged connections, his con-
duct has been strongly condemned. Never believe, Sire,
that the King could have fallen a prey to snares so
250 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
clumsily devised. The influence which Your Majesty
wields over his heart and mind is too potent to admit
of hesitation on his pare. Sire, he is about to place his
destiny once more in your hands ; it is my hope that
he will thus win back the favour you were wont to show
him, never to lose it again. If he does not, it will weigh
heavily on both of us. I am bound to confess to Your
Majesty that the article in the Moniteur which pained
us so much is ever present to my mind, and that it would
make me tremble for the King's reception at your hands
were it not for the knowledge I have that you are
thoroughly acquainted with his real sentiments." l
It remained to give a plausible reason for the King's
departure, and to display the event to the public and
the foreign powers as a mark of Imperial favour. Thus,
on the morrow of Murat's decision, it was currently
reported in Naples that the King had been summoned
to the Congress at Prague, at which the question of a
general peace was being discussed, it being desirable that
Naples and Sicily should be represented there since
England was anxious to retain Sicily. Compensation
was to be given to Ferdinand and to Joachim, hence the
summons.2 On the 2nd August the following note
appeared in the organ of the Neapolitan Government : —
" At a time when Europe as a whole is animated by
the most ardent desire for the restoration of peace, it
affords us deep satisfaction to be in a position to announce
that His Majesty, in response to an invitation received
from his august brother-in-law the Emperor and King,
is leaving to-night for Dresden. The happy prospect of
which this auspicious event is the augury must in some
measure compensate the King's subjects for the regret
his absence will cause them. The object with which
this Congress has assembled at Prague — that of restor-
1 Caroline to the Emperor, Naples, July 30, 1813. Archives Nationals.
2 Diario di Nicola.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 251
ing peace to the world — will render it memorable in
history ; and in undertaking his present journey His
Majesty is following the inclinations most dear to his
heart, in that he will be paying a visit to His Imperial
and Royal Majesty, his illustrious brother-in-law and
ally, to whom he is united by the sacred bonds of kinship
as well as by political relationship." l
The next person to have dust thrown in his eyes was
Mier, who was informed that the King had received a
letter from the Emperor.2 Even Carignano, the Neapo-
litan Minister in Paris, was not allowed to know the
truth. " His Majesty/' wrote Gallo, " having received
a most cordial and friendly invitation from His Majesty
the Emperor Napoleon, has decided to set out for Dresden.
He will travel incognito as General Domont, who will
accompany him as Captain of the Guards. The King
will leave to-morrow night, taking with him only the
Baron Carafa his chief equerry, Giuliani his aide-de-
camp, and P6bord the surgeon."
After all these cordial and fraternal invitations, Murat
had no choice but to start, and he began his journey
on the 2nd August at ten o'clock at night. Prior to his
departure he entrusted the Regency to Caroline, of whose
" haute sagesse " he declared himself highly appreciative,
and informed the Diplomatic Corps that his absence
could not be a prolonged one. Everything was to pro-
ceed as if he were present. Hardly had he got clear of
the capital when he encountered on the road a messenger
from Cariati, who, in addition to the dispatches which
the Neapolitan Minister was sending to his King, was
the bearer of papers addressed by Metternich to Mier,
Metternich having begged Cariati to suffer him to avail
himself of the opportunity thus accidentally offered of
communicating with his subordinate at Naples. Murat
1 Monitcur des Deux Sidles, August 2, 1813.
* Mier to Metternich, Naples, August I, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
252 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
was eager to examine the contents of his papers, but
unfortunately they were in cipher. He therefore com-
manded the courier to go on to Naples, and gave orders
that as soon as the documents had been decoded they
were to be sent on to him. Meanwhile he would wait
for them somewhere on the road. He then continued
his journey to Rome, saw Miollis, spoke of his early
return, of his army of thirty thousand men which would
enable him to undertake the defence of Italy, narrated
the attempts made by the British forces at Ponza and
recommenced his journey on the 3rd August at ten o'clock
at night,1 at the same time as the courier whom he had
encountered on the road was riding into Naples. Each
party opened his dispatches. Mier found a letter from
Metternich, written at Prague and dated the i6th July,
which calls for some explanation. From the I5th June,
the date of the second treaty of Reichenbach, which
had been supplemented by the treaty of Peterswaldau,
the Coalition had settled its policy regarding Italy.
England, Russia, and Prussia not only acquiesced in
Austria's claims to the Italian Tyrol — the Grand Duchies
of Tuscany and Modena — but agreed to give Austria the
control of affairs beyond the Alps.
The bonds which existed between England and Austria
were now to be drawn closer. By the secret treaty signed
at Prague on the 27th July, Great Britain definitely con-
sented to give Austria a free hand in Italy. On the
strength of the authority thus formally conceded to his
Government, Metternich now endeavoured to exert a
predominating influence in Neapolitan affairs. This
influence Bentinck was compelled to resist single-handed,
for Castlereagh and Aberdeen, their hands tied by the
treaty, had no legitimate grounds for interfering with
Austria's proposals. The first use which Metternich
made of this accession to his authority was to demand
1 Miollis to the Minister for War, Rome, August 4, 1813.
MURAT— BENTINCK— METTERNICH 253
from Murat an explanation of his policy. He, like
Cariati, had been wondering when Murat was going to
send those powers which alone were required to bring
about a settlement between the two countries. He was
determined to fathom the intentions of Naples and to
discover for certain with which party Joachim was going
to throw in his lot. Mier was therefore instructed to
seek an audience of the King and to put the question
to him. Metternich demanded that a reply should be
sent him by a Neapolitan emissary before the loth August,
for on the loth August Austria had finally resolved to
denounce the armistice. If, while awaiting develop-
ments, the King was willing to observe an effective
neutrality, then he was to sign a formal though secret
agreement to that effect. If, on the other hand, it was
his desire to take an active part in the righting, it behoved
him to appoint a plenipotentiary in order to enter into
an alliance with Austria and formally to join the Coali-
tion. He promised the King that in the event of the
Prague negotiations resulting in a peaceful settlement,
the Court of Vienna would divulge nothing. " We are
of opinion," he went on, " that the King's only means
of assuring his continued existence as a sovereign is to
join forces with Austria. He cannot honestly fail to see
that he has gone too far not to have exposed himself
to the full measure of the Emperor's reprobation."
Such were the famous proposals by which Metternich
hoped to dissuade Murat from departing to throw in his
lot with the Emperor. In point of fact, they gave Murat
not one of the things he wanted. What did they amount
to ? Merely an alliance with Austria, with nothing — not
so much as an inch of territory — to make up for the loss
of Sicily, his claim to which he was to agree to abandon.
How could he have been expected to assent to such
terms ? To have done so would have been sheer madness
on his part, and instincts of self-interest, with which he
254 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
was more plentifully endowed than with wisdom, told
him to refuse. In vain did Mier submit Metternich's
dispatch to the Queen Regent ; she tore it up. In vain
did he hurry after the King to Terracina : he was already
far away. From the hands of the courier, who had been
sent back again from Naples on the night of the 4th,
Murat received Cariati's dispatch, which contained a
copy of Metternich's. He read them, and then pursued
his journey at redoubled speed to make up for lost time.
Leaving Bologna on the 7th August, he reached Verona
on the 8th, where he halted for half-an-hour. Continuing
his journey thence via Rover edo, Bozen, and Inns-
bruck, he arrived at Munich at eleven o'clock on the
morning of the loth. There he alighted at the residence
of Caracciolo, his plenipotentiary, with whom he had a
long interview. In the afternoon he went to Nymphen-
burg to call on the King and Queen of Bavaria, with
whom he attended an operatic performance in the
evening.1 About midday on the nth he set out once
more, and on the I4th August found himself at Dresden.
1 Moniteur Universal.
CHAPTER IX
MURAT'S DEMANDS
Caroline at Naples — Relations between Murat and Napoleon at Dresden
Schinina's visit to Murat — Pescara's mission — Ollendorf — What Murat
demands of Metternich — He abandons the Grand Army — His arrival at
Naples — The defence of Italy — The Monitore— Interview with Mier —
Demands of the King and Gallo — The raising of the Continental blockade —
Murat decides on a forward movement — His letter to the Emperor — His
interview with Durant — Devices for making a peaceful entry into Italy —
Roman opinion — The second division sets out— Metternich's dispatches reach
Naples — The part played by Menz— Murat mistrusted by Napoleon— Fouche's
mission to Naples — Schinina's failure at Syracuse — The King stays his pre-
parations— Endeavours to renew relations with the Emperor.
CAROLINE, thus left to her own devices in
Naples, bore with a light heart the burden of
sovereignty. It is true that, as in 1812, the
King had carefully curtailed her prerogatives,
but if the crisis were grave or she deemed her throne in
peril, it was not in her nature to hesitate to assume even
the weightiest responsibilities. She set a higher value
on the throne than did the King himself. For him the
externals of royalty were all in all. Like the vain-
glorious adventurous son of Cahors that ^Ile" was^tTg"
Ee~loved the etiquette_whjch^constrained the
'
and illustrious nobility
— WrtFF
was far different. She had an eyelSxDve all
for the real, tangible advantages of the royal state, for
the power, the wealth, the position which it offered. She
255
256 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
loved the throne because it made her supreme (at least
within the limits of her realm), and placed within her
reach the means of gratifying her ambition and her love
of pleasure. To Murat she was willing to resign the
shadowy splendours of sovereignty so she herself might
remain in undisturbed possession of the substance.
By her inherited qualities Caroline was much better
fitted than her husband to hold the reins of government.
She took a clear, definite view of things ; and though she
was not to be compared with her brother, though she
had nothing of his world-wide vision, nothing of his
extraordinary depth of character, she played her part
with credit on a smaller stage, noting with intelligence
the march of events and recognising with keen and
accurate discernment the policy which her interests
required. So cleverly indeed had she directed that
policy that, up to the present, it had never entered
Napoleon's head that she might desert his cause if the
day should go against him. She neglected nothing that
might tend to place her conduct above suspicion. When,
a few days after Murat's departure, Naples was attacked
by the English, she was seen in the front rank riding
along the foreshore with her generals about her.1 On
the I5th August, the Emperor's birthday, she held a
reception and ordered Mass to be sung, while, in the
city, illuminations, free performances in the theatre,
salvoes of artillery at sunrise and at sunset, reminded the
people of the great occasion. On the 5th September she
ordered the victory at Dresden to be publicly announced,
and was herself accorded an enthusiastic reception at the
Theatre du Fundo.2 On the I2th a Te Deum was sung
for the same victory.
All this was for the multitude. In her own heart
Caroline was not so tranquil, not so certain that victory
would ultimately remain with the Emperor. Such a
1 Diario di Nicola. a Moniteur Universel.
HAUI.INK BONAPARTE
Front a f>astcl in the possession of Mr. John Lane
MURAT'S DEMANDS 257
host of difficulties now confronted him that she con-
ceived it hardly possible for him to overcome them.
Every day saw the hopes of peace grow fainter, every
day witnessed the uprising of some new foe, the appear-
ance of some fresh complication. All this was reflected
in her conduct, for it was not in her nature to carry her
support of anybody to the extent of risking her crown.
Thus she repeatedly caused Gallo to intimate that she
was anxious for Mier to remain at Naples as long as
possible, nor before she was absolutely compelled
did she consent that his passports should be delivered
to him.1 By this means she designed to maintain a
foothold in either camp, and to be in a position to trim
her policy according to events. Then, again, she wrote a
letter to Eugene excusing herself from sending troops on
the grounds, true or false (Murat may well have given
such a command), that she could do nothing without the
sanction of her husband. " According to orders given
by the King when he went away, I can do nothing,"
said she, " in the matter of sending troops out of the
kingdom, and I cannot take any action until I receive
instructions from Dresden. Nevertheless as soon as the
necessary permission reaches me I will not lose an instant,
for I am always happy and eager to carry out the Em-
peror's wishes." 2 However, it was necessary to reckon
with desertions on a large scale. In four days a single
division had lost seven hundred and fifty men in this
manner, a circumstance due to the terrible tales brought
back by the men who had returned from the North of
what they had suffered from the cold. This was another
addition to the list of excuses to be used the next time
troops were demanded.
Meanwhile Durant's influence had been on the wane
1 Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813. Quoted by
M. Weil.
a Caroline to Eugene, August 19, 1813. Archives de la Guerre.
R
£58 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
at Caroline's Court. Time was when she had been wont
freely to unburden her heart to the Mini :.t« -i ».f France,
and when he had been a sort of confidant, sometimes
indeed ;>n .illy, in her quarrels with INT husband. She
had made liberal enough use of his services in 1811.
But now times had changed. On the 27th August
Durant sent the Queen an official note informing her of
the resumption of hostilities, insisting that the Austrian
Ambassador should be sent home immediately, and
demanding that troops should be dispatched to the
front. It was all to no purpose. (i;dl<> replied that he
had received no one's instructions to dismiss the Austrian
Ambassador. Again and again did Dur.mt point out to
her what an unfavourable impression Mier's continued
presence at Naples was bound to have on Napoleon.1
It was of no avail. The Queen rejoined that it \\.is
impossible for her to send him away without specific
instructions from the King. As to the troops, she
that, in accordance with General Miollis' request, she had
given orders for the ist Light Infantry Regiment to set
out for Rome.2
It looked as though Mier was going to stay on in-
definitely when on the gih October a message came fumi
Joachim ordering that the Austrian Minister was to be
given his passports— this, of course, "with reluctance,
and only because circumstances made it absolutely
inevitable." Well, the passports had to be given since
there was no help for it; but to such an extent were
matters delayed that, though Mier had been officially
notified of the cessation of his functions on the loth
October, he was still at Naples when Murat returned,
and did not finally set out until the I4th November.
So we see that Caroline, once the life and soul of the
French party, had changed her attitude. Not as yet
1 Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813.
' Durant to Ba.vsano. Archives Atrangirts.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 259
actively or avowedly hostile, she had grown uneasy and
was standing on her guard. She, too, meant to await the
issue of the grim conflict that was approaching, so that
she could come to terms with the victor. As for Murat,
we have seen the circumstances which attended his
departure from Naples ; and what his feelings must have
been when he found himself face to face with the Em-
peror, it is no difficult task to conjecture. Though
neither party makes mention of it, the meeting must have
been a stormy one. At the end of August, after the
battle of Dresden perhaps, Joachim wrote the Queen a
letter, " in which he gave free expression to his dis-
content ; " * and it is doubtless about that time that
Napoleon addressed a reprimand to Berthier for his
action in sending the Adjutant Commandant Galbois to
Murat. " I disapprove," said the Emperor, " of your
informing the King of Naples of what passes between
the Austrians and myself." a Relations became still
more strained. Durant's reports on the attitude of the
Queen and the Government coincided too thoroughly
with the hostile position assumed by the King for Napo-
leon not to have taken the alarm. Vainly did he ask
his brother-in-law for proofs of his loyalty to France.
At last, losing all patience with the King because of his
obstinate refusal to send troops to support the Viceroy,
and confirmed by Durant's reports in his suspicion that
there was some secret understanding between the two
Courts, he broke out into a storm of rage, overwhelmed
Murat with the most violent and humiliating reproaches,
ordered him to recall Cariati from Vienna immediately
and to command the Queen to send Mier about his
business.8
1 Hiller to the Emperor of Austria, September 2.
* Napoleon to Berthier, Dresden, August 29, 1813; Lecestre, Ltttrts
intdites.
* Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813.
260 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
If we connect the letter from Bassano to Durant which
was dispatched from Dresden on the ist October 1813,
with the letter from Murat to the Queen giving orders
for Mier's dismissal which reached Naples on the gth, we
shall see that in all probability the quarrel between
Murat and the Emperor at Dresden took place some-
where about the end of September. That outburst,
however, was succeeded by a period of silence. Murat
was awaiting an opportunity to flee. It soon came.
No sooner did Metternich become aware that the King
had reached the Grand Army, than he conceived the
project of sending after him the proposals for an alliance
which, originally formulated in his letter of the i6th
July, had been renewed in that of the 3rd August,1
which latter was received at Naples some considerable
time after Joachim's departure. He dispatched them
through the agency of the Chevalier Schinina, the secre-
tary to the Neapolitan Legation at Vienna. Schinina,
thus sent by Metternich in pursuit of the King, came up
with him on the yth October,2 and informed him of the
advantageous terms which Austria, with the sanction of
the Allies (so at least Metternich alleged), was disposed
to offer him at that time ; the terms in question being
an offer to recognise Murat as lawful King of Naples on
condition that he should join the Coalition. On the
7th October, therefore, Austria's terms did not amount
to more than a mere willingness to " recognise " him.
Did Metternich suppose that Murat would abandon the
Emperor's cause, which had just emerged triumphant
from the field of Dresden, to transfer his allegiance to
the Coalition on the strength of such a niggardly con-
cession as that ? Eager as he may have been to throw
over Napoleon, he was not disposed to hold himself at
quite so cheap a rate. When, therefore, Joachim had
1 Metternich to Mier, August 3, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
2 Bentinck to Castlereagh, Palermo, December 20. Record Office.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 261
seen Schinina, he sent him back to Naples to talk over
the Austrian proposals with the Queen. Schinina lost
no time on the road. Staying his course no longer than
the necessity of changing horses demanded, he was in
Rome on the night of the i6th October,1 and reached
Naples the following evening. Without losing an in-
stant he acquainted the Queen with the preliminary
proposals which he had been instructed by Metternich to
lay before the King. He also informed her of the position
of the French armies, of the defection of Bavaria, and
spoke so strongly of the trend of events that Caroline
decided to seek a rapprochement with Austria. Next
day she saw Mier, and began by speaking to him of the
friendly overtures of the Emperor Francis. After that
honied exordium, she gave him the Act of Regency to
read, declaring that she was authorised on all occasions
of unusual importance to take whatever measures she
might deem expedient for the peace and safety of the
kingdom.2 She had therefore made up her mind, she
said, to enter into negotiations with Austria to assure
herself of that government's protection, and to use
every effort to bring about the fulfilment of their policy.
With this object in view, she requested Mier to draw
up a memorandum fully setting forth his ideas on the
subject.
This meant the extinction of French influence at
Naples. The Queen, though her plan was not completed
in detail till the 28th October, had made up her mind
to play the traitress. As for Murat, despite the ex-
postulations, the violent reproaches which the Emperor
hurled in his face, he had not summoned up courage to
abandon the cause of France. Still, he reflected, Napoleon
was but his brother-in-law, and he had long since ceased to
regard him as a benefactor. Yet Caroline, though it was
1 Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, October 18, 1813.
* Mier to Metternich, Report of the i6th December.
262 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
but little more than two months since she had sent the
Emperor that passionate appeal in which she affirmed that
her husband was on his side, and that she herself looked
upon Napoleon as their only protector, was visited by
no such hesitations. The transfer of her allegiance
to the enemy was the affair of one brief night. The
memory of past benefits, the love due from a sister
to a brother, were alike unavailing to restrain her.
Schinina and his message had sufficed to banish all such
considerations from her mindf^f we find it difficult to
discover a fitting attribute to apply to the falling away
of Murat, with what epithet shall we brand the treachery
of Carolinejj ftfVfvt** ^'u' 1 y <K <rn G ^!
On trfe28th October the news of Bavaria's defection
was confirmed by Brunetti, and the Queen resolved to
cross the Rubicon. Sending for Mier, she definitely in-
formed him that she wished to open negotiations with
Austria. It being, she said, impossible for her at the
moment to refer the matter to the King, she would
acquaint him with the steps she had taken at a later
opportunity. She requested him to lay her proposals
before his Court, and placed her future policy unreservedly
in the hands of the Emperor Francis. She instructed
Gallo to write to Metternich making proposals similar in
effect to those which the latter had sent to Mier, from
which it appears that the only condition laid down by
Caroline as the price of her co-operation was that her
husband should be recognised by the Allies as King of
Naples ; and in order that there might be no mistake
about the matter she gave her word that she would not
send another soldier out of the kingdom, and that her
whole army was at Austria's disposal if Austria needed
its services.1 Such was the point she had reached on
the 28th October. In eleven days she had done more
to advance the cause of Austria in Naples than her
i Mier to Metternich, Report of the i6th December.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 263
husband had compassed in eight long months. Metter-
nich had good reason to be satisfied with her. As yet,
however, he was in ignorance of the progress his policy
had made at Naples, and was still endeavouring with all
his might to detach Joachim from the Emperor. Lord
Aberdeen, who had been sent on a special mission to the
Emperor of Austria, had learned from a conversation
which he had had with Metternich that he was striving
to draw Murat into the Coalition. Aberdeen was there-
fore authorised to offer the royal family of Sicily com-
pensation for Naples in case Austria, to secure Murat's
co-operation, insisted on recognising him as its lawful
sovereign.1
1 Castlereagh to Bentinck, London, August 7, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
M. Masson (Napotion et sa FamilU, ix. 77) writes: — " Lord Aberdeen went
further. He made it understood that the Prince Regent left the Neapolitan
question entirely in the hands of Austria, and that he himself was in possession
of the King of Sicily's formal renunciation of his claims on the kingdom of
Naples, and that he was empowered to sign jointly with Austria a treaty with
the King of Naples, supposing that the latter was agreeable to such an
arrangement." M. Masson has taken this declaration from a dispatch which
Metternich sent to Mier from Ohrdruff on the 28th October 1813. Now
Metternich was lying in this dispatch, for Aberdeen never told him that he
had received the renunciation of the King of Sicily. The proof of this is to
be found in a conversation which Graham had with Neipperg and Menz on
the 5th January 1814. Graham's dispatch is as follows : —
44 ... After the papers enclosed as to the negotiations direct between
Buonaparte and headquarters, he (Neipperg) put into my hands three others,
the most extraordinary that were ever presented. 1st — The dispatch of the
28th October from Count Metternich ... In the dispatch of the 28th
October, immediately preceding the words which are quoted by M. Menz in
his letter to your Lordship (v. pages 291-292) it is stated that the reason why
Great Britain is prepared to treat with Murat is that she has obtained
(underlined) from the King of Sicily a renunciation in hope of an indemnity
for the crown of Naples. I asked M. Menz directly on the spot why he had
not inserted this clause of the sentence : he said he himself had entertained
some doubts as to the fact, and he was unwilling to raise an obstacle to an
early accommodation between Murat and Great Britain (underlined). The
undistinguished reason of this garbled extract is that M. Menz was aware of
the intention of signing a separate treaty. He knew the disinclination of
Murat to contract any engagements to which the British were no parties
and, conscious of the falsehood of this pretended renunciation, he studiously
264 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Metternich, who intended to neglect no means to
win Joachim to his side, sent word to Cariati to come to
Prague. In a secret interview which took place between
them at the end of September,1 they weighed the possi-
bilities of getting through dispatches to the King. It
was decided that Cariati should send a messenger to
Caracciolo, Murat's Minister at Munich; Caracciolo in
his turn was to dispatch another messenger bearing
Metternich's proposals to the King. The matter was
important, and Caracciolo entrusted Pescara, his own
secretary, with the mission.
The precise date of Pescara 's departure from Munich
has not hitherto been ascertained, but he eventually
succeeded in finding his way to Murat. According to
the latter, who cautiously qualified his statement with
the words " I think," 2 the date of this meeting was the
1 6th. Therein Murat lied (he was talking to Mier). He
knew the date perfectly well : he had good reason to re-
member it, for it was the day after Leipzig, and Leipzig
was not an event that could be readily forgotten.
Several of the best informed historians of the period,
such as Fain, Caulaincourt, Colletta, and Montveran, have
already made mention of the meeting which took place at
suppressed it." (Graham to Bentinck, Naples, January 5, 1814. Record
Office. Foreign Office, Sicily, vol. Ixiii.)
Metternich himself puts the matter as follows in a note which he sent to
Aberdeen from Frankfort on the I2th December 1813: — " The undersigned
has had the honour on several previous occasions of explaining how fair the
Emperor considers is the clause providing for an indemnity for the King of
Sicily in case the latter should renounce his claims to Naples." (Metternich
to Aberdeen. Frankfort, December 12, 1813. Record Office. Foreign
Office, Sicily.) It is clear therefore that Aberdeen never alleged that he
had obtained Ferdinand's renunciation, and that the latter, moreover, despite
all the pressure that had been brought to bear upon him, steadily refused to
sign such a document. This is one of the examples of Metternich's menda-
cious policy.
1 Metternich to Mier, Ohrdruff, October 28, 1813. Quoted by M.
Weil.
* Conversation between Murat and Mier ; Mier's Report.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 265
Ollendorf between Murat and the bearer of the Austrian
proposals, and those who have hitherto denied the authen-
ticity of the interview have all done so on the ground that
Austria's spokesman was Mier, and that Mier being at
Naples — as Durant's dispatches and his own papers
abundantly testify — he could not at the same time have
been in Germany. All, however, that is necessary is to
read Pescara for Mier, and the whole matter becomes as
plain as daylight. The conference at Ollendorf did in
fact take place : it took place on the 23rd October, and
the writings of the historians whose names I have men-
tioned above throw a singularly vivid light on this dark
chapter of diplomatic history.
Pescara it was, as Murat himself affirms, who took part
in the interview, and it was at Ollendorf that the conversa-
tion took place, but on the 23rd October, and not, we
repeat, on the i6th, as the King would have us believe.
When Schinina in the course of an interview he had with
Bentinck at Syracuse on the I2th December, explained
to Lord William that Austria had offered to recognise
Joachim as King of Naples if he would join the Coalition,
Bentinck observed that the offer had clearly been refused,
since at Leipzig Murat had fought against the Allies.
Whereon Schinina made reply that Murat did not know
of the offer before Leipzig, but that he had since signified
his acceptance of it. It therefore follows that the King
had seen nothing of Pescara on the i6th, but that they
had met subsequently, when Murat, as we shall presently
show, had agreed to accept the terms offered to him.
Here is evidence more convincing still. On the i6th
October, the day which Joachim alleges as that which
witnessed his interview with Pescara, Merfeldt, the feld-
zeugmeister, was taken prisoner by the French. Napoleon
took advantage of the occasion to send Merfeldt back with
proposals for the Allies. On the I7th he spent some hours
in conversation with his prisoner, and on the following
266 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
morning sent him on parole to the headquarters of the
Allies. On the way thither he saw and spoke to Murat.
But though Murat knew perfectly well that Merfeldt was
proceeding under safe-conduct to an interview with
Metternich, he limited his observations to an expression
of the satisfaction with which he had learned that the
missions of their respective countries were still at Naples
and Vienna, and merely added that he hoped they would
both remain at their posts.1 But of Pescara and his pro-
posals he said never a word. If, therefore, Murat failed to
avail himself of this supremely favourable opportunity of
communicating with Austria regarding the proposals of
which Pescara was the bearer, we can only conclude that
at the date in question Pescara had not yet arrived, and
that therefore Murat had nothing to say. In point of
fact it was not until after Leipzig, when the retreat had
begun, that Pescara came on the scene, and then he was
received with open arms. He carried with him an ordi-
nary note without superscription of any sort. " The
Austrian Cabinet," it ran, " is taking further steps to
obtain from the King of Naples as early a reply as pos-
sible to the overtures which the Chevalier Schinina was
authorised to impart. Austria is in a position to com-
municate to the King news of the utmost importance
from England and the Regent of Sicily as a result of
the direct relations established between the Neapolitan
Government and Lord William Bentinck, and it is de-
sirable that the King should, as soon as possible, send a
representative for the purpose of taking cognisance of
the proposals and of removing the uncertainty which still
exists regarding the intentions of his Neapolitan Majesty.
" The course of events is so unfavourable to France
that the King must recognise that in no long time it will
be impossible for us to ward off from Naples the animad-
version of the Powers or to prevail on them to accept any
1 Metternich to Mier, Ohrdruff, October 28, 1813.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 267
proposals which His Majesty may send us at the eleventh
hour."
There is no doubt about that being a document in-
tended to run the gauntlet of the enemy's lines. Undated,
unsigned, and enigmatic in tone, there were evidently
some negotiations in progress of which a knowledge was
necessary for its full comprehension. The terms which
Pescara was instructed to offer verbally were these : —
" Joachim was to quit the French Army l and to send
no more troops to the assistance of the Viceroy, while
England, who was willing to undertake to obtain Ferdi-
nand's renunciation of the kingdom of Naples, associated
herself with Austria in guaranteeing that Murat should
remain in independent possession of his kingdom. Nay,
they were willing to put him in the way of obtaining
additional advantages."
Joachim, who had paid no heed to Schinina, lent a
willing ear to Pescara, for the good reason that Leipzig
had intervened to modify his attitude. Napoleon's
defeat had put his hesitations to flight. No sooner had
he heard what Pescara had to say than,2 deeming there
was no time like the present, he saw the Emperor and
asked for permission to return to Naples. All his old
arguments were made to do duty once again. The
Allies had drawn nearer, Italy was in greater danger than
ever, and ought to be defended and so forth. Murat laid
great stress on the importance of his Neapolitan forces,
though Napoleon knew perfectly well that he would not
send a single man to Eugene's assistance. In the end
the Emperor gave his consent, so at least it would appear
1 The Due di Vicenza says " immediately abandon," and this fits in very
well with Murat's statement that he at once asked the Emperor's permission
to return to Naples.
2 This explains Murat's phrase " I made up my mind at once." In his
conversation with Mier the egregious Murat failed to see that there was a
whole week between the alleged date of his interview with Pescara (October
16) and that of his departure.
268 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
, from his letter to Cambacer£s and from the latter 's con-
versation with Clarke. " The King of Naples/' wrote
Napoleon, " started foi Naples last evening, his presence
there having seemed to me to be necessary." l " Mon-
sieur 1'Archichancelier told me the day before yesterday,"
wrote the Due de Feltre, " that the King of Naples had
merely returned home in order to make arrangements
for sending the greater part of his forces in the direction
of Upper Italy." 2 However, the interview was rather a
painful one. " Our farewells," said Joachim at a later
date, " were not particularly cordial. He (Napoleon)
displayed a good deal of ill-humour, and reproached me
for leaving him at a time of so much difficulty." 3
But before finally leaving the French army, it was
Murat's duty and intention to reply to the Austrian
proposals. For the first time he set out his remarkable
claims in writing. Cariati was instructed " to approach
Metternich and to inform him that as soon as the King
had become aware of the suggestions broached to him
(Cariati) at Prague, he had told the Emperor that the
interests of his country demanded his prompt return to
Naples, and that having made this declaration to the
Emperor he had left the Army and started for Naples
without waiting for a reply. His first task on reaching
Naples would be to bring his army up to eighty thousand
men, and he desired nothing so much as to make common
cause with the Allied Powers. Nevertheless he would
point out that he was not only King of Naples but King
of the Two Sicilies as well, and that Naples apart from
Sicily did not sufficiently guarantee his future as a
sovereign. While, therefore, he appreciated to the full
the offer of the Allies to guarantee him in the possession
of Naples, he was bound to insist that their guarantee
1 Napoleon to Cambace"res, Gotha, October 25, 1813.
* Minister of War to the Emperor, Paris, November 5.
3 Conversation between Murat and Mier.
CAMHACERKS
From a painting l>y Bailly after a bust taken from life by Roland
MURAT'S DEMANDS 269
should be extended to Sicily or to some equivalent to
that island, which equivalent in his view would suitably
be found in the Papal States. As soon as this matter
had been cleared up and put in order, the Allied Powers
would find him ready to give them his most active assist-
ance, but it was an indispensable preliminary that he
should make sure of the Papal States." * There we have
a clear statement of the price of his co-operation. The
claim was formally submitted to Austria and the Allies
immediately after the 24th October 1813. Having put
his dispatch into cipher, Joachim gave it to Pescara,
whose instructions were to seek out Cariati at the head-
quarters of the Allied armies, and to hand it over to him
in order that the Neapolitan Ambassador might person-
ally place it in the hands of Metternich. As there was
some risk of the document falling into the enemy's hands,
it was given to Pescara unsigned and undated like the
message he had brought with him.
Pescara departed with the precious paper, but amid
the confusion that followed on the battle of Leipzig
Cariati was nowhere to be found. Pescara therefore
made his way back to Munich, and handed the dispatch
to his chief, Caracciolo. On the 31 st October the latter
wrote off to Cariati at Vienna enclosing the royal docu-
ment, which reached the Austrian capital on the
3rd November. Unable to see Metternich, who was at
the moment at headquarters, he at once interviewed his
deputy, Hudelist, who undertook to hand the King's
proposals to his chief.
It was thus the 24th October that marked Murat's {
decisive entrance into the Coalition. To use his own
words, his " mind was made up " from that day onwards.
It may be asked why he should have deliberately gone
out of his way to deceive Mier by telling him, as he did
1 Hudelist's report to Metternich, Vienna, November 3, 1813. Quoted
by M. Weil.
270 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
on the 8th November, that he had seen Pescara on the
i6th October. The explanation is simple. On the i6th
Napoleon was still undefeated and formidable ; on the
23rd, after the bloody and decisive field of Leipzig, he
was beaten and a fugitive. Joachim was anxious to
conceal from the Austrian diplomatist, and indeed
from every one, that he had deferred his decision
until after the overthrow of his brother-in-law. Such,
however, was the fact. l^w^sJLeipzig, an4.Leipzig_onIy,
jthatde^ide^^^ratto turn traitor. After all, whatever
strictures weTniay pa^snrpon" his conduct, it needed a
battle to bring him to make up his mind, and he knew
better than any one how fiercely the conflict had raged.
With Caroline, Napoleon's own sister, it was different.
The mere possibility of what might come had sufficed to
send her over to the enemy.
The fact that, after this, relations continued to exist
between Naples and France, as well as the tone of the
letters which Murat wrote to the Emperor, will of course
be adduced as evidence by those who seek to show that
Joachim's treason was not consummated. Consummated
as yet it was not ; for that we must wait until the
8th January. But it was determined upon, and that
irrevocably. If Joachim wrote to Napoleon, it was be-
cause he had need of him, of his sanction, or at all events
of his silence, to accomplish his designs on the Papal
States. But from this time forth his real connection
with the Imperial system was a thing of the past, and if
he adhered to it in any way it was only because his
personal interests rendered such adherence expedient.
Henceforth, whether the Empire stood or fell, Joachim
Napoleon, King of the Two Sicilies, intended to be free
and independent. This was what he looked for when
his alliance and friendship with England and Austria
had been brought to pass. In the circumstances his
hopes were not extravagant, for Austria was apparently
MURAT'S DEMANDS 271
empowered to pledge her own word and that of England
also. As for Napoleon, the appeals that he made for
help through Eugene, Clarke, Durant, Fouche, Joseph,
and others met with no response. Not until he had
had experience of Austria's perfidy and England's in-
difference did the scales fall from Murat's eyes. Then,j
indeed, he turned once more to the Emperor, but turm
too late.
On the evening of the 24th Murat left the French
headquarters at Erfurt, and, proceeding by way of May-
ence, Strassburg, Switzerland, and the Simplon,1 where
he left his carriage embedded in the snow, he arrived at
Milan on the 3ist October. During the journey he was
very uneasy, fearful of arrest or pursuit, and apparently
resolved to defend himself if need arose. At Milan,
where he felt himself at home again, or nearly so, he
suddenly began to put his plans into execution. Though
simple in conception, these plans were by no means
easy to carry out. His object was to obtain, in compensa-
tion for Sicily, the whole or part of the Roman States.
He had already communicated his decision to Metter-
nich ; he was now going to set it down in black and
white in a letter to Napoleon. This was to be the first
step. Then if circumstances were favourable, if things
went as he hoped they would, he proposed to get the
whole of Italy within his grasp. But that was not so
simple. For such an enterprise as that he required time
and certain elements of success which at the moment
were lacking.
To enable him to realise his plans the King of Naples
was in need of many auxiliaries. Seeing that he was
fighting neither for France nor for Austria, but wholly
and solely for himself, he required the assistance of
French, Austrians, and English alike.
The French he needed because if he showed his hand
1 Mier's report to Metternich of the i6th December, 1813.
272 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
to his brother-in-law his forces would be unable to cross
the frontiers without immediately finding themselves
opposed by the troops of Eugene and Miollis. And
wherefore should he lay siege to the strongholds of Italy,
all of which were in the hands of the French, when all
that was necessary to bring them to fling wide their
gates was to appear before them as the Emperor's friend,
or better still as his lieutenant ? Why should he sacri-
fice his men, and thereby diminish his resources, when
he had such means as these at his command ? He had
only to cajole Napoleon, to mislead him as to his real
aims, until the Neapolitan troops had succeeded in occupy-
ing as much territory as the King desired to lay hands
upon, until he had gained possession of the French
fortresses under pretext of holding them against the
common foe ; and when this was accomplished the mask
could be thrown aside.
Austria he needed because he could not advance upon
the Roman States and Upper Italy without quickly
coming in contact with the Austrian troops, who would
soon be descending into French Italy with the object of
driving out Eugene. With the armies face to face,
Joachim would have to declare whether he came as
friend or foe.
Lastly, he was bound to propitiate the English, for
he could not draw away his troops from Naples to hold
the places he had won unless he was assured of the
safety of his capital. A pretty business it would be if,
while he himself was marching upon Upper Italy, the
enterprising Bentinck were to throw an Anglo-Sicilian
army into Naples. With England, therefore, he must
needs be friends.
It was to carry out this threefold deception that
Murat applied his energies. It was high time to act, or
the Austrians would be beforehand with him in Italy.
He therefore decided to write to the Emperor offering
MURAT'S DEMANDS 273
to send forward his troops on condition that he was
given control of the Roman States. But for that pur-
pose it was necessary that he should belittle in Napoleon's
eyes the man who seemed to have a natural right and
title to the position. He must cut the ground away
from Eugene.
" Sire," he wrote, " I hasten to inform you of my
arrival at Milan. The news of what had taken place at
Leipzig had already reached Switzerland, and they know
all about it here. As, however, the affair had been greatly
exaggerated, I am sanguine that my journey will have
had a reassuring effect, and that the public will have
gained a just impression of what had actually taken
place. The greatest alarm prevails here ; the Viceroy's
headquarters were at Sacile, and every one is convinced
that he will cross the Adige. I gave out that I was going
to march at the head of 40,000 men, and I am certain
that this news will have a salutary effect.
" For the rest, the Viceroy is falling back very quietly.
His retreat is unharassed, and it is averred that he
never fires a shot. Bavaria's action has created a deep
impression, the more so as it is given out that the
King is doing his best to procure a principality for the
Viceroy in Italy. Similar reports reach me from Munich.
I leave it to Your Majesty to give them their proper
value. The spontaneous and undisturbed retreat of
your army is not regarded in a favourable light here.
" I am about to make all the necessary arrangements
for putting thirty thousand men in motion, but I must
know for certain what you intend to do. I must have
the command of the Papal States if I am to march, and
in the event of my effecting a junction with the Viceroy,
I must know who is to have the chief command." 1
There, then, the question was definitely stated. To
Napoleon as to Austria, Murat makes the Papal States
1 Murat to Napoleon. Archives dc la Guerre.
S
274 NAPOLEON AND ,KING MURAT
the condition of his co-operation. If the Emperor
accepts, Joachim's mind will be at rest so far as France
is concerned.
Congratulating himself that Eugene's absence relieved
him from the necessity of entering upon awkward and
uncomfortable topics, Joachim also dispensed with the
obligation of paying his respects to the Viceroy's wife at
Monza. He saw Mejean, Eugene's secretary, however,
and gave him certain undertakings, repeating his ever-
lasting promise to come to the defence of Italy at the
head of forty thousand men. To some he had even had
the effrontery to speak of eighty thousand.1
From Milan, where he remained for a few hours, the
King set out for Florence, which he reached about ten
o'clock in the morning of the 2nd. " He proceeded to
the Pitti Palace, where he was received by their Royal
Highnesses the Grand Duchess and Prince Felix, and left
again for Naples at two o'clock." 2 At Florence he
followed the same tactics as at Milan. " From remarks
which His Majesty let fall, there can be no doubt," said
the Gazette de Florence, " that the sole object of his journey
was to offer effective assistance and to safeguard Italy
from any possibility of invasion or attack." To Elisa,
who had been positively amazed at the lightning rapidity
with which the King had travelled, Murat spoke of coming
with forty thousand men and establishing his headquarters
at Bologna. Then, what time the Grand Duchess sends
off a messenger to Caroline to inform her of the King's
arrival, the latter hastens to Rome in a borrowed
carriage. There he spent a night, saw Miollis, confirmed
some orders given by the Queen,3 and continued his
journey. On the 4th November Caroline went to await
his arrival as far as the Maison Aversa, but returned with-
1 Melzi to the Viceroy, November 5, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
2 Gazette de Florence.
3 Miollis to the Minister of War. Archives de la Guerre.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 275
out seeing him.1 At ten o'clock, however, he put in an
appearance. " He was in a gay mood and very pleased
at being back in his own kingdom again." On the 5th
November, at daybreak, the guns of the forts proclaimed
the King's arrival, and straightway the Moniteur des
Deux Sidles published the following article : —
" This morning the guns announced to the inhabitants
of the capital the joyful intelligence that our august and
beloved Sovereign was in our midst once more. The
Grand Army which is at present in Germany under the
command of the Emperor and King having made pre-
parations to go into winter quarters, the King our sove-
reign has availed himself of the opportunity thus offered
to fulfil the desire which lay nearest to his heart — the
desire, that is, to find himself in the bosom of his august
family and among his faithful subjects once again.
" His Majesty the Emperor and King was pleased to
give his sanction to this plan, and was anxious that the
King should not delay the execution of so auspicious a
project. His Majesty reached the capital at ten o'clock
last night in perfect health, his arrival being impatiently
awaited by all who had been apprised of his much-looked-
for return.
" His Majesty the Emperor and King gave permission
to all our troops with the Grand Army to return home,
and they immediately set out."
This was Joachim's explanation of his departure,
though in public people were already referring to it as a
flight.3 To his troops he issued the following general
orders. The language is unequivocal, and the purpose
obvious : —
" From to-day the King is resuming the command of
his army. His Majesty desires it to be made known that
1 Diario di Nicola.
a Mier's report to Metternich, December 16, 1813.
3 Diario di Nicola.
276 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the Neapolitan troops who have fought with such glory
in the North are on their way home. Never on any future
occasion will the Neapolitan Army find itself obliged to
serve in those rigorous climes to which it is unsuited.
It will be called upon for service in Italy alone, there to
fight for the safety and independence of the country." *
This was the first time he had hazarded the word
" independence " in a public document, and, for such as
were in the secret, the " independence of the country "
meant the " independence of Italy." Every day
saw some increase in his pretensions. Yesterday he
might still have been content with the Papal States ;
to-morrow we shall find him writing to the Emperor
urgently impressing upon him the necessity of consoli-
dating the whole of Italy under one head.
Mier had not left Naples, and it was necessary to
discuss matters with Austria before taking any steps.
Metternich had laid it down as an indispensable condition
of the alliance that no troops should be sent to help the
Viceroy. On the other hand, it would manifestly be im-
possible for Murat to carry out his invasion scheme if none
of his troops were to be allowed to leave the country. In
the first place, then, it was necessary that Mier should be
thoroughly aware that if the troops left Naples with the
ostensible purpose of rendering assistance to the forces of
Eugene and Miollis, this would be in reality merely a
blind. As a matter of fact the King's aim would be to
effect a junction with the Austrians. Such was the plan
he decided to unfold to the Austrian Minister. Thus
Metternich would find in the King's departure and his
apparent co-operation with the French, no grounds for
cutting off negotiations, since Mier would have informed
him of the King's real intentions.
Murat had thought of waiting for Pescara, who was
expected back with Metternich's reply, before dispatching
1 Durant to Bassano. Archives des Affaires £trangtres.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 277
Mier with his proposals x but time passed by and Pescara
did not arrive, and as Joachim could not put a single
soldier in motion until he had explained his intentions to
Mier, he decided to talk matters over with him. On the
8th November the Austrian Ambassador was informed
by the Grand Marshal of the Palace that His Majesty had
decided to receive him in private audience in his (the
Grand Marshal's) house, and begged him to be on the spot
at eleven o'clock that evening. There, with a great dis-
play of politeness and effusive eloquence on both sides,
he interview took place, and Murat laid bare his projects.
" I have," said he, " left the French army in deference
to the wishes of Austria and England, and I have deter-
mined not to comply with the demand for troops. My
mind is made up ; I mean to throw in my lot with the
Allies, to uphold their cause, to play my part in expelling
the French from Italy, and I look to have my share in the
benefits that will accrue therefrom. I promise frankly to
sever my relations with France ; I desire to enter into an
alliance with Austria, and to act according to her views,
provided that she supports me whenever necessary, and
procures for me in return some concessions indispensable to
my welfare,!!!2 He went on to speak of the Pope, who,
he considered, might be removed to some other city
either in Italy or Germany. If it was insisted upon that
he should occupy his old See, was it, he asked, necessary
that he should be left in possession of the same extent of
territory ? The City of Rome, with a nice piece of land
round it, a good and sure income combined with plenty of
homage, ought to be sufficient for the Holy Father. " I
desire," he continued, " that Austria and the other Powers
should guarantee my political existence and my indepen-
dence and grant me such concessions as would put me in a
position to render them useful assistance. Austria does
1 Mier to Metternich, Report of the i6th December.
» Idem.
278 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
not intend to retain the whole of Italy for herself. Let
her, then, grant me some additional territory adjoining my
frontiers, let her increase the extent of my realm by arrang-
ing that its confines should be rivers and mountains ; the
possession of Corfu would also give me great satisfaction."
Finally, he explained to Mier how he would be able to
effect a junction with the Austrian army. " I have given
orders for the mobilisation of thirty thousand men, and
they can be on French territory before the month is out.
While their ostensible object in proceeding thither will be
to guarantee the frontiers of my kingdom, their real aim
will be to enable them the more easily to act in concert
with the Austrian army when we have come to some
agreement regarding conditions." " I asked him," said
Mier, " whether he intended entering French territory as
a friend or an enemy." " As a friend," he answered,
" and I shall keep up the pretence of being a friend as long
as practicable."
Having dealt at great length with the situation as a
whole, Murat dismissed Mier with the request that he
should see the Queen before he left Naples. " Speak to
her frankly," he said. " Explain to her thoroughly how
matters stand. She has confidence in you, and anything
you say will tend to confirm her in her present favour-
able attitude." The Ambassador must have smiled when
he heard this advice, for on the 5th November she had
impressed upon him how necessary it would be to avoid
wounding the King's susceptibilities, and begged him to
say nothing to His Majesty about the arrangements she
had made for the exchange of communications between
the two Courts after his departure. It was her desire
that all such ideas should be made to seem as though
they came from him. For the rest, she undertook that
the King should act precisely as Austria might require.
Mier, who considered Murat 's demands exorbitant,
communicated his views to the Queen and to certain
MURAT'S DEMANDS 279
other persons who enjoyed the King's confidence. The
Due de Gallo used to see the Ambassador every day,
and on the I3th November, the day before the latter 's
departure, he informed him that he had made mention
to the King of his (Mier's) apprehensions regarding the
fate of the negotiations, and that he had been authorised
to state that the King's observations concerning an in-
crease of territory were suggestions and nothing more,
that they were not his last words on the subject, that
the matter must be further discussed, and that he was
sure a satisfactory understanding could be arrived at
with Austria. Gallo repeated to Mier what Cariati had
already said to Hudelist ; they could strike a bargain.
On the I4th Mier, who left his secretary M. de Menz
behind him, set out for Barletta, where he was to embark
for Austria, carrying with him to Metternich the latest
edition of the King's proposals.
England had not been overlooked in Murat's efforts
to secure the success of his plans. No sooner did he
reach home than he summoned his Council and en-
larged on the European outlook, the misfortunes of the
French army, the certain and imminent break up of
the Continental tariff . . . the necessity for reviving
national trade, and for establishing the country's domestic
welfare on a sure foundation. He requested the Council
to put forward its views on this matter. All this was
widely discussed by the public, who discerned the true
import of the official phraseology : " The King is said
to have declared that the door must be opened to the
English." By the 8th the decree had already been signed.
On the nth the Monitor e of the Two Sicilies rendered it
official. The King sanctioned the importation of foreign
goods under a hostile or neutral flag, and gave his per-
mission for the exportation of home products under
similar conditions.
Now that the Emperor believed Joachim to be the
280 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
friend of France, and Mier was equally convinced that he
was the ally of Austria, now too that England had been
appeased by the raising of the Continental blockade, the
King of Naples deemed that he might safely put his
forces in motion. Neither the Emperor, who would
assume that he was marching to the defence of Italy,
nor Mier, who would take it for granted that he was
going to join the Austrians, would have any grounds for
opposing his movements. On the nth, Tugny, the Nea-
politan War Minister, informed Miollis, the Governor-
General of Rome, and Elisa, the Governor-General of
Tuscany, that, in view of the urgency of the position,
His Majesty had resolved to dispatch a force of forty
thousand men, six thousand of whom were cavalry, to
Upper Italy.1 On the same day Gallo wrote to the Nea-
politan Charge" d'Affaires at Milan, so that the latter might
give the necessary information to the Italian Govern-
ment. Lastly, Carignano received word that a division
of ten thousand men had just had orders to proceed
from the Abruzzi in the direction of Rimini, while the
remaining divisions would march on Bologna, where the
King intended to fix his headquarters.
These tidings reached Miollis on the I3th November,
Elisa on the i6th, and Fontenelli on the igth. All three
made the necessary preparations for the arrival of the
Neapolitans. On the I2th Joachim wrote to the Emperor.
On returning from Italy, he said, he found the country
in a state of great uneasiness in consequence of the Vice-
roy's retreat and the advance of the Austrians. He had
stated that he was going to march with forty thousand
men to defend Upper Italy. For a time he had hesi-
tated to put these troops in motion, fearful, he said,
lest he should be considered to be violating Imperial
territory (this was his way of accounting for the delay
caused by his discussion with the Austrian Ambassador),
1 Gallo to Carignano. Naples, Archtvio di Stato.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 281
but atpength a sense of their common danger had decided
him to begin the march. Ten thousand men had been
ordered to Rimini, the remainder were preparing to pro-
ceed to Bologna, where he intended to establish his head-
quarters. If, however, the Austrians were to take Milan
and cross the Po, if they aimed at bringing back the
Pope and making a fresh partition of Italy, Murat was
not disposed to regard these measures as adequate.
There was, in his opinion, only one means of ensuring
success, and that was to proclaim the union and inde-
pendence of all Italy. This, he considered, would have
the effect of firing the enthusiasm of the whole nation,
and would bring them as one man to enlist for service
beneath the banner of whomsoever the Emperor should
appoint as their ruler. By no other means, he deemed,
could Italy be saved. Indeed, in the face of the various
movements which endeavours were being made to set on
foot in Naples itself, he saw no other possibility of pre-
serving his own crown. People had tried to convince
him on his return that no course was open to him but to
obtain peace from the belligerent powers on a promise
of neutrality, but this, he added, was repugnant to his
wishes, since it was his desire to serve the Emperor to
the last.1
The day after he wrote this letter to the Emperor he
saw Durant at Carditello. This was the first time he
had met him since his return. To him he laid great
stress on the evidences of uneasiness which he had en-
countered when passing through Italy. On every hand
he had been assured that he alone could save Italy. He
went on to speak of his letter to the Emperor, adding
that it was not his intention to wait for a reply before
setting out. Within three days, he said, the troops would
begin to move towards the frontiers, and at the first
1 Rapport du Due de Vienne a 1'Empereur. Paris, November 27, 1813.
Affaires £trangircs.
282 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
word from General Miollis he would march on the Po
with all speed, because he feared that if the Austrians
invaded Imperial teiritory and reached the heart of
Italy, the blame would be laid at his own door. What
would become of the Tuscans, what would happen to
the Roman States, what indeed would be his own fate,
if communication with France were cut off ? By keeping
the enemy on the other side of the Po, he would enable
the Emperor to throw into Italy as many reinforcements
as he might deem necessary. By this statement he
doubtless hoped to make a favourable impression on the
Emperor. He miscalculated the effect of his words on
Durant.
It had been better for him had he devoted less time
to speechifying and more to action. He had doubtless
done his utmost to put as many men as possible under
arms ; he had even put into execution a plan conceived as
long ago as 1807, and appointed the Chevalier Mariano
Simonetti as his Charge d'Affaires to the Swiss Confedera-
tion, with the object of bargaining for the transfer of
certain Swiss regiments to his service, an arrangement
which would have brought about a rapid addition to his
fighting force. Nevertheless there was no time to be lost
if he wished to be beforehand with the Austrians, for
Nugent had just taken Ferrara and was threatening
Bologna. On the morning of the igth he reviewed his
Guard and the remainder of his troops, consisting of four
cavalry squadrons, nine battalions of infantry, sappers,
and naval gunners.1 On the same day Ayine" sent word
to Miollis informing him of the departure of these troops,
adding that their commander, Carascosa, had received
special instructions to carry out no orders that did not
come direct from His Majesty.2 This measure was in-
tended to prevent the French authorities from making use
1 Diario di Nicola.
2 Ayme to Miollis, Naples, November 19, 1813. Archives de la Guerre.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 283
of Neapolitan troops, and so involving the King in diffi-
culties with Austria. On the 2ist the troops at last set
out for Rome. One can readily understand that they made
no secret of their discontent despite the " enthusiasm "
noted in the Gazettes. Indeed it became necessary for
the King to repeat the proclamation which declared
desertion to be punishable by death within forty-eight
hours.1 At length, however, they were got on the road,
and that was the main part of the business for Murat.
According to Joachim's supporters, their arrival at
Rome was awaited with impatience. As long ago as the
1 2th November, Zuccari, the Neapolitan Consul, a man
with a natural taste for intrigue, considering that his
position demanded that his part in the affair should be a
prominent one, requested Gallo to send a message of en-
couragement to the Romans, as they were apprehensive
that the Neapolitan army would fail to march.2 Gallo
replied on the I5th, stating that His Majesty had resolved
to send his army to Upper Italy.3 For a long time past
Zuccari had been working hard to increase the popularity
of the King of Naples, and ever since October he had been
forwarding bulletins to Gallo stating that Murat was re-
garded with such affection in Rome that even the Papal
party would rejoice to have him for their ruler. In his
eyes, therefore, the coming of the troops meant the triumph
of the cause of Naples. Norvins, whose character and
office alike disposed him to superior steadiness of judg-
ment, reported on Roman opinion in terms of greater
moderation. " It is generally held here/' he said, " that
the Pope should play a part in Italian affairs, whence it
comes about that the friendliness of the Neapolitans is
regarded with greater misgiving than the hostility of the
Austrians."
1 Diario\di Nicola.
8 Zuccari to Gallo. Naples, Archivio di Slafo.
3 Gallo to Zuccari.
284 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
From this it would appear that Murat and his schemes,
which were now no longer a secret, excited no great
measure of enthusiasm among the Romans. This, how-
ever, did not prevent the Neapolitan agitators pursuing
their work with alacrity, sometimes indeed with a zeal
that did more harm than good to their cause. Ever
since the visit paid by the King on his way back to Naples,
there had been scattered broadcast a host of incendiary
leaflets which, in the name of some alleged Italian league,
called upon the Italians to arise as one man, slay the
French, and secure their country's freedom.1 The author-
ship of these inflammatory documents was attributed by
the police to a priest of Viturchino in the district of
Viterbo, named Felix Battaglia. Orders were given to
arrest him at Viterbo, where he happened at the moment
to be. The priest resisted, killed the officer in command
of the troops who had come to seize him, and took to flight
with some forty of his followers.2 After this exploit he
proceeded to establish himself in a small village, where he
turned out the Mayor, seized the public funds and con-
tinued to perpetrate all kinds of misdeeds till he was even-
tually seized and taken off to Rome. This incident would
have been without importance had Battaglia merely been
acting on his own account. It happened, however, that
he was nothing less than the agent of Zuccari, the official
representative of Naples at Rome, who had made most
flattering references to him in his dispatches. He had
made no secret to Gallo of his relations with the priest
and the aims which they were jointly striving to fulfil.
" In the month of April last/' said he, " this Battaglia
imparted to me with much secrecy that he had conceived
a plan for creating a party in Italy whose members were
to unite and place themselves under the command of the
1 Report sent by Norvins, November 22, 1813. Archives Nationalcs.
2 Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 22, 1813. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 285
King in the event of French affairs taking an unfavourable
turn. Seeing how attached he is to our Sovereign's cause,
Battaglia may render invaluable assistance in adding
to the King's following in the districts of Viterbo, Luti,
and Civita Vecchia." x So Zuccari suffered him to assume
the title of " Chef de la Ligue italique," 2 and doubtless
gave him considerable assistance, since Battaglia, on his
arrest, confessed that he had acted solely on the instiga-
tion of Zuccari, the Neapolitan Consul, who had bidden
him stir up a general insurrection against the French.
On the 22nd November an estafette arrived with
details of the route which the Neapolitan troops were
following, and their coming was the sole topic of conversa-
tion in the city. Even Zuccari, however, admitted that
the inhabitants might have some reason to modify their
transports, since by a recent decision of Miollis the Nea-
politan troops were to be furnished with all their neces-
saries, not excepting horses, by requisition, an arrangement
which caused the liveliest discontent among the Romans.
This last-quoted letter brought forth a comment from
Gallo, who informed the Neapolitan Charge" d'Affaires that
the King was annoyed at the idea of private citizens being
put out in order to provide for his troops. " The King
is anxious," he said, " that no hardship should fall on the
civil population. On the contrary, it is his wish that they
should be most carefully studied." 3
Joachim was naturally averse from imposing hard-
ships on any one in the Papal States at this juncture,
1 Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 22, 1813. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
* Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 21, 1813. Idem.
3 Gallo to Zuccari, Naples, November 25, 1813. Naples, Archivio di
Stato. The postscript of the letter runs as follows: "Give encouragement
to all those who are desirous of taking part with the King in the dgfencg..of
Italy." In the original draft the sentence ran : " Give encouragement to all
who are desirous of taking part with the King in defending the freedom and
independence of Italy."
286 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
for he was now about to make his great effort to win
control of Italy. Whether it was the feeling that the
psychological moment had arrived, or whether he was
afraid of being outstripped in the race by Austria, it is
not easy to determine. It might well have been the
latter consideration. The young and redoubtable Nugent
— who represented the anti-Neapolitan school among the
Austrians much as Bentinck did among the English —
was advancing with such baffling rapidity that the King
began to feel alarmed. The second division was there-
fore ordered to proceed to Ancona and occupy the Eastern
half of the Papal States just as the first division had
been assigned the task of making sure of Rome and the
Western half. But before committing himself to this
decisive step the King considered it important to put
himself right with the world at large. On the 23rd
November, therefore, he wrote again to the Emperor.
Despite the risk to which he exposed his country by thus
denuding it of troops, he had, he said, put his army in
motion. Rome, Florence, and Milan had already had
instructions regarding the maintenance of his forces. If,
he reflected, Napoleon's mind were set at rest he would
have time to act. His next step was to invite Durant
to the chase, and to take advantage of the occasion to
talk matters over with him. Conversations with the
Minister of France were of somewhat rare occurrence
nowadays. He ran over the various arrangements he
had made, told him he had received a letter from the
Emperor, that some of his troops had left Naples and
that others were to follow, and that he himself was going
to take command. He hinted in a sort of offhand manner
that he hoped to receive an answer in such terms as
would enable him to prosecute his operations with the
energy necessary to bring them to a successful issue.
Continuing to give free vent to his eloquence, he came at
length to his main point. He laid great stress on the
MURAT'S DEMANDS 287
caution he had been obliged to observe in getting his
troops out of the kingdom. Once, however, he was at
their head and had got them well in hand, he would set
them to work. The state of public opinion had also
compelled him to allow his intentions to remain more or
less undefined. He therefore begged the Ambassador not
to say too much about the agreement between the
Emperor and himself.1 That was the point which he
had been leading up to. What he wanted to make sure
of was that Durant would maintain silence about his
relations with the Empire, for at a word from the
Minister of France the Austrian Ambassador would be
down on him, Bentinck's agents would apprise their
chief, and the whole of his edifice of deception would
come toppling about his ears, leaving him with no other
defence than his own much-vaunted army.
Now that word had gone to the Emperor and that
Durant was satisfied, the signal was given. Ambrosio,
who had command of the second division, consisting of
nine battalions of a thousand men each, was told to put
his troops in motion and to concentrate them at Ancona
between the 2nd and 4th December. Of this order
Ayme sent word to Miollis, and caused the necessary
arrangements to be made for housing and victualling the
troops. It was now that Joachim's envoys began to be
active in Italy. First General Colletta was sent across
the country ostensibly to carry out a reconnaissance of
the right bank of the river Po. " You must keep up a
regular correspondence with me," said the King in one
of his letters, " and let me know the enemy's every
movement in the region of the Lower Po, as well as the
attitude of the public, and any other news you may
consider useful. You must pay a visit to the Duke of
Otranto if he is still at Bologna. Endeavour also to
cultivate cordial relations with the Italian authorities.
1 Durant to Bassano, Naples, November 24, 1813. Affaires Etrangtres.
288 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Try to get on good terms with General Pino and any
other generals you may find at Bologna. Be very
cautious in what yon say, and limit yourself to stating
that the Italians may thoroughly rely on the assistance
of our troops." l Next came Carascosa, who was en-
trusted by Murat with a letter to General Pino regarding
the method to be followed to secure Italian unity. He
was also to interview the Adjutant-General Paolucci, and
endeavour to procure his co-operation in the liberationist
movement. In the case of Pino, matters were arranged
in twenty-four hours. Joachim had only to proclaim
the union and independence of Italy, and Pino was his
man. Paolucci gave a similar undertaking, and made
no doubt of his ability to carry with him the volunteer
battalions he had been commanded to raise. According
to them the other Italian generals, Zucchi, Palombini,
would follow their example, and the Italian army would
desert the French colours in a body.2 Exaggerated as
these statements may have been (Zucchi showed later on
that he had no treasonable intentions, and he at any rate
did not prove a deserter), it cannot be denied that Murat 's
cause was winning adherents in many quarters. Tre-
mendous efforts were now put forth. The Monitor e
could talk of nothing else but independence. Independ-
ence was made the theme of songs that were sung in
every Roman cafe* and placarded about at every turn.
The word was uponje very body's lips, and none made a
secret of it. The troops that were en route contributed
their share to the movement without any attempt at
concealment. The officers everywhere gave out that
they were marching to strike a blow for Italian freedom,
and not to fight for France.3 All eyes were now turned
1 Murat to Colletta, Naples, November 22, 1813. Colletta, Operc
inedite o rare.
* Gabriel Pepe, Galimatias ; published by A. Lombroso.
8 Letter from Testi to Tassoni, Milan, December 15, 1813. Quoted by
M. Weil.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 289
towards the Liberator, whose departure for the army
was to be the signal for that general uprising which
France and Austria would alike be powerless to resist.
Of a truth it was a glorious moment for Murat. Never
before had his vanity known so magnificent a triumph.
To be the Saviour of Italy : what a dream was that,
and he it was who was about to bring it to pass ! The
Monitore grew positively dithyrambic. It was announced
from Rome that no sooner was the coming of the first
division made known than popular enthusiasm was raised
to white heat. To such an extent was the writer carried
away that he even spoke of the " amour euse hospitaliti "
with which people intended to welcome the soldiers. In
the edict of the Mayor of Rome we read the following : —
' The troops of His Majesty the King of Naples will
begin to arrive in Rome to-morrow, the 25th November.
The first division, consisting of nine thousand five hundred
and eighty-four men will assemble in this city, and will
then go forth to fight for Italy, to bring Peace to these
regions and to banish from our land the evils of War.
Nothing has been left undone that would be calculated
to minister to the needs and conduce to the comfort of
the brave and disciplined soldiers of the gallant Prince
who made a lasting impression on the heart of every
Roman by the affability which he deigned to display in
the course of his sojourn in our midst. These senti-
ments, which mark the confidence inspired in the hearts
of us Romans by the virtues and military talents of the
King, are shared by all the Italian races, who turn towards
him with one accord, whose hearts have gone out to him,
and who invoke him as a champion and deliverer of
Italy. Heralded by the glory which their prodigious
valour and stern discipline have enabled them to win,
our brothers who fight beneath the victorious banner of
the King will find in Italy's preservation the most
glorious recompense for the hardships they endured and
T
•
390 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the laurels they won on the battlefields of Spain and
Germany.
" No epoch in the whole history of Naples has been
more honourable to the nation. What achievement
could outshine the glory she will attain from the splendid
stand she is making for future freedom by an act which
will fire the enthusiasm and excite the emulation of the
whole of Italy ? "
At Rome it was supposed that the King would arrive
early in December, about the 7th or 8th. Everything
had been got ready for his reception at the Palazzo
Farnese. The arrival of his military household and of
a portion of his domestic staff, together with that of the
Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
was publicly announced. Even the ceremonial that was
to be observed at his entry into the city had been
arranged, and the Neapolitan Artillery had received
orders to meet him at the Porto San Giovanni, where they
were to fire a salute of one hundred and fifty guns, and
precede him as he made his State entry into Rome.
All was ready. The hero of the hour alone was waited
for. On the 2nd December he took his final step : he
sent Prince Pignatelli-Strongoli on a mission to Upper
Italy. He was to proceed to Rome and Florence to see
Pino and the other Italian generals, make certain about
everything, inquire into all that had been done, find out
the attitude of the people, and report to Murat.
The King himself was about to begin his journey
when, on the 2nd December, the very day of Pignatelli's
departure, the Chevalier Menz, whom Mier had left
behind him to carry on the affairs of the Austrian Em-
bassy, presented himself to Gallo with a letter of the
gravest importance. Under the impression that he was
still at Naples, Metternich had sent the letter to Mier
informing him that he was transmitting it by a special
messenger provided with a passport taken out in an
MURAT'S DEMANDS 291
assumed name so that his arrival should not evoke
comment in Naples.
" We have now reached," so the missive ran, " a
momentous epoch, and the Neapolitan question must be
settled one way or the other. The enclosed batch of
State papers and military bulletins will sufficiently reveal
to you the counsels that have guided our deliberations
and the successes achieved by our arms.
" As a result of our recently assumed relations with
England, we have obtained cognisance of the transactions
which have been effected through Lord William Bentinck
direct with the British Cabinet, concurrently with the
negotiations carried on with ourselves. Lord Aberdeen,
the English Ambassador at our Court, received official
instructions to intimate that the Prince Regent was
willing to leave Neapolitan matters entirely in our hands.
He has in his possession a document in which the King
of Sicily formally renounces his claim to the Kingdom
of Naples, and he is empowered to sign a treaty jointly
with ourselves in the event of His Majesty proclaiming
himself in favour of such an arrangement.
' The King's unlooked-for departure for the French
Army and the active part played by him in that army's
operations led England to withdraw the foregoing offers.
We, however, took effective measures to keep the matter
open pending the receipt of the King's reply to the
friendly proposals of England and Sicily, which we had
undertaken to transmit to him.
" In the month of September last I had a secret
interview with Prince Cariati at Prague, in which we
discussed the best means of getting dispatches through
to the King. I am at the moment unaware whether, in
view of the complete discomfiture of the French army,
our communications ever reached his hands."
This dispatch brought Murat to a standstill. It
afforded food for reflection. Gallo in his first interview
292 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with Menz took refuge in generalities. " The King has
quite made up his mind to abandon the alliance with
France and to make common cause with the Allied Powers
if mutually satisfactory arrangements can be arrived at."
All this failed to satisfy Menz, but it was a means of
gaining time. Next day Menz had another meeting with
Gallo, who in the meantime had had an opportunity of
discussing the situation with the King. He now de-
clared that Joachim would send an army of thirty or
forty thousand men, and that they would begin opera-
tions as soon as terms were arranged with Austria. He
also made the formal announcement that Ambrosio 's
division, which was proceeding by way of the Abruzzi,
had nearly reached Ancona, and that another division
was in Rome. Menz artfully availed himself of the
occasion to request Gallo to see that instructions were
sent to General Ambrosio to assure Feldzeugmeister
Hiller in the King's name that the Neapolitan troops
did not intend to hinder his operations. By this means
Murat would be giving at one and the same time his first
pledge of friendship to Austria and the first indisputable
proof of his own treason.
Gallo saw the danger, and asked for twenty-four hours
in order to lay the matter before the King. The latter,
seeing the lengths he had gone with Austria, was com-
pelled to acquiesce. On the 4th, therefore, Gallo had a
further interview with Menz, and requested him to in-
form Hiller that the dispatch of the Neapolitan forces
to the Po implied no hostile intentions towards Austria,
and that they would not cross the river until definite
arrangements had been arrived at with Vienna. The
negotiations in progress with Austria and England, he
continued, could leave no doubt as to the King's sincerity,
and there was no need therefore for the Commander-in-
Chief to hamper his operations. General Ambrosio would
be instructed to keep in constant touch with General
MURAT'S DEMANDS 293
Killer, and orders would be sent to him to forward
this information to the Austrian headquarters without
delay.
On the evening of the 6th, a dispatch in the aforesaid
terms was sent off to Ambrosio. The plot betwixt
Naples and Austria began to thicken. Murat, satisfied
that Metternich's overtures meant peace, the integrity of
his kingdom, and compensation, possibly in the shape
of the whole of Italy, became increasingly disdainful to
France. So assured was he of success, that he could not
restrain himself from making open reference to the
negotiations which had hitherto been kept a profound
secret. On the gth December it was rumoured in Naples
that His Majesty had declared for the Allies against
France.
On the 24th there was a conversation with Durant,
who had been invited to lunch at Capo di Monte. There
was no particular object in the invitation, but on the other
hand it was not entirely without its aim, and that aim
was to inform Durant that the King had received en-
couraging overtures from Rome, Florence, and other
Italian cities. It was thought that by this means the
news would get to the Emperor's ears. Durant's atti-
tude was one of surprise. He would rather have had
some solid news concerning the troops than all this
thumping on the big drum. He sought out Gallo shortly
afterwards to tell him how urgently necessary it was to
hurry on the Neapolitan troops. Gallo, however, taking
a leaf from his royal master's book, merely began to
dilate on the subject of Italian independence and the
advances that had been made to Murat — the whole at
such length that the shrewd Durant at last remarked
that he assumed the King had told the Emperor which
of his subjects had taken it upon themselves to employ
such language.1
1 Durant to the Due de Vicenza, December 12, 1813.
294 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
That may have sufficed to put the closure on Gallo ;
it had no restraining effect on the King. He had just
been exalted to the seventh heaven by the following
letter which Menz had forwarded to Bentinck on the
1 4th December — " My Lord," it ran, " in the absence
of Monsieur le Comte de Mier, envoy extraordinary and
plenipotentiary at the Court of Naples, who has left
for the headquarters of the Allies, I have been informed
by the Due di Gallo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
the Neapolitan Government has sent a representative to
Sicily to sign an armistice with your Excellency. The
Due di Gallo has further expressed a desire that I should
acquaint your lordship with the latest communications
addressed by Austria to Naples. These communica-
tions, which relate to the attitude of the Court of London
towards the Neapolitan Government, reached Naples on
the 2nd December last, and state that Lord Aberdeen,
the English Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, is
authorised, in conjunction with Austria, to sign a treaty
with the King of Naples on the understanding that
His Majesty declares for the cause of Europe, and that
Austria proclaims her willingness to participate in such
an arrangement.
" I have deemed it my duty to comply as promptly
as possible with this demand, inasmuch as the aforesaid
Minister informed me that he was dispatching a messenger
to Prince Cariati with full powers to sign the treaty
in question." l
Murat was now fully convinced that the Austrian
Minister would warmly support the cause of Naples,
and that Bentinck, on receipt of Menz's letter with
Austria's official proposals, would have no alternative
but to sign an armistice. Considering himself beyond
the reach of any adverse stroke of fortune, his attitude
towards the Empire became more arrogant than ever.
1 Menz to Bentinck, Naples, December 14, 1813.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 295
On the 1 5th December he wrote to the Grand Duchess
and to Miollis in language that defies comment. " The
time has come," said he to the former, " to make the
fullest use of the resources of Tuscany, and you must
put a stop to the Tuscan tax-collectors sending funds
beyond the Apennines for purposes other than those on
which my troops are employed, namely the defence of
Tuscany. I have just informed General Miollis that
I am taking over the command in all districts occupied
by my troops, and I have given him instructions to
receive no more orders from the Viceroy. Your High-
ness will readily perceive that I cannot possibly under-
take the country's defence unless I am to have all the
civil and military authorities under my control. To
Your Imperial Highness I shall never go beyond making
requests, but I claim the right to dictate commands
to the Governor of the Tuscan States. I beg that you
will inform me whether Your Imperial Highness will
consider yourself in a position to carry out such direc-
tions as I may be under the necessity of giving for the
defence of Tuscany and to refrain from obeying the
instructions of the Viceroy. Were any obstacles thrown
in my way I should bring my army to an immediate
halt and concern myself solely with the ^defence of my
own territory." l
The same day he wrote to Miollis as follows : " Take
no more orders from the Viceroy, for I am in command
of all places occupied by my troops. You must hence-
forth refer to me in all matters concerning the defence
of the Papal States." 2
This was riding the high horse with a vengeance.
On the 1 7th December he issued the following procla-
mation : —
" We, Joachim, commanding the army in Italy, order
1 Murat to Elisa, Naples, December 15, 1813. Affaires Strangles.
1 Miollis to Clarke, Rome, December 17, 1813. Archives de la Guerre.
296 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
all authorities, civil and military, Italian and Neapo-
litan ; all prefects and sub-prefects, and especially
the Prefect of Rimini, to do their utmost to enable our
secretary, Monsieur de Couchy, who is entrusted with
a mission of importance, to proceed with all speed to
the outposts."
So much for the civilians. But further than this, he
had the effrontery to send orders direct to Eugene's
generals. " Monsieur le General," wrote he to Pigna-
telli-Strongoli, " I have duly received your reports up to
the 1 3th. Write to General Pino and say that I desire
him to hold Ferrara to the very last, but that if he is
compelled to evacuate the place he must fall back on
Bologna and effect a junction with my army. Polucci
must also remain at Bologna. Tell him I am counting
on him and the good folk there, and that I shall be with
them soon. I will write you from Rome. Send along
my horses to Florence." *
It was not so much that Murat sought to impose his
will on Miollis, Eugene, and Elisa, that he aimed at making
himself supreme in Italy, which calls for condemnation,
but rather the manner in which he went to work, pre-
tending to possess an authority that had never been
granted to him, and seeking, on the pretext of defending
the country against the Emperor's foes, to filch it for
himself. Indeed the most odious
^ _
treachery is that £e never^p^nlyJ^owed^L He had
from the country of his
adoption, and, though he had vaunted himself as stain-
less as a knight of chivalry, he did not hesitate, for the
1 An unpublished letter from Murat to Pignatelli, dated Strongoli,
December 19, 1813, in the Museo di San Martino, Naples. Pignatelli had
instructed Pepe to deliver the reports concerning his mission into the King's
own hands. Pepe left Bologna on the night of the 1 3th- 1 4th December and
reached Rome on the I7th. There he handed over his papers to Zuccari, who
gave them to the King, and it was on their receipt that Murat wrote the
letter quoted above.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 297
furtherance of his own ends, to stab his benefactor in
the back.
In spite of Murat's traitorous attempts to gain posses-
sion of Italy, Napoleon had, up to the present, given
him none but fair words, but he soon saw the snare.
Nevertheless for a brief space, at Mainz, he seems to
have had faith in Murat's promises. " My brother,"
he wrote to Eugene on the 3rd November, " the King of
Naples, tells me that he will shortly be at Bologna with
thirty thousand men. Work with him as well as you
possibly can. Send him an Italian commissary to see
to the victualling of his troops, and show him every con-
sideration, so that we may turn his assistance to the
best account. It is a great relief to me that, thanks to
his army, I shall have nothing more to fear as regards
Italy." * To avoid all jealousy between Murat and
Eugene, Napoleon decided " that the Neapolitan army
should form a corps apart under the command of the
King." On the I3th November Bassano advised Durant
to this effect. By the 20 th, however, the Emperor had
come to see through Joachim's procedure, and altered
his views. " The King of Naples," he wrote to Melzi,
" has given me his word that he will march on the Po
with thirty thousand men. If he keeps his promise, I
trust that no further disaster will occur." These words
are practically repeated in a letter which he sent Eugene
the same day to acquaint him with Fouche"s mission.
" I have dispatched the Due d'Otranto to Naples," the
latter runs, " to keep an eye on the King, and to urge
him to set out for the Po. Unless the King fails in his
duty to France and to myself, his progress thither
should have a great effect." 2 In a note of great length,
1 The Emperor to the Viceroy. Mainz, November 3, 1813. Corre-
spondence, 20,861.
* Napoleon to Eugene. Saint Cloud, November 18, 1813. Lecestre,
No. 1105.
298 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
intended to explain to General Anthouard the line of
conduct to be pursued in Italy, he adds, " lii all that I
have said I have not taken the King of Naples into
account, for if he is Icyal to France and to the dictates
of honour, he should be on the banks of the Po with
twenty-five thousand men." After that it can scarcely
be affirmed that the Emperor reposed unshaken con-
fidence in Joachim. Evidence of Murat's defection
now begins to reach him from all parts. Eugene, Miollis,
Elisa, Durant, Norvins, all unite in a chorus of accusa-
tion, and sucji^imanimitv could scarcely have been with-
jout its effect on a farjess sagacious man than Napolepju
Nevertheless, the Emperor insisted on making every
effort to retain Joachim's allegiance, and scattered
orders far and wide that eveiy consideration should be
shown to the Neapolitans. " If the King passes through
the Papal States on his march through Etruria to the
river Po, he must be accorded a good reception, and
his troops must have the best possible treatment."
These instructions were straightway sent by Clarke to
Miollis and Elisa, and as a result it was from Rome and
the French Departments that the King was enabled to
obtain necessaries for his men and horses ; provisions
from this place, boots from that, and various supplies
from another. Nay, on the 3rd December, he received
authority to take four thousand muskets from Corfu,
an opportunity of which, it is hardly necessary to add,
Gallo took prompt advantage. " Do not appear to
harbour the slightest doubt regarding the King's loyalty,
and display more confidence than you may in reality
entertain."1 Such was the order of the day, and it was
universally obeyed. Even the Moniteur, the restrained
and official Moniteur, indulged in eulogistic references
to thft__TSfra,pn1itan troops, notwithstanding the fact,
that in Italy they were ^"M npon as thipws ar>fi
Caulaincourt to Durant. Paris, December 4, 1813. Affaires £trangtres.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 299
plunderers, craven-hearted bullies that maltreated the
d'the weaklings.
For all the Emperor's efforts to deceive himself re-
garding Murat's real intentions, he was at last com-
pelled to abandon hope. Word having been sent by
Miollis that the King desired to occupy the Imperial
strongholds, Napoleon gave the following stern command :
" Instruct General Miollis definitely that he is not to
supply the King of Naples with any muskets, nor to
permit any Neapolitan troops to enter Civita Vecchia
or the Castle of S. Angelo. Reprimand him for having
sent the five hundred muskets, and tell him that there
will be none forthcoming for the conscripts. Write in
similar terms to the Grand Duchess and the Viceroy." l
Napoleon was in this hostile mood when he received
Murat's letter of the I5th December to Elisa. He at
once replied as follows : " No muskets must be given
to the Neapolitans. The King's ideas seem to me to
be extravagant. On no account allow him to assume
control of the civil government. If he comes with that
intention, he had better recall his troops and remain in
his own country. Do not give your consent to any
tampering with the funds. If the King declares war
upon us, it is not yet all over with France, and if any one
could meditate so base an act of treason as that it would
assuredly recoil on its author's head. I rely on your
firmness of character in this crisis. Let the King im-
prison you, let him slay you, but suffer no disloyalty to
the nation." 2
On the Emperor's part that was tantamount to a
declaration of war, and that Eugene's troops were not
immediately commanded to throw down the gauntlet
to Murat and his Neapolitans was solely due to the fact
that the Austrians were in Italy, and that in France he
1 Napoleon to Clarke. December 1 1, 1813. Correspondence, 20,998.
2 Napoleon to Elisa. December 25, 1813.
300 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
himself had more than he could cope with in stemming
the ceaseless advance of the Allies. All that he could do
had now been done. He had given orders that no more
muskets, no more boots, no more clothes should be
furnished to the troops of Naples ; food alone was to
be given to them, and that merely because the Treaty
of Bayonne required it ; he had also forbidden that
any Neapolitans should be admitted into the Imperial
fortresses. Alas, he could do no more. The day had
long gone by when Grenier and his men had been a
power in the land Iff yet if by some miracle that day
had dawned again, Murat, false now as he had been
false then, would assuredly have changed his tone and
have protested himself the Emperor's devoted servant
in phrases as interminable as insincere^
Not content with placing the resources of French
Italy at Joachim's disposal, the Emperor employed yet
further means to win his brother-in-law to his side. On
the outbreak of hostilities Fouche had quitted the Illyrian
provinces and was now roaming about in Northern Italy
scenting the breeze and resolved to follow whithersoever
chance might direct, yet eager for an opportunity to
return to Paris. He had, however, been obliged to send
word to Napoleon of his sojourn in Bologna, and on
receipt of the letter Napoleon decided to dispatch him
to Naples. He would thus not only get Fouche off his
hands, but turn his services to useful account. jlf \r\de.eA
was likely to exert^jm^jnJfrTgnq^over Murat,
Jfchatjnan was Fouche. Fouc>£ ^H fr^n T^g frjend and
confidant injjjpQ ; he. h adjsecretly protectedjiis interests
lit tne Imperial Court ; hehad been
in HjffirnTj^nr nrgpnf situations,
Ignorant though the Emperor may have been of all the
details of their manoeuvres, he probably knew enough
to convince him that their relations one with the other
were somewhat closer than the ordinary. When there-
IT (SHE a,
JOSEPH FOUCHE, DUKE OF OTRANTO
MURAT'S DEMANDS 301
fore he sent the Due d'Otranto to Joachim he was aware
that he was not dispatching a mere outsider. He wrote
to Fouche" requesting him to proceed with all haste to
Naples in order to impress on the King the importance
of marching with his twenty-five thousand men on the
river Po. He was to lay the matter before the Queen
as well, and to do his utmost to prevent the Government
of Naples from being misled by Austria's illusory promises
or the honeyed talk of Metternich. " In France troops
are everywhere arming and getting on the road. The
crisis is one of the extremest gravity. You will return
with the Neapolitan army if the King is loyal to the
dictates of patriotism and honour. You will then proceed
with all speed to Turin, where fresh orders will await you.
Go by way of Florence and Rome, and give every one
there such advice as the circumstances may indicate." l
Fouche", who had quitted Bologna, having made up
his mind to return to France by way of Parma and Milan,
found this letter waiting for him at Parma, on the 2ist.
Thereupon he wrote to Murat as follows : "... Our
fortunes, Sire, however widely we may be sundered in
point of rank, have but one foundation. We both owe
them to the Emperor. On him and on the continuance
of his prosperity they alone depend. We should be the
last to be induced to dissociate our aims from his. Could
we waver an instant, even though the sentiments of honour
and patriotism had been extinguished in our hearts ?
On the one side stands the Emperor with his genius and
strength of will wielding the vast resources which France
entrusts to his hands ; on the other are ranged a group
of feeble, mean-spirited princes nourishing hopes which
they are incapable of realising, holding out doubtful or
deceptive promises. The powers that are leagued against
us have but one desire at heart : they aim at the destruc-
tion of the Imperial line and the reinstatement of fallen
1 Napoleon to the Due d'Otranto. St. Cloud, November 15, 1813.
302 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
dynasties upon thrones which, despite the most solemn
treaties, they persist in regarding as being occupied by
usurpers." l
This was the official statement of the case. But Murat
knew that it would be in the course of conversation rather
than in the written word that Fouch6's real sentiments
would come to light. Having written his letter, Fouche
set out for Naples. On the 22nd he was at Bologna,
and the day after at Florence. On the 24th he posted
to Rome, where he arrived on the 25th. In obedience
! to his instructions, he discussed matters with Miollis,
and left Rome on the evening of the 26th. Delayed
by the floods of the Garigliano, he did not get to Naples
until eleven o'clock on the night of the 30 th. Next
morning, the ist December, he saw Murat and paid his
respects to the Queen. " Monsieur le Due," she said
to him, " you come too late. The King's heart is with
the Emperor, but his imagination has been led astray." 2
As for Joachim, he, as usual, was possessed with enthu-
siasm and zeal for the Emperor's cause, at least in word.
" There is no need to urge me to serve the Emperor,"
said he to the Due d'Otranto, " my heart is with him.
But in my present situation I cannot act openly without
imperilling my country's safety. The twenty-five
thousand men whom I promised to the Emperor are
en route ; the incessant rains and flooded rivers have alone
delayed my progress. I am allowing the English to
suppose that I am acting on my own account ; by so
doing my coasts will escape attack and my kingdom be
left in peace. The Emperor must rely on me." 3 Thus
far for all to hear. Then came conversations in a lower
tone, whispered confidences. They were just the sort of
men, these two, to arrive at an understanding with one
1 Fouch6 to Murat. Parma, November 21, 1813. Affaires £trangtres.
z Fouch£ to Napoleon. December 2O, 1813. Affaires £trangtres.
3 Fouche" to Napoleon. December 2, 1813. Affaires J-Ltrangtres.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 303
another, and Murat had too often experienced the value
of Pouches assistance to dispense with his aid now that
chance and the Emperor's waning fortunes had sent him
to his door. So protracted were the interviews between
them that Durant began to open his eyes. As to Fouche's
counsels, no document is extant to enable us to state
precisely what they were. Confidential exchanges of
this sort are not recorded in black and white. Never-
theless, if we piece together the King's half-avowals, the
laboured explanations of Fouch^, and the fragmentary
excuses with which he sought to justify his conduct to
Caulaincourt and the Emperor, we may perhaps recon-
struct his part in the affair as follows :—
Murat doubtless explained to the Due d'Otranto how
favourable circumstances were for him to declare his
independence. The Emperor had no force with which
to oppose him, since the only troops he had in Italy were
busy under Euge"ne fighting the Austrians. There was
no one who could be sent against him. Miollis, with his
slender resources, had just the wherewithal and no more
to retain possession of the fortresses of the Papal States.
The hour had therefore come for him to proclaim his
independence. But he could go still further ; he could
add to his dominions. Austria had not hesitated to make
overtures to him when he was yet with the French general
staff, overtures to which he had replied from Ollendorf
demanding that the whole or at least a part of the Papal
States should be given to him in compensation for the
loss of Sicily, and now Metternich was repeating these
very proposals through Menz, the Austrian Charge
d'Affaires. This meant that Austria desired him for her
ally, and there was every indication that she would agree
to his terms, particularly as she herself could be harbouring
no designs on the territory which he claimed. Nor was
this all. Over and beyond these indications of the coming
independence and extension of the kingdom of Naples
304 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
came the whole of the Italian race crying aloud for emanci-
pation, and pointing to him, Murat, as their deliverer.
Let Fouche but glance at all or any of the Italian journals,
let him read the letters that had been received at his
Court, the reports sent in by his emissaries ; let him note
the attitude of the Neapolitan officers, who everywhere
proclaimed that they were come to deliver Italy from
bondage, let him but hearken, as Murat himself hearkened,
to that mighty host crying with one voice, " Italy is
one, Italy is free ! " Then let him say whether the
moment had come for Joachim to cut himself adrift
from France and to put himself at the head of that
nation of freemen which destiny called on him to form,
and to become their King.
This or something like it would have been Murat 's
line, and to it Fouche* probably answered that the moment
was doubtless propitious for proclaiming the independ-
ence of Naples. But was it necessary to contract an
alliance with Austria ? What did they offer him ?
Independence. What did he demand of them ? The
cession of all or part of the Papal States. Now did not
Murat himself state that all Italy was calling upon
him to lead them ? Well, then, let him leave the Austrians
out of the question, let him seize this unique opportunity
and play the glorious role which circumstances put it
in his power to fulfil. Let him draw together all Italy
under his banners and proclaim the union of the Italian
people beneath his single sceptre : he would then be
King of Italy, he would have at his command an army
with which he could hold France and Austria alike at
defiance ; for Murat should know that " hi
in a
By making this his line of conduct Joachim would
be rejecting any compromise with the Allies, and from
the fact that he would have broken off the negotiations
v l Fouch^ to Murat. Florence, January 20, 1814. Quoted by Lumbroso. J
MURAT'S DEMANDS 305
for the proposed alliance with Austria, he could still
declare that his loyalty to France and the Emperor was
unimpaired. Nay, more, he could urge that he was
serving their cause. At the head of a large and powerful
army, wielding sway over wide and rich dominions, he
would take his place among the sovereigns of the Great
Powers, he would be admitted to their councils and have
a voice in their deliberations. The question of peace
was now being discussed, and " if he could add his in-
fluence to bring about a general pacification, if his voice
acquired sufficient authority in the affairs of Europe
to restore the dignity of the reigning houses and to
guarantee the independence of its peoples," * he would
be serving France as well as serving himself. He would
be able to bring his influence to bear in the negotiations,
and to compel the Allies to deal gently with his brother-
in-law. He would show that he was strong enough to
give back to the Emperor and to France that which
he had received from them, for just as Napoleon had
seated him on the. throne of Naples, he in turn would
be the means of restoring Napoleon to 'the throne of
France.
Such apparently was Fouch6's line of argument, and
as such it throws a light on the words he subsequently
used to Caulaincourt. " If," said he, " the King of
Naples had listened to me, he would be laying down the
law to the Coalition instead of being compelled to take
his orders from them. Moreover, he would have achieved
a lofty ambition and fulfilled his duty to his Emperor
and the land of his birth." 2 It is also a commentary
on his letter of the 27th December to the Emperor, in
which, on Murat's behalf, he pleads so warmly for Italian
independence. It is the key to his other letter of the
1 Fouch£ to Murat. Florence, January 20, 1814. Quoted by Lumbroso.
1 Fouche' to the Due de Vicenza. Florence, January 12, 1814. Affaires
306 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
3rd January and to the words — " The idea that he could
not count on the support of France, the thought of facing
the Coalition unaided and alone, daunted his imagination."
Finally, it explains, at least to some extent, Joachim's
two letters of the 2ist and 25th December, in both of
which, but more particularly in the former (the nearer
in date to Fouche's departure), he occupied himself with
the question of a general peace. Taking this thesis for
his text, Murat, even in his most overt acts against
France, would never allow that he had done aught to
injure the Emperor or his country. One can readily
understand why Durant was so rigidly excluded from
these colloquies. The question of Joachim's severing
the bonds which made him dependent upon France was
scarcely one to be discussed in the presence of the
Emperor's Minister.
Having " seen Their Majesties every day during his
stay," l Fouche left Naples on the I7th December. He,
>re with him a sum of one hundred and seventy_thojii-^
sand fraltCs-as-'a'l^^
jesting ho^^Lthe^JEmpe^ betrayecll
His mission may have done little to advance the French
cause at the Court of Naples, but it at least gave Joachim
some ideas for dissembling his treachery and cloaking his
ingratitude.
The Due d'Otranto's arrival in Naples had been well
timed. The city was as busy as an ant-heap : dis-
patch on dispatch, mission after mission was being
hurried away. The King, anxious to be away from
Naples, was treating simultaneously with the Austrians
and the English. For Joachim the English were still
more to be feared than the Austrians, and he was care-
ful not to leave them out of his calculations ; they
might well give him an unpleasant reminder of their
existence. Murat therefore sent for Lieut enant-General
1 Durant to Caulaincourt. Affaires J-Ltrangbes.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 307
Manh£s, and requested him to act as his intermediary
with the English. Decorated with the Grand Cordon
of the Royal Order, the price of his commission, Manhes
returned to Calabria on the 28th November bearing
the proposals which Murat had authorised him to
lay before Bentinck. On his arrival he demanded an
audience of Lord William, but in his stead saw General
Robert Hall. The latter he informed that the King of
Naples was desirous of entering into an alliance with
England, that he had, after the battle of Leipzig, made
terms with the Allied Sovereigns, and further, that he
was willing to join the Coalition if he received satisfactory
assurances as to England's peaceful intentions towards
him. l To these preliminaries there was, so far as
Manhes was concerned, no sequel, for the Neapolitan
Government now resolved to send an agent from Naples
with instructions " to furnish the fullest information."
The individual on whom the task devolved was a man
deep in Murat's confidence, a man who, after the King
himself, was more completely versed than any other in the
dark and crooked ways of Neapolitan diplomacy, a man
who had served his master in good stead in previous
negotiations with Metternich and Bentinck, and was
par excellence the person to whom the conduct of any
unusually difficult or delicate piece of business would
naturally be entrusted. This man was none other than
Schinina. When peace was concluded Joachim con-
ferred upon him the title of Marquis de Saint-Elie as a
reward for his services.
Schinina then it was on whom the King relied to
bring the negotiations with Bentinck to a satisfactory
termination. Manhes was hardly the man for the part,
but Schinina would tame the lion if any one could. On
the i Qth November, therefore, he left Naples for Ponza,
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, December 26, 1813. Quoted by
M. Weil.
3o8 NAPOLEON AND ,KING MURAT
whence he was conveyed across to Sicily. Arriving at
Palermo on the 27th November, no Bentinck was there,
but at Syracuse, on the nth December, Schinina came
up with his man. On the I2th Lord William consented
to receive him.1
Schinina duly revealed the object of his mission. The
King of Naples, he said, had received from Austria, who
was acting as spokesman for the Allies, a proposal to
the effect that he should join the Coalition. Deferring
to Austria's request, Murat, whose army consisted of
forty thousand men, had already given orders to his
first two divisions to march on Rome and Ancona. He
refused, however, to put the remainder of his forces in
motion until he was acquainted with Bentinck's inten-
tions and had come to a thorough understanding with
him. It might be, he went on, that his lordship did not
possess the requisite powers to enable him to sign a
treaty of peace whereby England should recognise his
master as the rightful King of Naples and guarantee his
kingdom. If this was so, he, Schinina, was authorised
to sign an armistice in which Bentinck was to promise
not to commit any act of hostility against Murat and not
to take advantage of his absence in Upper Italy to disturb
the peace of his kingdom.
Bentinck had heard nothing from the Allies since
Castlereagh's dispatch of the 7th August, and he refused
point blank to have anything to do with treaty or
armistice. Murat, he said, could have accepted, had
he wished, the offers made to him in Germany on the
7th October. Since, however, he had elected to fight
on Bonaparte's side, let him stop where he was. He,
Bentinck, would sign nothing unless he had definite
and specific instructions.2
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, December 26, 1813. Quoted by
M. Weil.
2 Idem. Palermo, December 20, 1813. Idem.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 309
The interview was not exactly proving a success.
Bentinck's attitude was haughty and uncompromising.
Schinina, however, would no doubt have endeavoured to
round off the corners a little, but in the very midst of
the discussion fresh instructions were handed to him
from Naples which obliged him to bring the conference
to an abrupt termination. Metternich's dispatch of the
28th October had reached Menz on the 2nd December,
and had been communicated the same day to the
Neapolitan Government. It made no small impression
on the Court. Murat, who was on the point of leaving
for the army, at once changed his purpose. The first
moment of astonishment over, he fell to reviewing the
situation, discussed matters with Gallo, and resolved
to modify his plans. On the 4th he had determined
on his course of action. He would let Hiller know that
the Neapolitans were not his enemies, and deemed it
expedient to send full powers to Cariati at Vienna to
conclude a treaty with Metternich. The agreement
was to be based on the proposals made by Metternich
in his dispatch, to which, of course, were to be added
those claims for compensation of which the Austrian
Cabinet already had cognisance. For this purpose,
however, he needed some one on whom he could rely,
some one who had the details of the negotiations with
Austria at his fingers' end. One man alone could fulfil
these requirements, and that was Schinina, who was
now in Sicily seeking for Bentinck. On the 7th Decem-
ber a messenger was sent after him. Together with
Metternich's dispatch concerning the negotiations with
England, they sent him word that, " according to infor-
mation received from Austria, Lord Aberdeen was in
possession of full powers to sign a treaty with Naples." x
In conclusion, Schinina was commanded to return to
1 Menz to Metternich. Naples, December 7, 1813. Quoted by
M. Weil.
3io NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Naples immediately,1 in order to convey to Cariati the
full powers required by him to sign a treaty.
It was this dispatch that was handed to Schinina in
the middle of his conversation with Bentinck. Thinking
to compel his lordship to abate something of his obdurate
hauteur, the Neapolitan handed him his dispatch, together
with the extract from Metternich's letter. Judge of his
amazement when Lord William, having glanced at the
document, declared that if " Lord Aberdeen held the full
powers in question, well and good ; he himself, at any rate,
had no authority to sign an armistice, far less to enter into
negotiations for a treaty." 2 In the face of this formal
refusal Schinina pressed the matter no further ; indeed
he had not the time, since his instructions were to return
home immediately. He therefore left Syracuse forthwith,
and was back in Naples on the i8th December, when he
gave Murat a full account of the failure of his negotiations
with Bentinck.
His efforts to arrive at an understanding with England
having come utterly to grief, Murat began to speculate
as to what success was awaiting him in Austria. On
the 20 th December Menz advised Metternich of Schinina 's
departure for Vienna. He carried a dispatch for Met-
ternich and full powers for Cariati, with whom he was
to remain as long as the pourparlers were in progress, to
assist in the negotiations and to bring back dispatches
to Naples. As to the contents of the letter to Metternich,
they doubtless consisted of those old undertakings which
Murat had once more repeated to Menz on the i7th
December in the following terms : " The King, having
implicit confidence in the sincerity, candour, and good-
will of the Emperor of Austria, will act exactly as he is
desired. He will personally direct any operations that
may be deemed necessary, and is willing to take command
1 Gallo to Mier. Naples, December 16, 1813.
* Menz to Metternich. Naples, December 20, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
MURAT'S DEMANDS 311
of any troops that may be entrusted to him. He will,
in a word, defer entirely to the wishes of the Austrian
Court." 1 With regard to the full powers which Schinina
was carrying to Cariati, they authorised the latter " to
arrange and sign a treaty of peace with Austria and the
Allies." 2
About the 25th December Schinina proceeded to
Bologna. To assist his chances of getting through the
French lines and reach the Austrian outposts, he was
handed over to the care of General Pepe, who was to
bear him company on his perilous mission. They took
the most elaborate precautions to avoid arrest. Before
setting out Schinina disguised himself as a lackey. At
every " suspicious sound they made ready to swallow
the papers ; for whatever happened, it was necessary to
prevent them from falling into the hands of the French." 3
Nor can their anxieties be regarded as excessive when it
is remembered that if Schinina had been taken and his
papers seized, the Emperor would have had written
proof of Joachim's perfidy and of his collusion with the
Austrians. " Happily," says Pepe, " all went well."
Schinina, astute and wary man, carried his caution to
the length of deceiving Pepe himself, for when the latter
questioned him as to the contents of the dispatches, he
told him he was carrying the Queen's promise to support
the policy of Austria, and that the Austrian alliance
might be regarded as a fait accompli. It was not the
Queen's promise that he had in his pocket, but something
even more important — to wit, the King's authority to
conclude the treaty.
The report which Schinina gave of his doings in Sicily
was an immense disappointment to Murat. It was
utterly impossible to leave his kingdom exposed to
1 Menzto Metternich. Naples, December 20, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.
* Graham to Bentinck. January 5, 1814. Record Office. Sicily.
8 Gabriel Pepe, Galimatias. Quoted by M. Lumbroso.
3i2 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the risk of attack from the English, and experience had
taught him that Lord William was a man to stick at
nothing. Once again, therefore, he put off his departure,
though all his preparations had been made. Certainly
his luck was out. In the beginning of December, when
everything was ready, he had been stopped by the
Austrian dispatches, and now, just as he had given the
word to start, Bentinck's refusal compelled him to
submit to a further postponement. To account for the
delay all manner of excuses were invented, some of them
not over skilful. On the 22nd Durant reported that
Murat was not leaving for the army " because of the
discovery of a plot, the details of which were still involved
in some mystery." l Next it was given out that Joachim
was remaining in Naples because the Queen was ill.2
Clearly nothing grave was the matter since the remedy
prescribed was " camomile tea."
The abortive result of the Sicilian negotiations not
only arrested his departure ; it prompted an immediate
change of tactics. Since the English would have neither
treaty nor armistice, they were not to be counted on,
at all events for the present ; but by a volte-face, which
to him seemed the most natural thing in the world,
Murat turned once more to the man whom he considered
still able to advance his cause. Forgetting the arrogant
and imperious tone of the communications he had sent
on the 1 5th to the agents of France, profiting by the
counsels which Fouche had given him, he addressed
himself on the 2ist December to the Emperor. " Sire,"
he began, " a new year is about to commence. May I
take advantage of the occasion to offer Your Majesty
my very best wishes ? Were they fulfilled, nothing could
be wanting to complete Your Majesty's happiness or
the happiness of your family. May this present year
1 Durant to Caulaincourt. December 22, 1813. Affaires £trangb-es.
2 Diario di Nicola,
MURAT'S DEMANDS 313
see the end of war, with all the distress that follows in
its train, and may the year which is about to dawn bring
us more peaceful days. Long may you take your ease
beneath the shade of the laurels you have won. Your
Majesty's glory is now complete, nothing remains to be
wrought that could add to its lustre. Now therefore
it behoves you to provide for your happiness. Give us
now the blessings of peace, and win from Europe admira-
tion of a new order by setting before all men the model
of a perfect government. Sire, all my life long I shall
love you. The affection which I entertain for Your
Majesty can never be changed by political events." l
This letter, which was to bring about a renewal of
relations that had well-nigh been broken off (for Murat
could scarcely have been in doubt as to how the Emperor
regarded him after his grave defiance of Imperial
authority), he followed up with an exhaustive apologia.
" Sire, I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th in
reply to mine of the 23rd November. You take it thaft
I am on the banks of the Po ; you assume that at the
sight of my army the enemy have taken to flight, and you
now express the desire that I should cross the river and
raise the blockade of Venice. Sire, I will speak to you
frankly ; I will tell you precisely what the position of my
country will allow me at the present time to do for France.
Thirty-five thousand men and an artillery train of fifty
guns are on the march for Florence and Fano. This
army comprises the total available forces of my Kingdom,
and I have not hesitated to send it beyond the Apennines,
because from the Roman States I can control my terri-
tory as though I were at Naples ; because by a counter-
march I could within a few days find myself at whatever
point danger might threaten my Kingdom ; because
from Bologna I can hold the whole of Southern Italy ;
Murat to the Emperor. Naples, December 21, 1813. Affaiies
314 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
because I am powerful enough to cope with aggression
from without or revolution within, and because I serve
your ends in checking the designs of your enemies on
Milan and Turin. The first move on the part of my
army did in fact bring the enemy to a standstill, and since
then the two armies have been under a sort of armistice.
I have thus carried out the task which Your Majesty
imposed upon me in the beginning. But now Your
Majesty requires fresh sacrifices of me. You ask that
I should throw my army across the Po and advance on
the Piave. You doubtless forget that I have left my
Kingdom without defence, and that the Queen and my
children have no other protection than the devotion of
my subjects. Meanwhile the English can bring war
into the heart of my country, destroy the peace of my
provinces, and fling their shells into my capital, almost
into my very palace. Sire, I must not mislead you ;
I have done for France and Your Majesty all that it
was in my power to do. I have fulfilled my obligations
as a Frenchman, as your friend and brother-in-law.
I have made up my mind to send forward my army to
the Po to arrest the enemy's advance on Milan and
Turin, to make a diversion in favour of your armies,
to protect my own territory, and thereby to help on the
negotiations for peace. But in the event of my action
not resulting in the attainment of the object I have
principally in view, which is the bringing about of peace,
would not Your Majesty yourself allow that, having
fulfilled my obligations towards you, it is next incumbent
upon me to do my duty by my own subjects and to take
steps for my own defence and for my Kingdom's safety ?
In that case Your Majesty will relinquish any hope you
may have formed of my crossing the Po, for by putting
that river between my subjects and myself I should be
powerless to oppose the enemy in Tuscany, the Papal
-States, and my own Kingdom. You will say that I might
MURATS DEMANDS 315
divide my forces. But in so doing I should render them
useless. I pointed out to Your Majesty the only alter-
native left, but you disdained my advice, or at all events
remained silent regarding it, and your silence told me
that my suggestion did not fit in with your plans.
" Believe me, Sire, the proclamation of the union
of the Italian peoples in one or two powers with the Po
as boundary would be the salvation of Italy. If this
course is not followed, Italy is lost irretrievably. She
will be once more rent asunder, and your lofty ambition
of setting Italy free, of making her one nation, will for ever
be destroyed. Only let me be free now to deal with
the provinces beyond the Po, and I give Your Majesty
my word that the Austrians shall not cross the Adige.
You will, in the negotiations for a general peace, be
the arbiter of the destinies of Italy, and you will have
created in me a trusty and powerful ally. With a single
word I can bring about that which the English and
Austrians at Leghorn, Lucca, and Ravenna have essayed
to achieve in vain. Remember, Sire, that the enemy
are exhorting the Italians to emancipate themselves,
they are offering to make them free, but the hopes which
they place in my army have rendered them deaf to these
proposals. Would they remain indifferent if the King
of Naples failed to realise their hopes — if, on the contrary,
he tightened the bonds of alien domination ? No ; the
Italians will throw in their lot with those who strive to
make them a free people. That is the fact, the plain,
unvarnished truth. Time is hurrying by, the enemy
is gathering reinforcements, and the day is not far distant
when I shall be obliged to make clear my position to
my nation and to the enemy. Were I to remain longer
silent as a result of the silence you have maintained
towards me, I should chill popular enthusiasm, and in
popular enthusiasm resides my only strength. Once
my popularity were gone I should be powerless to strike
316 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
- -
j a blow for you or for myself. Give me then, I beseech
, you, a definite answer. I could draw to the full on the
country's resources ; its inhabitants are ready to make
any sacrifice for me, whereas the French would be able
to obtain nothing.
" You know my heart is true ; my affection for you
I would make me shrink from nothing. Answer me
I then, I implore you. I can receive your reply at Florence
/ or Bologna. To-morrow I leave to take command of
/ my army.
/ " p.S. — Sire, in the name of all you hold dearest
in the world, carry resistance no farther. Make peace,
peace at any price. Only gain time and you will have
gained all. Your genius and time will do the rest.
If you turn a deaf ear to the prayers of your subjects,
of your friends, you will bring yourself and all of us to
ruin. Believe me, Italy is still loyal because she foresees
happier days in store, but she will not remain so for long
if her hopes are deceived. The Italians, once they give
free play to their passions, are capable of the utmost
excesses, even as to-day they are capable of making
the greatest sacrifices. There is still time to save Italy ;
Vonly declare what your intentions are."
When at the beginning of 1814 the Emperor received
this letter his line of conduct lay plain before him. Even
supposing he realised that Italy was slipping through
his fingers, and that in his own mind he was willing to
relinquish it to his brother-in-law, it was in fact no
longer in his power to do so. He himself was the first
to declare to the Due de Vicenza " that he had accepted
the conditions of the Treaty of Frankfort, and that it
was not in his power to make special arrangements
with Murat to the prejudice of the peace of Europe."
Therefore it was that he sent no reply to the King's
proposals.
His letter written, Murat began to make prepara-
MURAT'S DEMANDS 317
tions for his departure. When he told the Emperor
that he was leaving the next day he may have meant
what he said, for on the 30th December Colonel de
Beauffremont came up with Pignatelli-Strongoli and
informed him that the King would be at Rimini on the
ist January. Nevertheless Joachim was fated to get
no further than making ready, and now the play began
in earnest, for on the evening of the 30th December
Neipperg arrived at Naples.
CHAPTER X
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES WITH AUSTRIA
AND ENGLAND
Progress of the negotiations — The Treaty of the 8th January in draft and
in full— Metternich and Castlereagh— The second draft— Murat agrees to the
alterations — Why the Second Treaty was dated nth January — Murat's letter
to the Emperor of Austria — Epilogue — Official ratifications — Graham comes
to Naples — The object of his mission — He confers with Neipperg — He goes
to headquarters — He returns to Naples — The First Armistice signed — Lord
Bentinck's arrival — Signature of the Second Armistice — Wherein it differed
from the first.
" FRANKFORT-ON-MAIN,
loth December 1813.
« -m /iT ONSIEUR MON FRfeRE ,— I am sending
^L /I to Your Majesty my Lieutenant-General,
^y the Comte de Neipperg, who will have
\^ T M the honour to deliver this letter into your
hands. It being the object of his mission to draw yet
closer the bonds of friendship which unite us by employ-
ing them at the present important juncture in the
common interests of the Powers, I trust that Your Majesty
will treat him with cordiality and confidence. Parti-
cularly do I beg, Monsieur mon frere, that you will
attach entire credence to the assurances he will give
you of my regard for Your Majesty and of my sincere
desire to avail myself of every opportunity to afford
you proofs thereof/'
Such were the terms of the letter brought by Neip-
perg when he came to Murat's Court with his proposals
for a treaty. Metternich too wrote to Gallo as follows : —
" The latest proposals put forward by Prince Cariati
318
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 319
have decided His Majesty the Emperor to reply by
dispatching a confidential agent to His Majesty the
King of Naples ; His Majesty's choice has lighted upon
Field- Marshal the Comte de Neipperg. The special
information with which the said officer is entrusted,
taken in conjunction with the confidential communi-
cations transmitted through Monsieur de Mier, will en-
able him to lay the matter before Your Excellency in
the fullest detail."
Together with these official letters of introduction
Neipperg was given authorisations and instructions.
They were to be acted upon by him jointly with the
Comte de Mier, whom Metternich supposed to be still
at Naples. * You will observe," wrote Metternich
to Mier, " that these powers are delegated jointly to
you and Field-Marshal the Comte de Neipperg. Please
therefore arrange together to adopt a perfectly con-
sistent plan of procedure. The Comte de Neipperg's
initial task will be to acquaint you with the nature of
these joint instructions in order that you may arrive
at a mutual agreement regarding the best course to
follow in order to bring the negotiations to a successful
issue."
Neipperg's powers were drawn up at Frankfort-on-
Main and dated the yth December 1813. In the course
of his instructions to the two diplomatists Metternich
traced the successive changes which Murat's attitude
had undergone, showing how he had thrown over
Napoleon to join hands with Austria and England only
to return again to his former allegiance. He then went
on to impress on Mier the necessity of obtaining a clear
and definite understanding within " two or three times
twenty-four hours," adding that Austria, never having
recognised Murat as King, would support the claims
of King Ferdinand in the event of war with Naples.
" Austria," he continued, " is determined to find out
320 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
once and for all how matters stand. She means to
know whether the King of Naples is for the Powers or
against them. If he declares himself the friend of the
Allies, Austria will espouse his cause, but, in such an
event, it behoves her to know what part is to be played
by the Neapolitan army. The Comte de Neipperg will
inform the King that Naples cannot be suffered to re-
main neutral. If the King means to adopt an attitude
of neutrality Austria will recall her representatives.
The Comte de Neipperg will give the King to under-
stand that his fate is in Austria's hands, and that Austria
has been empowered by the Allies to act on their behalf,
that the arrangement of terms is in her discretion, and
that she alone can procure the assent of the Allies to any
treaty made between Naples and herself.
" The Comte de Neipperg will communicate direct
with Lord William Bentinck and Field-Marshal the
Comte de Bellegarde if his mission is brought to a success-
ful issue ; in the event of failure he will quit Naples at
the earliest possible moment. This also applies to the
Comte de Mier."
Carrying with him these instructions and the draft
of a treaty, Neipperg set out from headquarters. On
the i yth December he was at Vicenza, and the 20 th
found him at Boara, on the banks of the Adige. In
order to avoid the necessity of passing through the
French lines he went on board a trading brig. But
a storm springing up, the vessel was driven past Ancona,
signalling to those on the look-out, and finally put into
Manfredonia, where she was detained in quarantine.
At Manfredonia Neipperg was met by Coucy, one of
Murat's secretaries, and arrived on the 3ist December
at Naples, where he proceeded to take up his quarters
at the Hotel Mazetti at Santa Lucia. In the afternoon
of the same day Neipperg had a long interview with
Gallo. In the evening he went to the Palace. Taking
1 »
• * *
' , ' '
FBLAMCttS ' T-CE
' ('•<***,' «• I < < < <• * f
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 321
him apart, the King dismissed the various notabilities
who had come to present their New Year compliments,
and remained closeted with the Austrian till a late hour,
when he invited him to supper. On the ist January
there was a State performance at the San Carlo, at which
Neipperg and the whole Court were present. Negotia-
tions had so far advanced on the 3rd January that
Neipperg requested Nugent to suspend operations on
the main road from Rimini to Bologna if the presence
of the Neapolitan troops had caused the enemy to retire
from the neighbourhood. He also begged Nugent to
inform the Commander-in-Chief that his negotiations
seemed to be taking a favourable turn, and that as soon
as the treaty had been thoroughly settled and signed
the army of the King of Naples would lend its active
co-operation. On the morning of the 4th Neipperg and
Gallo met at the latter 's residence. When Graham,
the British emissary, came on the scene, he was informed
that proposals for an alliance had already been inter-
changed, and that only a few verbal and technical diffi-
culties remained to be settled before the treaty was
definitely signed. Gallo kept them both to dinner, and
the two diplomats chatted and discussed matters with
each other. On the 6th Murat gave a grand banquet
on board the Capri to Neipperg, Graham, and the officers
of the Furious, the British frigate on which Graham had
arrived. At last, on the night of the 7th-8th January,
the treaty of alliance between Austria and Naples was
signed. It was ratified by Murat, and needed only the
ratification of the Emperor of Austria for its completion.
Of what did this treaty of the 8th January consist ?
To the instructions given to Neipperg Metternich
had annexed the following draft.
" Article I. — There shall exist from the date on which
the present treaty is signed, and during the course of
the present war, an alliance both offensive and defensive
x
322 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
between Austria and Naples. In terms thereof their
Majesties bind themselves to direct the whole of their
forces towards the realisation of the objects set forth
in the preamble of this treaty.
" Article II. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
guarantees to His Majesty the King of Naples the States
at present possessed by the latter in Italy. His Imperial
and Royal Majesty will use his good offices to procure
the assent of his allies to the present guarantee.
" Article III. — So soon as peace is concluded a de-
fensive alliance shall be forthwith entered into between
the two courts for the purpose of giving due effect to
the said guarantee.
" Article IV. — To make more clear the assistance to
be rendered to the common cause by the High Contracting
Parties, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes
to maintain an active army of not less than 150,000
men. His Majesty the King of Naples shall on his part
put in the field a corps of ... infantry and . . .
cavalry, which shall always be maintained at full
strength.
" Article V. (Draft A). — The Neapolitan army, under
the personal command of His Majesty the King of Naples,
shall be reinforced by an Austrian contingent, which shall
in like manner be under the King's command.
" Article V. (Draft B). — The Neapolitan Army shall
be under the supreme control of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Austrian Army, but shall be in the immediate
command of a Neapolitan general. The Neapolitan
Army shall work in absolute agreement with the Austrian
Grand Army in Italy.
" Article VI. — All booty and trophies shall be
deemed the property of the army by which they may
have been captured.
" Article VII. — A military agreement shall at once
be made between the High Contracting Parties in order
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 323
to regulate questions relating to the victualling and
co-operation of the armies.
" Article VIII. — The present treaty shall be ratified
at the earliest possible moment."
To the above draft was added a preamble setting
forth the object of the alliance, which was described
as the re-establishment of peace on the basis of an
independent and equitable balance of power. Lastly
came a secret clause, separate from the rest of the treaty.
It consisted of a promise on Austria's part to employ
her influence with the Allies, especially Sicily and Eng-
land, to obtain the recognition of Murat as King of
Naples. At the same time Austria guaranteed to Murat
Ferdinand's renunciation of his claims on Naples.
To the instructions and draft quoted above, Metternich
added the following memoranda : —
" Article I. is essential, and the draft in this respect
must be rigidly adhered to. The King of Naples must
use every means in his power to achieve an aim in the
successful attainment of which will reside the sole
guarantee of his possessions.
" Articles II. and III. are wholly in favour of Naples.
We desire no reciprocal guarantee in Article II., as we
are not in a position to specify the arrangements that
have been made with other Powers regarding the future
reconstitution of the Austrian Monarchy. Our pleni-
potentiaries will put aside any proposals on the part
of the Neapolitan Government by stating that the
matter would be considered at the time of signing the
treaty to be entered into after the conclusion of peace.
" The forces for which provision is made in Article
IV. should be on the same scale as in Article I.
" We should prefer the second version of Article V.
But if the King accompanies the Army we could hardly
ask him to forego the command. The readiness of our
plenipotentiaries to fall in with the King's demands
324 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
should be in proportion to the advantage accruing from
the troops offered by him and to the zeal he may
display for the cause.
" The next three articles require no comment. The
separate and secret article should demonstrate to the
King the bona fides of our procedure. Our plenipoten-
tiaries are instructed to give a verbal promise that we
should, if necessary, use forcible means to compel the
King of Sicily to renounce his claims to the Kingdom of
Naples. Seeing the nature of the information previously
given by us to His Majesty concerning the King of Sicily's
attitude, he should entertain no further doubt as to the
readiness with which the necessary understanding will
be arrived at.
" If the King of Naples refuses his assent to the
treaty on the grounds that he receives nothing tangible
to indemnify him for his co-operation, and if on this
account there should be any risk of the negotiations
falling through, our plenipotentiaries are empowered
to sign a further secret article to the following
effect :
" His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of
Bohemia, Hungary, &c., undertakes when peace is restored
to use his influence in order to obtain for His Majesty
the King of Naples an extension of his frontiers as an
indemnity for the efforts made by him in support of
the common cause."
Such were Neipperg's instructions and the lines laid
down by Metternich. The following is the treaty of
the 8th January in extenso.1
1 The text of the treaty as here given is not official, since all efforts to
discover it in the Archives of Austria, England, France, and Naples have
hitherto proved unavailing. But taking the treaty dated nth January and
noting one after another the points of difference to which reference is made in
collateral and official documents, I have attempted to reconstruct the treaty
of the 8th January by making use of all the information at present available
on the subject.
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 325
" In the name of The Most Holy and Indivisible
Trinity.
" His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His
Majesty the King of Naples, being desirous of consolidat-
ing by the closest union the welfare of their respective
States and at the same time of considering the most
effective means for establishing a lasting peace in Europe,
and more especially among the peoples of Italy, upon
the basis of the independence and equilibrium of the
powers, have resolved to enter into a treaty of alliance
with one another for the purpose of uniting their efforts
for the attainment of the object in view.
" Wherefore the following plenipotentiaries have been
appointed.
" By His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of
Hungary and Bohemia,
' The Sieur Adam Albert, Comte de Neipperg,
Knight of the Order of Maria Theresa, Grand Cross of
the Order of Saint Anne of Russia, Knight of the Military
Order of Sweden, His Majesty's Chamberlain and
Lieutenant-General.1
" By His Majesty the King of Naples,
' The Sieur Martino Mastrilli, Due di Gallo, Grand
Dignitary of the Order of the Two Sicilies and of the
Iron Crown, Knight of the Golden Fleece, His Majesty's
Counsellor of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
" The same, after exchange of their full powers, have
agreed on the following terms :
" Article I. — From the date of the signature hereof
there shall be maintained friendship, alliance and sincere
union between His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and
His Majesty the King of Naples, their heirs and successors,
their dominions and subjects in perpetuity.
"The high contracting parties shall use every en-
1 Mier being absent, nothing could be said about his powers in the first
treaty.
326 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
deavour to maintain their mutual friendship by avoiding
whatsoever might be calculated to impair the union
and cordial relationship so happily existing between
them.
" Article II. — The alliance between the high contract-
ing parties shall be directed towards the prosecution
of the present war as well as towards the re-establishment,
through their joint efforts, of a due balance of power
and the restoration of peace to Europe, and particularly
to Italy, where the two high contracting parties agree
to co-operate for the defence of their States and respective
interests.
" Article III. — In pursuance of the preceding articles,
the high contracting parties have covenanted to aid
each other with all such means as Providence has placed
at their disposal, and not to lay down arms save by
mutual consent.
" Article IV. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
guarantees His Majesty the King of Naples, his heirs
and successors, the free and peaceful enjoyment of
the States at present possessed by His Majesty in
Italy, as well as the absolute and undivided sovereignty
thereof.
"[His Majesty the King of Naples renounces for himself
and his successors all claim upon the Kingdom of Sicily,
and declares his willingness to guarantee the possession
thereof to the present reigning dynasty.] l
" His Imperial and Royal Majesty will use his best
endeavours to procure the assent of his allies to this
guarantee.
" Article V. — By way of indicating in greater detail
1 The words in brackets were omitted or inserted elsewhere in the second
treaty. The paragraph in question was, in the second treaty, inserted in the
secret articles together with the passage relating to Austria's guarantee of
Ferdinand's renunciation of Naples, but in the first treaty it was included
in Article IV. It was at Murat's own request that Metternich made the
change.
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 327
the forces to be furnished by the high contracting
parties in the common cause, His Majesty the Emperor
of Austria, &c. &c., undertakes to keep constantly in
the field 150,000 men, of whom not less than 60,000
shall be for service in Italy.
" His Majesty the King of Naples likewise promises
to put a corps of 30,000 men in the field. These troops
shall consist of the due proportion of infantry, cavalry,
and artillery, and shall be maintained at their full strength
during the course of the present war.
"[It is, however, stipulated that the troops of His
Majesty the King of Naples shall only be required for
service in Italy, and that they shall not be employed
beyond the Alps.] l
" In the event of the forces provided in terms of the
preceding clause being insufficient for the defence of the
common interests, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria,
&c. &c., and His Majesty the King of Naples mutually
agree to increase their auxiliary forces in such measure
as the necessities of the case may demand, always, how-
ever, maintaining the proportion laid down in the pre-
ceding clause.
" Article VII. — In the event of the King of Naples
leading his army in person, the troops working in imme-
1 Durant, who knew of this article, makes the following comment there-
upon : "The King attached great importance to this restriction: it was an
immense weight off his conscience." (Durant to Caulaincourt. Naples,
January 5, 1814. Affaires fctrangb-es!) Mention is also made of it in a work
entitled, "Sulla condotta politica del Re Gioacchino Murat nel 1814 e nel
1815," published in the Minerva Napolitana in 1821. These articles,
which are unsigned, were manifestly written by one who followed the
negotiations very closely, or who possibly played an active part in them, for it
would be impossible for greater accuracy to be displayed, all the statements
contained in them being confirmed, without any exception, by collateral
documentary evidence. The work in question must not be confused with
a somewhat violent pamphlet published in 1814 and 1815 under the almost
identical title of " Memorie sulla condotto politica e militare tenata da
Gioacchino Murat."
328 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
TV
diate conjunction with the said army shall be under that
monarch's direct command.1
" In the contrary event, the Austrian Grand Army
in Italy being commanded by a field-marshal or feld-
zeugmeister of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the
Neapolitan corps co-operating with that army shall be
under the command of the said field-marshal or feld-
zeugmeister.
" If His Majesty the King is present the operations
shall be so planned and concerted as may be most ex-
pedient for the common interests and the success of the
armies of the two allies.
" Should His Majesty not accompany the army, the
general commanding the Neapolitan troops will take
his orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian
Army in respect of such plan as may be agreed upon
between the two armies.
" Article VIII. — For this purpose a military agree-
ment shall be arranged immediately after the present
treaty is signed in order to determine all questions re-
lating to the operations of the two armies, the lines
which they will be called upon to hold, as well as
the victualling and maintenance of the respective
troops, it being understood that each of the two
armies will avail itself of the resources of the district
it occupies.
" Article IX. — All prizes, booty, and prisoners shall
belong to the troops by whom they are captured.
" Article X. — The high contracting parties covenant
together that neither of them will make peace nor consent
to a truce without including its ally.
" Article XI. — The ambassadors and ministers of
the high contracting parties at foreign courts shall be
instructed to render assistance to each other, and in
1 At the request of Marechal Bellegarde this passage underwent some
modification in the second treaty.
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 329
every way and on all occasions to act in such manner
as may tend to further the interests of their sovereigns.
" Article XII. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
undertakes to release all Neapolitan prisoners in his
custody, and will use his influence to obtain the release
of such as are detained by the allied powers.
" Article XIII. — The present treaty shall be ratified,
and the ratifications exchanged at Naples at the earliest
possible moment.
" In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries
have hereunto set their hands and seals.
" Done at Naples the 8th January 1814.
" LE COMTE DE NEIPPERG.
" LE Due DI GALLO."
Secret Articles.
" Article I. — His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic
Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to facilitate
the conclusion of peace between His Majesty the King
of Naples and His Majesty the King of Great Britain
and His Majesty the King of Sicily on a base equally
just, sure, and honourable to all parties, as well as to
bring about the restoration of friendly relations and
a cordial understanding between His Majesty the
King of Naples and the other powers in alliance with
Austria.1
" Article II. — In order to preclude any possibility of
dispute between Their Majesties the King of Naples
and the King of Sicily, His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria will employ all possible means to obtain for
King Joachim Napoleon and his descendants a formal
1 Reconstructed on data obtained from a dispatch forwarded by Graham
to Bentinck. (Dispatch No. 4. Record Office. Sicily.) In the treaty of the
8th January this was the first of the secret articles. After revision by England
it was placed second.
330 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
act of renunciation from the King of Sicily of all claims
on the Kingdom of Naples. This renunciation shall
be recognised and guaranteed by His Majesty the Em-
peror of Austria to His Majesty the King of Naples,
and His Imperial and Royal Majesty will take steps
to obtain from the allied powers a similar recognition
and guarantee.
" Article III. — The two high contracting parties,
recognising that it is impossible for His Majesty the
King of Naples to send his troops any farther afield
than they are at present unless he is relieved from the
apprehension of a descent upon his shores, it is specially
agreed that His Neapolitan Majesty shall not be obliged
to permit his army to take an active part in such opera-
tions as shall be determined upon until he shall have been
completely assured that Great Britain will cease all
hostile action against him.
" Article IV. — The two high contracting parties
reserve the right to enter, on the conclusion of a general
peace, into a treaty of alliance with the object of mutu-
ally safeguarding their dominions in Italy and of aiding
one another in such fashion as may be calculated to
advance the interests of their respective crowns and
peoples.
" Article V. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
binds himself to use effective means, on the conclusion
of a general peace, to secure as an indemnity for the
King of Naples in respect of the efforts and sacrifices
made by His Majesty for the furtherance of the common
cause, a satisfactory military frontier in conformity
with the political interests of the two powers and with
the friendly relations established between them by the
treaty of this date.
" Naples, the 8th January 1814.
" LE COMTE DE NEIPPERG.
" LE Due DI GALLO."
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 331
In the course of the negotiations Neipperg found
himself compelled to make use of the additional induce-
ment indicated by Metternich regarding the King of
Sicily's renunciation of his claims to the throne of Naples,
which renunciation Austria undertook to obtain by
every means in her power. Murat demanded that this
undertaking should be inserted in a clause in the treaty,
but to this Neipperg obstinately refused to consent.1
Gallo was thereupon commanded to place the declara-
tion on record, and this he did in the following terms : —
Special Article.
"I, the undersigned Minister for Foreign Affairs
of His Majesty the King of Naples, do hereby state that
Monsieur le Lieutenant-General Comte de Neipperg,
Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of Austria, declared to me in the course of the discussions
which took place between us in connexion with the
treaty of friendship and alliance signed at Naples this
8th day of January 1814, that he was authorised by
the instructions of His Imperial and Royal Majesty to
assure the King, my Master, that in the event of his
becoming a party to the political system of the allied
powers in the present war, His Majesty the Emperor
of Austria would use every means, and if necessary would
resort to force, in order to prevail upon the King of
Sicily formally to renounce the Kingdom of Naples for
himself and his successors in perpetuity and to guarantee
the peaceable and undivided possession of the same
to His Majesty King Joachim and his descendants
for ever.
" In witness whereof I, the undersigned, have, with
the consent of Monsieur le Comte de Neipperg, recorded
the said verbal statement in these presents, which I have
1 Minerva Napolitana.
332 NAPOLEON AND ,KING MURAT
communicated to him and whereunto I have set my
hand and seal.
" Done at Naples, the 8th January 1814.
" LE Due DI GALLO."
The treaty being signed, or just about to be signed,
Murat dispatched Lieut enant-General Pignatelli-Strongoli
with the following reply to the Emperor of Austria.
" NAPLES, 7 th January 1814.
" MONSIEUR MON FRERE, — The Comte de Neipperg
duly handed me the letter which Your Imperial and
Royal Majesty was so good as to send me from Frank-
fort under date of the loth December last. The mission
with which the officer in question was entrusted con-
stituted a further proof of the interest and friendliness
with which Your Majesty has ever regarded me. I
beg you to accept my sincere thanks for the same and
to rest assured of my ardent desire to lose no opportunity
of affording you convincing demonstration of my sincere
friendship and gratitude. I am sending to Your
Majesty's headquarters Lieutenant-General the Prince
de Pignatelli-Strongoli, one of my aides-de-camp, who
will deliver the present letter and reiterate by word of
mouth the sentiments which I entertain towards you.
I thoroughly and most genuinely share in the desire
expressed by Your Majesty and your Allies for the
re-establishment of peace on the basis of the due balance
and independence of the powers. Your Majesty may
rely on my doing all that in me lies to assist in the attain-
ment of this most desirable object.
" It will always afford me satisfaction to draw yet
closer the bonds which unite us, convinced as I am
from my knowledge of Your Majesty's character that
the fresh ties which are about to be formed between us
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 333
and our thrones will conduce to the interests we have
in common as well as to the welfare of our peoples.
" Believe me to remain, Monsieur mon frere, Your
Imperial and Royal Majesty's affectionate brother.
"J. NAPOLEON."1
On the 8th January envoys set out for the head-
quarters of the Allies with the signed treaty. Menz,
who was accompanied by Coucy, had charge of the
copy intended for Metternich.2 Simultaneously Captain
the Baron d'Aspre was dispatched by Neipperg with
the following letter to Lord William Bentinck : —
" Acting on the commands and instructions of His
Majesty the Emperor, my Master, and in conformity
with the arrangements made by His said Majesty with
the High Allied Powers, and especially with the British
Government, I had come here not to seek an alliance
with the King of Naples, but to discover the attitude
which he intends to take up at the present juncture with
regard to the other powers. I have strictly adhered to
my instructions, which were definite and required that
I should satisfy myself as to his intentions within a
strictly limited interval of time.
" It was Austria's duty to come to an understanding.
It was necessary for her to know as soon as possible
whether the King was hostile to the cause of Europe :
it was above all important from the military point of
view that she should clearly understand whether she
had to regard the Neapolitans as the allies of her army
in Italy or whether she would be under the necessity of
detaching a portion of her forces in order to keep a watch
on the movements of a hostile Neapolitan army.
1 Murat to the Emperor of Austria. Quoted by Lumbroso. Revue de
Paris.
2 Neipperg to Metternich. Naples, January 8, 1814. Quoted by M.
Weil.
,334 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
' Taking into account the position of the armies
in Italy and Switzerland, I have been led, on mature
consideration, to negotiate and sign the accompanying
treaty. In now entrusting it to you I rely on your noted
good faith and uprightness to make no use of it, whether
in connection with your own Government or in any other
manner whatsoever, until the news of the transaction
has been made public through the official channels."
After a few notes regarding the forces of the Allies
and the necessity of calling on the Neapolitan troops
for assistance, he proceeded —
" Having unfolded to you, my Lord, the advan-
tages that would accrue from the co-operation of the
Neapolitan troops and made clear the danger of pursuing
a contrary policy, I must in addition to these purely
military considerations call your attention to the fact
that my expedition was undertaken with the full cogni-
sance of Lord Aberdeen. You may therefore rest
thoroughly assured that you will be acting in full accord-
ance with the views of your Government in signing an
armistice with King Joachim, such armistice being an
essential condition of the active employment of the
Neapolitan troops mentioned in the treaty. I therefore
urge you, my Lord, in the common interest, not to put
off the conclusion of an armistice with the Neapolitan
Government, seeing that it will bring about an immediate
cessation of hostilities between Sicily and Naples, render
effective the provisions of the treaty which I have just
signed, and procure the prompt and active co-operation
of the Neapolitan army in Italy.
" Any further delay in arranging this armistice might
result in incalculable injury to the cause of the Allies.
I am under the necessity of officially declaring in the
name of my August Sovereign and His Allies that both
you and I will be held responsible by them if we are the
cause of delay in securing the co-operation of the fifty
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 335
or sixty thousand men who may seal the fate of Italy,
and consequently of Europe also. To you, my Lord,
blame will attach for delaying the conclusion of the
armistice which I have the honour to submit to you,
and to me for failing to convince you by the cogency of
my arguments of the sincerity by which I am actuated." 1
The above letter and the treaty were conveyed to
Palermo by Captain d'Aspre, who embarked on the
Furious with Colonel Berthemy. The frigate made
ready to sail on the gth January, but owing to the
stormy weather, she did not put to sea until the loth.
As for Menz, he reached the headquarters at Bale
somewhere between the 2oth and 22nd January with
the treaty signed by Neipperg. This he duly handed to
Metternich, who in turn submitted it to Lord Castlereagh
on the 22nd January. Instead, however, of immediately
laying it before the Emperor of Austria for ratification,
it was decided, in view of representations made by
Castlereagh, to introduce certain alterations.
A second treaty was accordingly drawn up, and on
the 23rd January Menz was instructed to convey it with
certain orders to Mier. The revised version differed in
two essential respects from the original. In the first
place, Murat was now to undertake to procure a suitable
indemnity for the King of Sicily ; in the second the in-
demnity promised to the King of Naples was to be strictly
denned.
The second article of the secret treaty, which by
reason of the changes that were made became one of the
principal clauses in the agreement, was now put in the
first place, and read as follows : —
" Article I. — In order to remove all grounds for dis-
pute between Their Majesties the Kings of Naples and
Sicily, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c., under-
1 Neipperg to Bentinck. Naples, 8th January 1814. Quoted by M.
Weil.
.336 NAPOLEON AND , KING MURAT
takes to use every endeavour to obtain in favour of His
Majesty King Joachim Napoleon and his descendants,
the King of Sicily's formal renunciation of his claims on
the Crown of Naples, which shall be binding on him and
his descendants in perpetuity. The said renunciation
shall be recognised and guaranteed by His Majesty the
Emperor of Austria to His Majesty the King of Naples,
and His Imperial Majesty will approach the Allied Powers
with the object of obtaining from them a like recognition
and guarantee.
" On the other hand, His Majesty the King of Naples
renounces, on his own behalf and that of his successors,
all claims on the Kingdom of Sicily, and declares his
willingness to guarantee the possession thereof to the
present reigning house.
" Inasmuch, however, as the Allied Powers are not
in a position to acquiesce in the guarantee of the Kingdom
of Naples to King Joachim unless the latter becomes a
party to the agreement mutually arranged between the
said powers to procure a fitting indemnity for the King
of Sicily, His Majesty the King of Naples now and hence-
forth binds himself to admit the principle of such in-
demnity, and the efforts of His Neapolitan Majesty
being directed towards the attainment of all the objects
of the Great European Alliance, he specially undertakes
to embrace in his aims the procuring of an indemnity
for the King of Sicily."
At the same time was added the article defining the
concessions made in Murat's favour.
-rf£ Additional and Secret Article.
" His Majesty the King of Naples and His Majesty
the Emperor of Austria being desirous of concluding
forthwith a lasting agreement in pursuance of the
stipulations of Article IV. of the secret treaty signed
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 337
at Naples on the nth January, have covenanted as
follows : —
" His Imperial and Royal Majesty guarantees His
Neapolitan Majesty an acquisition calculated on a scale
of 400,000 souls to be taken from the Roman State as
may be agreed upon between the two States. His
Apostolic Majesty will lend his good offices to obtain
the consent and sanction of the Holy Father and the
Allies to this concession.
" On the other hand His Majesty the King of Naples
formally agrees to look upon (the fulfilment of) this
undertaking as fully satisfying all bis claims to be ac-
corded an increase of territory.
' The present article shall be ratified separately,
and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at the
same time as those of the overt and secret treaties of this
date."
Menz, bearing Metternich's instructions and the new
treaty, reached Naples on the 3rd February. Next
morning Mier read over the treaty to the King, as well
as his instructions regarding the same. The King gave
his unqualified assent to the new treaty, and wrote as
follows to the Emperor of Austria : —
" BOLOGNA, $th February 1814.
" MONSIEUR MON FRERE, — Monsieur le Comte de
Mier has acquainted me with the modifications which
Your Imperial and Royal Majesty has deemed it necessary
to make in the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed
at Naples by our respective plenipotentiaries, and I take
the earliest opportunity of informing Your Majesty that,
relying on the constant friendship of which you have
never failed to give me proof, I have unreservedly
assented to the new version and to the additional
articles ; this letter may be looked upon in the mean-
time as a preliminary ratification.
Y
338 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
" I trust that this loyal and frank determination on
my part will bear witness to my conscientiousness and
to my wish to second with the utmost promptitude the
efforts you are making for the success of the common
cause. I am now at the head of my army, and I am
only awaiting information regarding Monsieur le Comte
de Bellegarde's plan of action to support him by every
means in my power.
" I pray Your Imperial and Royal Majesty to be
assured of my sincerity and to accept my best wishes
for your own happiness and for that of your illustrious
Family."
This letter was conveyed to the headquarters of the
Allies by Colonel de Beauffremont, Murat's aide-de-
camp, and delivered by him on the I4th February into
the hands of the Emperor of Austria at Langres.
Meanwhile — on the evening of the I2th February —
Neipperg, Mier, and Gallo had put their hands to the new
treaty of alliance, and it was immediately handed to the
Comte de Schonfeldt to be conveyed by him to Metter-
nich. It is this second treaty which was eventually
dated the nth January.
The Emperor of Austria, who received Murat's letter
on the I4th February, sent him the following reply
from Troyes on the 2ist : —
" MONSIEUR MON FRERE, — Your Majesty's aide-de-
camp, the bearer hereof, handed me the letter ratifying
the treaty which I had proposed to you with certain
modifications. I accept your preliminary ratification,
and I beg you to regard the present letter as an under-
taking on my part to dispatch with the least possible
delay the said treaty in its proper form.
" The resolution adopted by Your Majesty neces-
sarily insures you my entire support, and I have in-
structed my Minister to lend a hand to Prince Cariati
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 339
in connection with such steps as remain to be taken in
order to procure the assent of the Sovereigns my Allies
to the provisions of the said treaty. This will doubtless
afford Your Majesty a further proof of the regard I have
ever entertained for you. The happy relations existing
between us cannot but contribute to the final triumph
of the general cause and particularly to the future
welfare and tranquillity of Italy.
" Believe me to remain, Monsieur mon fre're, Your
Majesty's affectionate brother,
" FRANCIS."
Subsequently, after the treaty of Paris, Murat was
anxious to have the agreement officially ratified. On
the 1 3th July, therefore, the " Cavaliere " de Angelis, head
of the principal department of the Neapolitan Foreign
Office, arrived at Vienna with a formal ratification bear-
ing Joachim's signature, for which Metternich readily
exchanged a ratification signed by the Emperor Francis.
In the course of these proceedings Campochiaro ob-
served that the Austrian ratifications were dated from
Dijon. On his manifesting surprise thereat, Metternich
informed him that the document in question was one
which had been dispatched from Vienna to the head-
quarters at Dijon, and had been supposed to have gone
astray, but that, having been subsequently discovered, it
had not been considered worth while to alter the date,
seeing that the exchange was officially recorded as having
been effected at Vienna.
As soon as the due formalities were concluded, the
Due de Roccaromana returned with the official documents
to Naples, and on the 22nd October delivered into the
hands of the King the copy of the treaty which was sup-
posed to have been concluded on the nth January.
One last question arises in connection with these two
treaties and their dates. Why did Metternich cause the
340 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
treaty which was signed on the I2th February to be ante-
dated ? Merely because he now perceived that the neces-
sity for the treaty for which he had striven so hard was
growing less and less urgent, and because he wished to
avoid the adverse criticisms of the Allies, whose agent he
was for all matters connected with Italy. He therefore
put the date of the treaty as far back as possible, so that
it might be generally supposed that vital necessity had
at the time impelled him to get it signed.
Far less crooked, far less underhand, the negotiations
with England were equally decisive. On the ist January
1814, on receipt of a letter from Menz dated the I4th
December, Bentinck sent Graham, his private secretary,
to Naples with full powers to conclude an armistice.
Graham, however, was formally instructed " not to sign,
whatever the nature of the offers that might be made to
him, until he had put himself into communication with
the Allies/' He left on board the Furious, which reached
Naples on the morning of the 4th. On proceeding to
Gallo's quarters he was " somewhat astonished to find an
Austrian General there." The Austrian General was
Neipperg.
Faithful to his orders, Graham, after several discus-
sions with Neipperg, who wanted him to sign the armistice
with Naples then and there, requested Gallo to give him
passports for the headquarters of the Allies. These he
received on the morning of the yth, and, setting out on the
8th with Menz, he reached the Austrian outposts at Forli
on the 1 3th, finally arriving at Bellegarde's headquarters
on the 1 7th. " It was his intention to proceed on his
journey to the Imperial headquarters, but His Excellency
Marshal Bellegarde urged him so strongly to go back to
Lord William Bentinck, and laid such stress on the import-
ance of the armistice demanded by Marshal Murat as a sine
qua non of his co-operation, that he made up his mind to
fall in with His Excellency's views.' Thus Graham left
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 341
again on the very day of his arrival. Before his departure,
however, he had a long conversation with Sir Robert
Wilson, the English attache at Bellegarde's headquarters.
Wilson, misled by the representations of the Austrians,
gave him to understand that the British Government
was desirous of making peace with Murat. On the
25th January Graham found himself back again in Naples.
Without a moment's delay he sought out Gallo and signed
the armistice with him at four o'clock on the morning of
the 26th. The following is the text of the agreement : —
' The undersigned, being furnished with the requisite
full powers, have concluded an agreement for an armistice
in the following terms :
" Article I. — There shall be from this date an absolute
cessation of hostilities between the land and sea forces of
Naples and Great Britain, and such forces as may be
under British command in the Mediterranean.
" Article II. — This armistice shall remain in force until
the treaty of peace which is to be concluded between the
respective countries for the purpose of securing united
action in the common cause has been definitely signed.
" Plenipotentiaries shall be appointed by either party
for the purpose of arranging the said treaty, and they
shall meet together at the earliest possible opportunity.
" Done at Naples, 26th January 1814.
"E. A. BERTHEMY, JAMES GRAHAM,
" Marechal de Camp, Aide-de-Camp to His
His Majesty's Aide-de-Camp. Excellency Lord William Bentinck."
Meantime, Bentinck had made up his mind to come to
Naples. Sailing from Palermo on the 3oth January on
board the America, he reached Naples at eleven o'clock
on the following night and proceeded to take up his
quarters at the " Locanda de la Grande Bretagne." On
the ist February, after seeing Graham, who acquainted
'
342 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
him with the terms of the armistice which, he had signed
on the 26th January, Bentinck had an interview with
Gallo and Neipperg, and drew up a modified version.
The following are the reasons he gave to Castlereagh for
not accepting Graham's settlement : —
" MY DEAR LORD, — On arriving here the night before
last in order to conclude an armistice with Murat, I found
that an armistice had already been made by Mr. Graham.
Lord Aberdeen will have sent you a copy of the agreement
as arranged between the Due de Gallo and Mr. Graham,
as well as the memorandum in which the latter mentions
the considerations which guided him in the matter. The
Comte de Neipperg and Sir Robert Wilson appear con-
vinced that Lord Aberdeen had given me full powers to
sign a treaty of peace with Murat, or that such powers
had been sent me direct by the British Government. As
far as Mr. Graham was concerned, he was absolutely
positive that the letter which I recently received from
Lord Aberdeen contained the necessary powers. You
will have seen from the letter which I sent to Lord Aber-
deen by my aide-de-camp, Captain Foljambe, that in
giving effect to the instructions of the British Government
I thought it incumbent upon me to express the doubt I
entertained as to the interpretation put upon Lord
Aberdeen's letter of the I2th December, which reached me
on the 1 8th January — the only one I received from him.
" The Neapolitan Government is very anxious to
make peace with Great Britain, and the army and the
people generally are being told a great deal about the
prospect of the treaty being signed at an early date.
Constant pressure has been brought to bear on Mr.
Graham, and it was in order to hasten on negotiations
for the treaty that they were so anxious to introduce
Article 2 into the armistice stipulating for the immediate
appointment of plenipotentiaries. Fully persuaded after
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 343
his conversation with Sir Robert Wilson that the in-
tentions of the British Government lay in this direction,
Graham did not consider himself justified in opposing
the desires of the Due de Gallo. For my part, I could
not see my way to accept the article, and this I made
clear both to the Due de Gallo and to the Comte de
Neipperg. I told them that I was prepared to conclude
an armistice, to enter into a military agreement or a
scheme of co-operation, but that my powers did not go
beyond that. They then put forward a number of
other suggestions, and pressed for the introduction of an
article which would have been tantamount to giving
them all they wanted. But I absolutely refused to
insert anything that was extraneous to the strict object
of the matter I had been instructed to negotiate, as
that, in my opinion, exceeded the powers which I con-
sidered had been* granted to me. I am particularly
anxious not to involve the Government in any way, nor
should I like the King and Crown Prince of Sicily to
have grounds for thinking that I am taking Murat's
part against them."
While Bentinck was thus explaining to Castlereagh
the reasons which had led him to suppress the second
article of Graham's armistice, Caroline was also express-
ing her dissatisfaction to Gallo. " I have since yesterday
given a great deal of thought to the armistice proposals
which you submitted to me, and what I am afraid of
is that the English are endeavouring to obtain all the
advantages of a peace, of an alliance even, by a mere
offer to suspend hostilities without giving us any guarantee
in return.
" What in fact do their promises amount to ? Simply
to an offer to suspend hostilities which, according to the
terms you have just put before me, they would be able
to resume whenever they chose. On the other hand,
344 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
what do they want for themselves ? First of all, that
their trading vessels, or vessels proceeding from islands
in their possession, should have unrestricted access to
our ports, and that, secondly, a military agreement
should be drawn up in order to arrange the nature and
scope of the joint operations of the Neapolitan, English,
and Austrian forces.
" These two clauses might conceivably find a place
in a treaty of alliance, but they are not admissible in a
mere armistice. Unrestricted trade relations presuppose
and constitute conditions of absolute peace. The union
and co-operation of the forces of the two powers for a
common end constitute and presuppose a state of
alliance. But it is without precedent and contrary to
all accepted principles that an alliance should exist
between two powers one of which has not formally
recognised the other. If the English can obtain the
twofold advantage at which they are apparently aiming,
what object would they have in concluding a regular
treaty of peace and in formally recognising our dynasty ?
Evidently none at all. On the contrary, it would be
much better policy for them to avoid stipulations which
would only add to their obligations without giving them
anything they do not already possess.
" I am, therefore, of opinion that if Lord William
Bentinck could sign a treaty of peace there would be no
objection to acceding to his proposals. But as he is not
possessed of the requisite authority, I think we should
adhere to the armistice as already concluded, which, as
I gather, merely amounts to a mutual undertaking to
cease hostilities.
" This is what you should give Lord William Bentinck
to understand, taking pains to state your views in such
terms as could not give offence, and carefully avoiding
the discussion of any other proposals. You can allege
that the first agreement having been confirmed by the
TREATIES AND ARMISTICES 345
King and made public, I could scarcely assent to different
terms without his sanction. In the event of their re-
fusing to give way, you might suggest to these gentlemen
that they should go and see the King and treat with
His Majesty direct."
Vainly did Caroline attempt to wring better terms
from Bentinck. The latter was obdurate. At last he
presented his ultimatum. Either his terms should be
accepted or he would return to Palermo. Gallo, how-
ever, did succeed in obtaining a small concession : either
side wishing to terminate the armistice could only do so
by giving three months' notice to that effect. On the
3rd February, after two days of negotiation, Graham's
arrangement was superseded by an armistice in the
following terms : —
" Article I. — From this day forth there shall be an
entire cessation of hostilities, by land and sea, between
the British and Neapolitan forces as well as between the
Kingdom of Naples and the islands in the Mediterranean
and Adriatic where British troops or troops under the
command of the British may happen to be stationed.
" Article II. — During the armistice commerce in all
unprohibited articles shall be freely carried on between
the Kingdom of Naples, Great Britain, and the islands
aforementioned, subject, however, to such regulations as
have been laid down or may be hereafter laid down by
the respective Governments.
" Article III. — If circumstances should render it
necessary to terminate the armistice, hostilities shall not
be resumed till after the expiration of a period of three
months from the date on which either of the parties
shall have denounced the same.
" Article IV. — A military agreement shall be entered
into between the generals and superior officers of the
Austrian, Neapolitan, and English armies for the purpose
of arranging a plan whereby the operations of the re-
346 NAPOLEON AND ,KING MURAT
spective forces, united for the fulfilment of a common end,
shall be determined."
The armistice signed, Bentinck immediately gave
orders to Graham to set out to acquaint Castlereagh
with the result of the negotiations. On the 20th February
Graham delivered his dispatches to the latter and
informed him of what had taken place. Next day
from Ohatillon-sur-Seine Castlereagh confirmed all that
Bentinck had done. " The armistice as now settled by
Your Lordship is wholly satisfactory." 1
1 Castlereagh to Bentinck. Chatillon-sur-Seine, February 21, 1814.
CHAPTER XI
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY
Negotiations with Austria — Neipperg's offers — Metternich's proposals —
Murat's demands — The part played by Graham : his interview with Cam-
pochiaro — Murat's letter to the Emperor — The signature of the treaty —
Caroline's attitude — How Murat attempted to deceive Elisa and Miollis in
order to gain possession of the forts at Leghorn and Rome — Gallo's false
statements to Durant — Pe"rignon's departure — Murat's letter to the Emperor
( 1 5th January) — His false assertions — Murat confers with Mier — Endeavours
to obtain the surrender of Rome and Ancona — Maghella and La Vauguyon —
Murat's relations with Eugene and Fouche* — Negotiations with Bentinck —
The latter promises to come to Naples — Murat sets out for Rome — The
decrees — Waiting for England's reply — Murat leaves to join the army at
Bologna — He throws aside the mask — Proclamations— Italy under Murat's
control.
THE Papal States were overrun with Murat's
troops. Carascosa, with the first division and
the Royal Guard, had secured possession of
Rome, Foligno, Florence, Imola, and Bologna,
and thus held the whole western portion of the terri-
tory which the King proposed to take for his own. On
the east, d'Ambrosio, with the second division, was
advancing northwards, making sure of the road that runs
through Ancona, Rimini, and Ravenna, echeloning his
forces at Sinigaglia, Fano, and Pesaro. Moreover, Joachim
was still the ally of France, and on the I4th January
1814 was well able to hold his head high in discussing
with Neipperg the proposals which Austria laid before
him.
So thoroughly was this recognised at the headquarters
of the Allies that the Austrian plenipotentiary came laden
347
348 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with good things. Joachim was to be recognised and his
kingdom guaranteed by Austria ; Ferdinand was to re-
nounce his claim to Naples, and the said renunciation
should, if necessary, be obtained by force ; lastly his
services should be rewarded with another slice of terri-
tory. It is true that the offers were presented in terms
that were abrupt and haughty. Austria, resolved to see
plainly how matters stood, called upon Murat to declare
the attitude he intended to take up. Neutrality was
admissible no longer, and Neipperg was to play the rough
and domineering dragoon and bring the whole business
off in a few rounds of the clock. But in reality Metter-
nich, who was ready to purchase Murat 's friendship at
any price, soon laid aside this assumption of arrogance
to resume his customary attitude of prudence and polite-
ness. Mier's arrival at Fribourg in Breisgau, the recol-
lection of the events of the last few months of 1813, and
a few hours' conversation with his chief sufficed to make
the latter abandon the attitude which Neipperg had been
ordered to assume and to push his concessions to a point
that drew upon him the censure of the English. In
accordance with his instructions of the loth December,
Neipperg was supposed to terminate the negotiations in
"two or three times twenty-four hours." Nevertheless
ten days later, on the 2oth, Metternich sent him orders
" not to cut off the communications/' instructing him,
if the King had not come to an arrangement with him,
to await Mier's return before saying the final word.
Fresh instructions were given to Mier ; he was to begin
by offering a population of half a million souls, to be
taken from the departments of Tronto, Musone, and
Metauro. Should this not prove acceptable, he was to
offer the departments in question with a population of
717,647. Thirdly and lastly, if the King was not satis-
fied with this offer, Mier was authorised to go as far as
Naviglio along a line excluding Faenza and thence to the
COUNT V<)\ NKIl-l'KRC.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 349
Tuscan frontier. Even this, however, was not Metter-
nich's final word, for he gave Mier instructions that in
the event of the King's not assenting to any of these
proposals, he was to hold the matter open by stating
that he would be obliged to ask for further orders. Had
Murat proved recalcitrant, Austria would have been
quite capable of giving him the whole of Tuscany.
Happily for Austria's amour propre and her future
position at the Congress of Vienna, Neipperg, who com-
bined military decision with diplomatic subtlety, extri-
cated Metternich from his difficult situation with prompti-
tude and skill. Wasting little time over the brilliant
court fetes and the elaborate receptions with which the
King and his ministers sought to welcome him, he went
straight to the point at issue. In the course of the negotia-
tions, which he himself describes as " stormy and pain-
ful," but above all " very active," he allowed neither
Murat nor Gallo any breathing space.
As usual Murat met the Austrian proposals with an
account of the terms which he alleged had been offered
him by France. According to him, Napoleon was ready
to give him more than half of Italy. He would have
command of Prince Eugene's army, which was to be
increased to one hundred thousand men. His frontiers
were to be immediately extended to the Po, and it had
been settled that half of the future conquests in Italy
should be retained by him. Taking his stand upon
these pretended concessions, he had no compunction
about asking Neipperg for that upon which he had set
his heart, namely, the Papal States. Unhappily for the
King, the Austrian's credulity was limited, and he cate-
gorically refused to entertain the request, and proceeded
to lay before him all that he had authority to offer.
It was not long before the affair was settled, for
Joachim did not insist, and for good reasons, upon his
exorbitant claims. On the 3rd January Neipperg sent
^. 350 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
word to Nugent of his initial success. On that day all
essential matters had been arranged : there was to be
an alliance, both offensive and defensive ; Naples was
to be guaranteed to Murat ; Ferdinand was to be com-
pelled to renounce his claim to Naples, and Joachim was
to have an indemnity. All that remained to be settled
were questions of form and detail — a mere matter of
time. On the 4th Neipperg was at work with Gallo in
the latter's room when the door opened and admitted
Bentinck's envoy, to wit, his secretary Graham.
A curiously interesting figure is that of James
Graham. A young man of twenty-one, he was making,
in these negotiations, his first official entry into the
diplomatic profession, and though he had to contend
with the skill and experience of the veteran Gallo and
with the soldier-like bluntness of Neipperg, he displayed
a coolness of demeanour which formed a striking con-
trast with the fiery impetuosity of Bentinck, his chief.
He proved himself a consummate dialectician, evinced
a rare faculty for accurate expression and clear thinking,
and succeeded in leading his adversary to make admis-
sions without ever revealing his own hand. With that
stubborn imperturbability so characteristic of his race,
he kept constantly harping on the limited scope of his
instructions, and managed to lead the discussion on to
whatever ground seemed most favourable to his side of
the question. No contradictions escaped him, no dis-
simulations passed undetected, not a single subterfuge
or deceit did he fail to scent out and drag forth into
the light of day. Bentinck's ideas concerning Italy and
his consequent hostility to Murat may have preserved
England from a peace which Castlereagh, had he been
in Bentinck's place, would probably have had no scruples
about signing, but Graham it was who, in the negotia-
tions with Austria, succeeded — where Bentinck himself
would perhaps have failed — in insuring the triumph of
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 351
his master's policy. It was he who enabled Lord
William to take stock of the position at his leisure and
brought out into strong relief the manner in which the
Austrian aims conflicted with the policy imposed upon
England by necessity and by duty ; he it was who
detected without a moment's hesitation the special
reasons which made Austria so anxious to come to
terms with Murat. Throughout the whole affair he
avoided every pitfall, kept his hands free, and left the
future open. In the diplomatic trial of strength that
began on the 4th and ended on the 7th January the
victory was undoubtedly with Graham.
Neipperg's countenance must have fallen somewhat
when the British envoy appeared on the scene. What
sort of comments was Bentinck's secretary going to make
about the promises given to Murat concerning Ferdinand's
renunciation ? Nevertheless Graham was received with
a great show of cordiality, and was told that his arrival
was highly opportune, since a treaty for an offensive and
defensive alliance was at that moment under discussion.
And then the business began. Asked to sign the armis-
tice for which it was presumed he had been sent, Graham
refused, and in his turn demanded a private interview
with Neipperg and Menz.1 The interview was given, and
1 Graham had certainly not been sent by Bentinck to sign an armistice
with Naples. The letter which Menz had written him on the 14th December
had quite taken him by surprise, and as he had received no English news from
the headquarters of the Allies save a solitary letter from Lord Aberdeen
dated the I2th December, he decided to send his secretary, James Graham, in
whom he placed implicit confidence, to find out how matters stood.
Graham therefore was to go to Naples, see Menz, talk things over with
him, and then continue his journey to the headquarters of the Allies, where it
was expected he would get definite news from England and probably instruc-
tions as well. In the event of the aspect of affairs tallying with the statements
contained in Menz's despatch, Graham was given authority to sign an armis-
tice. The said authority, however, was wholly conditional, and was only to
be acted upon after Graham had duly acquainted himself with the position
of affairs, it being the essential object of his journey to obtain positive
information regarding the state of European politics.
352 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the Austrian General apprised him of the various events
that had taken place since Leipzig. Thus was Graham
informed of Metternirh's proposals of the 28th October, of
the movements of Miller's army in Italy, and of the nego-
tiations that had taken place between Napoleon and the
Allies' headquarters. These general topics disposed of,
they proceeded to examine the details of the proposed
treaty with Naples. Neipperg informed Bentinck 's envoy
of Metternich's dispatch of the 28th October, which had
been sent to Mier and was received in his absence by Menz
on the 2nd December ; he also acquainted him with the
provisions of Metternich's draft treaty as well as with the
Neapolitan counter-proposals. Graham, knowing the
character of the Austrian Minister (Metternich), at once
expressed surprise at not seeing Lord Aberdeen's sig-
nature on the deeds, and detected contradictory passages
in the documents presented to him. He was astonished
that, although on the one hand Austria was declared to
have obtained the King of Sicily's renunciation, together
with some hopes of an indemnity, this clause, of first-rate
importance from the British point of view, had not been
inserted in the treaty. He called upon Menz for an ex-
planation. Menz stammered out that he was not certain
about the matter himself, and that he wished to throw no
difficulties in the way of an early arrangement between
Murat and Great Britain. Graham then manifested sur-
prise that Great Britain had left the Murat affair to be
dealt with by Austria, notwithstanding the fact that
Bentinck had been placed in possession of full powers by
Lord Aberdeen. In the end, when he had read the in-
structions given to Neipperg " to communicate with Lord
Bentinck when his treaty was signed, and not before," he
was no longer in doubt as to the opinion he ought to enter-
tain of Austria's good faith. After that he was appealed
to in vain to sign the armistice. He was convinced that
Lord Aberdeen knew absolutely nothing about the con-
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 353
tents of the papers, and made up his mind that Austria's
falsehoods would have to be nailed to the counter. First
Gallo, then Neipperg, employed every means of pressure
and persuasion to bring him over. Graham was obdu-
rate. The aspect of things had been completely changed
by the presence of an Austrian emissary at Naples, and he
professed himself quite unable to sign without fresh in-
structions. He therefore decided to dispatch his frigate
to Palermo, though, in order to avoid putting any obstacle
in the way of beginning military operations at once, he
undertook as a favour to repair to the headquarters of
the Allies in order to arrange a plan of campaign.
Gallo conveyed to the King the news of Graham's
refusal as well as his request to leave. Instead of sending
his reply by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Murat,
anxious not to let slip so favourable an opportunity of
making further overtures to Bentinck, sent Jones with a
letter addressed to Lord William which he asked Graham
to deliver. Jones discharged this duty, and, after a few
observations, withdrew. Next, Campochiaro, who had
been specially entrusted by Murat with the conduct of
negotiations with Bentinck, came upon the scene.
" Campochiaro came," says Graham, " with instruc-
tions from the King to furnish any explanations that I
might wish to have. He began with the breaking off of
the Ponza negotiations, and took me right up to the battle
of Leipzig, repeating the various details which your lord-
ship has heard so often, and which I am inclined to think
are, on the whole, true. After the defeat of Leipzig,
Murat, according to the Minister's account, presented
himself in person to Bonaparte and begged him to make
peace. The Emperor would not hear of it, and Murat
then announced his intention of withdrawing from the
army and making peace with the Allies on such terms as
he was able to obtain. The truth, I think, is that under
cover of the confusion that followed the defeat Murat
z
354 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
secretly made his escape from the army and sent word of
his intentions to the Emperor by letter when he got to
Naples.
" Fouchet (sic) was here about a fortnight ago and
made him the most tempting offers : he was to have
command of Beauharnais' army, which was to be increased
to 100,000 men, the frontiers of his kingdom were to be
immediately extended to the Po, and it was even settled
that future conquests in Italy were to be equally divided.
These proposals were rejected by Murat, and when the
Italian levy (Catinelli's expedition) seized Lucca, and his
sister-in-law demanded his assistance, he sent orders to
his generals on the frontier not to stir. In reply to the
demands of the Duchess (Elisa), he merely referred her to
the declarations he had made to Bonaparte. On the
other hand, he had thrown down the gauntlet ; his troops
had entered Florence, Bologna, Ancona, despite the re-
monstrances of the French : at present, continued Cam-
pochiaro, he was about to make an offensive and defen-
sive alliance with Austria against France herself.
" To make his co-operation effective, he only needed an
armistice with Great Britain ; he was ready to cast him-
self into our arms. England was his country's natural
ally. With her he could defy the world, without her he
was bound to confess that his continental alliances were
useless ; for the help of the British navy he would willingly
abandon them. If only he were received by us as a friend
he would ask nothing further. Murat, he went on, did not
conceal the fact that he had military ambitions. The
ideal that was nearest his heart was to be at the head of
an Italian Nation, and this did not conflict, but rather
coincided, with England's interests. The formation of a
great and united Empire controlled in Italy itself by a
soldier of genius would serve at once as a barrier against
France and as a curb on the greed of Austria. He was
too good a judge of what his own country's true policy
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 355
should be to aspire to naval supremacy. If we were
willing to fight for him by sea he would fight for us on
land. It was Bonaparte who had forced him to maintain
the fleet he now possessed, but if the armistice were
signed he would give it up to-morrow, and be only too
well pleased to expunge this item, which did not conduce
to his proper aims, from his expenditure. Colonial pro-
duce, articles of foreign manufacture, naval defence —
for all these things he would look to England. Neither
France nor Austria would be able to work him ill if we
were on his side. He asked no favours, but merely for
some military supplies and the recognition of his title.
He would then follow us without reluctance in the path
we pointed out to him.
" I admitted the cogency of the argument, and added
that the political importance of a union between England
and Naples was really too obvious to require discussion.
But, said I, we are bound by our undertaking with
another King, a sovereign who has made sacrifices on
our behalf, and whose rights we have promised to defend.
At the present time, I went on, Murat's sphere of action
was necessarily circumscribed. His line of conduct
might be represented in the form of a dilemma. Either
he would have to side with France or he would have to
make peace with England. At war with us and hampered
by our army, it would be impossible for him to support
our adversaries with a force large enough to make success
possible. His only course, therefore, was to make peace
with Great Britain on such terms as he could obtain.
" The Duke's reply is worthy of attention, because the
same argument evoked a similar answer from the Queen
when she was pressed by the Comte de Neipperg, and it
shows that Her Majesty the Queen really directs the
policy of this Court, which thus seems fated to be con-
trolled by a woman.
"The Duke declared that there was a third alter-
356 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
native, and that His Majesty had made up his mind to
adopt it if Great Britain refused to recognise him. He
might be overborne, but he had learned to scorn danger
when fighting for others, and he was not going to grow
timid when it came to fighting for his own cause. By the
sword he had won his crown, and if the worst came to
the worst, by the sword he would defend it. He would
either fall as King of Naples and Great Britain's foe or
he would reign as a sovereign recognised by her and as
her firm and faithful ally.
" I replied that he (Murat) had spoken about giving
the King of Sicily an indemnity for the loss of Naples.
But why would not Murat accept an equivalent for
Naples, since no particular ties bound him to that
kingdom ? The Duke replied that I could tell Your
Lordship that Murat's most ardent desire was to ally
himself with England, but that if his crown and his life
depended on the renunciation of his claims to Naples,
then he would lay down life and crown together.
" Such sentiments, I remarked, are more chivalrous
than politic. That matters not, was the reply ; when
Murat's honour is at stake his interests count for nothing.
" The Due de Campochiaro next pointed out that
there was a singular identity between your views regard-
ing Italy and Murat's. He said that His Majesty had
become an Italian, that it was in the interests of France
and Austria to partition Italy, but that his aim was to
unite it and to be independent. His greatest ambition,
continued Campochiaro, was to be at the head of a nation
so united, and with England at his back he could defy
the world. I inquired whether, supposing such a union
were possible, a Frenchman would ever be suffered to
accomplish it. He answered that he was absolutely
convinced that Murat had abandoned the land of his
birth. He wished to live and die an Italian, and the
sentiments which he had expressed in favour of Italian
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 357
independence had won him popularity. I replied that
in my opinion his rule was one of terror rather than of
affection. An absolute monarch who imposed the laws
of France on his subjects and swelled the ranks of his
army by conscription to an extent far beyond what the
nation could bear could not be very greatly beloved.
The reply was that the system in question had been
forced upon him by Bonaparte, that hitherto Murat
had not had a free hand in his own kingdom, that though
his ministers were unpopular he was held in esteem, and
finally that if absolute rule was the sole remaining ob-
stacle, that obstacle was not insurmountable. Kings, I
rejoined, are as a rule very loth to exchange absolute
power for a limited authority. He appeared, however,
to think that this did not apply to Murat, who aimed
not so much at power as at glory. ..."
Such, openly stated for the nonce, were Murat's
demands. Here were no sounding phrases, no protesta-
tions of " unalterable devotion " and " everlasting
attachment." In plain, bald terms, Murat wanted an
alliance with England, and England would do well to
make friends with Naples. Therefore, let an armistice
be signed, let peace be concluded so that beneath the
aegis of England Joachim might bring to pass the unifica-
tion of Italy and become its ruler. Such were Murat's pro-
posals. To delude Graham, as he had deluded Neipperg,
as he had endeavoured to delude Durant, Miollis, and the
French generally, as he was fain to delude the Emperor
himself, he always had recourse to one and the same
device — he lied. He lied when he told Graham that he
had informed Napoleon at Erfurt of his intention to
make peace with the Allies, but Graham knew he was
lying. He lied when he affirmed that Napoleon had
offered him the command of Eugene's army, for Napoleon
had definitely stated that the army of the King of
Naples was to form a separate corps ; he lied again when
358 NAPOLEON AND , KING MURAT
he said that it had been proposed to extend his frontiers
to the Po, that future conquests were to be divided,
that he had written Elisa simply referring her to his
declarations to the Emperor (and therefore, according
to him, of his resolve to make peace with the enemy).
What he really did tell her was that General Filangieri
was to receive orders immediately to undertake the
defence of Florence.
Henceforth there were dupes no more. Though he
had endeavoured to play off Graham against Neipperg
and Napoleon against the English and the Austrians, he
could not now deceive those who had heard what he
himself had said and possessed letters which he himself
had written. It is useless to plead that Campochiaro in
his interview with the British envoy was merely giving
expression to his own private opinions, for Graham was
careful to settle that matter at the very outset. The
Neapolitan Minister was sent by the King to supply
official explanations, and those explanations give clear
and irrefragable evidence of Joachim's betrayal of the
Emperor. Thereafter his interminable letters, excuses,
and protestations of good faith availed him little :
they were all so much play-acting. The real drama
was being enacted behind the scenes with Austria
and England. To them Murat appeared without
the tinsel properties he assumed for the benefit of
the French and, showing himself in his true colours,
avowed his desire to become King of a free and united
Italy.
No sooner had Graham arrived in Naples than,
trembling with delight and fully believing that matters
were on the point of being satisfactorily arranged with
England, Murat took up his pen in order to give his
brother-in-law a harrowing account of the unhappy cir-
cumstances which compelled him to take sides against
France. The following letter, which he wrote on the
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 359
4th, should be read in conjunction with Campochiaro's
declarations to Graham : — — .
" Sire/' he began, " I have now reached the un-
happiest day of my life. I am a prey to more painful
thoughts than any that ever yet came to torment my
peace of mind. The hour is at hand when I must choose.
On the one side I behold the inevitable loss of my country,
and, may be, of my fame as well ; on the other I am
invited to enter into undertakings which conflict with
my undying affection for Your Majesty and my un-
alterable affection for France.
" For four days an Austrian plenipotentiary has been
here in order to submit to me in his Sovereign's name
proposals for a treaty of alliance. Bringing with him
the kindest of letters from the Emperor of Austria, he
has offered me terms most highly advantageous to my
kingdom, and this morning, while my Foreign Minister
and he were conferring together, a British frigate, flying
a flag of truce, brought an officer with authority from
Lord Bentinck to arrange an armistice pending the con-
clusion of a formal treaty of peace.
" Nevertheless, Sire, I have delayed, I am delaying
still. I wished to await, and I am still awaiting, Your
Majesty's reply to the urgent demands I sent you to
put me in a position to undertake the defence of Italy
and of my own kingdom with some chance of success.
I pray you read again my letters of the 23rd November
and the 25th December. In them I spoke to you with
all the loyalty of my nature, with all the frankness that
the circumstances so imperiously demanded, yet all that
Your Majesty has written me up to now has only served,
and could only have served, to increase my doubts and
difficulties to the most lamentable degree.
" You bade me march my army to the Po, and I
ordered the advance, but you gave me no authority in the
places through which I had to pass and where of neces-
360 NAPOLEON- AND KING MURAT
sity I was obliged to establish my military bases. The
result was that I was met on every side with sullenness
and opposition. Everywhere the royal authority was
flouted, the movements of my army hampered. You
expressed a desire that I should advance upon the Piave,
despite the fact that Your Majesty knew perfectly well,
for I had told you, that I could not cross the Po without
exposing my family and my kingdom, threatened as
they were by attacks from the sea, to the most imminent
peril. Nor did you decide who was to have the supreme
command when my army had effected a junction with
the Viceroy's. The absence of any such instructions
rendered it manifestly out of the question to attempt
to carry out operations the success of which — if success
were possible — could only be obtained by the most
rigidly harmonious and united action.
" You informed me, after I had urged you repeatedly,
that you had agreed to negotiate for peace and that a
congress was about to meet, but you did not condescend
to acquaint me with the lines upon which you intended
to treat ; you said not a word about guaranteeing the
existence of my States ; you took no notice of the urgent
requests which I made myself and transmitted through
others, to have a voice in the negotiations by sending
a Neapolitan plenipotentiary to the Congress. I was, I
am bound to add, informed that Your Majesty had made
proposals very prejudicial to my interests as King of
Naples. I should, however, have done you wrong had I
for an instant imagined that these reports were true.
" I cannot help being impressed by the manner in
which my relations with a sovereign to whose cause I
have given my lifelong and faithful service contrast
with the terms on which I stand with princes whom
I have never ceased to combat ; for, while by the former
I am treated with a mistrust which twenty years of
loyal and devoted attachment should have eradicated
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 361
for ever from his mind, the latter not only afford ma
unmistakable evidences of their esteem and good-will\
but overwhelm me with offers of the most flattering \
description.
" Nevertheless it would not enter my mind to hesi-
tate had Your Majesty but given me, could you but give
me now, the opportunity of serving you, of serving that
beloved France, my earliest home, whose glory and
prosperity will, so long as life lasts, be ever dear to me.
' Yes, Sire, had Your Majesty but suffered me to /
avail myself of the resources offered me in Southern
Italy, I should have had eighty thousand men ready to
fight for you. Such an army would have placed the
issue of the war in Italy beyond all doubt — nay, more,
it would, I judge, have set a term to the disasters of
France by inclining our enemies to conclude a treaty
that would have brought peace with honour to all the
powers concerned. And even now, I swear it, if I
thought that by sacrificing my own welfare, by con-
senting to my own undoing, I could save France from
the miseries that threaten to engulf her, I would sur-
render all — prosperity, happiness, kingdom, life itself —
for her sake.
" But what can I do with perils all around me,
with no one upon whom I can rely for help ? Had I
a French army to lead into battle, I would risk all, I
would fight wherever there were foes to be found, and
if fortune went against me, I would endeavour, difficult
as the task might be, to cut my way back by Genoa.
But think you that I could act thus with Neapolitan
troops ? Do you dream that I could hope to lead them
beyond the Alps, or that, however deep their attach-
ment to me, they would not forsake a sovereign who
forsook their Fatherland ?
" Such circumstances may make it my duty to follow
a course at enmity with my dearest and most constant
362 NAPOLEON AND JCING MURAT
affections. If it should come to this, may Your Majesty
have pity on me. It would mean that for the sake of
my subjects, throne, and children, there had been wrung
from me the direst sacrifice that it was in my power to
make. Whatever the course that Fate may compel me
to adopt, believe me, Sire, my heart will always be with
France, whose friend I shall never cease to be. Believe
me also when I tell you, Sire, that he whose teacher you
have been, your kinsman, your most devoted friend,
will never show himself unworthy of Your Majesty.
The love he bears you is unchangeable, and speaks to
his heart in accents that compel the more now that he
beholds you again at strife with Fortune — Fortune whom
you have so often subdued and moulded to your will.
Suffer him still to enjoy your friendship ; you know how
for twenty years he has wrought to win and to retain it.
Doubt not, Sire, but that he will again find means to
prove himself worthy that friendship still, and worthy
the esteem of France.
" Sire, if cruel necessity compels me, as I have cause
to fear it may, to enter into relations which apparently
conflict with your interests, such relations may yet prove
of service to Your Majesty and to France, by enabling me
to make my voice heard in the negotiations for peace. I
therefore make so bold as to hope that you will judge my
conduct with calmness and impartiality, fully taking into
Account the necessities of my country's situation."
Having written the letter, Murat kept it back until the
7th. It may have been that he was anxious to make
quite sure of the success of his negotiations, for he could
not have been waiting, as he said he was, for the Emperor
to reply to his letter of the 25th December, which he knew
perfectly well had hardly reached Paris. Whatever the
cause of the delay, a courier was dispatched to Carignano
on the 7th January bearing the letter as well as instruc-
tions for the Minister.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 363
In addition to writing to his brother-in-law, Joachim
also took care to advise the French Ambassador. On
the 4th, after the arrival of the British envoy, he ordered
Gallo to see Durant, to draw his attention to the lament-
able condition of the affairs of France, and to serve up to
the Emperor's Minister the various arguments which the
Emperor himself was to find in Murat's letter. But
another falsehood was added. " The British Agent/'
said Gallo, " who is empowered to sign an armistice as
soon as we have come to an agreement with Austria, is
threatening us, if we refuse, with a force of twenty thou-
sand men, who are being held in readiness to embark at
Trieste and Fiume to effect a descent on our shores."
Truly a pretty assertion this when it was perfectly well
known that the object of Graham's mission was merely to
see how the land lay, and that he was under strict orders
not to commit himself to any undertaking.
On the 6th Perignon was allowed to obtain an inkling
of the state of affairs, though the King dared not tell him
openly. " The King had promised Mare*chal PeYignon
that he would advise him of the date fixed for the signa-
ture. The Marechal had just dined at the Court, and the
Queen had told him in somewhat offhand fashion that it
was doubtless for the last time. The King was much
preoccupied, but he made no statement to the Marechal."
At length on the yth, a few hours before the treaty
was signed, he charged Millet, the captain of the Guards,
to address the French officers of his army in terms curi-
ously reminiscent of his own letters to the Emperor.
" I am not," the address began, " speaking to you on
the present occasion as your chief, but as a fellow-country-
man to whom you are dear, as a friend who esteems you
and knows your worth. I am aware that efforts are now
being made to influence the views of the French officers
of the Guard at Rome and at Naples. There is possibly
a desire to take advantage of the trying situation in which
364 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the King is now placed to make them imagine that His
Majesty would be capable of proving false to those senti-
ments which are, and ever will be, ours as well as his.
You then it is whom I bid enlighten the men (if such there
be) who may, even for an instant, suffer themselves to be
misled upon the matter. You will remind them that the
chief and noblest Frenchman of us all is the man who for
twenty years has fought for the honour of his native land,
who twice, beneath our very eyes, bade farewell to his
wife, his children, his subjects, and all that he held most
dear, to go and brave innumerable perils in order to
advance the glory of the Emperor and of France.
" And now, returning to the bosom of his country
after winning unexampled successes, after giving manifold
proofs of the most unselfish devotion, he finds himself
abandoned to his own resources. Nevertheless, up-
borne by his unconquerable courage, he even now makes
offer to hold all Italy against the enemy. For all reply
he is greeted with obstinate silence. Time is fleeting by,
the enemy is advancing, the King's position grows daily
more critical. The Emperor he has told in detail what
his position is, but still he gives no answer, and the King,
who occupies a throne on which he has so often shed
renown, seems destined to the shame of being required to
yield his sovereignty to each and every one who may be
called upon to share it. Negotiations are afoot, yet he
has been suffered to know nothing of them.
" Ponder for a moment on what must be the thoughts
of a prince, whose splendid achievements seem to be for-
gotten, when he beholds the pains that are taken to rear
again the long fallen throne of the Roman Pontiff. Then,
on the other hand, see how the Allies, far from abusing
their position, display their willingness to recognise the
King's independence, make him offers of peace which
alone can bring happiness to his people, and this despite
His Majesty's refusal to take arms against his country
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 365
and without any condition save that of friendship alone.
Imagine yourselves for a moment in his place and tell me
how you would have acted. When all hope was gone of
assisting a cause which you had served so well and so
gallantly in days gone by, when the foe in countless
numbers was bearing down upon Italy from without or
striking at her heart from within, when the enemy had
invaded Switzerland, crossed the Rhine, and set foot on
the unhappy soil of France herself, would you have im-
perilled the future of your children, the welfare of your
subjects, your own political existence and the fortunes of
those brave Frenchmen with whom that political exist-
ence is intimately connected ? No, you would have
yielded even as he has done to the force of circumstances
(at the moment irresistible) in order to reserve your
strength for happier days when perchance you could
render more useful service to that cherished land which
one so great and noble as our King could never cease to
love or bear in memory.
" I know full well that an attempt has been made toj
assail your ears with vain and malicious rumours. Some *
will tell you that His Majesty will now require the French-
men in his service to renounce the land of their birth, and
I am authorised by His Majesty to give the lie direct to
this assertion. Others, going to the opposite extreme,
declare that the King has no further need of your services,
but I swear to you by that Honour which is your guide that
never have I seen more clearly than I see to-day the
affection he harbours in his heart for the children of the
Motherland.
" Fight, then, against those insidious suggestions,
thrust from you those base insinuations : whoso speaks
to you in different words from mine is the enemy of
the King and the enemy of truth.
" If among the number of your friends and comrades
there should be found (and I scarce think it possible)
L
366 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
any of those timid folk whose only sentiments are those
of misgiving, whose conscience is but prejudice, and who
have no opinions save such as they borrow from others,
bid them take heart, and be assured yourselves that His
Majesty desires and aims at nothing but your love, and
that never will he avail himself unworthily of your
services."
Thus, in language that half revealed and half con-
cealed the truth, protesting more effusively than ever
his loyalty to France and his devotion to the Emperor,
Murat was careful to give some hint of his intentions to
all. Napoleon, Durant, Perignon, his French officers,
were all advised of the treason that was hatching, yet
all in such a manner that none could believe that
Joachim had resolved to come to terms with Austria.
Following on the rapid interchange of views between
Neipperg and Gallo, the conclusion of which was post-
poned at least two days by Graham's appearance on the
scene, the Austro-Neapolitan treaty was signed on the
night of the 7th-8th January. An agreement had been
arrived at regarding Murat's indemnity. In return for
the efforts he was about to make in furtherance of the
common cause, it was promised that when peace was
made he should be granted " a satisfactory military
frontier." Herein lurked mutual deceit. Neipperg, as
he himself confessed, assented to this vague phraseology
because the concessions allowed laid no burden and no
obligation upon Austria. Murat, on his side, was pleased
with such a hazy stipulation because he considered that
it gave him, or at least implied, Austria's sanction to
bring to pass his ambitious dream. According to the
clause as he read it, Italy was to be his : what could
that " military frontier " betoken but the river Po ?
He had spoken of it too often to the Austrian envoys,
to Mier, Menz, to Neipperg himself, for Austria to go
astray on that point. With this article to go upon, he
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 367
claimed to possess and control the Papal States, Tuscany,
Parma, Modena. All the country between Naples and
the right bank of the river would henceforth be Neapo-
litan. Thus Murat in high glee fancied that he had
obtained from Austria far more than Mier was autho-
rised to offer him.
All Joachim's future tergiversations, his successive
leanings now to this side, now to that, were contained
in embryo in the secret article which Neipperg and Gallo
had signed and which had just received his royal ratifi-
cation. Later on, when Metternich revealed the slender
portion that was granted him, Murat rejected the beggarly
pittance with indignant scorn. Not until Mier presented
his ultimatum of the 4th February did the King accept
the inevitable and realise how utterly he had been duped.
Doubtless Neipperg drew up his article without per-
ceiving all that was to come of it ; nevertheless, in ex-
clusively concerning himself with the Austrian side of
the question he succeeded in bringing off a master-stroke
of which Metternich himself might have well been proud,
for it was destined to destroy Murat 's hopes of winning
Italy, and finally to deprive him of his kingdom.
On the 8th January then it was that, betraying his
fealty to France and to his overlord, forsaking his former
companions-in-arms, breaking the parole he had given
and the treaties he had signed, Murat entered into that
odious and fatal covenant which was destined to hurry
him to his doom. Nevertheless justice demands that we
should not heap all the guilt upon his head alone, that
we should apportion the blame among those who deserve
to share it.
It was, as we have seen, the Queen who, led to a
sudden change of front by Schinina's report of the dis-
asters that had taken place in the north, and urged on
by Mier to enter into an alliance with Austria, resolved
then and there upon a course of action which Leipzig
368 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
and the Empire's misfortunes only served to confirm.
Anxious at all costs to preserve her husband's crown,
Caroline from the veiy moment of his return urged her
husband, whose own ideas made him a ready listener
to her counsels, to cast in his lot with Austria. The
testimony of Mier and Durant leaves no room for doubt
regarding the part played by the Queen. On Neipperg's
arrival she toiled and plotted with redoubled vigour.
Even at that date we find Lord Aberdeen, who had been
informed of the dispatch of an Austrian plenipotentiary
to Naples, writing to Castlereagh telling him that Murat
would probably put forward some high and mighty claims,
but that the Queen, who managed everything, had
written to Metternich saying that in the end he would
do all that was required of him. During the negotia-
tions that took place between the ist and the 8th January,
Caroline's attitude could not have been more charac-
teristic. While she extended to Neipperg the most
gracious of welcomes and did everything in her power
to please him, she was present at all her husband's minis-
terial councils. Informing Durant that the treaty was
on the point of being signed, Gallo said : " The King
makes no doubt that France will recover herself and
that she will always be a power to reckon with, but he
feels that before she is able to re-establish her influence
over the destinies of Italy the throne of Naples might be
lost to him and to his children. The Queen herself is
entirely of the same opinion." Her attitude towards
Perignon was no less significant. On the 6th January,
when the Marshal was dining at the Palace, the Queen
is reported to have said to him somewhat lightly that
no doubt he was dining there for the last time. She
was also present on the I4th when Perignon called upon
the King to explain his conduct. The Marshal addressed
himself in terms of hot reproach to the King, who scarcely
replied at all. Then, turning to the Queen, he cried :
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 369
" And you, Madame, you, the Emperor's sister, if this
fatal treaty is to be signed it will doubtless be against
your wishes, and you will of course depart with the
French army. Surely Napoleon's own sister will not
remain here among his enemies. She will protest by
her departure against a treaty which she strove to pre-
vent." " Monsieur le Marechal," she replied, with a
smile and a little curtsy in her husband's direction, " you
ought to know that a woman's duty is to obey her lord."
And by continuing in this jesting tone she gave him to
understand that the conversation had endured long
enough. Durant remarks in the most positive fashion
on the part played by the Queen in bringing the treaty
to pass. " The Queen," he wrote on the gth January,
" is even more decided in the matter of the Austrian
alliance than the King himself. She looks on it as her
own particular handiwork." Nor is the testimony of
the negotiators, who were eye-witnesses of her activities,
any less convincing. Graham considered that it was she
par excellence who directed the policy of Naples. As
for Neipperg, he attached great importance to her inter-
vention. " Her Majesty the Queen, convinced of the
justice of our demands, gave them her warm support.
The welfare of her kingdom and her subjects was her
sole concern." Lastly, Mier himself judged her as
follows : " The Queen is perfect. She has manifested
on this occasion a greater strength of character than
any one deemed she possessed."
Thus all who were witnesses of or actors in the
treachery of the Court of Naples were of one unanimous
opinion. The Frenchmen, Durant and Perignon ; the
Austrians, Metternich, Mier, and Neipperg; the English,
Graham and Aberdeen; all point with one accord to
Caroline as the originator. All the force and subtlety
which in former days she had placed at her brother's
service she now brought to bear on the accomplishment
2A
370 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
of this alliance. Though Murat signed the treaty, hers
were the efforts that impelled him to the act, and it is
perhaps no exaggeration to say that if Caroline had stood
by the Emperor in the hour of his defeat in 1814 with a
loyalty equal to that which she had displayed in 1811,
when her husband's throne had been momentarily in
peril, Napoleon might still have had Naples for an ally,
and although of course no active assistance would have
been rendered by Murat to the Imperial cause, he would
at all events have been spared the ignominy of his useless
act of treachery.
The treaty having been signed, it remained to send
word of the fact to the parties concerned. While
Berthemy, with Bentinck's copy, was making for Palermo
accompanied by d'Aspre, who was bearing Neipperg's
letter to the English ambassador, Menz and Coucy set
out for the headquarters of the Allies with the copy
intended for Austria. At the same time Prince Pigna-
telli departed with the letter which Murat was sending
to the Emperor Francis in answer to the latter 's com-
munication of the loth December.
After the signature, ratification, and dispatch of the
treaty of the 8th January, it only remained for Joachim
to reap the fruits of his diplomacy — that is to say, to
occupy the States on which he had set his heart. There
was now to be a trial of speed between himself and
Austria, a race to see who would be the first effectively
to occupy the lands along the banks of the Po. In his
eagerness to get away from Naples and to begin the
systematic organisation of the territory which, on the
plea of a temporary occupation, he intended to keep
permanently for himself, he had made up his mind to
set out the moment the Austrian treaty and the armistice
which he deemed Graham to be on the point of signing
were completed. The day he had fixed upon for his
departure was the 8th. Finding, however, that the
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 371
British envoy was deaf alike to his Minister's impor-
tunities and to Neipperg's arguments, he decided that
there was nothing for it but to remain at Naples until
he received Bentinck's reply. This was an early
and a serious set-back. He determined, however, to
send such orders to his troops as would tend as far as
possible to make up for the time he was forced to waste
vainly champing at the bit in Naples. In the first
place, he could not organise the Papal States until he
had them completely under his own control. True, he
practically occupied the whole of them, but still the
fortresses were not yet his. Above the castle of San
Angelo, above the fortress of Ancona, the flag of France
was floating yet ; Tuscany was still French. He there-
fore decided to attempt to obtain by trickery what he
knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to
win by force, for he was very uncertain in his own mind
as to how his troops would take a command to storm
the castle of San Angelo. He therefore went gently
to work. On the Qth January General Pignatelli-
Cerchiara asked Miollis for permission to quarter the
train of the 7th Neapolitan of the Line, which was hourly
expected in Rome, in the castle of San Angelo. It very
fortunately happened, however, that Durant, having
been informed by Gallo on the 4th that the signature of
the treaty with Austria was only a question of hours,
had written Miollis on the 6th saying that he had strong
reason to believe that an offensive and defensive alliance
had already been concluded between Naples and Austria
as well as an armistice with England. The governor,
therefore, merely informed Pignatelli that the castle of
San Angelo was entirely occupied by the garrison and
supplies. Persisting in his endeavour to persuade the
French General, of whose honesty and straightforward-
ness he was well aware, Murat sent him word on the
loth of an alleged attack by England on Leghorn, and
372 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
announced that Pignatelli had orders to defend the town
as soon as he was in occupation jointly with the French
of the castle of San Angelo. As he was also anxious
to prepare the ground at Rome for the establishment of
his projected military government, that being the second
step in the direction of an effective occupation of the
Papal States, he added : "I informed you in my letter
of the 1 5th December that I was taking over the com-
mand in all districts occupied by my troops. You sent
me no reply, doubtless because you did not regard your-
self as possessing the necessary authority, and were
desirous of awaiting your Government's instructions.
I therefore give you notice that if you persist in your
refusal to carry out my orders, particularly now when
our communications with France are about to be cut
off, I shall be obliged to take matters into my own hands.
I prefer to think, however, that, realising the position
in which you, the French in Italy, and I myself are placed,
you will not only relieve me of the necessity of taking so
disagreeable a step, but that you will render me your
willing assistance in maintaining the peace of the Roman
States and in protecting the interests of the French
subjects within them."
Meanwhile, anxious to deceive Miollis as he had de-
ceived every one else, he wrote him saying : "I have had
an Austrian plenipotentiary here for the past ten days,
but I have been unwilling to make any arrangement
with him because I am waiting to hear from the Em-
peror." That was written on the gth January, a day
after the treaty had been signed.
In reply Miollis met him with a polite but uncon-
ditional refusal, and begged him to wait, as he himself
was waiting, for the Emperor's messages and instruc-
tions. This was another rebuff for Murat.
With regard to Tuscany, the King on the 7th January
had sent a special messenger to Elisa to announce that
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 373
he would shortly rid her oi the brigands who were in-
festing the country. Then he gave her a brief survey of
the position of the negotiations with Austria, stating
that he was in a position of doubt and suspense which
only the Emperor could resolve. On the gth, after the
treaty had been signed, he wrote her another letter. To
give an excuse for marching his troops into Tuscany,
he now pretended that the English were meditating an
attack on Leghorn. According to his account, Bentinck
was about to begin operations in Tuscany with six
thousand men. Pignatelli-Cerchiara was therefore
coming to defend Leghorn with the 4th Light Infantry
regiment, for which he requested a becoming reception.
Speaking of the treaty, which had actually been signed
the day before, he had the effrontery to write : " The
negotiations are still going on without anything definite
being arrived at, and I believe that the real object of
these delays is to give them time to get the most im-
portant harbours, such as Genoa, La Spezia, and Leghorn,
into their hands."
But Elisa had also been forewarned and was not to
be taken in. While thanking the King for his obliging
offer to relieve her of the brigands, of which, however,
she declined to avail herself, she added : " When the
English did attack Leghorn (alluding to Catinelli's ex-
pedition), Your Majesty's troops were by no means
eager to march to its defence, yet now, when the place
is in no danger, you desire to come without being asked.
Do you want to declare war upon France by deploying
your troops against a country which they have no
business to occupy ?
" The knowledge that Your Majesty has compounded
with the enemy forbids me to hand over a country to
whose defence I might indeed summon you, but which I
have no right to deliver up to you as to an ally or neutral
party. I beg Your Majesty to consider the position in
374 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
which I am placed. I am too well aware of the quality
of Your Majesty's friendship to believe that you will
continue to make such demands of me as would destroy
my esteem for you, dishonour me in the eyes of the
Emperor and of Europe, and deprive me of my own self-
respect. I therefore beg Your Majesty to stay the
progress of your troops, and to order them not to proceed
to Leghorn, where it would be impossible for me to
receive them."
Thus in Tuscany also Murat 's schemes were doomed
to come to naught.
Nor did the King meet with better success in Naples
itself. On the morning of the Qth he told Perignon, as
he told every one else, that nothing had been arranged.
In the evening Gallo gave a similar assurance to Durant,
who, nevertheless, felt convinced that the treaty had been
signed. In vain did Murat endeavour to bring his schemes
to pass by throwing dust in the eyes of those who repre-
sented in Italy the vestiges of the power of France ; he
succeeded in deluding no one. His last essay in mendacity
was to be directed towards the Emperor himself. He
was farther away, news took some time to reach him.
It remains to be seen how far the attempt was successful.
Since his letter of the 3rd January, the King had
written no word to his brother-in-law. What could he
have told him in the midst of the negotiations with the
enemies of France ? How was he to explain these
negotiations now that they were completed ? Bold as
he was, Murat blenched before the task of making the
avowal. At length, on the I5th January, he braced
himself for the ordeal.
" Sire," wrote he, " I have just concluded an alliance
with Austria. I, who fought at your side so long, your
kinsman and friend, have signed a treaty which makes
it appear as though I had made myself your foe. I need
say no more. Your Majesty can now judge how dire
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 375
is the necessity to which I yield and how my heart is
rent. It were useless to recall the past. Your Majesty
has all my letters before you, especially those of the
23rd November and the 25th December. I was then
firmly convinced that by acting on the lines I had indi-
cated it would be possible to insure the independence
of a large part of Italy, possibly of the whole. In the
confident expectation of a definite reply, a reply which
I never ceased to hope for, I sent forward my troops
and was already beginning to act in conformity with the
plan I had laid down. But for two whole months Your
Majesty was silent. However, events were hurrying on,
the movements of my troops had resulted in bringing
me face to face with the armies of Austria. There was
no time for deliberation ; it was necessary to join battle
then and there or to accept peace on the conditions
offered. ... I was therefore compelled to come to
terms and to consent, almost against my will, to save
myself, my family, and my crown. And yet, in spite of
all, I was still undecided how to act when I received the
report of the Central Commission and Your Majesty's
reply to the Senate's address. I learned therefrom that
not only by the whole of France, but by Your Majesty as
well, peace was ardently desired, and that to give peace
to the world you were willing to renounce all your con-
quests. Italy then, was no longer of importance in
your sight. This announcement, which Your Majesty
doubtless gave me by design, was duly understood by
me. Thus, though necessity compelled me to make
peace with those who are still your foes, amid all these
seeming changes my heart is still the same. No, against
France and against you I will not fight. The scene of
this unhappy war is vast enough to permit the hope
that we shall never meet in conflict and that the general
treaty of which your own moderation seems to afford the
presage may soon come to remove from the peace which
376 NAPOLEON AND, KING MURAT
I have now concluded all that may be bitter to your
heart."
According to Murat, then, the determining factors in
the situation had been, first, the silence of the Emperor,
secondly, Napoleon's message to the Senate.1
As regards the first point we have the comments of
Napoleon himself. " About the middle of January the
Emperor received two letters from Naples, one of which
was, I think, from the Queen, his sister. Besides these,
other letters reached him from several parts of Italy in
which King Joachim was pictured as being driven, despite
himself, to take desperate measures. As his position was
represented as being forced upon him by the silence
with which his appeals were met, I took the opportunity
of asking the Emperor if he would not send him some sort
of answer. ' Well/ was the reply, ' what would you have
me say to a madman ? How can he fail to see that
my overwhelming preponderance in Europe alone kept
the Pope out of Rome ? It is the wish of all Europe
that he should return thither, and now I myself desire it
too.' I suggested that, without giving in to the King,
for his demands were certainly unreasonable, the Em-
peror might show him some mark of friendship and con-
fidence and relieve him of the idea that he was being
1 ' ' Senators, I fully appreciate the sentiments to which you have given
expression. From the documents with which I have made you acquainted
you have learned the efforts I have made to bring about peace. The sacrifices
involved in the preliminary conditions proposed by the enemy have had my
acceptance, and I shall carry them out without regret. My life has but one
aim — the happiness of the French people. Nevertheless, Beam, Alsace, the
Franch Comte, Brabant, are all assailed. The cries of my people there make
my heart bleed. I call upon the Frenchmen of Paris, of Brittany, of
Normandy and Burgundy and the other departments to rally to the aid of
their brothers. Shall we abandon them in their hour of need ? Peace and
the deliverance of our country should be our battle-cry. When he beholds the
whole country thus in arms the foreigner will flee or he will sign a treaty of
peace on the conditions proposed. We must no longer think of winning
back our conquests."
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 377
treated with disdain. ' What would be the good of it ? '
rejoined the Emperor. ' He is bereft of his senses ; he
is hurrying to his doom. I shall have to allow him
something, but/ he added vehemently, ' in the interests
of morality, such black ingratitude ought not to go un-
punished, and I will see to it that it does not/ The
Emperor Napoleon never doubted that he could keep
or recall King Joachim's allegiance by giving him what
he asked, but he refused to hold him or to have him back
at such a price/' l
It was therefore by design that Napoleon, thunder-
struck, no doubt, by the extravagance of Murat's de-
mands, sent him no reply. Joachim's second decisive
argument, the plea that he was led to compound with
Austria and England by the terms of Napoleon's ad-
dress to the Senate, may be refuted by a mere examina-
tion of the dates. The address in question was given on
the 3oth December 1813 and published in the Moniteur
of the following day, and at the very earliest it could
not have been at Naples before the loth January. Now
when Graham arrived on the 4th, the treaty was all but
completed, only matters of detail remained to be settled,
and the Royal signatures and ratifications were obtained
on the night of the 7th-8th January, some two or three
days before the French paper came to hand. Murat's
allegation therefore affords but one more instance of his
treachery to the Emperor.
The latter, however, had guessed how matters stood.
Fouche's letter of the 3rd January, which he received
on the I3th, the letter from Murat himself falsely dated
the 3rd which reached him on the igth, left him no
longer in doubt. He read clearly enough between the
lines of the latter to write the same day to Caulaincourt
as follows : "It seems that the King has almost con-
1 La Besnardiere to Talleyrand. Vienna, December 12, 1814. Affaires
Etrangeres.
NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
eluded his treaty. The Austrian General Neipperg has
been the intermediary in the matter, and a British colonel
with whom the King has negotiated though he had no
powers and did not recognise him as a King. These gentle-
men, observing the importance publicly attached to their
presence in Naples, imposed very severe conditions on the
King, and he is apparently still struggling against them."
Napoleon now decided to take action. To combat
Murat he determined to set up a ruler who was an Italian
and a sovereign recognised by the Allies. On the 2ist
January, Savary was informed that the Pope was to
leave for Savona that very night. He was commanded
to see that his departure took place at all events before
five o'clock in the morning. The adjutant of the palace
was to attend him on his journey. The carriages were
to cross the Rhone at the Pont Saint-Esprit and proceed
to Savona by way of Nice, ostensibly to avoid the moun-
tains. The adjutant of the palace was to state that he
was conducting him to Rome, his orders being to bring
him thither with the suddenness of a bombshell. On
arriving at Savona the Pope was to be treated as before.
Then he took a second step. This was the recall of all
the French at Naples, whatever the nature of their busi-
ness there.
" Whereas Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King
of Italy, &c., considering that the King of Naples has
severed all ties which bound him to our Empire, that he
has violated the treaty of alliance of the i5th July 1808,
and has taken up an attitude of hostility to France by
covenanting with our enemies, even with those who have
not recognised him as King ;
" And whereas it is the bounden duty of all our sub-
jects to quit the service of a prince who has declared
himself the enemy of our country, such duty being pre-
scribed by the law of the land and still more by the dic-
tates of honour ;
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 379
" And whereas it is in especial measure to the deeds
of the brave soldiers of France that the King owes his
crown, they having shed their blood for the welfare of
France alone, and having only attached themselves to
the service of the King as being a prince in alliance with
France, we therefore now ordain as follows :
" Article I. — All French subjects in the civil and
military service of the Kingdom of Naples, of whatso-
ever rank, officers and soldiers, officials of the palace,
administrators, agents, and employees of whatever kind
or grade, shall cease their functions and return to France.
Officers will retain in France the rank enjoyed by them
in the Kingdom of Naples.
" Article II. — Such officers as, in pursuance of the
present decree, shall have failed within one month of its
promulgation to quit the service of Naples, shall be de-
clared to have acted dishonourably, to have been guilty
of treason towards their country, and shall be dealt
with in accordance with our decree of the 6th April 1809.
" Article III. — Such French soldiers as may be com-
pulsorily detained in the Neapolitan army shall, even
after the expiration of the period laid down in the pre-
ceding article, be permitted to return to France on giving
proof that they left the colours at the earliest possible
moment and as soon as they came face to face with
French troops.
" Article IV. — Particularly on our subjects of the
departments of the Golo and Liamone do we enjoin the
necessity of quitting the service of the enemy.
" Article V. — All Frenchmen holding civil appoint-
ments about the palace, all those employed in the Customs
and Postal Service are commanded to cease work im-
mediately and to return to France forthwith."
This draft was probably drawn up at the same time as
it was decided to send the Pope to Savona. It was for-
warded to Durant, who had orders to publish it if hostili-
380 NAPOLEON AND . KING MURAT
ties broke out and if the King had really compounded
with His Majesty's enemies. If, however, he had only
concluded a treaty of neutrality, base as such a defection
would be, he was enjoined to say nothing.
The Emperor was not kept long in suspense. Murat's
letter of the I5th January reached him at Brienne on the
3ist. All doubts about his brother-in-law's treachery
being now removed, he commanded d'Hauterive to send
on his decree to Durant. Unluckily it was fated to arrive
too late.
While Joachim was doing his best to deceive the
Emperor and his agents, Mier appeared on the scene—
Mier, his friend and confidant whom he had charged to
plead his cause with Metternich. On the 6th January
Carascosa, who had proceeded as far as the Austrian
outposts to await the Ambassador's arrival, gave him a
magnificent reception at Rimini. On the nth Mier
reached Naples, too late to suit Murat's purpose, since the
treaty had been signed three days before. However, the
King, who felt more at home with him than with Neip-
perg, was very anxious to explain to him all the con-
cessions he imagined he had wrung from Austria. No
sooner, therefore, had the Ambassador arrived than he
begged him to come to the palace.1 The following is an
account of what took place : —
1 According to M. Masson, the treaty was signed on the I ith January, and
Mier played a predominant part in securing to Murat the cession of a piece of
territory comprising 400,000 souls. " On the nth," he says, " Mier arrived,
and before signing the treaty had a prolonged interview with Murat, who
dilated with the most exuberant verbosity on the indemnity due to him on the
conclusion of peace. Mier protested that his powers did not in any degree
differ from Neipperg's. However, after a discussion which lasted all through
the night, he gave a reluctant assent to the cession of a portion of the Papal
States comprising a population of 400,000 souls." (Napolton et sa Famille,
ix. 194.)
As a matter of fact, the treaty which had been signed on the 8th January
had already been dispatched to headquarters when Mier reached Naples.
Moreover, it was not by any means on his own responsibility that Mier made
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 381
' The roads were almost impassable/' wrote Mier to
Metternich, " and the caution I was compelled to use in
getting through the places still held by French troops
prevented my reaching Naples until the nth instant. I
learned with real pleasure on my arrival that an alliance
between the two courts had been concluded and signed
on the 8th January in accordance with the instructions
given by Your Highness to the Comte de Neipperg, who
on this occasion has given further proof of his talents, his
savoir-faire, and his devotion to our august Sovereign.
" One hour after my arrival in Naples His Majesty
the King sent me word by M. le Due di Gallo that he was
anxious to see me immediately. I therefore repaired
to the Palace, where the King received me with much
kindness, making a number of complimentary remarks
about my return and referring to the hopes which he
entertained of keeping me with him always. Offering
him my respectful thanks, I informed him that it had been
my Sovereign's intention, in the event of diplomatic
relations being resumed between the two countries, to
replace me in my former office, and that it accordingly
only rested with His Majesty to confirm my master's
choice. ' I asked the Comte de Neipperg,' was the Bang's
reply, ' to beg the Emperor as a favour to send you back
to Naples. You will therefore understand the pleasure
I feel at learning for certain that you are to be accredited
to my Court. I have done,' His Majesty went on, ' every-
thing that Austria desired : I have signed without ques-
tion the treaty submitted to me by the Comte de Neipperg
placing no less reliance on the friendship and goodwill
the offer of " 400,000 souls." It was Metternich who, after conferring with
Castlereagh, 2Oth-23rd January 1814, sent Mier with the second treaty which
contained the aforesaid offer, an offer which the King of Naples at first refused,
saying that it was not worth while putting it in a treaty. But in the course
of his conversation of the nth January he conceded nothing. With the
object of giving formal proof of this version of the matter I here reproduce in
txtcnso the report of the interview which was sent by Mier to Metternich.
382 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
.
which the Emperor Francis is kind enough to display
towards me, and on his promise to obtain an indemnity
for me when peace is concluded in return for the sacrifices
I have undertaken to make, than upon the transactions
and stipulations which we were able to agree upon for
the time being.
" ' I place myself entirely in the hands of the Emperor
Francis, and I am perfectly willing to act beneath the
segis of the Austrian Government. I am confident that I
shall never have cause to regret my action, but I must say
once more that you ought to increase my power so that I
may no longer be a burden to you. You will reap no
advantage from the various little states you are desirous
of establishing in Italy. Put me in a position to maintain
a standing army of 60,000 men, and the peace of Italy and
your influence in the country will be assured. Only
enable me to withstand the first onslaught of whatever
foe may come to attack you there, thus giving you time
to come to my support, and Austria and the King of
Naples, having one single aim between them, could defy
any attack the powers might make upon Italy/ I re-
plied that Austria deserved to be trusted by the King
because of her perseverance in upholding and defending
his interests with regard to the other powers ; that he
should fully realise that he owes the preservation of his
crown entirely to her efforts, and that his country's
interests as well as the gratitude which he ought to
entertain should prompt him to second the aims of my
Court ; that if he conscientiously carried out his promises
and undertakings and displayed straightforwardness in
all his proceedings he could be assured of Austria's un-
failing support, and that on these conditions I was autho-
rised to promise him an increase of territory and other
advantages when peace was declared.
" ' I will discharge my obligations,' said the King, ' as
becomes a man of honour. From the moment I decide
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 383
to throw in my lot with her, Austria will never have occa-
sion to regret the protection she affords me. But could
you not give me some assurance beforehand regarding
the concessions you promise that I am to have when peace
is made ? The matter should remain a secret, and I
should feel more confident regarding the future.'
" I replied that nothing of the kind had been done in
the case of any other power, and that all such considera-
tions had been reserved until the war was over, adding
that if the separate interests of each particular power
had been studied at the outset, the allied armies would
not yet have crossed the Rhine. I went on to remark
that the confidence with which the King had placed his
interests in the hands of the Emperor Francis would make
it the more incumbent on my master to see that he ob-
tained some tangible benefit when peace was concluded.
" The King replied that only the absolute confidence
he reposed in the goodwill of our Sovereign had induced
him to forego the consideration of many matters which
touched him personally and to give his unquestioning
consent to our views. ' I will not conceal from you/ he
went on, ' that it is painful for me to have to fight against
the French. Your Sovereign would have but a sorry
opinion of me were it not so. But I know what my
country's interests demand. I am acting as King of
Naples, and to my kingdom's welfare all other considera-
tions are but secondary. The Neapolitans ought to be
grateful to me for giving them such a convincing testimony
of my devotion, and my present and future conduct
proves and will continue to prove to the sovereigns of
Europe that I am worthy to take my place among them.
I was first of all anxious to await your return before sign-
ing the alliance, as I felt confident that the proposals with
which I had entrusted you as well as your perfect ac-
quaintance with our opinions and the feelings which I
entertain for your master would be the means of securing
384 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
me better terms and some genuine and definite conces-
sions. Upon reflection, however, I came to the conclusion
that it was better not to put any obstacle in the way of a
prompt settlement. Such questions therefore that have
been left open for the time being will be settled later.'
" I made answer to His Majesty that my instructions
and powers were precisely similar to those of the Comte
de Neipperg, and that my arrival would have had no
influence on the course of the negotiations. I am, I
added, merely authorised to assure Your Majesty that
my Sovereign will readily lend his good offices in obtain-
ing advantageous terms for you on the conclusion of
peace, and that such terms will be proportionate to the
efforts made by you to assist the cause of the Allies.
" Our conversation was prolonged far into the night,
and everything that His Majesty was pleased to say to
me afforded me convincing proof that we may rely on
him."
Murat got but little satisfaction from Mier. The
Ambassador, knowing that Neipperg had signed the
treaty, took refuge in generalities, and refused to make
any definite promise. Nor did he show himself in any
way responsive to the King's overtures regarding the
suppression of the lesser Italian States. And so Joachim,
not particularly well satisfied, declared positively " that
he would take no steps until the treaty had been ratified."
Thus Murat came back to his original plan. He
would occupy Italy before the Austrians. With Austria
for an ally, in treaty with the English for an armistice
whose signature was now only a matter of days, not yet
officially at war with France, and therefore not wholly
dispossessed in the eyes of the French in Naples of the
prestige that had formerly attached to him as a lieutenant
of the Emperor, he was in an admirable position to effect
the realisation of his desires. To occupy the Papal
States, Tuscany, and the departments of Southern Italy,
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 385
to proceed northwards towards the Po, and to set up in
the countries thus " provisionally " occupied a civil and
military organisation — the whole without coming to blows
with the French and without awakening the suspicions
of Austria — such was the initial part of his plan. There-
after he would increase his fighting force, gather sup-
porters to his side, and await the issue of the struggle,
confident in the possession of a powerful army and in the
affection of his subjects. Then, when peace was declared,
and relying on Austria for support, he would demand of
the Allies that they should confirm him in the permanent
possession of those regions his occupation of which he
had alleged to be merely provisional. Thus, assured of
his conquests, King of Naples, of Tuscany, of the States
of the Church, of all Italy as far as the Po, Murat would
make them all into a single kingdom : he would bring
his dream to pass — he would be King of Italy !
To bring about this provisional occupation, the in-
dispensable preliminary of final success, what remains
to be achieved ? Scarcely anything at all, now that
Austria is on his side, unless it be to dislodge Miollis from
Rome, Barbon from Ancona, Elisa from Leghorn, and to
throw Eugdne off the scent. True, he has already at-
tempted this task without success. Since, however,
persuasion seems to have no effect on men who are stupid
enough to remain loyal to their country when it is in its
death agony, he will show his teeth or make pretence
of so doing. On receiving Miollis' letter of the nth,
Murat resolves on a fresh line of action. He determines
to find out the state of popular feeling in Rome and to
endeavour to stir up a movement in his favour. Zuccari
will lure the authorities from their allegiance, popular
manifestations of discontent are to be artfully fomented,
and the whole will form an excuse for the King to seize
the reins of the civil and military government. To carry
out this plan Maghella, his trusty confederate in all dark
2B
386 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
and crooked tasks, sets out for Rome on the I3th
January.
" He was," said Durant, " to have supreme control over
the administration of the former Papal States. His first
duty was to get together a deputation, no matter how,
in order to wait upon His Majesty with the request that
he should at least grant them his protection. From this
moment attempts were made to share the task of guarding
the City of Rome between the soldiers of France and
Naples. At the King of Spain's palace, at the residence of
the Queen of Etruria, behold Neapolitans mount guard
side by side with the soldiers of Miollis. Neapolitans are
stationed at the City Gates. All Rome is eagerly dis-
cussing the coming of the King. Reaching Rome on the
I4th, Maghella immediately set to work, and first and
foremost organised the wonderful deputation that was to
start for Naples without delay. It arrived on the i6th,
and gave Murat an excuse for taking action. Without
losing a single day he issued a decree stating that in view
of the disorder prevalent in the Roman States and of
the request of the principal families in Rome as well
as of King Charles IV. who demanded protection ; by
reason also of the refusal of General Miollis to co-operate
with the Neapolitan troops in the defence of the said States,
the King had resolved to take possession of the same."
Thus the die was cast. La Vauguyon was to have
charge of the military, Maghella of the civil government.
The latter demanded an interview with Miollis, and on
the morning of the iyth endeavoured to explain why
Naples had intervened and sought to justify Murat 's
conduct towards France. " It might be," said he,
" that the King would be under the necessity of occupy-
ing certain places in order to preserve them from the
evils of an otherwise inevitable invasion." On the iQth,
La Vauguyon issued a proclamation which put Murat 's
intentions beyond all doubt. It ran as follows : —
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 387
" We, Paul de la Vauguyon, Lieutenant-General of
His Majesty the King of The Two Sicilies, Senior Com-
mandant of the Roman States, unto the inhabitants of
the Departments of Rome and Trasimeno ;
" Whereas, &c. &C.1
" His Majesty having by his decree of the i6th
instant been pleased to appoint us to the Chief Com-
mand of the Roman States, we regard it as our first
duty to announce that the powers hitherto exercised by
General le Comte de Miollis have expired, and we com-
mand all the authorities, both civil and military, to
consider the said powers as having been transferred to
ourselves by order of our August Sovereign Lord His
Majesty the King of Naples." 2
Simultaneously the city was filled with Murat's
troops. Neapolitans were picketed in all the squares :
Miollis could do nothing against such superior numbers.
On receipt of La Vauguyon's letter of the igth he sent
word to La Salcette and instructed him to bring into
Civita Vecchia all the detachments remaining on the
coast in order to defend the place to the last extremity.
He ordered General La Fosse to concentrate the gen-
darmerie in the province of Trasimeno with a view of
keeping open the line of retreat in the direction of Tus-
cany. He commanded General Lecrosnier to do the same
for the Department of Rome. Having taken what pre-
cautions he could, he replied to La Vauguyon, giving him
clearly to understand that on no condition could he
recognise any other authority but that which he himself
had been granted by His Majesty the Emperor. He
then informed Napoleon and the Minister of War how
matters stood, and finally betook himself to the
1 The preamble recited Murat's usual arguments : the popular movements,
public disorders, the address of the Roman citizens, the paralysis of public
business, the King of Spain's anxiety, the helplessness of the French
Government.
a Moniteur des Deux Sidles.
388 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Castle of S. Angelo, where he made ready his means of
defence.
Miollis then being cornered and helpless in his fort,
there only remained the Emperor's representative in
Italy, Joachim's execrated rival Eugene. On hearing
the news of Murat's treachery the Viceroy had immedi-
ately sent a message to him inquiring whether there was
any truth in the report, and asked the King for a definite
"yes," or "no." " It would not be like you to allow
the man who is entrusted with the defence of the Em-
peror's interests here to learn from any other source
but yourself of the course you have been led to adopt.
I therefore apply to Your Majesty with full confidence
to enlighten me as to what the Emperor's subjects and
soldiers are to hope for or to apprehend from the troops
which belong to you. If Your Majesty takes sides
against the tmperor, I shall indeed be filled with pro-
found regret, but I shall not be led thereby to forget
the sentiments which attach me to you personally ; and
difficult as the position in which Your Majesty will have
placed me must prove, I shall be unable to help ex-
pressing the hope that you and your family may enjoy
every happiness." This letter was entrusted to General
Gifflenga, who was instructed to present it to Joachim
and obtain detailed explanations. He would also see
for himself how matters stood and report to Eugene.
Having surmounted innumerable difficulties, Gifflenga
reached Naples on the morning of the 20th January.
Next day he was received in audience by Murat. The
conversation lasted three hours, and it is possible that
the King confessed that he had entered into an alliance
with Austria, but if he did he wrapped up the avowal
with such a host of rhetorical qualifications, such endless
protestations of loyalty and affection for the Emperor,
that Gifflenga was unable to bring back any positive
report as to what had really happened. He bore with
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 389
him a letter from the King in which the latter set forth
the proposals he had made to the Emperor, how the
presence of his troops had prevented the Austrians
crossing the Adige and how he was prevented from
crushing them solely by the arrival of an Austrian
emissary with powers to negotiate for peace. At present,
he went on, he had been led by the attractive nature of
the terms offered to enter into negotiations of which,
however, he had advised the Emperor. He concluded
with a formal undertaking to the effect that if he were
compelled to take up a definite position he would carry
out no movement calculated to prejudice the Viceroy's
army without sending him word beforehand. Hood-
winked by these lies, Eugene made no effort to move
until Murat without striking a blow had possessed him-
self of all the territory he desired.
Everything had been arranged, the troops were on
the march, Maghella and La Vauguyon had gone to
Rome, yet still Murat lingered on at Naples. On the
1 5th January was published the decree of the 24th
December 1813 raising a levy of 12,000 men. On the
1 7th the King's equipages left Rome. The same night
all those who were going to Rome in connection with
the organisation of the provisional government took
their departure. There were the " Cavaliere " Mace-
donio, Poerio the procurator, Winspeare, Onofrio, Fortu-
nato, Tito Manzi, &c. The King actually wrote a letter
to the Due d'Otranto requesting him to put in writing
the ideas that had occurred to him in connection with
the suggested constitution. Why then was he tarrying ?
What was preventing him from putting himself at the
head of his troops and appearing in triumph in his
newly acquired dominion amid the vociferous acclama-
tions of the crowd ?
One circumstance alone restrained him. On the
magnificent prospect that lay unfolded before him
390 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
lingered one dark cloud. That cloud was England.
Murat knew well enough how deeply hostile to his aims
was Bentinck, and would on no account quit Naples
with such a danger in his rear. Some time back when
negotiations had been in progress with Graham, the
King had been on the point of leaving, feeling sure that
the British representative would fall in with Neipperg's
proposals. When Graham refused he suddenly faced
about and sent him word that he would not leave Naples
until the treaty had been ratified. Since then he had
been doing his utmost to prevail on Bentinck to sign
the armistice and — he was still waiting. On the loth
January the Furious set sail for Sicily, having on board
Berthemy, Murat's aide-de-camp, and Captain d'Aspre,
who had been sent by Neipperg. On the I2th they had
an interview with Bentinck, who, adhering to his cus-
tomary tactics, would sign nothing until he had received
his Government's authorisation in documents drawn up
at the headquarters of the Allied Sovereigns. Back
again, therefore, they sailed for Naples, still on board
the British frigate. On the I3th, at ten o'clock at night,
they were home again, and Berthemy immediately sent
word to the Palace of the result of their mission. Murat
was aghast. Happily, however, for him, Neipperg had
received through Comte Michel the message which
Aberdeen had addressed to Bentinck under date of
the I2th December. He decided to send it on at once.1
Without a moment's loss Gallo wrote off to the British
Ambassador as follows : —
" The King trusts that the dispatches of Lord Aber-
deen which the Comte de Neipperg, Austria's Minister
Plenipotentiary, has been instructed to forward to Your
Excellency, will remove all the difficulties that have
hitherto impeded the progress of the negotiations, to the
1 Bentinck to Aberdeen. Palermo, January 22, 1814. Record Office,
Sicily.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 391
satisfactory issue of which His Majesty attaches the
highest importance. General Berthemy, who will have
the honour to hand this letter to Your Excellency, will
inform you how ardently His Majesty desires to make
your personal acquaintance. General Berthemy, more-
over, is empowered to make all arrangements necessary
to secure the object of his mission should you, to His
Majesty's regret, be prevented from coming to Naples
yourself." »
On the 1 5th January Berthemy and d'Aspre em-
barked again on a British vessel which had arrived
from Sicily on the I2th with one of Bentinck's aides-
de-camp and some letters. At length, on the i8th
January, Berthemy landed at Palermo and delivered
into Bentinck's hands Aberdeen's dispatch giving him
authority to negotiate with Murat. This put a different
complexion on matters, and, now that Bentinck had his
Government's formal sanction to proceed, he could ad-
vance no further excuse for delaying to sign an armistice.
England's acquiescence in the Austro-Neapolitan
policy was therefore merely a matter of days. Still,
Joachim was loth to leave his kingdom until the success
of the negotiations with Sicily was absolutely beyond
doubt. Notwithstanding that everything was ready for
him to set out, and that his officers and confidants had
already started, he still lingered behind at Naples in
constant expectation of Bentinck's reply. On every side
pressure was brought to bear on him to put himself
en route, but all to no purpose ; nothing availed to
shake his resolution. From the I5th to the 22nd, a
whole precious week went by during which he might
have taken possession of Tuscany and the country
bordering on the Po. Times without number he peered
with eager longing across the bay to try to catch a
1 Gailo to Bentinck. Naples, January 13, 1814. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
392 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
glimpse of the British man-of-war that seemed as though
it would never heave in sight. Though he fumed with
ill-suppressed impatience, he would not leave until he
had received a satisfactory assurance from Bentinck.
At last, however, racked with suspense, harassed and
goaded unceasingly by Mier and Caroline, who were
fearful lest he should take a step in the wrong direction,
he reluctantly resolved to go.1 But while he suffered
his wife and the Austrian to suppose he was hurrying
away to take up the command of the army, he made
all manner of reservations to himself. He promised him-
self that he would come to a halt at Rome, where, on
pretence of busying himself with matters of organisation,
he would wait for Bentinck's reply. If that reply were
to betoken a declaration of war he could be back again
at Naples in a day.
On the 22nd January his departure was officially
announced. His Majesty was to leave that evening.
A note regarding the provisions of the Austrian and
English alliances was put into circulation in Naples,
which, though it emanated from the Palace, was purely
a product of the imagination.
" The King of Naples," it ran, " is upheld and con-
firmed in the possession of his kingdom in terms of a
Treaty which he has concluded with the Allies. Great
Britain and Austria constitute themselves guarantors of
the indemnity to be granted to him. His dominions
will, when a general peace is declared, be increased by
a large extension of territory. As a provisional measure
he takes possession in the name of the Allies of the
Papal States and legations, as well as of Tuscany. The
English will occupy no fort in the Kingdom. The
Neapolitan navy will be armed and will act in conjunc-
tion with them, and they in turn bind themselves to
render the King every possible assistance.
1 Mier to Metternich. Naples, January 22, 1814.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 393
" King Ferdinand has renounced for himself, his heirs
and successors, all claim on the Kingdom of Naples, and
the King of Naples will act likewise in regard to Sicily.
The coronation of the King of Naples will shortly take
place." l
On the morning of the same day the announcement
was made in the Monitore of The Two Sicilies that such
authorities as offered no objection to the Neapolitan
occupation would be treated as friends. By this subtle
process Murat possibly hoped to obtain the support or
at least the neutrality of the French officials, for
so great was his audacity (or his effrontery) that he
tried to make people believe that he was still on terms
of friendship with the Emperor even when he was ad-
vancing with his troops into countries beneath the
French flag. He even had the hardihood to put pres-
sure on Durant, the Minister of France, to accompany
him to Rome in order to make his seizure of French
territory appear to be the outcome of an arrangement
with Napoleon's representative. At the King's command
Gallo wrote to the French Ambassador informing him
that His Majesty was leaving for Rome, and desired that
he (Durant) would have the goodness to precede him in
order to be there on his arrival. He further handed
him the necessary passports, and informed him that
arrangements had been made for him to be attended
by suitable escorts along the road from Naples to Rome.
So confident was Murat of the success of his stratagem
that he wrote to Pignatelli saying : " The Minister of
France has left for Rome, together with my Foreign
Minister." 2 Luckily for himself and the French, Durant
did not rise to this clumsy bait. He sent word to Gallo
that the only passports he required were passports for
France, and gave him clearly to understand that he
1 Note issued by the Government of Naples, January 22, 1814.
* Murat to Pignatelli, January 23, 1814. Naples, Archivio di Stato.
394 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
would take no notice of the extraordinary request he
had received.
Finally, Murat appointed the Queen as Regent, and
issued two decrees for the maintenance of public order
in his newly acquired territory. But despite these various
preparations, despite the official announcements and the
promises given to Caroline and Mier, the evening of the
22nd found the King still at Naples. Do what he would,
he could not help thinking of what would happen if
Bentinck were to refuse to negotiate. He therefore made
up his mind to spend the 23rd at Naples, and took advan-
tage of the opportunity to receive a deputation consisting
of the principal property -holders in Rome. At last, in
the afternoon, news was brought to him that the British
ship had returned with Berthemy on board. Berthemy
had with him Bentinck's reply in the shape of a letter for
Neipperg and another for Gallo. Each made known his
Lordship's decision. In order that there might be no
delay in the negotiations, he would, he said, take ship for
Naples on the 27th, and at Naples he would arrange
matters. Murat's anxieties were now dispelled ; he could
start with an easy mind. Without a moment's delay,
therefore, he set out from Naples at five o'clock in the
evening in a travelling conveyance drawn by ordinary
post-horses.
Joachim reached Rome on the 24th and made a
triumphal entry into the city, which was en fete to greet
him. The Court of Appeal presented an address in
which the hope was expressed that the King would
restore the glories of ancient Rome. The various corpora-
tions came to do homage. After this he went to visit
the King of Spain, who received him at the foot of his
staircase, and immediately returned the visit.1 He also
sent Romeuf, his aide-de-camp, to suggest to Miollis
that he should retire with the French troops on Genoa.
1 Monitors of The Two Sicilies.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 395
Miollis refused, and Romeuf went back again an hour
later with another message from the King inquiring
whether the Empire and the Kingdom were at enmity,
whereupon Miollis replied that the proclamation which
had emanated from the King " certainly seemed to betray
hostile intentions." l
Installed at Rome, Joachim, while waiting for Ben-
tinck to fulfil his promise and come to Naples, set to
work with Maghella to reorganise the government of the
Papal States. Suddenly the good news was brought to
him that an armistice had been drawn up and signed by
Graham and Berthemy, to whom the King had given
full authority to negotiate. Joachim's mind was now at
rest ; he could set to work in earnest.
The 27th January 1814 was indeed a red-letter day
for Murat. His dreams were coming to pass, and, for
at least a few days, he was able to look upon himself as
the heaven-sent architect of Italian unity. The armis-
tice with England had removed the sole obstacle that
had stood betwixt him and the attainment of his designs.
From France there was little or nothing to apprehend, par-
ticularly as his falsehoods had, for the present at any rate,
disarmed the incipient hostility of Eugene and Miollis.
Assured of Austria's friendship and Great Britain's neu-
trality, he deemed that his cause was bound to triumph.
While Joachim's ardent imagination was thus centred
on adding to his prestige and extending his dominions,
Caroline was fulfilling her duties as Regent with wisdom
and moderation. "The Queen," wrote Mier, "who is
now in charge of the government, will be much better
able to hold her own than the King, and will allow nothing
to interfere with the due discharge of the obligations
entered into with Austria."2 With a cleverness that
1 Miollis to the Due de Feltre. Rome, January 25, 1814. Archives de
la Guerre.
J Mier to Metternich. Quoted by M. Weil.
396 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
would have been quite beyond Murat, she boldly re-
quested the Minister of France to come to her before he
took his departure. On the night of the 24th Durant
was asked to proceed secretly to the Queen's apartment,
and there, in an interview which lasted from nine o'clock
to midnight, she doubtless unfolded to him the reasons
which had dictated her husband's policy and her own.
Though every one in Naples knew full well, Durant better
than most, that she was irrevocably bound to Austria,
she yet essayed to win the sympathies of the French
Ambassador, who, she knew, would soon be seeing the
Emperor and repeating to him what she had said.
Durant left on the evening of the 25th,1 and Caroline
resumed negotiations with the Allies. On Graham's
arrival she at once put him into communication with
Berthemy. Next day she sent her husband the armistice
signed and duly completed. Two days later Joachim's
reply came to hand from Rome, whereupon she com-
manded the armistice to be made known to all Govern-
ment officials who had remained in Naples. " I have
the honour to inform Your Excellency," wrote Gallo to
Pignatelli, " that an armistice was signed on the 26th
instant between the land and sea forces of the King and
those of His Britannic Majesty, in terms of which there
shall be an entire cessation of hostilities between the two
powers pending the conclusion of the permanent treaty
to be discussed forthwith by plenipotentiaries appointed
for the purpose." And Gallo requested the Secretary of
State to inform his subordinates.2 On the 30 th the
Monitor e published the good news to all Naples. Certainly
the Queen Regent could not be taxed with dilatoriness.
Nor had Murat himself any time to spare if he intended
to be beforehand with the Austrians and the English.
1 Durant to Caulaincourt. Turin, February n, 1814. Affaires £t>angeres.
* Gallo to Pignatelli. Naples, January 29, 1814. Naples, Archivio di
Stato.
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 397
On the 27th, therefore, he made ready to leave Rome, and
on the 28th he signed a decree appointing Zurlo to the
control of the departments of Southern Italy.1 He then
left for Bologna, where his arrival was impatiently
awaited. It was truly a triumphal progress that his
agents had arranged for him. On the morning of the
30th he arrived at Ancona amidst salvos of artillery fired
from the city and the harbour.
Deeming success to be beyond all doubt, and feeling
that he could now safely abandon his brother-in-law, he
at last threw aside the mask. It was no longer Joachim
Napoleon, the Emperor's brother-in-law, and a vassal of
the French Empire, that was speaking. It was Joachim,
King of Naples, soon to be King of Italy, who for the
first time made his accents heard in a proclamation which
was to give to his lieutenants the signal for which they
had so impatiently waited.
" Soldiers," he said, " so long as it was possible for
me to believe that the Emperor Napoleon was fighting
to bring peace and glory to France I fought loyally at
his side ; but now I can deceive myself no longer ; I
know that the Emperor's sole desire is war.
" I should be doing an injury to the land of my
birth, to my Kingdom, and to you, did I not immedi-
ately dissociate my troops from his and join the Allies,
whose lofty aim it is to restore freedom to the nations
and to re-establish the thrones of Europe in all their
former dignity.
" I am well aware that attempts are being made to
beguile the patriotism of the Frenchmen in my army by
voicing false ideas of honour and loyalty ; as if there
were aught of honour and loyalty in subjecting the
world to Napoleon's mad ambition !
" Soldiers, there are now but two banners in Europe.
On the one you may read ' Religion, Morality, Justice,
1 Zurlo to Pignatelli. Naples, Archivio di Stato.
NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Moderation, Law, Peace, and Happiness.' Upon the
other, ' Persecution, Insincerity, Tyranny, .War, and
Sorrow in every home.'
" Make your choice between them.
" JOACHIM."
No sooner had Murat issued his proclamation at
Ancona (he had first intended not to publish it till he
reached Bologna) than, in accordance with the concerted
plan, it was echoed by all his lieutenants in turn. At
Modena on the 3ist January Carascosa issued an in-
flammatory appeal,1 Poerio followed with a call to arms
at Ancona, next d'Ambrosio issued general orders from
his headquarters at Rimini, then came General Minu-
tolo's address to his soldiers at Florence on the 3rd
February and Joseph Lecchi's appeal to the inhabitants
of Tuscany on the 5th of the same month. By all of
them great homage was done to the Italian people, by
all of them the King of Italy was belauded to the skies.
1 In order not to overload the text of the narrative, it has been considered
advisable to reproduce these proclamations in the form of a note.
MODENA, 31^ January 1814.
Men of Italy ! At last the wished-for hour has come. The cry " Our
Country " has united us all beneath the same standard. After so many
generations of division, behold the happy day is dawning when, fighting for
the same object, defending the same country, striving for the common weal,
we have but to gather round the noble king who guarantees us all these
benefits to be certain of gaining them and of attaining by victory upon victory
to their peaceful possession. Unselfish patriotism, unquestioning confidence
in our excellent sovereign King Joachim, who has already brought happiness
to the people of Naples, perseverance in the face of all the hardships of a
glorious war, such must be our equipment. Then naught shall stay the
valour of our onslaught as we fight beneath the leadership of the foremost
captain of the age, with our hearts fired by the consciousness that we are
battling for the noblest of causes.
Come, then, Men of Italy, come and unite your ranks with ours ; abandon
those who oppress you. Let not Europe behold so pitiable a spectacle as
would be offered by a conflict between the Italians of the South and those
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 399
Meanwhile, the hero of the hour, in resplendent majesty,
bade fare well to Ancona amid the acclamations of the whole
populace and pursued his way in triumph to Bologna.
There his entry was marked by a piece of well-rehearsed
sensationalism. An officer had arrived in haste to give
the prefect orders for the city to be illuminated, and as
the shades of evening were beginning to fall Murat ap-
peared with his general staff about him. No sooner was
his presence known than several groups of people — who
had been observed lingering in the streets on the two
preceding days — fell to shouting, " Vive le grand
Joachim," " Vive le roi d'ltalie," to which the Guards
who dwell beyond the Po when a noble summons bids us all unite to fight
for honour, happiness, and glory. Will you turn a deaf ear to these appeals ?
Will you continue to forge the chains which hold you in thrall? Would you
prefer slavery to the most entrancing visions that have ever set men's hearts
on fire? Will you too not play your part in bringing to pass this mighty
task. . . . ?
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CARASCOSA.
(Menioria sulla condotta politica e military tcnuta da Gioacchino Murat
ntl 1814.)
ANCONA, $ist January 1814.
To THE INHABITANTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF SOUTHERN ITALY.
A Treaty of Peace concluded with His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic
Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the Allied Powers has given His Majesty
the King of The Two Sicilies temporary possession of the Roman States,
Tuscany, and the departments of Southern Italy. In addition to these
advantages, the freedom of the seas and the wealth of commerce are
guaranteed by an armistice with England.
The inhabitants of so fair a portion of Italy will readily perceive the
advantages and expectations to which this novel and remarkable situation
gives rise. They will recognise their duty. The King's fair fame required
that he should protect the countries occupied from external aggression, and
already his armies, concentrated along the Po, are pushing back the scene of
the conflict from these regions. The King's sense of justice demanded that he
should see to the ordering of your internal government, and behold a Minister
has taken up his quarters in Rome, and is taking measures for the proper
administration of the Finances, of Justice, and the Civil Service. The King's
warm heart compelled him to become the champion of your welfare, and
already Royal Commissioners, who proceeded to the spot armed with the
400 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
replied, " Vive le roi d'ltalie/' " Vive Joachim." The
King bowed his thanks and passed on in triumph. He
had entered at last into possession of his future kingdom,
and he readily mistook the police-paid acclamations for
the enthusiastic welcome of the entire population.
What a strange contrast is here ! While Murat in
all his pomp and glory was on the point of crowning
himself King of Italy, the Emperor was fighting against
overwhelming odds and desperately disputing every inch
of ground with the Allies. At Brienne he was handed
the letter of the I5th January, in which Murat told him,
this time in no doubtful terms, that he had decided to
•
necessary powers, have inquired into your needs, have taken note of your
wishes through the medium of departmental councils, and have suggested
valuable improvements.
I am instructed to inform you :
That His Majesty gives his word of honour to protect the Ministers of
Public Worship, all public establishments, and the persons and property of
private citizens.
That he proclaims and undertakes to protect freedom of maritime trade
with friendly and neutral powers, that vacant appointments or such as may
become vacant, shall be filled exclusively by yourselves, and, finally, that no
new tax will be imposed upon your country. It is, on the contrary, His
Majesty's desire to abolish or diminish all such taxes as experience may have
proved to be too burdensome.
People of Southern Italy, give up your hearts to gratitude, to those
feelings which cannot be evoked to order, but which the King's virtues and
good deeds never fail to inspire.
Your political independence (that prime necessity of national existence)
will be the handmaid of the zeal and energy with which you will strive to
further the aims of His Majesty and the Allied Powers. The moderation of
their systenij the unselfishness which guides their steps, the wisdom which
presides at their deliberations, justify and guarantee your confidence.
GUISEPPE POERIO.
(Organisation des dtpartcments de f Italic mtridionale. Naples. Societa
Napolitana di Storia Patria. )
ARMEE NAPOLITAINE — IITH DIVISION. GENERAL ORDERS.
His Majesty the King of Naples, whose constant care is the welfare of his
people, has concluded an armistice with England which at the earliest
possible date will be confirmed by a regular treaty of peace. By this measure
the ports of the provinces of Italy as far as the Po, provinces which have
MURAT AS KING OF ITALY 401
play the traitor. Napoleon immediately sent orders to
d'Hauterive to forward Durant the decree recalling the
French officers from Naples, adding, however, that it
was only to be used as a last resource. And that was
all. The man who had once controlled the destinies of
Europe could do no more. So it was that while the
Emperor, vanquished and outworn, was pondering sadly
on the glory that had once been his, Murat in the ecstasy
of triumph was dreaming of the brilliant days to come.
hitherto been starved, ruined, and downtrodden by the inexorable enactments
of tyranny, are once again opened to manufactures, to the arts, and to
commerce. The inhabitants of Italy will at length experience, from the
advent of the Neapolitan armies upon their soil, the blessings of peace, of
tranquillity, and of plenty.
Given at our Headquarters at Rimini, 3ist January 1814.
D'AMBROSIO, Lieutenant- Genera!.
(Organisation dts departments de Musone^ Reno et Rubicon. Naples.
Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria.)
FLORENCE, $th February 1814.
Men of Tuscany. Summoned by His Majesty the King to take up the
supreme command of the Tuscan States, we hasten to inform you of our
appointment and also to declare to you that the arrival of the King's troops
upon your soil need in no wise cause you anxiety. Our sole aim is to restore
your independence and your happiness. You desire a government, an Italian
government, adapted in your soil, your climate, your habits, and your customs.
Your prayers shall be answered. You complain of arbitrary taxes whose
proceeds are devoted to the advancement of interests alien to your own ; you
are grief-stricken at being compelled to see your children depart on distant and
interminable campaigns never to see them more. Soon you shall see them,
soon you will enjoy the blessings of a lasting peace guaranteed by all the
powers of Europe. All governing authority save that which we ourselves
have just assumed in the name of our King shall now cease. Henceforth also
passions should be still and party strife be laid aside.
LlCCHI.
(Quoted by M.Weil.)
2C
CHAPTER XII
THE AWAKENING
Austria and England — Metternich's new proposals — The Austrian ulti-
matum— Bellegarde's counterblast to Murat's proclamations — Bentinck and
the armistice — Murat's wrath — Seeks a rapprochement with Eugene — The
Emperor of Austria's letter — Interview with Catinelli — Murat's pact with
Eugene — Negotiations (i7th-27th February) — Murat is furious with
Bentinck — Why Murat desired to make friends with the Emperor — His letter
to the Emperor — Zucchi and Carascosa confer — Brunetti's proposals miscarry
— Eugene writes to Murat (3rd March) — Arrival of Beauffremont — Rupture
between Murat and Eugene — The engagement at Reggio — Napoleon's letter
to Eugene — Bentinck arrives at Leghorn — His conference with Murat — Murat
changes sides — His letter to Eugene — Negotiations — Conference between
Zucchi and Carascosa — The debacle — Caroline — Bentinck — Bellegarde —
Arrival of the Pope — Murat forced to abandon Rome and the Papal States —
Tuscany restored to the Grand Duke — Murat's last efforts to conciliate
Austria — The combat of the I3th April — Balachoff refuses to sign — The Tuscan
convention — Austria takes possession of Italy — The King reaches Naples.
WHILE Murat was waiting anxiously for Eng-
land to signify her assent to his treaty with
Austria, his emissaries had proceeded with
all haste to the headquarters of the Allies.
Journeying by way of Bologna, Menz and Couci had
made their way through the French outposts and had
at length succeeded in reaching Bale. Unluckily for
the King of Naples, Castlereagh had preceded them by
just two or three days. The latter had at once informed
Metternich and Hardenberg of his arrival and asked for
an appointment for the next day. He was not the sort
of man to let the grass grow under his feet, and by the
20th he had obtained all the information he required
regarding the policy of the Allies ; on that day he wrote
402
THE AWAKENING 403
to Lord Bathurst stating that he had been presented
to the Sovereigns and had conversed at length with
their respective ministers. The Neapolitan question had
formed one of the subjects of discussion. While, however,
Metternich explained the position as it then was to the
British diplomat, he could scarcely have informed him
on the 20th January of the signing of the treaty, since
he himself did not become aware of what had taken
place at Naples till he had heard what Menz had to say,
and at the date in question the bearers of the treaty
signed by Murat had not yet made their appearance at
headquarters. They probably arrived on the 2ist or
early on the 22nd, for on that day Castlereagh was
informed by Metternich of the signature of the treaty
of the 8th January. Castlereagh, with the concurrence
of the Austrian Ambassador, immediately sent Bentinck
instructions to abstain from further offensive operations
against Naples, and enjoined him to urge the King of
Sicily to adopt a similar course. He went on to say
that as soon as he arrived at the headquarters at Chau-
mont he would obtain from Lord Aberdeen the corre-
spondence which had taken place between Vienna and
St. James's, and advise him how to regulate his future
conduct with regard to this important matter.
There was certainly need to act with promptitude,
for it was a matter of great importance to the Allies that
Murat should not be fettered by any action on the part of
the British representative in Sicily. Bentinck was there-
fore given full leave to sign an armistice pending the re-
ceipt of instructions to conclude a formal treaty of peace.
The same day Castlereagh officially advised Bathurst
of the news that had just come to hand from Metternich
and of his preliminary instructions to Bentinck. Having,
he said, received official intimation from Prince Metter-
nich that a treaty (of which he sent his Lordship a copy)
had been concluded between the Emperor of Austria and
404 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
" the person exercising the government of Naples," he
had given Lord William Bentinck instructions, which he
trusted the Prince Regent would approve, in a dispatch
which he was sending that very day. With regard to
the treaty itself, however, Castlereagh had some objections
to offer. He considered that Murat came off too hand-
somely, and was anxious to do something for his country's
ally, the King of Sicily. " He was desirous of defining
the increase of territory promised to Joachim, and wished
at the same time to stipulate that King Ferdinand should
be provided with a compensation in order, as he put it,
that the British Government might be able to accede to
the treaty." 1 A fresh instrument was therefore drawn
up (the one which was eventually signed on the I2th
February), and before quitting Bale to join the Russian
Emperor at Langres, Metternich sent Menz back to
Naples on the 23rd January with the revised treaty as
well as Castlereagh's letter to Bentinck, which was dated
the day before.2 This done, the British and Austrian
plenipotentiaries set out for Langres, where they arrived
on the 26th January at one o'clock in the morning.
Metternich immediately on his arrival sent Castlereagh a
copy of the second treaty, which, with the British Minister's
concurrence, he had ordered to be submitted to Murat,
this copy being a reproduction of the one which Menz
was conveying to Naples.3
1 Minerva Napolitana.
2 Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 4, 1814.
3 M. Masson, basing his observations on the letter which Castlereagh
wrote to Metternich on the 27th January, remarks : " On the 3rd February
Bentinck had, therefore, no power to sign an armistice ; nay, it is not too
much to say that even his instructions of the 27th conferred no such powers
upon him, as they distinctly made the signing of the armistice conditional upon
the receipt of advice officially intimating that Murat had agreed to the treaty
in its amended form. Moreover, these instructions, which were dispatched
from Langres at the earliest on the 27th, could not have so much as reached
Naples by the 3rd February. In order to shield his subordinate from any
censure that might have attached to him for having acted ultra vires ^
LORD CASTLEREAGH
THE AWAKENING 405
What time Murat's allotted share was thus being
whittled down at the headquarters of the Allies, Murat
himself, elated with the triumph of his policy, was setting
to work to organise the government of his new depart-
ments. " Ever since I left Rome/' he wrote to Zurlo
from Ancona, " my march has been one long triumphal
progress. Everywhere enthusiasm has been at its height.
It is of the utmost importance that M(acedonio) should
proceed to Trasimeno to set matters on a working basis
Castlereagh had recourse to a ruse, and, assuming that his instructions would
be regarded as conveying the requisite authority to Bentinck, dated them the
22nd instead of the 27th, and it was under the former date that they were
notified to the English Parliament and published." (Napotion et sa famille.)
Here are two inaccuracies that call for correction. In the first place,
there can be no doubt that Castlereagh did write to Bentinck on the
22nd January, since corrobo ration of the date is to be found in the letter he
wrote Bathurst on the same day. "I have," he says, "given instructions to
Lord W. Bentinck in a dispatch which I am sending off at the same time as
this letter." Besides that, it is possible to follow every step in the course of
Castlereagh's dispatch to Bentinck of the 22nd January. Menz set out with
it on the 23rd, and handed it over to Mier in the neighbourhood of Ancona
on the 2nd February. (Mier to Metternich. Bologna, 4th February.) On
the 4th February, Baron de Frolich, who was dispatched by Mier, left for
Palermo in the capacity of courier with the letter from Lord Castlereagh
to Bentinck. (Mier to Metternich, Bologna, 4th February. Mier to Bentinck,
4th February.)
As regards Castlereagh's letter of the 27th January to Metternich, that
constituted an acknowledgment by the former of the receipt of the second
draft treaty which the two plenipotentiaries had drawn up in collaboration,
and of which Metternich was now sending Castlereagh a copy at the latter's
request. Castlereagh's letter reads as follows: "The undersigned has the
honour to offer to Prince Metternich his acknowledgments for the copy of the
treaty in the form in which it is proposed to stand between His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the person now exercising the govern-
ment of Naples."
We now have to consider the second question. What were Bentinck's
powers ? They were evidently so far from having lapsed (Masson, ix. 311), that
Bentinck himself, writing to Aberdeen on the 22nd January 1814, says : " My
instructions of the 22nd July empower me to sign an agreement, but on
different lines from yours. The lines in question were settled by me with the
Prince Hereditary, and provide that an equivalent should be given to Murat."
On the 7th August Castlereagh strengthened his agent's hands by authorising
him to negotiate on the new basis (confirming Murat in his possession of the
406 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
there. You must betake yourself immediately to the
departments of Southern Italy ; your presence there is
absolutely necessary. You will have to make our Nea-
politan friends abate some of their ardour, or their excess
of zeal will bring all our plans to the ground. I am
eagerly waiting for the figures regarding the budget of
the Papal States which I asked you to let me have, and
also for the instructions for Poerio." l
Poerio, as soon as the King had left Ancona, began to
busy himself with the work of organisation. His first
act was to notify the Prefects of Metauro, Musone, and
Tronto that His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies
had taken possession of their departments.2 He next
appointed a chief commissioner of police, and issued
a decree enacting that all trading vessels belonging to
the departments of which His Majesty had taken pro-
visional possession should fly the Neapolitan flag and
no other. Joachim was anxious to make sure of his
position.
Nevertheless the hours of his Italian sovereignty were
numbered. On the 3ist January, " Monsieur Schinina,
having fallen in with His Majesty the King between
Naples and Pesaro, gave him an account of the documents
kingdom of Naples), but only in conjunction with Austria. Where, then, do
we find the subsequent orders cancelling Bentinck's powers? So sure was
Bentinck that he was acting under authority that he himself delegated his
powers to Graham, while throughout January 1814 he was writing to
Aberdeen and Castlereagh explaining that although he had authority to
negotiate with Murat, he did not wish to do so, as he regarded such a pro-
ceeding as impolitic. Not until he received Aberdeen's dispatch of the
1 2th December, practically commanding him to act, did he make up his mind,
with extreme reluctance, to set out for Naples, and he was careful to advise
Aberdeen (22nd January) and Castlereagh (3Oth January) of his departure.
There is thus no doubt about Bentinck's powers. He received his instructions
on the 22nd July. These were confirmed by Castlereagh's letter of the
7th August 1813, and were again referred to in Aberdeen's dispatch of the
1 2th December.
1 Murat to Zurlo. Quoted by M. Weil.
8 Naples, Archives de la Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria.
THE AWAKENING
407
which Metternich had read over to him/' x These docu-
ments, which Menz was bearing with him, announced the
ruin of Murat's hopes. His hour of triumph was over.
They presaged, moreover, the chastisement that was to
overtake him for his betrayal of France. They left him
no room for doubt : he now knew how utterly he had
been deceived. What, then, did the documents contain ?
On the 3rd February Mier, who had left Naples after
Graham and Berthemy had signed the armistice of the
26th January, arrived at Bologna. On his way he had
met Menz, who had given him Metternich's dispatch of
the 23rd January embodying a fresh draft treaty and
sundry instructions.2 He had scarcely been at Bologna
half-an-hour when Campochiaro came to him and informed
him that the King was greatly upset at the non-ratifica-
tion of the treaty of alliance which had been signed by
the Comte de Neipperg, and that he had had immense
trouble to set his mind at rest on this point. But firmness
and patience on Mier's part would arrange everything to
Austria's satisfaction. He asked the Ambassador to go
and see the King. Ushered into the King's presence,
Mier gave him a general idea of the contents of Metter-
1 Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 4, 1814.
1 Metternich's dispatch to Mier, dated Bale, 23rd January, a document of
first-rate importance for this chapter of Murat's history, is no longer to be
found among the Archives Autrichicnncs. It is possible, however, to obtain
an idea of its main purport by taking <stock of Mier's replies and by avail-
ing ourselves of collateral documents. Metternich first announced that Menz
had arrived. He then informed Mier that he had conferred with Lord
Castlereagh with regard to the treaty which Murat had signed on the 8th
January, and that Castlereagh had insisted that a definite settlement should
be arrived at with respect to the relations of Joachim and Ferdinand. He
demanded that Murat should formally renounce all claim upon Sicily, and
that he should undertake in a manner no less formal to procure Ferdinand
an indemnity for the loss of Naples. Castlereagh further desired that the
territorial increase to be granted to Murat should be limited and defined, and
that an additional article should be drawn up (the article which on the
official document bears the spurious date of the I4th January) indicating
precisely the indemnity granted to the King. On this matter Metternich
408 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
nich's dispatch, and reserved the full account of the bad
news until the next day.
On the morrow Mier gave the assault. " His
Majesty," he said, " received me somewhat coldly, and
after a few commonplace remarks said that he had been
very surprised and pained to learn from M. Schinina of
the non-ratification of the treaty of alliance that had
been signed by the Comte de Neipperg and of the changes
that had been made in it. ' Monsieur de Neipperg/ said
Murat, ' had told us what his instructions were, and I
do not think that he in any way exceeded them. In
view of that, it was scarcely possible for me to doubt
that the treaty would be ratified. I did everything that
Austria wanted : why, then, make any difficulties in the
matter ? ' * Your Majesty will see/ I answered, * that
the alterations it has been thought necessary to make
relate exclusively to matters of form. The basis of our
alliance remains practically unaltered. As regards the
additional secret clause guaranteeing Your Majesty an
increase of territory calculated on a scale of 400,000
inhabitants, this can be nothing but an unqualified
imparted to Mier "the views of the Allies with regard to European affairs
generally and Italy in particular." The plans arranged between the several
parties to the coalition " regarding the future reconstruction of Italy involved
the reinstatement of the Holy Father in the States of the Church, of the
Grand Duke of Wurzburg in Tuscany, of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont,
and of the House of Este in their hereditary possessions." Mier would also
certainly have been called upon to add that it formed an essential part of the
Allies' plan of campaign to summon the inhabitants of these several States to
assist in the restoration of their former Sovereigns. He would then have been
commanded to inform the King of the alterations that had been made in the
treaty as originally drafted. He would have been instructed to tell Murat
that the signing of the additional provision was a sine qua non of an alliance
with Austria. Finally, he would have been requested by Metternich to send
on to its destination Castlereagh's dispatch for Lord William Bentinck.
(Mier to Metternich, 4th February, Dispatch No. 5; nth February,
Dispatch No. 7 ; P.S. 2 ad No. 7. Neipperg and Mier to the Due de Gallo,
loth February, ad P.S. 2 ad No. 7. — Minerva Napolitana. Mier to Bentinck,
4th February, ad No 5. )
THE AWAKENING 409
advantage to Your Majesty. The clause providing for
a good military frontier was too vague ; it might have
been interpreted to mean very little, and have furnished
material later on for unpleasant discussions between the
two Courts. Your Majesty now knows for certain what
you can rely upon as the reward of the efforts you are
about to make for the cause of the Allies ; the terri-
torial acquisition in question will henceforth be guaran-
teed you by the members of the Coalition. The new
form in which our treaty has been drafted was deter-
mined upon in conjunction with Lord Castlereagh. He
has made additions thereto, and it may to some extent
be looked upon as a treaty with England. By reason
of the alterations that have now been embodied in the
treaty Your Majesty may be assured of the accession
of England and the other powers to our treaty of alli-
ance.' The King's answer was that this increase of
territory with a population of 400,000 souls was not
worth the trouble of a treaty of alliance, that it might
be thought by the world in general that this offer alone
decided him to act in concert with the Allies. He would
rather have nothing, he said, and then, when peace was
concluded, if it was desired to grant him an increase, he
would be content with whatever it might be decided to
give him. He therefore desired that the promise of a
good military frontier should be allowed to remain in
the treaty without any definite stipulation being made
in regard to the matter.
" I contested the King's view of the case as well as
the truth of his remarks regarding the alterations made
in the treaty. My arguments were based upon the notes
and comments you were good enough to send me as
well as upon the present position of affairs. I told him
that if we had been alone in the matter we should still
have insisted on the additional proviso, though without
making any change in the text of the treaty as signed,
410 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
but that as Lord CastlereagH would have categorically
refused to accede to the treaty unless the alterations
proposed by him were embodied therein, His Majesty
the Emperor Francis considered himself bound to give
ear to the extremely just and correct representations of
the English Minister, which, as they implied the acces-
sion of England to the treaty, would redound to Murat's
advantage.
" Seeing that the King was unwilling to entertain the
idea of the addition, and that he was apparently abso-
lutely bent on its omission, I told him at last that the
additional clause and all the other alterations which we
had made in the treaty as signed by the Comte de Neip-
perg were regarded by Austria and England as absolutely
essential and as conditio sine qua non, and that unless
His Majesty gave his full and unqualified consent thereto
the treaty would never be signed and ratified. When
I had put the matter thus plainly the King made no
further demur, and requested me to bring him the treaty
in its revised form next morning." l
Next day Mier laid the treaty before Campochiaro,
who was of opinion that the alterations should be allowed
without reserve. As, however, he knew the King was in
an unfavourable mood, he begged Mier not to approach
him for another hour, so that he should have time to
prepare him.
" I found the King calmer than he had been the
day before. We read over the new draft together, as
well as the remarks, comments, and instructions relating
thereto with which Your Highness was good enough to
furnish me. He harked back again upon the additional
article, but seeing that I firmly adhered to what I had
asserted the previous day, namely, that the full and
unqualified acceptance of the new treaty was a conditio
sine qua non of the alliance, he at last said that he un-
i Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February II, 1814.
THE AWAKENING 411
reservedly agreed to it, and proposed that the new treaty
should be signed then and there, for he knew that I had
the necessary powers to that effect, and he desired to
delegate similar authority to the Due di Campochiaro.
We, however, refused out of consideration for the Due di
Gallo and the Comte de Neipperg. Yet knowing how
fickle the^jCing's disposition was,., and fearing lest he
should go back on his promise, which was only a verbal
one, I suggested that he should write an autograph letter
to His Majesty the Emperor Francis, and at the same
time furnish me with a communication which I could
transmit to Lord Bentinck. He agreed, and, with the
assistance of the Due di Campochiaro we proceeded to
draw up the documents in question. I next hinted that
it would look well if he sent off the letter as quickly
as possible, and he decided to dispatch one of his aides-
de-camp with it there and then/' 1
That very day, in fact, Colonel de Beauffremont set out
with Murat's letter for the Emperor of Austria.2 Simul-
taneously Campochiaro sent Mier an official confirmation
of Murat's determination to assent to Metternich's con-
ditions, for mere verbal acquiescence was not enough
for Austria.
Thus all Murat's hopes vanished into thin air. The
kingdom that was to stretch from Messina to the Po,
the union of races from which he had expected so much,
all the gorgeous dreams that for three years had glittered
so alluringly before his eyes, dreams for which he had
deserted his Emperor and betrayed the land of his birth,
where were they now ? Metternich and Castlereagh had
shattered them at a blow. The Austrian letter of the
23rd January had been a rude awakening for Murat. King
of Naples he was, King of Naples he was to remain, but
the chains that bound him to Austria were now heavy
1 Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February n, 1814.
* For the text of this letter see page 337.
412 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
upon him. Truly it was a cruel sequel to his " triumphal
march " from Rome to Ancona, that meeting with
Schinina and that interview with Mier at Bologna. To
feel that after all he had played the traitor to no purpose,
to realise that he was being dragged in captive bonds
beside the chariot wheels of the Allies, all this filled Murat
with such tempestuous rage that for some ten days after
his meeting with Mier he was half inclined to defy the
Powers and refuse to relinquish his prey.
However, a succession of events swiftly showed that
Austria was thoroughly determined not to tolerate
Joachim's encroachments. On the very day that Mier
was making havoc of Murat's hopes at Bologna, Belle-
garde delivered Austria's counterblast to the " Italian "
proclamations in the following terms : —
" While the Emperor of Austria's victorious legions
were arriving from Saxony upon your frontiers, His
Majesty the King of Naples decided to unite his forces
with those of the Allies and to employ all his troops and
his great military talents in furthering the cause of peace.
We are crossing the Adige, we are coming as friends within
the confines of your country. Behold in us your deliverers.
We ask nothing save what is indispensably necessary
for our progress and subsistence. We come to protect
indisputable rights and to re-establish what force and
ambition have overthrown. . . .
" To arms then, men of Piedmont ! Gather one and
all beneath the standards of your King. His courage and
his constancy give promise of the return of those brave
and happy days which were yours so long beneath the
rule of the illustrious house of Savoy.
" Great-hearted Tuscans ! For a space our arms have
broken the quiet of your peaceful homes ; it was but in
order to restore that illustrious and paternal government
whose absence you unceasingly deplore. Unite your
forces with ours, and you will soon behold the return of
THE AWAKENING 413
that beloved Prince, and in his train Art and Science and
the blessings of Peace shall once more come to make their
home in your land.
" People of Italy ! It is the generous desire of the
Allied Princes to rear once again, so far as altered circum-
stances will permit, the political fabric of Europe upon
those time-honoured foundations which for so long were
the sources of its happiness and glory.
' You will thus see flourishing once more in your midst
that ancient House of Este. . . . The city, doubly
immortal, the capital of the whole world, shall cease to
be the appanage of an alien Empire, and shall arise in
fresh glory as the chief city of Christendom. As your
provinces are delivered from the foreign yoke, your
government shall be re-established peacefully, without
violence and with only such changes as place, circum-
stances, and your own needs may dictate." l
On learning of this further confirmation of the set-back
to his plans, Murat trembled with anger. " Marshal
Bellegarde's proclamation of the 5th February/' wrote
Mier, " has completely disconcerted, or rather destroyed,
the hopes and schemes of the Italian Jacobins for bringing
about the union of Italy. The speeches of the King of
Naples, the proclamations issued by his generals, the official
notices and measures of the organisers of the provinces
occupied by his troops, and the state of feeling which
prevailed generally among the officers of his army, gave
a certain appearance of seriousness to those wild schemes.
1 Bellegarde's proclamation. Verona, February 4, 1814. Quoted by M.
Weil.
It may be inquired how it was that Bellegarde was sufficiently acquainted
with the views of the Allies to employ such precise and positive terms in his
proclamation. The answer is that when Metternich sent Mier his instructions
regarding the future settlement of Italy, he enclosed his dispatch in an
envelope with a " flying seal." This enabled Bellegarde to note its contents
on the 2Qth January, when Menz passed through Vicenza. This was how it
was that the Marshal was able to make so prompt a reply and to take up
a position so strongly opposed to Murat's Italianist proclamation.
414 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Marshal Bellegarde's proclamation, therefore, did not meet
with their approval. The Neapolitan Generals and other
officers gave free expression to their discontent, and I
had a hot discussion with the King." It being impossible
to stop the issue of Bellegarde's proclamation, an
attempt was made to stop its circulation. Joachim in
his fury ordered the printer of it to be imprisoned and
his emissaries went about with great zeal tearing it
down wherever they saw it placarded.
Baulked of his prey, Murat's fury knew no bounds.
Protests and threats had no effect upon him. Bellegarde
sent Nugent to the Neapolitan headquarters to serve
under Murat ; a quasi-military arrangement was made
on the yth February between Nugent and Livron settling
the boundaries of the lands to be occupied by the troops,
but nothing availed to console Joachim for the defeat of
his original plans. Like a wild beast at bay, he was
for ever turning back on his tracks, incessantly resolving
to hold Italy and set Austria at defiance.
" All the measures and administrative arrangements
which are being carried out in the provinces occupied
by the Neapolitan troops in general, and particularly in
Tuscany, clearly show that the King's intention was to
retain them under his control until the restoration of
peace, and that he had made up his mind to ignore what
I had said to him on the matter when conveying Your
Highness's remarks regarding the additional article, re-
marks in which you adverted to the plans arranged by
the Allies for the future settlement of Italy, the re-
establishment of the Holy Father, the Grand Duke of
Wurzburg, the King of Sardinia, and the House of Este
in their possessions. As, moreover, I had definitely
told him that it was an essential part of our plan to
call upon the people to aid in the restoration of their
former sovereigns, I asked the King for an explanation
in the matter. After disputes and discussions that
THE AWAKENING 415
ran into several days, he declared that the adminis-
tration of the provinces in question was secured to
him by the treaty signed by the Comte de Neipperg,
that he had already taken possession of them and
installed his administrators, and that he considered
he might retain them until peace was proclaimed. I
thereupon informed him that as soon as M. de Gallo
reached Bologna I should address him a note on the
subject, and that the matter would have to be put straight
before the treaty of alliance was signed. " l
The arrival of Gallo on the loth February had no
soothing effect upon Murat. In fact, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs was the bearer of another regrettable
piece of intelligence. Bentinck, despite the provisions
of the armistice signed by Graham, had refused to con-
clude a treaty of peace. All he would do was to sign
a further armistice. After a series of discussions with
King Ferdinand and the Prince Hereditary, Lord William
had left Palermo on the evening of the 3oth January
on board the America.2 He arrived at Naples during the
following night, and saw Graham, who informed him of
the agreement signed on the 26th January. Despite the
entreaties of Gallo and Neipperg, who begged and prayed
him to conclude a treaty of peace, the British repre-
sentative was inexorable, and absolutely refused to put
his hand to anything but a fresh armistice, from which,
it is hardly necessary to add, Article II. of Graham's
agreement was carefully excluded.
The news of this further reverse was a heavy blow
for Murat, and he grew more furious than ever against
the Coalition and Bentinck, by the former of whom he
was held in check and by the latter treated with con-
tempt. Yet what could he do, bound to them as he
was hand and foot ?
1 Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February II, 1814.
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, January 30, 1814.
416 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
As though to complete the King's discomfiture, Mier,
faithful to his word, had an interview with Neipperg
immediately on the latter 's arrival at the Court of Naples.
He gave him full particulars of Murat's attempted defiance
of Austria, and both of them drew up and sent to Gallo
the Note with which Mier had threatened the King. It
ran as follows : —
" The undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the Emperor of Austria hasten to communicate
to His Excellency Monsieur le Due di Gallo a copy of
the Treaty of Alliance signed at Naples under date
nth January last with the alterations and additions
which have been deemed necessary, and to which His
Neapolitan Majesty gave his full and unqualified assent
in the autograph letter which he addressed on this sub-
ject to His Majesty the Emperor Francis on the 4th
of this month, whereof the final settlement by the re-
spective plenipotentiaries has been delayed solely on
account of the absence of Monsieur le Due di Gallo and
the Comte de Neipperg.
" The Comte de Mier, on arriving at Bologna, sub-
mitted the new draft and the additional article to His
Majesty the King of Naples and dealt at considerable
length with the general outline of the agreement arrived
at between the Allies regarding the political settlement
of Europe as a whole, with more particular reference to
the reinstatement of the Holy Father in the States of
the Church, and the restoration of the Grand Duke of
Wurzburg to Tuscany, of the King of Sardinia to Pied-
mont, and of the House of Este to their hereditary pos-
sessions. He pointed out to His Majesty that the
summoning of the inhabitants of these various States
to assist in bringing about the return of their former
rulers was an integral part of the Coalition programme,
the deputations from all parts of the country leaving no
room for doubt regarding the state of public opinion on
THE AWAKENING 417
the matter. It would therefore follow that in adopting
an opposite line of conduct the King would not only be
acting in contrariety to the intentions of the Allies, but
would be placing an obstacle in the way of their acces-
sion to our treaty and to our ratification of the same.
" His Majesty the King of Naples, by giving his un-
qualified assent to the various modifications introduced
into the existing treaty after consultation with the
British Cabinet, and by giving due consideration to the
point of view of the allied powers, may rest assured
that no difficulties will be offered to the ratification of
the treaty, and, in order that the active co-operation of
the Neapolitan forces with Austria . . . should not be
delayed by the formalities attendant upon the exchange
of these ratifications, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria
has, pending the dispatch of the treaty in its regular
form, sent to His Neapolitan Majesty a preliminary but
perfectly binding ratification in the form of an auto-
graph letter, a plan which has of late years been very
generally followed in transactions between the Allies.
" The undersigned urge His Excellency the Due di
Gallo to conclude without further delay the treaty of
alliance between the two Courts, and express the hope
that His Majesty will henceforth allow nothing to interfere
with the active and vigorous co-operation of his army
in order to attain the object set forth in the treaty, the
stipulations in favour of the King of Naples being de-
pendent upon the complete fulfilment of his obligations
in this respect." l
On receiving the Note of the Austrian plenipoten-
tiaries, following as it did so hard on the bad news
brought by Gallo, the King had an attack of fever
similar to those which the Emperor's comminatory
epistles had formerly been wont to bring upon him.
On the morning of the nth, while his Minister was
1 Neipperg and Mier to the Due di Gallo. Bologna, February 10, 1814.
2D
418 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
arguing desperately with the two Austrians and doing
his utmost, in accordance with Joachim's instructions,
to avoid the necessity of making an official reply to the
Note of the previous day, the King was obliged to take
to his bed, and would see neither Gallo, who was waiting
for further orders, nor Catinelli, who had arrived with
a message from Bentinck.
On the morrow, however, beaten and broken, Murat
gave way on every point, and to the Note that had been
presented by Neipperg and Mier, Gallo made the follow-
ing reply :
" The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs to His
Majesty the King of Naples, duly submitted to the King
his Master the Note presented on the loth instant by
the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia.
"He is now commanded to state in reply that the
King, having already informed His Majesty the Emperor
of Austria in an autograph letter of the 5th February
of his willingness to agree to the alterations proposed
by His Imperial Majesty to the treaty signed by their
respective representatives on the nth January, and of
his desire to give His Majesty the Emperor by such
assent a further proof of his unlimited confidence, he
has now instructed the undersigned to accept without
reserve all the suggested alterations, and to sign a new
treaty under the same date embodying all the modifica-
tions agreed upon.
" The King also consents that, in view of the circum-
stances, the ratification of the treaty about to be signed
should be made in the first instance by autograph letters
of the two Sovereigns pending the dispatch of the formal
ratifications by the respective Chancelleries, which dis-
patch shall take place at the earliest possible moment.
" The King's own preliminary ratification has already
been forwarded to His Majesty the Emperor in a letter
THE AWAKENING
419
of the 5th February. His Majesty therefore in his turn
eagerly awaits the autograph letter from His Majesty
the Emperor and King which his plenipotentiaries pro-
mised, as long ago as the 4th, to present within a few
days' time, the understanding that such a letter would
be forthcoming having alone enabled the King to agree
to the alterations put forward and to send his autograph
ratification to His Imperial Majesty.
" The moment the King receives the promised ratifi-
cation, the moment he formally becomes an integral
member of the Coalition, he will hasten to act in accord-
ance with the views and principles set forth by the
Austrian plenipotentiaries regarding the political settle-
ment of Italy and Europe in general.
" GALLO." *
That same night the second treaty was signed.
Murat's fate was now in Austria's hands. Metternich's
agents raised the paean of victory. " The undersigned,"
they wrote to the Chancellor, " beg to send your High-
ness, by the hands of the Count de Schonfeldt, the new
treaty of alliance that has been concluded with the
Court of Naples. The same was signed yesterday evening,
having been drawn up in the new form and with the
alterations which your Highness deemed necessary. To
these alterations the King of Naples has given his un-
qualified assent, not only in the autograph letter which
he has dispatched to our august Sovereign, but also in
answer to a Note which we deemed it incumbent upon
us to address to the Due di Gallo before proceeding to
1 Gallo to Neipperg and Mier. Bologna, February 12, 1814. This
contradicts the following assertion by M. Masson : — " Since Bellegarde issued
his proclamation he had got a drubbing at the Mincio, and had grown more
prudent. Murat had not signed the declaration which Neipperg and Mier
were anxious to get from him, and he considered that his hands were free."
{Napoleon et safamille.)
420 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
sign the treaty, and whereto he made a satisfactory
reply." x
In the document he had just signed Murat had prac-
tically renounced all claim to the throne of Italy. He
now knew what Austria meant — he realised how com-
pletely Metternich had fooled him with his promise of
a good military frontier. " 400,000 souls/' forsooth !
A beggarly pittance " that wasn't worth putting down
in a treaty ! " And being thus utterly taken in, being
compelled to give up all idea of the throne of Italy, he
came to hate Austria — to look on her as an enemy much
rather than an ally. Insatiably ambitious still, he must
needs find something to satisfy his hunger for greatness.
Metternich had cheated him ; why should he not cheat
Metternich ? To Napoleon therefore he decided to turn
once more, and even when he put his hand to the new
treaty, Murat had it in mind to throw over Austria for
France.
Even before the I2th February he was attempting to
renew relations with France, though one would have
thought that his Bologna proclamation had severed
them for ever. Certainly there would have been no
attempt to renew them had Austria adhered to the
treaty of the 8th January. But on the 3ist January
Murat met Schinina on the road to Ancona, and Schinina's
disconcerting news caused him, figuratively speaking, to
face to the right-about. Austria wanted to carry the
curtailment process too far, to pare away his position
a little too much, and therefore he would apply to
France. This step was rendered the more easy as
General Gifflenga had acquainted Eugene with the
King's plans, and Eugene, on the 28th January, had
sent Joachim a letter which, though expressing surprise
at his line of conduct, concluded in the following terms :
" Your Majesty has said — and I place absolute reliance
1 Neipperg and Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 13, 1814.
THE AWAKENING 421
on your royal word — that you will carry out no offensive
movement against the Imperial forces under my com-
mand without giving me full and sufficient warning." 1
On receipt of this letter Murat, who in the meantime
had seen Schinina, immediately reopened communica-
tions with Eugene. " I received Your Imperial High-
ness's letter yesterday on the road to Ancona. I again
repeat my promise not to commence hostilities without /]
giving you due warning, and I earnestly pray that peace,/ 1
of which the world is so sorely in need, may come and/ 1
spare me the pain of entering into conflict with YOUD
Imperial Highness's troops — with my own countrymen! \
Remember me to the Emperor, my dear Eugene : tell \
him of my grief — I weep as I pen these words." \
It was time for him to make professions of loyalty
and tenderness towards the Emperor, for his need was__
^the measure of his affection. On the 4th ±<ebruary~
Corner brought Joacfiim's letter to Eugene. The Vice-
roy, far from suspecting the profound revulsion which
Schinina 's communication had caused in the mind of
Murat, supposed that his views were still the same, and
that " he had not yet decided upon war." Joachim
was anxious to assure him that he need apprehend
nothing from him, and messages for Eugene were dis-
patched in hot haste. First of all there was Carascosa,
who availed himself of the opportunity offered by a
reconnoitring movement before Reggio to send a letter
from the King to the Viceroy. A few days later a
Neapolitan officer came to seek out the Viceroy. " As
soon," says Eugene, " as the King of Naples knew that
I had won the battle of the Mincio, he sent an officer
to me with friendly overtures. I immediately deputed
Bataille to arrange matters. It would be a first-rate
thing for me if I could prevail on him to declare for us."
On the other hand, Murat, now that he was coquetting
1 The Viceroy to Murat. Verona, January 28, 1814.
422 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with Eugene, would pay no heed to Bellegarde's ad-
vances, and though he had sent him word -that he was
prepared to give him his active support, this was merely
an official promise indited under constant pressure from
Mier, and he made up his mind that he would not fulfil
it. He secretly gave orders of the most definite descrip-
tion that the Austrians were on no account to be per-
mitted to pass his outposts. Relying on the assistance
of the King of Naples, Bellegarde joined battle with
Eugene by the Mincio, and on the very morning of the
conflict urged him to send his Neapolitan divisions to
Nugent 's support. The summons was made in vain ;
not a man stirred, and to Murat's inaction Eugene was
indebted for his partial success. But when Gallo and
Neipperg arrived at Bologna, when it became painfully
certain that Bentinck would not enter into negotiations
for peace, when the joint efforts of Neipperg and Mier
constrained him to assent to Austria's views and to sign
the new treaty, and, above all, when Pignatelli-Strongoli
arrived on the scene, the King found himself obliged to
come to heel.
On the I4th February, two days after the second
treaty had been signed, Pignatelli appeared with the
famous letter from the Austrian Emperor, the letter for
which Joachim, Mier, and Neipperg had been unceasingly
clamouring. Just at the moment Joachim would per-
haps have been quite content to do without it, but as
he had promised Mier to act as soon as he received the
letter, as he had complained in every one's hearing of
the time it took to obtain a reply,1 as he had pledged
his word to give Austria his active support as soon as
he himself knew how he stood, he was bound to do some-
thing, though he determined that that something should
not exceed the minimum. Very loth to use the sword,
he deemed it enough to employ the pen, and sent orders
1 Wilson, Private Diary of Public Events during 1812, 1813, 1814, &c.
THE AWAKENING 423
to General Millet to dispatch to Vignolle, Eugene's Chief
of Staff, an official declaration of war. He himself wrote
to Bellegarde on the I5th February, saying that he would
join him with two divisions when the Austrians had
passed the Mincio. The letter was greeted with laughter
at the Austrian headquarters.1 Nevertheless, his position
with regard to his allies was strictly correct, and they
could find nothing wherewith to reproach him. But
they seemed to go out of their way to vex him, to alienate
him from their cause. On the iyth February there
arrived at the Neapolitan headquarters one Catinelli,
who had been sent thither by Bentinck. The latter,
being desirous of landing troops at Leghorn, requested
•that they might make use of Tuscan territory. The
King refused. According to him, the Tuscans had begged
and prayed him to occupy their country. He had saved
it from anarchy, and the inhabitants were well content
with his government. He made the most of his rights
as first comer, and declared to Catinelli that if Bentinck
particularly desired it, he would let him have Leghorn
as soon as he had taken it with a portion of the sur-
rounding district. That was as much as he could do.
Thereupon the other made reply that " they were grands
seigneurs enough to have a right to the whole house
without being limited to the ground-floor or the en-
tresol." * Knowing that Catinelli was an Italian,
Joachim endeavoured to win him over to his cause.
He managed to get rid of Mier, who had been present
up to that point, and asked why England was so dead
against making peace with Naples. If England were
willing, Italy might be made a free and united country.
" I shall have everything to fear, and my throne will be
1 ' ' This promise is only conditional, and reminds me of Mrs. Glasse's
directions for dressing a dolphin." — Wilson, Private Diary of Public Events
during 1812, 1813, 1814, &c.
* Catinelli's report to Bentinck. Cited by M. Weil.
424 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
very unstable, so long as we are at war with England,"
said the King. " I shall fight on if I am attacked, and
I shall amaze the world, but I shall go under, whereas
with England at my back I could resist all the powers
of the Continent. I owe a great deal to my people ;
they love me, and have made sacrifices on my behalf ;
their welfare I regard as sacred. Italy certainly de-
serves a better fate than that which Austria has in
store for her. Only England can ward off the ill that
will certainly befall her. I have a great affection for
the Italians. They were of old the foremost race in the
world, and they might once more recover their position." l
Catinelli knew not what reply to make to these overtures.
But as long ago as 1813 Bentinck had seen through
Murat's designs, and had no intention of engaging in
hostilities with Austria for the sake of putting Joachim
on the throne of Italy.
Catinelli having taken his departure, the King, who
was conscious that Tuscany was slipping through his
fingers, and feared that England might play with him
as Austria had done, felt less inclination than ever to
assist in his own undoing. He immediately ordered
Millet to send back Carascosa's troops, and left Nugent
unsupported. On the following morning, the i8th, he
wrote a letter to Bellegarde in which he gave free vent
to his spleen against Bentinck.
" There is another matter I want to discuss with
you, a matter which, though of secondary importance,
may have a great effect on the ultimate success of the
campaign : I mean the co-operation of Lord William
Bentinck.
' You told me that you had suggested that he should
land his troops at Genoa, and yesterday the Comte de
Mier informed Lieutenant-Colonel Catinelli that the
English would land at Leghorn. According to Article 4
1 Catinelli's report to Bentinck.
THE AWAKENING 425
of the agreement entered into between Lord W. Bentinck
and my Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was provided
that a military arrangement regarding the co-operation
of the English should be agreed upon between the leaders
of the Austrian, Neapolitan, and English armies. I shall
therefore be unable to regard as valid any arrangement
that conflicts with the said agreement, a copy of which
is in the hands of the Comte de Neipperg.
" Besides, the support of the English, valuable as it
would be at Genoa, would be useless in Tuscany unless
after landing at Leghorn they marched straight away
towards the Po. For my part, I adhere to the view that
the proper place for the English to land would be be-
tween Genoa and Savona." l
Such was Murat's state of mind when, the very same
day, an envoy arrived from Eugene. The latter, a little
taken aback at Murat's declaration of war, considered
it advisable to send word to the King of the victories
that had been won at Champaubert and Montmirail, and
at. the same time to attempt to find out what he really
intended to do. To this end Corner was dispatched to
the Neapolitan headquarters. His stay was brief. On
the 1 8th he saw Murat, who asked for a detailed account
of the Emperor's victories, and said that the ratification
of his treaty with Austria had not yet arrived. On the
igth he was back again with Eugene giving an account
of his mission. Taking his cue from what his envoy
told him, the Viceroy forwarded Murat journals giving
a full account of Napoleon's victories. Thus friendly
relations were resumed. So firm, in fact, was the truce
that Murat sent word to Eugene of his slightest move-
ments. Communications of some sort or another were
constantly passing between the two headquarters. On
the 25th the King, having come to inspect the defence-
works on the Po, made it his first care to send a reassur-
1 Murat to Bellegarde. Modena, February 18, 1814.
426 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
ing message to the Viceroy. " The Neapolitan troops
will make no move. His mind may be completely at
rest on that point ; " and, in order that he might be
still further reassured, Eugene was informed that, " until
further orders, no move would be effected of such a
nature as to compel the Viceroy to evacuate his posi-
tion." These were comforting messages — too comforting,
indeed, for Eugene, who knew his Murat, and who, his
suspicions aroused by so many marks of friendship,
deemed it his duty to keep a more vigilant eye than
ever on the Neapolitans.
Joachim had good reasons for smoothing Eugene
down and for putting off Bellegarde with prevarications
that drove the latter to desperation. The King felt
that Bentinck's arrival in Upper Italy would sound the
death-knell of his hopes. There is no doubt that Mier's
communication of the 4th February at Bologna and the
conversations that took place between them during the
ensuing week, as well as Neipperg's arrival and the joint
note addressed to him by the Austrian plenipotentiaries,
had made a deep impression on his mind, and had to a
great extent undeceived him ; still, these were merely
words after ah1. Nowhere as yet was Murat confronted
with an adversary, at least with an adversary drawn up
against him in battle array, with muskets and cannon
ready to fire, an adversary, in a word, with whom he
would have to fight in grim earnest for possession of the
coveted lands.
But the whole complexion of affairs might be altered
by Bentinck's appearance on the scene. An obstinate
determination on his part to maintain his hold on Tuscany
might lead to serious consequences. So unwilling was
he, however, to relinquish his prey that it had momen-
tarily entered his head to send Gallo to negotiate matters
with the Englishman. " The Chevalier Schinina," writes
Gallo to Murat, " has just conveyed to me Your Majesty's
THE AWAKENING 427
instructions. I am ready to start for Leghorn to-morrow
with Count Mier if Your Majesty so commands. ... I
beseech Your Majesty to recognise once and for all that
nothing in the world will induce Lord Bentinck to abandon
his claim to settle the affairs of Tuscany, to proclaim the
Grand Duke, and to reinstate him in his dominions ; the
task would be easy of execution and is too flattering
to Bentinck's vanity. . . .
" Matters are so far advanced that I venture to think
Your Majesty's sole means of extricating yourself from
an imbroglio that might be fraught with infinitely serious
possibilities, is to proclaim the Grand Duke's restoration
before the English and Austrians proclaim it for you,
and consequently before Lord W. Bentinck and his
forces show themselves off Leghorn.
" Your Majesty could have nothing to say against
this measure either on military or political grounds,
since, having abandoned your claim to Tuscany, no one
could more fittingly rule there, from your point of view,
than the Archduke Ferdinand. The whole question,
therefore, is whether Your Majesty will hand over Tuscany
a few weeks sooner or a few weeks later." 1
Not so ! The question was a weightier one than that.
All along Murat had concealed his hand from Gallo, and
now once again he had managed to dissemble his real
aims. It was no question of a few weeks sooner or later
that was tormenting Murat well-nigh to desperation ; it
was a question of life or death, of the triumph or ruin
of his life-work and his dearest hopes, for Bentinck's
appearance would mean the overthrow, the irrevocable
overthrow, of all his plans. How could Gallo imagine
for a moment that the King would fall in with his pro-
posal to restore Tuscany to the Grand Duke ? He,
Gallo, was a diplomat ; let him then examine with a
1 Gallo to Murat. Bologna, February 23, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil,
Corrcspondancc historique et archtologique.
428 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
diplomat's eye the position of Italy as at the 24th
February, and he would see the nature and extent of
Murat's expectations. Spread over the whole of
Northern Italy, the Neapolitan troops had long been
in occupation of the Papal States, Tuscany, Modena,
and the Duchy of Parma. Neapolitan administrators
were already at work in what had once been the French
Departments of Rome, Trasimeno, Metauro, Musone, and
Tronto. The French fortresses alone held out, and now,
as the result of secret dealings between Fouche" and
himself, they too were to be delivered into his hands.
What the conditions of their surrender might be mattered
little to him if surrendered they were. The Austrians
expressed amazement that, contrary to all precedent, the
capitulating troops were sent home through the enemy's
lines still retaining their arms. That was of no moment
for Murat, provided that Italy, or as much of Italy as
he occupied, were rid of the French troops. On the
1 5th February the capitulation of Ancona was agreed
to, and the fortress was handed over on the i8th. On
the igth the city of Leghorn was surrendered. At
Florence the forts of St. John the Baptist and the Belve-
dere were given up to the Neapolitans. Finally, to put
the finishing touch on Joachim's work, Fouche signed
the treaty of Lucca, and placed the King in possession
of the few remaining places over which the tricolour still
floated. By the agreement signed that day Miollis was
compelled to quit the Castle of San Angelo, and La
Salcette to relinquish Civita Vecchia.
By the morning of the 25th February Italy, right up
to the Po, was clear of the French and the Austrians.
None but Murat's soldiers lay encamped there, none
but Murat was in command. How long the situation
would endure none could tell, but it would be no great
while. Dark clouds were gathering, and told the King
that if he would succeed in his final effort to retain these
land
THE AWAKENING 429
s beneath his sway he had little time to lose. Ben-
tinck was proclaiming far and wide that he was coming
to Leghorn ; his emissaries were already scouring the
country. Bellegarde's proclamation of the 4th February
had had a powerful effect on the feelings of the people.
Every day the rumours of the Pope's return gathered
strength, ditties about his home-coming were in every-
body's mouth, and the police had perforce to listen to
what they were powerless to suppress.1
It was, then, necessary to press forward ; the sands
were running out. What else remained for Murat to
do ? Merely to turn once again to Napoleon, to ask
him yet once more to confirm him in the possession of
the lands he had occupied, and then to join hands with
Eugene, to unite the forces of Naples and France, and
drive the English and the Austrians out of Italy. Murat
would then be master of the situation. To propitiate
Eugene, he had overwhelmed him with courtesies and
attentions. It was important to create a favourable
impression in the mind of the Emperor's lieutenant,
since through him would probably be negotiated the
treaty of the future. But beyond everything Joachim
needed troops, for if there was to be war with Austria,
war not with the pen this time, but with the sword, the
Neapolitan army must needs be reinforced to cope suc-
cessfully with Bellegarde, and during the period from
the 22nd February to the ist March we have evidence
of the great efforts put forth by Murat to organise fresh
forces. The idea of so doing had already occurred to
him when Austria had compelled him to toe the line
on that memorable 4th February. On the 7th he had
requested Pepe — a well-known " unionist " — to form an
Italian legion.2 He now took up the idea again and
1 Zuccari to Gallo. Rome, February 16, 1814. Naples, Archi-vio di
Stato.
2 Pepe, Mdtnorie.
430 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
developed it as far as he could. On the 22nd February
a royal decree granted a general pardon to >all refractory
recruits and to all deserters under the Italian conscription
provided that they presented themselves within a month
for service in the departmental guards. Men were beaten
up from every possible quarter. The King gave instruc-
tions that deserters and all disbanded Italian troops were to
be summoned to rejoin the colours. General Pinodo, who
was entrusted with this task, was given carte blanche to do
as best he could in the various departments. Forcible
recruiting went on everywhere. The prisons were
emptied of their tenants, convicts were given arms,
deserters from the Austrian outposts were pressed into
the service, and when Nugent demanded that they
should be sent back to him, it was alleged that it was
their own wish to remain, though, as a matter of fact,
their services had been paid for to the tune of two,
three, and occasionally four louis per man.1 An endeavour
was made to win over the Military College at Modena,
but the tempting offer was not accepted. Never had
recruiting been so actively carried on in Italy as at this
moment. All these soldiers were to be made into de-
partmental guards, and each department was to have
six regiments or thereabouts. Since it was necessary
to find leaders for this human herd, which consisted of
all the male inhabitants between the ages of seventeen
and fifty, the King ordered that the Italian officers who
had quitted Eugene's army should be approached in the
matter. They were for the most part scattered about
the Marches ; some few of them had just got as far as
Rome. All were apparently waiting to see what line
Generals Pino, Mazzuchelli, Zucchi, and Palombini were
going to take. They complained that the King had not
spoken out plainly enough. They had been waiting for
a personal proclamation from the King himself, for a
1 Mtmorie sulla condotta politico, e militare tenuta da Gioacchino Murat.
THE AWAKENING 431
frank and emphatic statement of his policy with regard
to Italy. Instead of that, they said, he had only spoken
through his generals, and what they had said amounted
on the whole to very little. However, in spite of their
grievances, they agreed to march. Finally Joachim made
appeal to the ban and arriere-ban of Naples. From
Bologna, on the ist March, he signed a decree enact-
ing that the four thousand conscripts of the reserve
formed in pursuance of the decree of the 24th December
1813 should be held at the disposal of the Minister
for War.
What time these various measures for securing the
future independence of Italy were being put into execu-
tion, Murat had not been unmindful of Napoleon. By
the 28th February he considered his preparations suffi-
ciently advanced to allow him to disclose his aims, and
that day he wrote the Emperor a letter, probably the
first since his epistle of the I5th January in which he
had announced his intention of cutting himself adrift
from France.
" Sire/' he said, " Your Majesty is beset by dangers.
France is threatened in her very capital, and I am not
suffered to die for you. I who love you seem to be
your foe. Sire, one word from you, and I sacrifice my
family and my subjects. Ruin will be my lot, but what
matter. I shall have served you, I shall have proved
to you that you had no better friend than I. ... I
ask nothing more of you at the moment, provided the
Viceroy makes known to you my conduct.
" The tears which fill my eyes forbid me to continue.
I am here alone in the midst of strangers. Even my
tears I must not suffer to be seen. By this letter I
resign my future wholly into your hands. My life is
yours. Could you but see me, could you but form an
idea of the grief which for two months I have suffered,
you would have pity on me. Love me till the end :
432 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
never was I worthier your affection. Your friend till
death." i
All that was merely introductory. Murat, never
having had the courage to unburden himself directly
to the Emperor concerning the question which he had so
much at heart — to wit, the disposal of Italy — bethought
himself of a subterfuge, and when sending this letter to
the Emperor he dispatched Brunetti, the Secretary to
the Italian Legation at Naples, to confer with Eugene.
Brunetti 's mission was a verbal one (for Murat con-
sidered it too dangerous to commit his promises to
writing), and it consisted in undertaking on the King's
behalf that his troops should abstain from all hostile
action against the Imperial forces until His Majesty the
Emperor had sent a reply to the overtures that had been
made to him. In point of fact, his real task was to
request Eugene to transmit to Napoleon the ultimatum
which Murat had not dared to send himself. Brunetti
accordingly handed the Viceroy a note and begged him,
in Joachim's name, to forward it to the Emperor. This
note Eugene refers to as a " ridiculous document," and
says that it gives an idea of " the madness that had
taken hold of the King." 2 Had he examined the matter
a little more closely he would have perceived that it
was but a formal restatement of Joachim's desiderata,
the division of Italy into two portions, with the Po for
boundary and the recognition of himself (Joachim) as
King of a free and united Italy. " On these conditions
Joachim was ready to declare against the Austrians."
1 This letter is undated. But the knowledge we have of the negotiations
entered into by Murat with the Emperor through Eugene, negotiations to
which he refers in the letter itself when he says, " I ask nothing more of you
at the moment, provided the Viceroy makes known to you my conduct,"
enables us to fix the date. The letter was sent to the Emperor the same day
that Brunetti set out to visit Eugene. It was intended to serve as an intro-
duction to the proposals which the Viceroy was to convey to the Emperor.
* Eugene to the Emperor. Volta, March I, 1814. Archives de la Guerre.
THE AWAKENING 433
The " conditions " were certainly rather out of harmony
with the " tears " of repentance Murat had spoken of
in his letter to his brother-in-law, but that mattered
little. The main point was to prevail on the Viceroy
to send on his proposals since, for all his effrontery, he
had not the face to send them himself.
Zucchi and Carascosa sat down to discuss the said
conditions. The Neapolitan general's first step was to
ask whether the Viceroy had received due authority
from the Emperor to negotiate. Zucchi replied with
astonishment that there was no need, since Eugene, the
Emperor's lieutenant, was commander-in-chief. Where-
upon Carascosa declined to proceed. It therefore became
necessary to wait for powers. Murat evidently had not
forgotten the manner in which he had been deceived by
Austria. He did not mean to be fooled again this time
as he had once been fooled by Metternich.
Eugene on his side encouraged the King in his favour-
able attitude towards France. On the 2nd March
Grenier had fought an engagement near Parma and
taken the city. Murat was not unconnected with the
victory. At the last moment he had given orders to
his troops to fall back, and thus left the Austrians to
their own devices. It happened that among the prisoners
Grenier discovered some sixty Neapolitan soldiers, who
were sent back into their own lines with a letter from
the Viceroy. " I am now more than ever anxious to
know definitely what Your Majesty's intentions are. . . .
I must regulate my movements accordingly. ... I there-
fore beg you to let me know what I am to hope or fear
from your army. I trust that your reply will be a
favourable one, and I venture to ask that it shall be
explicit. The withdrawal of the Austrians should now
permit Your Majesty to listen to the dictates of your
interests and your heart."
While this exchange of compliments was taking place
434 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
between the two adversaries, Colonel de Beauffremont
suddenly arrived at Modena. On the 3rd March he
brought the King the eagerly awaited ratification of the
Austrian Emperor. Murat's mind was now at rest as
far as Austria was concerned, and this occasioned him
a certain degree of satisfaction. He was a master of
exaggerated statement, and as it was necessary for him
to disguise [his real intentions beneath a wealth of
ixuriant rhetoric and effusive sentiment, he adopted
the dithyrambic tone with Mier. " Not until now," he
said, " now that its possession has been guaranteed to
me by Austria, have I felt certain of my crown. Surely
no one else would have done what I have done. With-
out waiting to be assured of your alliance, beset with
misgivings at the non-ratification of our original treaty,
I nevertheless threw down the gauntlet to France, drove
out her troops and her officials from a part of Italy, lent
my support to the operations of your army, though not,
it is true, with all the vigour of which I was capable,
for I was anxious to husband the strength of my troops.
So long as I had no guarantee from you that I and my
children should retain the Kingdom of Naples, my sole
hope lay in my little army. I should have defended
myself to the very last against the whole world had you
forsaken me. Now that Naples is secured to me, I can
afford to lose my whole army in battling with France,
for I have the certainty that I shall return to my country
King and be recognised as such by all the powers
Europe."
This eloquence was intended for the Allies, and it fell
pleasantly upon their ears. Not only Mier, but Belle-
garde and his staff, were put off the proper scent.1 But
to complete the work of deceit, thoroughly to play the part
of the staunch and faithful ally, Murat thought it advisable
1 Murat joyfully received on the 4th the ratification of his treaty with
Austria. — Wilson, Private Diary.
THE AWAKENING 435
to send a letter to Metternich as well. " I feel," he said,
" that I must tell you how grateful I am for all your
good offices in the negotiations which have just been
brought to such a happy issue. Now that Austria is
my ally, I can give myself up unreservedly to that
feeling of confidence which the integrity of her prin-
ciples and, above all, the staunchness of her present
Sovereign, cannot fail to inspire. I have shown that
ambition was not among my motives by accepting an
indemnity that was wholly disproportionate to the sacri-
fices I had agreed to make and to the magnitude of the
assistance to be rendered by the army of 50,000 men
which I command in person. J^ shall therefore be
^ghting for^Kl^thei^object^rianthat ~oi assisting
the^ great allied powers IcT brrng"~about^ie restora-
tion^ of peace, and I^bnly hope that when the work
of reorganisation is taken in hand, Europe will be
so constituted that peace may find therein a firm and
lasting abode.
" The means of force which may be found in the
countries that we have occupied must not be left without
employment. It would be an easy matter to organise
the troops there, but great care must be exercised in
order to avoid disquieting public opinion by making too
sudden an announcement of approaching changes. What
is to become of each country will be determined when
peace is made ; until that great day arrives we should
restrict ourselves to making the people feel that they
have been delivered from an unwelcome domination, and
that it is their duty to bestir themselves to prevent its
return. I could already have raised troops thus in the
Papal States and in Tuscany, but I postponed the measure
in order to avoid taking any step that had not been
agreed on in advance with His Majesty the Emperor of
Austria. Nevertheless, I regard such a measure as being
one of absolute necessity, and I am about to pave the
436 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
way so that if it is to be carried out it may be done
without unnecessary delay.
" There is some talk of proclaiming new sovereigns
in each country, but apart from the fact that such acts
could only take place as a result of the provisions of the
treaty of peace, they would have the twofold disadvan-
tage of depriving us of all the resources offered by the
said countries and of rendering the government of the new
rulers odious by establishing it at a time when the pro-
secution of the war would make it necessary to impose
so many sacrifices on the inhabitants." *
In thus pledging his word to remain loyal to Austria,
Murat was seeking to discount the effect of Bellegarde's
reports regarding his organisation of the countries occu-
pied by his troops and the considerable military pre-
parations, which could not have passed unperceived. In
advising Metternich that he had taken and would take
no steps which had not been agreed on in advance with
Austria, he purposely overlooked all the measures to
which he had committed himself in February, consider-
ing that he would be able to disarm Mier's criticism by
telling him that he had been in direct communication
with Metternich. He had formerly employed the same
tactics with Durant, to whom he used to declare that
he had arranged matters with the Emperor.
v Such being the state of affairs, it need scarcely astonish
us that while on the one hand Murat sent word to Eugene
that he was not yet in a position to give him a definite
reply about their entente, on the other, he gave orders
Jhat support was to be given to the Austrians. It
seemed to him that in view of his statements to Mier and
his promises to Metternich he really ought to make a show
of rendering them assistance ; to make a show, no more,
for, notwithstanding the numerous commands he was
1 Murat to Metternich, Modena, March 4, 1814. Quoted by M. Lumbroso,
Revue de Paris.
THE AWAKENING 437
dictating, Murat thoroughly intended to give the French
plenty of warning of the part he intended to play.
It having been decided to attack General Severoli,
who was defending Reggio, the King ordered Carascosa
to join forces with the Austrians. On the morning of
the yth the combined armies began to advance against
the French, but Joachim had taken precautions. From
Modena he sent Nugent orders to delay his forward
movement on Reggio because he himself proposed to
reconnoitre the position in person about noon. He would
thus be able to send warning to Severoli and afford him
an opportunity to fall back. Unfortunately, Nugent had
already begun to move, and it was impossible to carry
out the order. As, moreover, the outposts were held by
Austrians, Murat 's messenger to Severoli was compelled
to make a wide detour, and failed to arrive in time to
give the necessary warning. The French columns gave
way beneath the shock of the attack, Severoli had one
of his legs shot away by a cannon-ball, and was obliged
to hand over the command to Rambourg. Surrounded
and borne down on every side, the French had only
death or surrender before them when Murat arrived on
the scene and sent Rambourg an offer to suspend hos-
tilities for an hour to allow him to withdraw to Parma.
The offer was at once accepted, and " the Austrian troops,
who were already in possession of the Parma road, were,
to their intense indignation, compelled to retire and
allow the enemy to pass by unmolested." l
It was when the Emperor himself was fighting for
very life that he learned how matters had been going
in Italy. On the I3th February he had received Fouche's
letters. They removed every vestige of hope that Murat
would return to his allegiance, and gave unmistakable
proof of the " hideous ingratitude " of Caroline and her
husband. That very day he determined to break with
1 Journal de Nugent, with Verklein's notes. Quoted by M. Weil.
438 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
them. The Neapolitan Ambassador received orders to
quit. The French vessels were commanded to attack
the Neapolitans. All French subjects in the service of
Naples were ordered to return home. The breach seemed
final. On the I7th Caulaincourt sent Carignano his
passports, and the latter left Paris on the 23rd. But the
successes gained at Champaubert and Montmirail altered
the Emperor's plans. Victory, it seemed, was about to
smile on him once more. Perhaps it might yet be
possible to rid France of her foes. However, on the
26th February, when appearances pointed to the prob-
able failure of the Chatillon conferences, the Emperor
resolved, with infinite reluctance no doubt, to make
advances to Murat. " It appears," he said in a letter
to Joseph, " that the King of Naples has not yet had
his treaty ratified by the Allies, and I want you to send
one of your people to him as quickly as possible. Tell
him plainly how iniquitous his conduct has been, and
offer your services as mediator in bringing about a
reconciliation. Say that there is no other alternative
open to him, and that if he rejects it either France or
the Allies will bring about his overthrow. I need not
go into all you can say now. The English do not even
recognise him as a King. Write to the Queen too ; tell
her that nothing can justify her ingratitude, and that
even the Allies are revolted at it. Say that as no battle
has yet taken place between the French and Neapolitan
troops, all may still be settled, but that there is not a
moment to lose. As Fouche is in those parts, you might
tell him to associate himself in this affair with your
emissary." l On receipt of this letter Joseph dispatched
Faitpoult, but his mission proved a failure.
On the 1 2th March the Emperor received Joachim's
letter of the 28th February, the proposals which the
King had asked Eugene to forward, as well as a letter
1 Corrcspondance, 21,382.
THE AWAKENING 439
>m Eugene himself. Harsh as Murat's conditions may
have been, the Emperor was not in a position to criticise
them, far less reject them. However much it galled
him to be dictated to by his brother-in-law, he was
obliged to bow to the force of circumstances. Napoleon
therefore immediately wrote off to Eugene as follows :
" I am sending you a -copy of an extraordinary letter I
have just had from the King of Naples. Seeing that
France and-^are^£fcde^ih^rips-jadth ttie^agga.ssms, snch^
Hments are jruly inconceivable.
re^also received your letter and the draft treaty
which the King sent you. You regard the idea as mad-
ness. Never mind ; send an agent to thisjnost extra^
nnjrnary of traitorqjniH make a treaty with him in my
name. Leave Piedmont and Genoa alone, and split up
the rest of Italy into two kingdoms. Arrange that the
treaty shall be kept secret until the Austrians have been
cleared out of the country, and that twenty-four hours
after it has been signed, the King shall declare for France
and attack the Austrians. You may go as far as you
like in this direction. Seeing how we are situated at
present, no effort should be spared to procure the support^
of the Neapolitans. Later on we can do as we wish, for
after such ingratitude and in such circumstances, no
obligation is binding."
While Napoleon was thus preparing to tempt fortune
for the last time in Italy, trouble had arisen between
Eugene and Murat. The Reggio affair, which, despite the
King's efforts to avoid a conflict, Eugene persisted in
regarding as a breach of faith, had seriously strained
their relations. Joachim's subsequent attempt to ex-
plain and justify his conduct of the 7th March had
proved unavailing, and the Viceroy had determined to
have nothing further to do with Murat till some new
element entered into the situation. This new element was
soon supplied by the arrival of Lord William Bentinck.
440 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
On the 28th February Bentinck had left Palermo
with the proclamation of the Prince Hereditary of Sicily
to the Neapolitans in which that Prince declared that
he had in no wise renounced his claim to the crown
of Naples. On the 2nd March, Bentinck set foot in
Naples. There he found Catinelli, who told him of the
result of his mission. Lord William then set out over-
land for Leghorn, and arrived there on the 8th March.
Anxious to avoid all possibility of unpleasantness with
him, for the consequences might be serious, Murat gave
the most detailed instructions regarding the manner in
which Bentinck was to be received ; no courtesy was
to be omitted. Lecchi was in command at Leghorn, and
it fell to his lot to do the honours and to open the dis-
cussion with his redoubtable lordship. The result of
the interview was not favourable to the cause of Naples.
Bentinck protested against the occupation of Tuscany —
he would go into the matter with Murat. To Filangieri,
whose ostensible mission was to convey Joachim's salu-
tations, but whose real task was to find out how the land
lay, he rapped out the same reply. Lord William looked
upon it as a waste of time to enter into discussions with
subordinates when he was just about to start for head-
quarters. This promised trouble.
On the night of the i5th Bentinck was at Reggio.
Next morning found him face to face with the King of
Naples. He did not beat about the bush. There were
three reasons, he said, which compelled him to occupy
Tuscany. First of all, there was the safety of his army,
then the necessity of securing supplies, and, finally, his
Government's dignity ; they did not beg favours. To
this Murat's reply was that he had conquered Tuscany,
that he had been the first to occupy it, and, further, that
Austria herself had consented to that occupation. He had
established a civil administration, and his dignity would
not permit him to draw back. On these lines the dis-
THE AWAKENING 441
cussion might have gone on for ever, but the King
proposed a concession. The English should have the
military command in Tuscany, he would control the civil
government, and the whole question should be referred
to Lord Castlereagh for decision. Bentinck would not
budge an inch, and the interview was barren of result.
Murat came forth boiling with rage. He vowerL that
he^wnnld sooner lose his crown than be dictated_to_by_
Bentinck. As, however, he was notjanxious to be reduced
to thaTextremity,_he^ecided once again to have recourse.
to hisgood friends THe French. He therefore dispatched
aTnessenger to Eugene. Cozza was the selected emissary,
and the statements he was authorised to let fall — state-
ments that were intended for the Viceroy's ear — showed
how anxious Joachim was to resume relations with France.
" On several occasions," said Cozza to Zucchi, " I have
had the honour to come before you as the spokesman
of my King, but never at a juncture so urgent and so
grave as the present. On the considerations which I am
instructed to lay before you depend the safety and
welfare of our Sovereigns and their armies." To have
provoked so weighty an utterance, Cozza must have had
a more important matter on hand than the transmission
of the following commonplace message : " I am sending
you some letters from the Queen. I trust you will be
so kind as to forward them to their destination. I am
grieved, my dear Eugene, that you are so vexed with
me and that you have given up sending me the papers.
I asked you, too, to give me news of the health of the
Emperor and the Vicereine. You are annoyed with
me, but I am sure without reason. No one is more
sincerely attached to you than I, or more anxious
to give you proof of his attachment. Adieu, my dear
nephew ; be assured of my entire friendship. — Your very
affectionate friend, J. NAPOLEON." 1
1 Murat to Eugene. Reggio, March 18, 1814. Affaires £trangtrcs.
442 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
This missive was to put the Austrians off the scent
in case they seized the messenger. The. real message
was a verbal one. It was to inform Eugene of Murat's
ardent desire to come to an arrangement with him, and
Cozza was instructed to use language of sufficient plain-
ness and cogency to impress upon the Viceroy that the
safety of the two armies was at stake.1 By a singular
and happy coincidence the Neapolitan envoy and the
Emperor's letter of the I2th March reached Eugene at
the same time. Having received the fullest sanction
from Napoleon, nothing now prevented Eugene from
entering into negotiations, and he wrote back to Murat
as follows : —
" Sire, I have been handed Your Majesty's letter of
yesterday, the i8th March, and I hasten to assure you
that all the letters you have sent me shall duly reach
their destination.
" I have this moment received a letter dated the
1 2th instant from His Majesty the Emperor giving me
permission to come to an arrangement with Your Majesty,
and I therefore beg you to appoint some confidential
agent for the purpose of discussing the matter. Every-
thing shall be promptly settled. Till then I beg you to
1 Evidence of Murat's desire to throw off the despotism of Austria and
England, and of the persistence with which he pursued his secret ambition,
the unification of Italy, whose King he wished to be, is clearly afforded
not only by his negotiations with Eugene, but also by a letter he wrote
\ to Fouche' on the i8th March, the same date as his letter to the Vice-
\ | roy. " All the Powers have made proclamations regarding the inde-
\ I pendence of Italy, and all have insulted the brave Italians, since all desire
\ I the restoration of the old dynasties. I alone have as yet said nothing.
1 I Beyond all doubt I genuinely desire that union and independence. I alone
\l can reach the ears of the Italians. I should therefore like a proclamation of
V the independence of Italy, which the Emperor himself must wish to save.
A Such a proclamation would afford me a pretext for breaking with the
/ Austrians. I should like a few words saying definitely ' My army will
/ co-operate with that Power which is sincerely desirous of securing the
independence of Italy and of saving her from the return of the old dynasties.'
My troops will do wonders ; they are crying aloud to save Italy."
pos
THE AWAKENING 443
tpone all operations. I request you to observe the
greatest secrecy." l
Eugene appointed Zucchi to meet Carascosa, and gave
him the following instructions : —
1. Piedmont and Genoa were not to be meddled
with. The rest of Italy could be split up into two
kingdoms.
2. The rights of the Pope as a temporal prince were
to be glossed over as lightly as possible. It could be
said that whatever happened the Pope would have to
return to Rome, but that the nature of his sovereignty
would be determined at a later date.
3. An attempt was to be made to prevail on the
King of Naples to be satisfied with Tuscany and the
three departments recently added to the kingdom.
4. The kingdom of Northern Italy therefore would,
apart from the three departments mentioned above, be
made up exactly as it was before.
5. An agreement was to be arrived at, even though
it meant some further sacrifices, particularly if the two
following clauses were agreed to : —
(a) That the treaty should remain secret until the
Austrians had been driven back beyond the Izonzo.
(b) That twenty-four hours after the signing of the
treaty the King of Naples should declare for France and
attack the Austrians.2
Murat's instructions to Garascosa have only survived
in fragmentary form. The great thing to be sure of was
that the Frenchman's powers were quite in order.
The dread of an unratified treaty, of a repetition of his
Austrian experience, was decidedly preying on his mind.
Article i of these instructions, at any rate, was formal.
J' On and after the date on which the ratifications of
1 The Viceroy to Murat. Mantua, March 19, 1814. Affaires £trangtrcs.
a Eugene's instructions to Zucchi. Quoted by M. Weil. Revue d'Histoirc
moderne et contemporaine.
444 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
\ the present shall have been exchanged there shall exist
an offensive and defensive alliance between the high
contracting parties, and they shall mutually undertake
to combine their armies in order to expel the foreign
troops from Italy/'
A conference between Carascosa and Zucchi finally
took place at San Giacomo di Po. The Neapolitan
desired to see the Emperor's signed instructions ;
Eugene's representative did not possess them. However,
the discussion at last began. Zucchi put forward the
Viceroy's proposals ; Carascosa restated Murat's custo-
mary terms, the terms which he presented to Neipperg,
and which he thought for a moment Austria had accepted,
the terms which he submitted to Graham and suggested
to Metternich, and which he now claimed to impose on
the Emperor. They were that Italy was to be divided
into two parts. The southern portion, which was to be
Joachim's appanage, was to be bounded by the Po and
the Taro. The French army was then to be sent back
across the Alps. Genoa and Piedmont were to belong to
France on condition that the roads across the Alps should
be excluded. Zucchi, infuriated at such proposals, broke
off the negotiations and hastened to inform Eugene, who
was no less indignant than his lieutenant.
Though we may readily understand Eugene's wrath
at the claims advanced by Murat, that wrath had no
real justification. By instructing Zucchi to curtail
Murat's portion and to limit the part he was to play,
Eugene himself had departed from the Emperor's plans.
In his letter of the izth he certainly displayed no such
restrictive tendencies as were manifested by Eugene a
few days later. It was no doubt an immense sacrifice
for Napoleon to make, and it is equally certain that
he only made it because he was absolutely obliged ;
nevertheless, having decided that the thing must be
done, he did it with that high magnanimity, that_Jofty
THE AWAKENING 445
disregard of_thenicelv__calculated less or
"oifen characterised his""actions._ In his letter to Eugene
there is no question of cutting Joachim down to this or
that, of paring down his portion or making him put up
with Tuscany and the three departments. The Emperor
knew that the boundary for which Joachim was so
anxious was the Po. He did not stop to haggle or quibble,
but simply gave him what he wanted. " Split the rest
of Italy into two kingdoms " — those were his words.
There was no question of driving a hard bargain about
a little bit of territory more or less, and, in order that
the Viceroy might have a free hand, in order that no
unforeseen question should crop up and delay the settle-
ment of the matter — the crisis was urgent — Napoleon
told Eugene that " he could go as far as he liked," give
Murat everything he asked for, and that, seeing how
they were situated, he must spare no effort to bring the
affair to a satisfactory conclusion. These powers were
obviously as ample as they could possibly be, and if
Murat claimed a little more territory than the conscience
of the worthy Eugene told him he ought to give him,
that was no reason for breaking off negotiations on
which the fate of Italy quite possibly depended. _No
doubt, when Eugene's failure to obey ordersjj|rovp Mnraf
back into the arms of Austna and England, the issue of
the struggle was a foregone conclusion. The act of
Ireasor^ tthe tttn January had done its
Allies were nrmlyentrenched in Italy^ theyhad nothing
lo fear^trom^nmce. Time was when. iFlSIuTat had
"acted ioyallyTthe situation might have been different,
but that time had gone by, and, even if Murat had come
to terms with Eugene, it would have had no effect on
the course of events ; the Fates had worked their will.
But although all this is true, it is none the less true that
the Viceroy transgressed the Emperor's commands, and
for the fact that Murat at this juncture did not decide
446 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
once more to throw in his lot with France, Eug&ne, and
none but Eugene, was to blame.
When Murat received the letter requesting him to
appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate with France he
was so thoroughly convinced that his plans were at last
to be crowned with success that in a momentary access
of zeal he made the Due di Gallo write to Campochiaro
ordering him to break off his negotiations with the Allies,
and sent a messenger to the Cavaliere di Angelis, acting
Foreign Minister at Naples, bidding him delay the pub-
lication of the treaty of the 2nd January, which had
been sent him for that purpose a few days previously.
The Due di Campochiaro very sensibly refrained from
giving effect to this ill-considered injunction, and decided
to await the arrival of further orders. As for the Cava-
liere di Angelis, he was unable to execute his instructions,
because, before the messenger arrived, he had published
the treaty, and communicated its terms to the Corps
Diplomatique and all the authorities in the kingdom. This
meant that the King's last card was in danger of being
thrown away, and to prevent that, he brought into play
such feeble means as remained to him. He felt that
amid the general ruin of his schemes France was his
solitary plank of safety. He appears to have sent an
emissary — it may have been Livron — to Mantua on the
25th March.1 Brunetti certainly went there shortly
afterwards. Murat was now reduced to desperate shifts.
All had forsaken him. French, English, and Austrians
alike at last saw clearly the nature of the aims he was
1 A good deal of uncertainty still hangs about Livron's mission. Some
documents would seem to indicate that it followed Carascosa's, which would
mean that it took place, as M. Weil points out, between the 25th and 2Qth
March. On the other hand, Livron told Wilson on the 3ist March that he
had been to Mantua, but that he had been sent there after the arrival of
a dispatch informing the King that negotiations for peace had been begun in
France. As the aide-de-camp who brought the news to which Livron
alludes was at Murat's headquarters on the 6th March, it would thus appear
that Livron's mission took place before Carascosa's.
THE AWAKENING 447
following and refused any longer to play into his hands.
His downfall was not far off.
Caroline, ruling in her husband's absence at Naples, j
was far from sharing his insane ambition of governing /
Italy, and, in direct opposition to Murat, she had taken j
active steps to complete the rupture with France. On /
the 1 2th February she commanded that all communica-
tions should cease between the kingdom of Naples and
the French Empire, and ordered that whatever measures
were necessitated by a state of war should be carried out.1
Her mind was thoroughly made up ; she would leave
her fate in Austria's hands and have nothing to do with
Joachim's Utopian dreams. Mier, however, and other
people as well, had told her of the King's unsatisfactory
behaviour, and she had at first sent him messages coun-
selling submission to Austria's views. All this was
1 The following are Caroline's letter and the Minister's reply : " Monsieur
le ministre, I have just given orders for the taking over of the Principalities
of Benevento and Ponte Corvo and the seizure of all French ships of war or
trading vessels which are now in our ports or may hereafter enter them.
I have also commanded that all the officers and agents of the French
Government shall be sent back to Corfu or to France, that all communications
shall cease between the kingdom of Naples and the French Empire, and
finally that seals shall be affixed to all the chests belonging to the French
Government. In advising you of the steps I have taken, it is my desire that
you should submit to me whatever other supplementary measures are
rendered necessary by the fact that we are in a state of war with France. —
CAROLINE. NAPLES, February 12, 1814."
** NAPLES, February 15, 1814. Report to Her Majesty the Queen Regent-
In fulfilment of the commands which Your Majesty was pleased to give me in
your letter of the I2th, I submit to your wise consideration some observations
regarding certain steps that may be necessitated by the rupture that has taken
place between the kingdom of Naples and the French Empire. It has
doubtless not escaped Your Majesty's foresight that an essential measure in
the circumstances is the recall of the royal legation in Paris as well as of the
Neapolitan consuls in French ports ; but Your Majesty no doubt considered
that when the Due di Gallo saw His Majesty the King he would lose no time
in sending these agents the necessary instructions in the matter. I can assure
Your Majesty that he was already in possession of instructions for dealing
with the possible eventuality of an outbreak of war.
"Inasmuch as the French legation and consulate have already left the
448 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
trouble thrown away. Joachim, absorbed in his dreams,
was deaf to all remonstrances. Vainly did Caroline
urge him to attack the Viceroy ; she only learned that
he was negotiating with him. Not being the sort of
woman to display unmurmuring acquiescence and
being anxious to retain her kingdom, she promptly
sent him a comminatory warning. During the night
of the 25th March the Comte de Mosbourg and
Caracciolo set out from the royal palace at Naples
for Joachim's headquarters. They were the bearers
of letters and verbal messages of the most forcible
description. If the King persisted in his tortuous policy
with regard to Austria, if he continued to maintain
relations with France, the Queen would leave him — she
would sever her destiny from his entirely, and cause the
Neapolitan Government to take whatever measures she
might deem to be in conformity with the country's
real interests. For a moment she thought of going
to seek the King in person — she even gave orders on
the ist April for the Duchess di Gallo to accompany
kingdom, I am of opinion that all the State authorities should be informed
that they are no longer to recognise the French vice-consuls or consular
agents resident in the ports of the kingdom. I need not call Your Majesty's
attention to the fact that it is absolutely necessary that the rupture between
Naples and France should be notified to the ministers and agents of foreign
Powers at Naples, as well as to the Neapolitan ministers and agents at foreign
courts. I am convinced that this will have already occurred to the Due di
Gallo. He had prepared for the purpose and submitted to the King for
approval a declaration to be published at the same time in the kingdom.
" Your Majesty will in your wisdom decide whether it is advisable to
sequester the property in this country assigned to the domain-extraordinary
of the French crown as well as the Nuncio's palace, which was the property
of the Pope, and which was seized by the French legation when the Roman
States were annexed to the French Empire.
" If the measures which have formed the subject of Your Majesty's
commands are to be extended to include the kingdom of Italy, the same
procedure which Your Majesty may see fit to adopt with regard to the above-
mentioned property might also be observed in the case of the Italian
legation, which belonged to the former Republic of Venice. — Di ANGELIS."
Naples, Archivio di Stato.
THE AWAKENING 449
her ; l but illness — or more probably reflection — made her
abandon the idea and content herself with waiting to
see what came of her messages.
Bentinck was a formidable stumbling-block to the
luckless Joachim. After the Reggio conference the two
men considered it vain to renew the discussion. It was
therefore to Bellegarde that Bentinck betook himself at
Verona. After discussing matters for two days with the
Marshal, the Englishman, in no satisfied state of mind,
ordered Wilson to see Murat and settle the question.
" An immediate decision is a sine qua non of my re-
maining here with the expeditionary force." That was
Bentinck's last word.
Wilson, who was received by Murat at Bologna, was.
much struck with his manners and appearance. " Murat's
dress was singular. Hair curled in Roman coiffure — two
ringlets or what, d la Parisienne, are styled ' pensees,'
dependent on each shoulder. Blue uniform coat, red
pantaloons, yellow shoes, with spurs, sword with three
pictures in the handle. His countenance martial, his
manners soft, his conversation easy and intelligent.1
Possibly the irascible Bentinck had not given a flattering
description of him. Wilson dined with him, and con-
sidered that " the banquet was according to the rules
of perfect gastronomy." He was present with the King
at a ball, and thought his manners, when he was dancing,
very attractive and very unaffected.
But however favourable the impressions of the English
General, it was his duty to carry out his instructions.
He therefore made an imperative demand for Tuscany,
and handed Murat a note in which Bentinck had the
effrontery to deliver himself as follows : " It would
certainly be inconsistent with the straightforwardness of
the undersigned if he refrained from stating as his private
opinion that the hopes to which the treaty gave rise
1 Diario di Nicola.
2F
450 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
have been but too thoroughly belied." That was too
much for Murat. He stopped short, glared at Wilson,
handed the note to Gallo, and without another word
broke up the conference.
With Eugene turning a deaf ear to his overtures,
with Caroline threatening to cast him off, with Bentinck
full of suspicion, and telling him so to his face, to whom
was he to turn — who would take his part ? The Austrians
would perhaps have served his purpose had he been
on a friendly footing with them, but with the exception
of Mier, whose professional duty it was to keep their
mutual relations unstrained, the rest had no compunc-
tion about blaming his actions. Nugent, later on his
inveterate enemy, Bellegarde, who voiced his complaints
to the Emperor of Austria, Metternich, who from afar
caused it to be said that the King's vacillating conduct
was producing the worst possible effect on the Allies — all
were against him, all were spying upon him, waiting to
entrap him, all knew of his dealings with Eugene.
They knew the dates, they knew what resolutions had
been adopted. Wilson has it in his diary that on the
24th March some one from Mantua had told them all
about the San Giacomo negotiations. He even states
what their object was, namely, to create an Italian
league to drive the Austrians and the English out of
Italy — even to give the French the go-by.1 Though he
went somewhat astray on the last point, he had a fairly
accurate idea of what was in Murat 's mind. However,
something had to be done to settle the Tuscany ques-
tion ; the Muratist confederation must be given its death-
blow, and so, at a conference of the Ministers of the
various Powers which took place at Bologna, it was
decided that Bentinck was to have Leghorn, Pisa, and
Viareggio. The Neapolitans were to undertake the ad-
ministration of the rest of Tuscany. By this concession
1 Robert Wilson. Private Diary of Events during 1812, 1813, 1814.
THE AWAKENING 451
to Murat's amour propre (he knew very well that his part
in the play was over) appearances were saved, and the
King, mollified and cowed, resigned himself to every-
thing. He consented to discuss a scheme of operations
with Bellegarde, nay, he even went further, and agreed
to choose one of three plans without going into the
matter at all. He signified his readiness to do anything
the Austrian marshal wished, he would fall in with any
plan he liked to suggest — he would even serve under his
command. What more did they ask of him ? Did they
wish him to leave the army and go back to Naples, so
that they might be quite sure he could work no more
mischief ? To that too he would consent. Yes, he
would hand over his troops to Bellegarde and go home.
What cared he ? Nothing mattered now. Listless and
weary, like a body living on without a soul, he was
tasting the bitterness entailed by the irremediable ruin
of his hopes. The din of camps, the excitement and
bustle of preparing for battle, failed to stir his interest ;
his thoughts were elsewhere. Hope, and, with hope, all
strength of will, had utterly forsaken him.
To complete his overthrow, to quench the last faint
gleam of hope in the night of utter despair, there now
came upon the scene the last but not the least redoubt-
able of his foes. Frail and defenceless, without money and
without an army, that adversary drew near, and lo, the
multitude cast themselves at his feet and strove with
one another to kiss the hem of his white robe : Pius VII.
was returning from his long exile ! From the hour when
he had been handed over to the Austrian soldiers, who
lined the route in his honour for a distance of about
ten kilometres before Parma, his journey had been one
long triumphal progress. He begged to be suffered to
continue his route without a break ; the people would
not hear of it. Again and again he was compelled to
appear at the windows of the ducal palace that over-
452 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
looked the Piazza to bless the surging throng, who sent
up deafening shouts of Evviva il Papa Re! At length
the Pope set out for Bologna. There he met Bentinck,
who placed his country's funds at his disposal ; there
too he saw Joachim, whom he scarcely deigned to notice.
At last came the irremediable catastrophe. Paris
was taken ; the Allies were masters of France ! On the
nth April, at seven in the morning, a messenger arrived
post-haste from Turin to bring the news to Murat. But
all was not lost. As yet the Allies in Italy were ignorant
of the event. There might even yet be time to deceive
them — to pose as their trusty ally. At Borgo San Donnino
in a conflict with the French troops Murat flung himself
strenuously into the fight, astounding Mier and Eckhardt
by his prodigies of energy and valour and calling forth the
admiration of the Allies. Balachoff, the Russian envoy,
alone held aloof and refused to add his voice to the general
chorus of 'praise, nor would he sign the alliance with
Joachim, for which he had specially come to Italy. He
subsequently stated that had the King marched against the
French twenty-four hours earlier he would have put his
hand to the treaty.1 By this crowning effort, this final
piece of bluff, Murat's sole idea was to propitiate the
Powers by making himself their humble servant. His
ambition was dead- — dead and cruelly trampled upon.
The Pope was back again in Rome ; the Austrians were
holding the duchy of Modena in the name of its former
possessor ; Tuscany had to be given up to the Duke of
Wurzburg, and the Marquis de Sommariva came in the
name of the Allies to take possession of the departments
that had formerly composed the kingdom of Italy. But
worse was to come. Bellegarde gave the King to under-
stand that he must return home on the 2Qth April, and
while Mier and Gallo were at work settling the respective
spheres of operation of the Austrian and Neapolitan
1 Saint Marsan to King Victor Emmanuel. Vienna, February 17, 1815.
THE AWAKENING 453
armies, Joachim set out for Naples via Ancona, com-
manding all the Neapolitan employees to follow suit.
On the 2nd May, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Murat,
in civilian dress, drove through his capital with the Queen
and Prince Achilles in an open carriage, and as, with
thoughtful and dejected mien, he made his way into his
palace, the Emperor too was close at hand, passing on
his way to exile, for on the 3rd May, Napoleon set foot
on the island of Elba.
CHAPTER XIII
THE FINAL HAZARD
Murat endeavours to propitiate the Allies — Pauline comes to Naples — The
arrival of Fesch — Arrangements for the transmission of correspondence — The
Curafoa at Naples — Madame Mere goes to Elba — The Caterbi affair —
Pauline's departure — Torlonia, Colonna, and Fesch — Letters for Napoleon
intercepted — Murat's political position at the 1st January 1815 — His relations
with the Pope, Austria, England, and France — Napoleon escapes from Elba —
Colonna's task — Murat's attitude (5th-ioth March)— The arrival of the
Inconstant at Naples — Murat makes up his mind — Preparations for war
(ioth-i5th March) — News of the Emperor's arrival at Lyons — The King
goes to Bologna — Caroline — Murat's advance into Italy — Napoleon's corre-
spondence with Murat — Belliard's mission — Murat flees to France — The
mission of Baudus.
AT'.KENED from his dream, called back to
grim reality, Murat received the news of
Napoleon's exile with indifference. He was
far too deeply wrapped up in the defeat of
his own ambitions to spare any pity for the lot that had
befallen his brother-in-law. Compelled to bow before the
victors of the hour, his policy now was to propitiate
them and to endeavour to obliterate from their minds
the regrettable impression produced by his attitude in
the recent campaign. His first step was to remove from
the public service all those who were not Neapolitans by
birth or naturalisation. This was a blow aimed directly
at the French employees whom Napoleon's decree of the
6th July 1811 had maintained at Naples in spite of
Murat's wishes. A further decree abolished conscription
and restored the system of levies. These concessions,
ostensibly granted to the Neapolitans, were really in-
tended by Joachim as an earnest of good behaviour to
454
THE FINAL HAZARD
455
the Allies. In order to conciliate Bentinck, whom he
knew to be a strong supporter of the Sicilian cause, he
formally commanded that all vessels arriving in Neapo-
litan waters from Sicily should be treated with the
respect due to the ships of the most friendly Powers, and
that trade between Sicily and Naples should be fostered
by every means calculated to insure its prosperity.1
Towards the vanquished one of Elba, Joachim's atti-
tude was markedly different. He was no longer useful,
and had therefore to be kept at arm's length. When
relations between France and Naples were broken off, the
former Neapolitan consul in the island, the Chevalier
Cattaneo, had left Porto Ferrajo on the 2nd March and
betaken himself to Leghorn to await his Government's
instructions.2 As no message reached him, he assumed
that it was his duty to go back to the island on Napo-
leon's arrival. On his return he presented himself to
General Bertrand, who told him that, although up to the
present no communications had taken place with His
Majesty the King of Naples, he might continue to dis-
charge his consular functions. This arrangement, how-
ever, by no means met with Murat's approval, for he
feared that the fact of having a Neapolitan agent in such
a position would give umbrage to the Powers. On the
ist June, therefore, Gallo disavowed his subordinate, and
sent him an injunction to abstain from discharging any
official duties.3
So great was the anxiety at Naples to avoid all inter-
course with the island, that when Napoleon wrote to
Caroline, asking her to send him " a cook, an upholsterer,
some furniture, and books, the Queen excused herself on
the grounds that it would not be compatible with the
position in which they were personally placed to comply
1 Moniteur Universel.
* Cattaneo to Gallo. Porto Ferrajo, March 2, 1814.
3 Gallo to Cattaneo. Naples, June i, 1814.
456 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with these requests." l Such was the footing on which
they presumed to treat the Emperor.2 This was the
official attitude. However, the members of the Imperial
family came to take their stand by the fallen Emperor,
as of old they had gathered round him in his days of
triumph ; the adherents of the Napoleonic cause were
secretly striving to secure their master's freedom ; then
again, Murat was at loggerheads with the Powers. All
these causes combined to bring about an improvement
in the relations. Soon, too, the Princess Pauline came to
throw oil on the troubled waters. Wishing to be near
her brother, she decided to go and stay at Naples, and
two English vessels went to fetch her. The Curafoa,
anchored off Nice, vainly waited for her captain to
bring the Princess from Frejus. The Undaunted, which
had sailed from Elba on the iyth May, also arrived too
late. Pauline had already left on board a Neapolitan
frigate, the Lcztitia. Before going on to Naples the
vessel called at Elba, where she arrived about the 2Qth
or 3oth May. According to the officers of the frigate,
Pauline did not go ashore ; Napoleon came on board,
remained with her two hours in a cabin, and then returned
1 Mier to Metternich, June 2, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.
t 2 Murat had no hesitation about writing in gushing terms to the proteges
of the Allies. The following is what he said to the King of Spain on the
loth June : " Monsieur mon frere, — The news that Your Catholic Majesty
has returned to the bosom of your subjects prompts us to convey to you the
satisfaction this happy event has occasioned us. We beg you to accept our
heartiest congratulations. The interest we take in all that concerns Your
Catholic Majesty should convince you of the sincerity of our sentiments. It is
our earnest desire that this memorable epoch should mark the commence-
ment of fresh ties between our respective countries, and that the bonds of friend-
ship and goodwill which have hitherto existed between the Sovereigns of
Naples and Spain should be drawn still closer to the mutual welfare of both
nations. We shall never cease to hope for the fulfilment of these wishes, as
well as for the unbroken prosperity of Your Catholic Majesty and Your
Royal Family. Wherefore we pray God, Monsieur mon frere, to have you
in His holy keeping. — Your affectionate brother,
" JOACHIM NAPOLEON."
THE FINAL HAZARD 457
to the island.1 From an Austrian account, on the other
hand, it would appear that Pauline's stay was of longer
duration. All the time she was on the island, however,
she was, according to this version of the story, " never
able to talk to her brother about what she wished, and
she at last gave up the attempt in despair and took her
departure." 2 In any case, her stay on the island was
of the briefest.
Yet another member of the Imperial family now came
to take up his abode within reach of the Isle of Elba. This
was Cardinal Fesch, who had gone to join Madame Mere
at the Palazzo Falconieri at Rome, having made up his
mind to give his active assistance to Napoleon. He
immediately opened a correspondence with the Emperor,
whose first commission was of a domestic description.
Fesch was directed to send him by the English vessel,
the Cura$oa, a variety of things, such as " plate, furniture,
two thousand hundredweight of wheat, twenty thousand
bushels of oats, two thousand ewes, with their comple-
ment of rams, twenty milch-cows, fifty orange trees,"
and so forth. The Cardinal, somewhat in a quandary,
informed Murat of these requirements, but he being
unable or unwilling to reply, the Queen wrote in his
stead. "The present state of affairs," she said, "for-
bids us to enter into any sort of intercourse with the
Isle of Elba. The fate of Naples is still in the balance.
Everything leads us to hope that the matter will be
satisfactorily settled, but that hope will not be realised
unless we proceed with the utmost caution. It pains
me a great deal to be obliged to reply to you in this
way, but the King's future and that of my children leave
me no alternative." 3 However, the Cura$oa on her way
1 Diario di Nicola.
2 Note to Ilager. Vienna, July 15, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil. Joachim
Mural, roi de Naples.
3 Caroline to Fesch, June 25, 1814. Quoted by M Weil. Joachim
Murat) roi de Naples.
458 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
from France touched at Elba, stayed there twenty-four
hours, took up letters from Napoleon to Madame Mere —
probably also to Cardinal Fesch — and continued her
voyage to Naples, arriving there on the 2Qth June.
Captain Tower, the commander of the Curafoa, seemed
by no means harshly disposed towards Napoleon and his
family. He invited the King and Queen of Naples to a
grand function on board his ship on the 6th July (a
proceeding which provoked a remonstrance from the
court of Sicily), and offered to make himself the means
of communication between Elba and Naples. On the
nth July the Emperor asked Bertrand to find out from
Fesch " who could suitably be appointed Consul at
Civita Vecchia." On the ijth he had a reply sent to
Lucien thanking him for his letter of the 2nd June and
excusing himself for not writing personally on the grounds
that he was writing no letters to any one.
Then yet another event occurred to draw the family
bonds closer. Madame Mere decided to make her home
in Elba, and Napoleon, having made the necessary pre-
parations for receiving her, gave orders to Bertrand on
the 24th July to see that the Abeille started that night,
if the weather permitted, to bring her away from
Civita Vecchia. As it turned out, however, the Abeille
was too late. Campbell, a representative of the British
Government, had been to Leghorn waiting for Madame
Mere, who arrived from Rome on the 29th July, accom-
panied by Colonna and Bartolucci, two of Napoleon's
emissaries. On the 2nd August she embarked on an
English brig, the Grasshopper, with Colonel Campbell,
Colonna, and two ladies-in-waiting. The weather was all
in their favour, and they succeeded in reaching Elba the
same day.
While Madame Mere was sailing away from Leghorn on
the Grasshopper, the Abeille, commanded by Captain
Taillade, was just reaching Civita Vecchia. Learning
THE FINAL HAZARD 459
that his visit there was to no purpose, Taillade, who
carried letters for Cardinal Fesch, immediately went on
to Rome, whither His Eminence had invited him. The
Cardinal was doubtless anxious that Napoleon should be
informed about the arrangements made for the trans-
mission of their correspondence, which the Emperor was
desirous of entrusting to a safe man at Civita Vecchia,
for the Austrian police now began to keep a sharp look-out
on all that went on between Elba and the Continent.
Many strange characters now appeared on the scene,
who, according to their own account, were acting as con-
fidential messengers between Murat and his brother-in-
law. The most recent instance of the kind related to
one Caterbi, rather a singular individual whom some
people took for an Austrian spy, others for a secret agent
of Napoleon's. Whatever he was, he caused enough stir
for Joachim to take the alarm and order the following
notice to be inserted in the Monitore. " The Government
has been surprised to hear from Leghorn and Civita
Vecchia that certain persons, calling themselves officers
in the service of the King of Naples and wearing the
decorations of his Royal Order, have appeared in those
parts alleging that they had been sent by the Court of
Naples to the island of Elba. Though the meaning of
this trick should be quite obvious to all, the Minister of
Police thinks it as well to state that these individuals
do not belong to the kingdom of Naples, that they are
quite unknown there, and that they have never been
sent on any sort of mission to the island of Elba. This
being the case, all local authorities are requested to order
the arrest of any persons who give out that they have
been sent on any such mission. " 1
Perhaps all these official protestations were intended
to conceal a substratum of truth. At any rate, there is
no doubt that some one — and it may have been Caterbi
1 Monitore di Due Sicilie. August 27, 1814.
460 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
himself — conveyed a letter to Napoleon from Murat, since
on the gth September the former wrote to Bertrand
saying that he had received a very affectionate epistle
from the King of Naples. Certainly, in view of the turn
things were taking in Italy Joachim had good reason to
seek a reconciliation with his brother-in-law. Every-
thing, indeed, encouraged him to take the step ; Napoleon's
increasing popularity in Italy, the propaganda that was
being carried on in his name as well as the secret libera-
tionist aspirations and agitations of theJLtalian peoples,
who had rudely been compelled.to boja^jthe neck once
more fc^a yoke which fifteen yeari~oTcoi
mdered th^Tnofe^irHolerablerrAs for the kingdom of
"Naples, relations with the Allies showed little tendency
to improve. It did not look as though the Congress
was going to decide in favour of the King of Naples.
His most formidable antagonists, Consalvi and Talley-
rand, were gaining ground every day. Policy therefore
rendered it advisable to patch up a peace with the Em-
peror, who, deposed though he was, still represented an
enormous force. To this aim therefore Murat directed
his energies. But opportunities for a correspondence
which had necessarily to be carried on with secrecy and
circumspection were few and far between, and it would
have been impossible to come to any practical arrange-
ment had not Joachim by a happy chance encountered
a valuable intermediary in the person of Princess Pauline.
Pauline, who was staying for the time being in Naples,
was due to join her brother early in September. The
Inconstant, which was under orders to fetch her, was
delayed for sundry reasons, and did not arrive until some
time during the first fortnight in October. The officers
were presented to Murat, who received them cordially
and eagerly questioned them concerning his brother-in-
law, asking about his health, and inquiring how he occu-
pied his time and what amusements he had. He was
THE FINAL HAZARD 461
also anxious to know how many troops he possessed,
and how they were made up. On learning from Taillade,
the captain of the brig, that he had not more than
fifteen hundred men all told, Joachim exclaimed, " Well,
that might easily be the nucleus of an army of five hundred^ vrv-u
fliousajKLlL. On the 2gth October Taillade, who "had
been decorated with the order of the Two Sicilies, set
sail with the Princess, taking with him a letter which
he " handed to Napoleon from his brother-in-law."
As to the nature of the messages Pauline bore with
her we are reduced to mere conjecture. According to
Pons, she advanced matters very considerably. " The
Princess Pauline," he says, " had effected a reconciliation
between the Emperor Napoleon and King Murat, the
result of which was apparently an offensive and defensive
alliance in terms of which the island of Elba was ceded
to the Two Sicilies. We have had in our possession a
letter from the King of Naples in his own handwriting
setting forth the various clauses and conditions of this
transaction." 1
It is incontestable that from the day of Pauline's
arrival at Porto Ferrajo a change did come over the
relations between the Emperor and Murat — a change
which did not escape the notice of those whose business
it was to keep an eye on all that went on in the
island of Elba. Austrians, Italians, French alike noted
the increased frequency which from this time onward
marked the goings and comings between Naples and the
island. It was about this time also that Napoleon com-
pleted the organisation of his intelligence system. He
already had agents at Genoa, by whose means he was
able to carry on a private correspondence with the
1 Pons de 1'Herault. Souvenirs et anecdotes de file d'Elbe. Positive as
Pons is on the subject of this treaty between the Emperor and Murat, not the
slightest confirmation of the matter is anywhere to be found. It is to be
hoped that Murat's] letters, now in course of publication, will supply the
deficiency.
462 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
Empress, and he now established centres all over Italy
from which orders and messengers were sent out in all
directions. The management of the whole business was
in the hands of Fesch, his Minister of Police, who was
residing in Rome. He it was who gave orders to the
rest, fixed their destinations, collected the news,
sent off messengers, and put Murat and Napoleon
into communication with each other. He held the
power and the purse. Torlonia, the famous Roman
banker, managed the Emperor's funds, or rather the
funds which Napoleon and others had set aside for the
advancement of the Imperial cause in Italy, and Fesch
was at liberty to draw on this source for any secret
business he had on hand. At Leghorn the Imperial
interests were in the hands of Bartolucci, who pitted
himself and his men, not unsuccessfully, against the secret
service agents of Louis XVIII. under Mariotti. Besides
these there were a host of emissaries constantly coming
and going, men whose identity was unknown and cannot
now be traced, but who all had to take orders from
Colonna when any important matter was on hand.
Golonna it was who, on a variety of pretexts, went
travelling about all over Italy, but especially in Tuscany
and the regions adjacent to the Po. He too it was who
succeeded in obtaining private information regarding the
Congress at Vienna and sent Napoleon the most detailed
accounts of its proceedings.
Though these picked agents formed the main body of
his intelligence staff, Napoleon counted besides on the
various members of his family, who sent him on occasion
letters of an interesting character. According to the
Austrian police, Murat was not the least assiduous of
Napoleon's correspondents, and they stated that an
exchange of correspondence between Naples and Porto
Ferrajo was of constant, not to say daily, occurrence.
Nevertheless, on examination of the various statements
THE FINAL HAZARD 463
and affirmations, it turned out that no one had any
really definite knowledge to go upon. Letters were
intercepted, lists of the people who came and went
between Elba and the mainland were drawn up, attempts
were made to engage the confidence of those who were
known to be attached to the Imperial cause — all the
thousand and one precautions which misgiving suggests
were observed ; but nothing decisively incriminating could
be discovered either against Napoleon or against Murat.
The baffled detectives were apparently plentifully en-
dowed with the imaginative faculty, for, according to
them, there was not a spot on the whole coast, from
Naples to Genoa, that was not used as a receiving station
for the Emperor's correspondence. As for the rank and
file employed in this service, even black men and Turks
were said to be included in the number. But wiser
heads, less excitable folk, did not attach much import-
ance to these rumours, and Bellegarde in a report which
he sent on the 6th August to Metternich, was compelled
to admit that, despite all the efforts that had been made,
they had not succeeded in bringing anything home to the
Emperor.1
Early in 1815, however, Tiberio Pacca, delegate apos-
tolic of Civita Vecchia and a nephew of the Cardinal
of the same name, managed, by having recourse to
rather questionable means, to obtain sure proof that
correspondence was in progress between Murat and his
brother-in-law. In a box dispatched by Cardinal Fesch
to Porto Ferrajo he discovered a letter from Joachim to
Napoleon and another for Pauline, as well as a note from
Fesch himself for Bertrand regarding the affairs of Italy
and Europe and the proceedings of the Congress.
To Pauline, Murat expressed the pleasure with which
he had learned of her safe arrival and of the improve-
ment her health and spirits had undergone. He was
1 Bellegarde to Metternich. Milan, August 6, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.
464 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
not, he continued, writing to the Emperor about
" affairs," because he knew that the latter-still retained
some feelings of irritation against him. Although the
Emperor had often been unjust towards him, Pauline
was requested to tell him that he always had been, and
would always continue to be, his friend and the most
grateful of his followers. The Empress, he went on, was
in good health. Pauline was greatly missed and greatly
beloved by his children. The Congress, he said, was
hanging fire, but his affairs in Italy had taken a capital
turn. Austria appeared to have resolved to maintain
her alliance with him, and his supporters were increasing
in number. That was all that could be hoped for at the
moment.1
To Napoleon he said that he could not allow the
opportunity to go by without sending his remembrances.
He had heard from Vienna that the Empress and the
King of Rome were in good health. The Queen had
quite recently had letters from Her Majesty and Madame
de Montesquiou. His children sent their homage. It
was, he continued, a considerable time since the Imperial
flag had been seen in Neapolitan waters, although it was
greatly respected and received with pleasure there. The
letter concluded with assurances of his " invariable
attachment." 2
It was probably to a copy of these letters that the
Comte de Polignac was alluding when, on returning a
few days later from a mission to Rome, he stated in the
presence of the British Ambassador at Florence that he
was in possession of letters from Murat to the Emperor
and Pauline. Such were the only papers they had been
able to discover up to the present.
It was becoming increasingly necessary for Joachim to
make friends with the Emperor, for he could now see
i Murat to Pauline. Naples, December 26, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.
* Murat to Napoleon. Naples, December 27, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.
THE FINAL HAZARD 465
that serious trouble was brewing between himself and
the Allies. The attempts he had made on his return
from Northern Italy in May 1814 to insinuate himself
into the good graces of Europe had not been successful.
He could not advance the claims of Divine Right, nor
was he covered by the principe de la legitimate.
Gradually his adversaries began to gain ground. He
had at first endeavoured to exchange courtesies with
Sicily, but he had ultimately been forced to forbid his
ports to Sicilian vessels. With Austria his relations were
becoming every day more strained. At the Congress of
Vienna Oampochiaro and Cariati had attempted by every
means in their power to secure, first of all that Murat
should be officially represented at the deliberations, and
next, that Austria should give effect to the provisions
of the treaty of 1814. But Metternich, influenced by
the prayers of the Pope's representative and the impor-
tunities of Talleyrand, could make no reply, and carefully
abstained from granting to the Neapolitan envoys the
support to which Murat was justly laying claim.
As regards Great Britain, though it is true that
Joachim was on terms of quite unusual cordiality with
certain individual Englishmen, the official relations be-
tween the two Governments were still cold and strained.
Castlereagh indeed had declared to Murat's ministers that
in time England might be able to recognise him as the
rightful occupant of the throne of Naples,1 but of this
statement no confirmation had been received. On the
2gth December, therefore, Joachim sent Castlereagh an
official note, and on the i8th January he resolved that
he would write to the Regent himself. In this letter he
pointed out the peculiarly anomalous position in which
he was placed with regard to England. In the late war
British troops had fought and conquered under his
leadership, yet now, though peace had been general
1 Minerva Napolitana.
2G
466 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
throughout Europe for several months, friendly relations
had not formally been established between England and
Naples. Though he was himself quite ready to place
implicit trust in th^ promises of the British Govern-
ment, such an informal arrangement was scarcely satis-
factory from the international point of view, and it would
be in the interests of both countries if the understanding
that existed between them were embodied in a diplo-
matic instrument drawn up in regular form. After
reviewing the circumstances which should lead the
Regent to enter into negotiations for the immediate
settlement of a treaty of peace and alliance, he con-
cluded as follows: "The people over whom I rule are
sensitive and generous ; they are deeply attached to me
because they know that aU my efforts, all my longings,
are centred upon their happiness and glory. The love
they bear me, the bravery for which they are distin-
guished, the devotion of which they are capable, render
me sufficiently strong to fear no danger so long as they
are under arms. But it is not meet that a nation should
be perpetually armed. I desire that my people should
enjoy the blessings of peace, and that consummation is
impossible until the tranquillity of my realm is guaranteed
by an alliance with England. To delay this treaty there-
fore will be to postpone the happiness of five millions
of brave Neapolitans.
" Should any unforeseen difficulties prevent Your
Royal Highness proceeding as rapidly as I should desire
with the negotiations which I propose, I beg that you
will send me, in whatever form you may prefer, a
definite statement of your intentions with respect to the
:ourt of Naples." l
It was, however, with his neighbour the Pope that
Murat had his most constant and serious difficulties.
At the beginning of the year 1815 the protests made
1 Murat to the Prince Regent of England.
THE FINAL HAZARD 467
by the Holy See in the matter of the Marches had reached
such a point that a rupture was imminent. Zuccari, the
Neapolitan Consul, received the following letter from
Pacca. " The Cardinal Camerlingo, pro-Secretary of
State, has been formally directed by His Holiness to tell
you definitely that he is weary of putting up with your
behaviour towards his Government. The Holy Father is
perfectly well aware that you have set up a secret system
of espionage ; he is equally cognisant of the leaflets that
you have caused to be circulated in Rome and the Roman
States with the criminal and dastardly intention of casting
a doubt on the lawfulness of his rule. Finally, the
Holy Father knows all about your meetings, your
speeches, and your letters. His Holiness has commanded
me to remind you that as you have no official status
in this city, you are liable, in common with every
one else, to the regulations of the local police, and any
further offences on your part will certainly not escape
their vigilance." J
Such, then, was the situation of Murat with regard to
Europe at the beginning of 1815. It was not reassuring.
Nowhere could he count on any certain ally. Of the
Powers many were secretly, some avowedly, hostile.
Metternich, whom he had relied upon to guide the
Neapolitan plenipotentiaries through the various diplo-
matic pitfalls — Metternich, who had undertaken to
give the King of Naples the benefit of the sagacity for
which he was renowned, was now only casting about
for a suitable opportunity to turn against him. Murat,
feeling the ground gradually failing beneath his feet,
resolved on a decisive course of action. On the 8th
February he commanded Gallo to send orders to Campo-
chiaro at Vienna to ask Metternich for a formal declara-
tion regarding his rights to the crown of Naples and the
relations of the kingdom of Naples with France. Did
1 Pacca to Zuccari. Rome, December 30, 1814. Diario di Nicola.
468 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
France mean peace or war ? Joachim demanded a
definite reply. In the event of a declaration of war with
France, he requested Austria's permission to send an
army of eighty thousand men across Northern Italy.
Talleyrand promptly seized the opportunity thus
offered to persuade Austria to declare against Murat.
He easily prevailed upon Metternich, already more than
half convinced, to announce in a declaration, which
was addressed to Talleyrand as well as to Campo-
chiaro, that Austria would allow no foreign troops to
make use of her territory. This declaration was to be
supported by the recall of the forces then on the Polish
frontier and by their transfer to Italy.1 Certainly events
moved on apace. Campochiaro had acquainted Metter-
nich with the King's views on the 23rd February ; on
the 25th the Austrian replied with the note to Campo-
chiaro, and on the same day orders were sent off to the
Austrian troops. Thus affairs were coming to a head.
Nothing was wanting but a suitable opportunity to put
a match to the powder, when all Europe was startled
as by a clap of thunder — Napoleon had quitted Elba !
On the 5th March official news of the event reached
Naples and created immense excitement. There was one
man, however, who had been no stranger to Napoleon's
resolve. That man was Murat. On the iyth February
the Emperor had decided to acquaint Joachim with his
plans, and Colonna, who had only just returned from his
protracted journey in Italy, was dispatched to Naples
with instructions to inform the King that the Emperor
had made up his mind to proceed to Paris and drive out
the Bourbons, and that he was willing to forget the wrongs
he had suffered at the hands of the King, who could now
count on his Imperial protection. As soon as he learned
that the Emperor had landed in France, Murat was to
1 Talleyrand to Louis XVIII. Vienna, February 24, 1815. Pallain,
Correspondence de Talleyrand et de Louis XVIII.
TALLEYRAND
THE FINAL HAZARD 469
send a confidential emissary to Vienna and himself inform
the Austrian Ambassador at Naples of Napoleon's peace-
able intentions. Murat was further to be requested to
take up a position with his army on the frontiers of his
kingdom, so that in the event of Austria attempting to
throw troops into France, the presence of the King of
Naples and his sixty thousand men would considerably
hamper their movements.1 Colonna reached Naples on
the ist March totally ignorant " how and when the
Emperor designed to act." His instructions were merely
to announce the Emperor's intended departure. As to
when that intention was to be put into execution he
could say nothing, and probably the Emperor did not
know himself. Colonna at once sought out Murat, who
was thunderstruck at the news. In reply to the King's
offer to send ships to the Emperor, Napoleon's envoy
stated that his instructions were merely to sign a treaty
to relieve the King of Naples of all anxiety, and if the
latter considered it expedient to enter into an offensive
and defensive alliance, he was empowered to sign such
an agreement on the understanding that it was only to
become effective when it was found impossible to remain
at peace with foreign Powers. Colonna also requested
the King to send a small vessel to cruise about off the
coast of Provence in order to pick up news. In this
manner Joachim would receive rapid and accurate noti-
fication of Napoleon's arrival in France and of the sub-
sequent course of events. Murat did not consider it
advisable to sign an agreement with Colonna. He wanted
fuller and more detailed information concerning the
departure of his brother-in-law, to whom, however, he
was quite willing to lend a hand. He ordered the
Adjutant-General Franceschetti to leave at once for
Porto Ferrajo with " a letter of the utmost importance."
The seventy-four gunners, the Capri and the Gioacchino,
1 L'lle d'Elbe et les Cent Jours. Correspondancet XXXI.
470 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
were ordered to Elba to bring away Madame M&re.1
To conceal their destination Joachim had given out that
the Capri was going to join the Neapolitan frigates which
had just been dispatched to Ancona.2 Thus put off the
scent, the Austrian Minister would have no suspicions
of the important news that had come to hand or of
Franceschetti's mission. Simultaneously with Frances-
chetti's departure for Elba, the vessel that was to cruise
about on the look-out for news of Napoleon's landing
set sail for the coast of Provence. The vessel in ques-
tion was the Prince Lucien. She carried twelve guns
and a crew of eighty men under the command of M.
Pierre Ferreto. On the 3rd March she sailed out of
Naples harbour and headed for Toulon and Marseilles.
Murat now had nothing to do but await developments.3
He had not long to wait. On the morning of the
5th a courier, dispatched from Rome by the Chevalier
1 Franceschetti. Mtmoires sur les tvtnements qui ont pr£c<!d£ la inort de
Joachim Ier, rot des Deux Sidles.
2 Mier to Metternich, Naples, March 9, 1815.
* It has often been questioned whether Napoleon informed Murat of his
departure. Although the Emperor himself indicated the date of Colonna's
arrival at Naples as the 1st March it was not supposed that Murat could have
known of the event before the 5th. It is undoubtedly true that he did not
know the day on which Napoleon's departure took place until the 5th March,
or possibly the evening of the 4th, but as early as the 1st he had learnt from
Colonna that the Emperor intended to leave Porto Ferrajo. It may be
argued that Napoleon himself assigns two different dates to Colonna's arrival
in Naples, viz. the 1st March (Correspondance XXXI, 40) and the 4th
(Correspondance XXXI, 164). But the latter date is erroneous since we have
proof that on the 3rd March Murat was ordering the dispatch of a vessel
which, in obedience to the instructions brought by Colonna, was to cruise
about off the French coast.
4 The following occurs in a message sent by Murat to Gallo : "If
Questiaux has not already left postpone his departure till to-morrow." This
note, which was written on the evening of the 4th, tends to support the idea
that at that hour Murat had already received word of Napoleon's departure.
This may have been quite possible since, besides such information as private
individuals or foreigners may then have had about the matter, the Neapolitan
vice-consul at Leghorn had sent off the news on the morning of the ist
THE FINAL HAZARD 471
Crivelli the day before, brought word that Napoleon had
escaped from Elba. Without losing a moment Murat
carried out the first part of the Emperor's proposed
plan ; he dispatched a confidential messenger to Vienna
to make known his peaceable intentions. He sent for
Mier, who found him " in a state of great agitation/'
told him of Napoleon's success and stated that within
an hour or two's time he would be sending a messenger
to Vienna. " Campochiaro," says Mier, " has orders to
declare to our Court that whatever happens the policy
of the King of Naples will remain subservient to ours.
From this decision he says nothing will make him depart,
and he desires to know what procedure we consider it
expedient to adopt at the present juncture in order that
he may fall in with it. The King once more took occa-
sion to repeat to me how desirous he was of affording
the Emperor Francis proofs of his gratitude and affec-
tion." The conversation, which took place in the presence
of the Queen, lasted for more than two hours, and the
King withdrew on word being brought to him that
a vessel had arrived from Elba. On board was Mary,
Pauline's secretary, with detailed information.
Inasmuch as by assisting Napoleon's designs he would
be placing himself on a satisfactory footing with the
Allies he hastened to carry out the Emperor's behests
and assured them of his pacific intentions. He was too
well pleased at finding an opportunity of relieving him-
self of the crushing and profitless burden of Austrian
" protection " to have any hesitation about complying,
at all events in spirit, with his brother-in-law's plans.
The pacific assurances which he was about to give to
Austria at the very same time as witnessed his departure
for the frontier with his army in fighting trim, are
March. As the distance between Naples and Leghorn could easily have
been covered in four days it would have been quite possible for the King to
have received the dispatch on the 4th March.
472 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
strikingly reminiscent of his modus operandi of 1814
when, desirous of filching Italy from the French, he
advanced with his troops, and palming himself off as the
ally of France substituted his authority for hers without
so much as striking a blow. As Mier remarks with some
astonishment, the Emperor's escape from Elba, instead of
determining Murat to postpone his intended visit to The
Marches, appeared to make him all the more anxious to
set out. The Austrian Ambassador was of opinion that
the King's state of mind argued that he had plans, but
that they were still more or less in the air and that he
was waiting to see how Napoleon's adventure was likely
to turn out before definitely deciding on a course of
action. He would have modified his opinion if he had
heard the conversation which took place between Murat
and d'Ambrosio on the latter 's return from Vienna.
" Hurrying along through Northern Italy," writes d'Am-
brosio, " I learned when I got to Ferrara that Bonaparte
had managed to get away from Elba. Arriving at
Ancona, I found my friend Carascosa consumed with
patriotic zeal. I prevailed upon him to abate his ardour
and see what time brought forth. I next came upon
the King's baggage train, which had been sent on to
Ancona whither troops were already being dispatched.
Certain functionaries, civil and military, had arrived
ahead of the King who, they said, would shortly be
putting in an appearance with the officers of the royal
household.
" At last I reached Naples and at once saw the King.
Napoleon's return had completely turned his head. He
could now only behold in the Emperor the victor of
Marengo, of Jena, Austerlitz, Wagram, and Mojaisk. He
gave me no time to say a word about matters at Vienna,
but, filled with wrath and hatred against Austria, he
exclaimed : ' At last then the hour of vengeance has
come.' ' Not so, Sire,' I replied. ' And why not, pray ? '
THE FINAL HAZARD 473
asked he. ' Europe,' I said, ' assembled in congress,
will decide what is to be done in regard to Napoleon.
The Powers have retained their unanimity of action.
The bonds between them have been drawn the closer
by their common hatred of French domination. The
utmost France, with her lack of horses and war material,
can possibly achieve will be to preserve her independence.
She can never again destroy the independence of others.
Your Majesty will gain nothing from an alliance with
the French whose struggle will be for existence and not
for glory.' ' What need have I of alliances,' was the
King's retort, ' when the Italians hail me as their
liberator ? I can invade Italy, establish myself on the
banks of the Po, throw my army across the river and
take Venice by surprise. Beneath my standards I can
rally the Piedmontese, sick of the follies of their King ;
Milan, the latest home of liberal ideas ; Venice, still
mindful of her ancient glory ; Liguria, groaning beneath
the Sardinian domination ; and the people of Romagna,
who are naturally warlike and would readily lend me
their support in such an enterprise. As for Austria, will
she not soon be called upon to do battle with the French ?
How then will she be able to meet every necessity and
combat every foe at once ? ' 'Is Your Majesty then
ignorant of the forces which Austria has at her disposal ?
Do you not know that Austria has an army of 450,000
men and twenty-six million inhabitants and that she is
most closely allied with England and Russia, and do you
forget that before she went to war with France she
would necessarily have to pour troops into Italy in order
to keep the French beyond the Alps and prevent them
from effecting a junction with the forces that will be
called upon to fight in Germany ? A year ago I was
certainly of opinion that Your Majesty should have come
to terms with Austria on the banks of the Po after
summoning to your side the Italian troops, then
474 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
full of patriotic enthusiasm. Your Majesty could
then have taken the field with a hundred thousand,
perhaps two hundred thousand men. But now how can
you hope to succeed with the Pope back again in Rome,
with all these princelings who have dragged back the
Italian provinces into that condition of sluggishness and
stagnation from which, under French rule, they were
just beginning to emerge.' The King then said it was
useless to enter into further discussion concerning a
matter on which his mind was already made up. ' Go,'
he concluded, ' and rest after your journey and then make
ready to set out. The time for negotiations has passed ;
it is now the time to fight.' Here the Queen broke in
saying : ' Austria has her fears concerning you, just as she
is afraid about what may happen in Italy, but she has no
intention of altering the status quo or of interfering with
our present position unless you put yourself completely
in the wrong.' * Enough of this, exclaimed the King,
4 let us change the subject.' Thereupon I took my
departure."
As soon as he reached home d'Ambrosio deemed it
his duty to send Murat a letter advising him to proceed
with caution and see what time brought forth. Next
morning he was sent for by the King. "How," ex-
claimed His Majesty, " could you write me such a
letter ? " " Sire," answered the General, " you are
treading upon a volcano. You have no sure foundation
to go upon. I have said so before and I repeat it now."
" No," was the King's reply, " we shall win the day.
I will appeal to the people of Italy to gather round me
at Bologna. You who know all that went on at Vienna,
all the promises that have been left unfulfilled, do you not
feel the same bitterness that I do ? " At this point the
arrival of the ministers abruptly cut short the discussion.1
1 D'Ambrosio, Voyage a Vienne en 1813. Manuscrit de la Societa
Napolitana di Storia Patria.
THE FINAL HAZARD 475
In these warlike sentiments we can trace the germ
of those ideas which found full expression in the pro-
clamation issued from Rimini on the 30 th March. Nor
did the King fail to suit his actions to his words. On
the 6th his saddle-horses were sent off to the Marches,
and he himself set about his military preparations with
the utmost energy. Not a day passed but he was super-
intending or taking part in manoeuvres and evolutions of
one kind or another.1 On the 7th he issued a decree
giving every facility to the Neapolitans in Sicily to come
and join the army of Naples. On their arrival they were
to be paid the arrears due to them in Sicily.2 When
sending word of this decision to Desvernois, the general
commanding in Calabria, the King naively suggested that
he should apply to the English for the necessary means
of transport.
In the midst of all these events the Inconstant sailed
into Naples. After landing Napoleon on the coast of
Provence she had been sent back to Naples in order to
refit, a process which it was pretended could not be
carried out in a French port, all of them being still closed
against the Emperor. On the loth March according to
the captain's report, the Inconstant had arrived at
Gaeta, bringing tidings of the happiest description,
Napoleon's proclamations and a variety of papers and
pamphlets.
On receiving this news Murat could restrain himself
no longer. The city was filled with rumours of his
immediate departure. To Lucien he wrote off saying :
" At last things are going splendidly. I have made up
my mind now and I am going to give my support to the
cause of the Emperor and of France. I am starting for
Ancona at once." Through Lucien he made official
application to the Pope for permission to pass through
the Papal States, pledging himself to see that order
1 Diario di Nicola. * Monitcur UnivcrseL
476
NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
was maintained there.1 In everything Joachim said
he made it quite clear that he intended to put him-
self at the head of his troops and to assist Napoleon,
for whose cause he manifested immense enthusiasm.
To Desvernois he sent off five hundred copies of each
of the Emperor's two proclamations for distribution in
Sicily.2
Nevertheless, Murat had no d£sire^_ta_jabouron
andMJ^Jbie_4eci3eSrtojm^ke use of
TKtpJjSsi^
^lra£_ojie_xJiaiicfi, in a jjiousand of emancipating Emsej£
from Austria/sjrkspme control.^ As he told d'Ambrosio.
"ite-^Tad no needof alliances. His great desire was to
resume the programme of 1814, to rouse Italy to action,
to defeat the Austrians, and to make himself master of
the situation. Since the due execution of this plan
demanded that he should be accurately informed as to
the state of opinion in the various parts of Italy, he
sent for General Filangieri on the I4th March and en-
trusted him with a mission. Ostensibly he was to go to
Milan and confer with Nugent in the matter of Madame
Metre's return to Naples, but in reality his duties were
to visit Italy and report to the King on the state of
public opinion and the extent of the Austrian military
preparations. In ordex^on the otherhand^ that Napp-
A :r^3^--^^5"deajing^Mjir^
old taciics
faithful
oHowsj, —
r "It was with inexpressible delight that I learned of
Your Majesty's debarkation on the shores of your Empire.
I I should have liked to receive some instructions as to
\ how our movements were to be co-ordinated but doubt-
V less I shall soon get directions on this point. I hasten,
\Jiowever, to inform Your Majesty that my whole army
1 Weil. Joachim Murat, rot de Naples.
2 Desvernois, Mtmoires.
THE FINAL HAZARD 477
Ancona in order that I may be better able to keep
matters under my control and also be within closer reach
of any news Your Majesty may have to send me. Sire,
I have never ceased to be your friend. I have only been
waiting for a favourable opportunity ; that opportunity
has now come, and I am going to prove to you and to
Europe that I am worthy of the opinion you hold of me.
Had I made this attempt at any other time it would
only have meant a useless sacrifice on my part."
This letter was dispatched on the I4th March by
Beauffremont,1 the same Beauffremont that had formerly
acted as go-between in Murat's negotiations with Austria.
On the 1 5th a messenger from Genoa 2 came with startling
news to Naples ; Napoleon had passed through the whole
of South-Eastern France and had made a triumphal
entry first into Grenoble and then into Lyons. This
news was fraught with the weightiest consequences, and
Murat decided to precipitate his movements. Summon-
ing his Council of State he explained the reasons which
were impelling him to march on the Po and, paying no
heed to the advice of his ministers who again counselled
delay, he at once decided on war. He ordered Zuccari
to inform the Papal Government that two Neapolitan
divisions would be passing through the Roman States.
Zuccari was also to guarantee the safety of the Pope's
person and to give a pledge as to the good behaviour
of the Neapolitan troops. In the meantime Murat had
received advice of certain movements of doubtful friendli-
ness on the part of Bellegarde in the neighbourhood of
the Po. He was also aware that two days previously
an Austrian colonel had arrived in Naples and he began
to feel uneasy. He therefore determined to take the
1 Caulaincourt to Fesch. Paris, April 8, 1815. Affaires £tranglres.
• L'lle (fElbe et les Cent Jours.
478 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
offensive, and instructed Gallo to voice his grievances
against Austria. Gallo saw Mier in the course of the
evening, complained of the visible decline in the warmth
of Austria's sympathy, of the lukewarm support she had
been giving to Joachim, of the very perfunctory manner
in which she had urged his claims for recognition and
of the way in which his ministers were spoken about in
Vienna. The Congress, he said, would come to an end
without Austria having fulfilled any of her promises.
Only one inference was possible, and that was that
Austria would abandon Naples if matters reached a
crisis. Therefore, he concluded, the King was obliged to
seek for support elsewhere and avail himself of other
means to attain his end.1
Having taken all necessary measures Murat left
Naples at one o'clock in the afternoon of the I7th March
in an eight-horse travelling-coach followed by three other
carriages and six.2 With him went General d'Ambrosio ;
Zurlo, Agar, and Gallo were to follow later. Gallo sent
a short note to Mier announcing his departure. " Having
received the King's commands to attend him on a tour
which he has decided to make in the Abruzzi and the
Marches, I beg hereby to send you official notification
of my departure."
Murat, who had appointed Manhes Governor of Naples
with Rosaroll as deputy and had reinstated Maghella in
the control of the Police, did not on this occasion entrust
the Regency to the Queen. Was it jealousy of Caroline's
influence that had led him to forego her assistance ?
Had any difference of opinion induced him to dissociate
his policy from hers ? It had certainly seemed as though
they had patched up their quarrel, and the Austrian
alliance had apparently set the seal on their reconcilia-
tion. As a matter of fact it was Caroline this time and
1 Mier to Metternich. Naples, March 16, 1815.
2 Diario di Nicola.
THE FINAL HAZARD 479
not Murat who was the unwilling party. She regarded
the whole affair in a totally different light from that in
which it presented itself to Murat. As soon as she heard
that Napoleon had qiiitted Elba she expressed her views
about the matter with great vehemence to Mier. She
declared to him that she was constantly impressing on
the King that if ever Napoleon became Emperor of the
French again he would once more throw the whole of
Europe into the melting pot. She knew him too well
to have any doubts on that score. The King, she went
on, had a great part to play, and that part was to remain
thoroughly loyal to the policy he had adopted and to
make his interests coincide as closely as possible with
those of Austria. Notwithstanding the fact that she"
was Napoleon's own sister it was as much as she could do
to prevent herself wishing he was dead. Tender feelings
truly to entertain towards a brother ! *•
Such being Caroline's state of mind it is no wonder"
that she was grieved at her husband's decision and dis-
tressed when she heard of the successes that were falling
to the lot of her mar-feast of a brother. Determined
to retain Austria's goodwill by hook or by crook, she
had quarrels of the most violent description with Murat,
quarrels which culminated in a complete rupture between
husband and wife. " I found the Queen very much
upset," writes Mier, " and in a state of great conster-
nation at all the King had been doing. She repeated
what she had already said to me about the matter and
assured me that she was doing all she possibly could
to prevent the King's departure, for she saw what would
come of it. Twice, she continued, he had been on the
point of getting into his carriage to leave Naples when
she had succeeded in dissuading him from his purpose.
To prevail upon him to abandon his journey she had
told him that she would not undertake the regency or
1 Mier to Metternich. Naples, March 9, 1815.
480 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
have anything whatever to do with the government in
his absence. She vowed that if he went away she
would withdraw to Portici and live there in the strictest
retirement, that she would not see a single minister or
discuss any government matter. This is most embar-
rassing for the King, since he knows that no one but the
Queen is competent to carry on the government in his
absence." In the counsel she gave her husband, that
wonderful sisterly love of hers is always apparent. " I
am advising the King," she said, " that in the event of
Austria refusing to acquiesce in the possible successes
of Napoleon, he ought to throw in his lot with her and
act in full accord with her policy. You see that my
own affections and the torture of seeing my family per-
secuted and overwhelmed with obloquy give place to
my duties as a mother and as Queen of Naples. Once
indeed I clung to France and to the policy of France
till the last extremity because I felt that our welfare
demanded it. But events necessitated a change of
policy, and I became convinced that our only safety
lay in uniting ourselves as closely as possible with Austria.
To that conviction I cling with all my heart and soul." l
As she said more than once to a man for whom she had
tender spot in her heart, " You would think it suffi-
f cient would you not for a peasant of Le Quercy to occupy
j the fairest throne of Italy. But no, he must needs have
the whole peninsula." 2
Such was Caroline's attitude towards her country and
her brother. We can readily understand that Murat,
at the moment full of zeal for the Emperor (for his
policy demanded it), paid not the smallest heed to his
wife's admonitions. But, it will be asked, why did
Murat rush off headlong towards the Po instead of
quietly staying on at Naples till he knew that Napo-
1 Mier to Metternich. Naples, April 16, 1815.
a Orloff. Mtmoires sur le royaume de Naples*
THE FINAL HAZARD 481
Icon was back in Paris, till he heard how matters were
going to turn out ? Was it that he wished to help the
Emperor by keeping to the plan that had been agreed
upon ? That, indeed, was the version he afterwards gave
of the matter when he wrote Napoleon from Cannes
saying : " You ordered the Due de Vicenza to write to
me, and then added in your own hand, ' I will support
you with all the means at my disposal.' ' But the plea
was impossible and he knew it. A mere reference to the
dates is sufficient to put Murat out of court. The letter
containing the passage quoted by the King is, as a matter
of fact, dated the 29th March, and Joachim set out on
his campaign on the lyth. It was on the 3oth March,
while the first few shots were being exchanged, that the
famous proclamation of Rimini was given to the world.
The real truth of the matter is that once again Murat
had designed to be beforehand with everybody in the
conquest of Italy ; that was still his one aim, his one
desire. " Courage and fidelity," he cried to the magis-
trates of Ancona, " these are all I need of you. All I
ask of you in order to give Italy her freedom is to stand
shoulder to shoulder. The Marches are mine by right
of conquest ; they are doubly mine because they were
promised me by the Allies. Rather than give them up
I was, and I still am, resolved to reduce them to ashes.
I say to you again, all I ask of you is to be united, to
be loyal and to be brave. Italy's only boundaries are
the mountains and the sea ; I know no other." l
That was the reason of Murat 's haste. The ex-
planation of his ten days' sojourn at Ancona is not
to be found as one might imagine in any desire to wait
for news from Paris and the Emperor's instructions. He
remained there because he wished to rally the Italian
people about him and to swell the ranks of his army
1 English vice-consul at Ancona to Burghersh. Ancona, March 21, 1815.
Quoted by M. Weil. Joachim Murat, roi de Naples.
2 H
482 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
with all those whom he believed were longing to give
up everything and follow him. On thet 28th March,
between Fano and Sinigaglia, he encountered Jerome
who had made good his escape from Trieste. Their
conversation was significant. " Ignorant as to the
motives of the King's advance," writes Jerome, " I
asked him for an explanation. ' I am at war with
Austria/ replied he, ' and hostilities have already begun/
' You have a treaty with the English then, I suppose ? '
' No, but they could not want to throw any obstacle
in the way of the independence of Italy, for all Italy
has pronounced in my favour/ ' The Emperor then is
in Paris and working in conjunction with you, and a
French army is coming down over the Alps ? ' I asked
again. ' I do not know/ he answered, ' what the Em-
peror is doing. I do not know whether he has entered
Paris, though that must be so. But if Italy arises en masse
I shall possess an army of 150,000 men, and with such
a force as that I am afraid of nobody/ " l
In order to obtain a just appreciation of the part
played by Napoleon's letters in deciding Murat's course
of action we must carefully study the correspondence
which took place between the two brothers-in-law as
well as the channels by which that correspondence was
transmitted. The first communication to reach the King
after his departure for the army was the letter, falsely
dated the i6th March, which was dispatched by Joseph
from Prangins.2 It was received by Joachim on the
March somewhere between Fano and Pesaro.
1 Mtmoires du roijtrdme.
* There is no doubt that Joseph wrote to Murat because the King
certainly received a letter, but it was not the letter of which a copy exists
at the office of Foreign Affairs. The copy in question runs as follows :
" Prangins, March 16, 1815. The Emperor has arrived at Auxonne with all
the troops he fell in with on the road, and Marshal Ney, with the troops that
were collected at Lons-le-Saulnier, has followed the Emperor. The Bourbons
are everywhere in full flight. General Maison, who left Paris with as many
THE FINAL HAZARD 483
On the 2o,th March Napoleon wrote Murat as follows :
" I have arrived ; I have passed through France. The
army, the people, those of the country and those of the
towns, came out to greet me. On the 2Oth March I
entered Paris at the head of the troops of Essone, troops
on whom the King was relying. The King withdrew
towards Lille, where he arrived on the 23rd. Next day,
seeing that the garrison were determined to refuse ad-
mittance to his household and that he was within an
ace of being made prisoner, he retired to England. All
his family have done the same.
" The whole of France except Marseilles, of which
I have as yet no news, has hoisted the national colours.
Everything is going on as well as possible. The old
troops as he could muster on the way, has been deserted and has taken
to flight with twenty gendarmes. France is moved by the same unanimous
enthusiasm as in '89. To-night the Emperor sleeps at Chalon. He will
arrive in Paris with more than a hundred thousand men. I am borne up
by the hope of holding aloft the fortunes of our common country and of
winning over Austria. As for you, my brother, lend your aid to the noble
policy of the country which you have helped to adorn. Such aid, both
military and political, it is in your power to render. Now is the time to
decide. Speak to Austria by example and by precept. . . .
11 Speak and act as your heart dictates. March up to the Alps but do not
pass beyond them. I can promise you happiness because your policy will be
in accord with your duty as a Frenchman and as a son of the Revolution
owing all to the people and nothing to the principle of Divine Right, nothing
to eighteenth-century ideas. Away with the Bourbons. All honour to the
men of the Revolution. . . ." The letter, at all events in this form, could not
have been written by Joseph. In the first place he speaks about the Emperor
arriving at Auxonne, whereas it ought to have been Auxerre, as the Emperor
did not pass through Auxonne. Now Napoleon was at Auxerre on the i8th
March. Secondly, he mentions the flight of the Bourbons and General
Maison. But General Maison left Paris on the 2Oth March at the last
moment. Lastly, he states further on that the Emperor would be sleeping
that night (the i6th) at Chalon. As a matter of fact it was on the I3th that
he passed the night there. It is therefore manifestly impossible that the
letter, the original of which is not to be found, should have been sent by
Joseph in that form. Either it is a spurious copy or else it contains passages
interpolated from other correspondence. In its existing form the letter is in
no sense to be relied on and cannot be adduced in support of any argument.
484 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
soldiers are flocking in crowds to join their flag, the
country districts have decided to make every sacrifice.
" I have an army in Flanders, one in Alsace, one
in the Interior, and another in course of formation in
Dauphine". Up to now I am at peace with every one. I
will support you to the utmost of my power. I rely on
you. As soon as Marseilles hoists the Tricolour send
along some vessels so that we can correspond, for
I am very much afraid we shall have some difficulty
in getting letters through by way of Italy. Send me
a minister ; I will send you one of mine on a frigate
before long.1
" I was not sufficiently master of the situation to
wait for the ships you sent me, but I thank you none
the less for dispatching them. If you send any ships
to France with messages for me they should go to Toulon.
It is the best and safest place.
" As you may readily imagine I am sincerely anxious
to maintain peace. This above everything would guar-
antee Your Majesty's future. If, however, we are com-
pelled to have recourse to arms I am from this day forth
perfectly well prepared to face whatever the future may
have in store, and the unanimity with which the people
of France have rallied round me makes me confident
that I can count on the energetic support of the entire
nation.
" The French are willing to make any sacrifice in
order to rid themselves forever of the hateful and de-
grading rule from which they have just been set free,
and the one thing men are longing for is to have a govern-
ment strong enough to give them efficient protection.
I am therefore able to look at the future without anxiety.
Your Majesty's assistance will add yet further to my
confidence. If your affection for me has undergone no
1 At this point the letter as published in the Corrcspondancc comes to an
end.
THE FINAL HAZARD 485
change I shall have the pleasure of proving to you yet
once more that you also may ever rely on my friendship." 1
This letter was first of all entrusted to Monsieur de
Beauffremont who had just brought the Emperor the
letter which Murat had written on the I4th March.
Beauffremont, however, was not to reach his destination.
On arriving at Turin he was seized and kept a prisoner
for nine days and then compelled to return to France.
The 1 2th April found him back again at Lyons. He
had managed to retain possession of his letter though
his mission had proved a failure.2
A second copy was given to Gruchet, a captain in
the Neapolitan Royal Guard, who left Paris at the
beginning of April, travelling by way of Switzerland ;
but he was held up at Versoix, not far from Geneva, and
forbidden to cross the frontier. He was journeying
southwards, hoping to get across the Alps by another
pass, when he fell into the hands of the French troops.
By order of the general commanding at Antibes he was
sent to Fort Carre, from which Caulaincourt obtained
his release on the 27th May.
On the 30th March Napoleon was availing himself
of yet another means of communication. Thinking that
he might make use of the Prince Lucien, a Neapolitan
vessel which had been waiting in Toulon harbour at
least since the 22nd March for the alleged purpose of
getting possession of certain belongings of the Queen
of Naples, he sent the following message to Decres :
" The Neapolitan schooner at Toulon has come in accord-
ance with arrangements to pick up news. Send three
smart officers, one after another at intervals of twenty-
1 The text of the letter here quoted, of which a part only is printed in
the Correspondence (No. 21,745), is that of the document preserved at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that document the date, which is not stated
in the Correspondance , is given as the 29th March.
2 Moniteur Universel.
486 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
four hours, each with a cipher copy of the letter which
will be handed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
These officers will deliver the letter as well as copies of
the Moniteur from the 20th March to date to the captain
of the schooner. One should go via Gap, another by
way of Aries and the third by the ordinary route. They
should all be natives of the district." l On the ist April
Decr£s sent word to Caulaincourt that he had received
the first of the cipher communications. On the 3rd all
three packets had reached Toulon. Notwithstanding
these exaggerated precautions this plan proved no less
unsuccessful than the first. On the 2gth April Decre"s
wrote Gaulaincourt that the scheme had fallen through.
" The Neapolitan ship," said he, " which was supposed
to pick up your dispatches for the King of Naples at
Toulon or Marseilles had already sailed when the papers
arrived. They are being returned to me one after another,
and I have the honour to forward Your Excellency the
first which has reached me. I will do the same with
the two that remain as and when they come to
hand." 2
On the 30th March Caulaincourt was dispatching
messengers to the various courts of Europe bearing
a circular letter suspending the representatives of
Louis XVIII. from the discharge of their functions.
Vanier, who was selected to go to Italy, carried with
him packets for the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Papal
States, and the Kingdom of Naples. Unfortunately
Vanier, who reached Saint- Jean-de-Maurienne on the
3rd April, was shadowed by a company of carabineers
as far as Turin, and on arriving there on the 4th was
at once conducted back to France without having been
able to deliver a solitary dispatch.3
1 Correspondence, 21,744.
2 Decres to Caulaincourt, April I, 1815.
3 Moniteur Universe!.
THE FINAL HAZARD 487
On the 4th April Napoleon forwarded a circular letter
to the Sovereigns of Europe announcing his ardent desire
for peace, and at the same time his Foreign Secretary
dispatched letters to his fellow-ministers in the various
courts. Great care was taken not to overlook the King
of Naples. On the 5th April, Levecq started for Italy
bearing missives from the Emperor for Victor Emmanuel,
the Pope, and Murat, as well as communications from
Caulaincourt for the Comte de Vallaise, Cardinal Pacca,
and Gallo. Attached to Caulaincourt 's letter for Gallo
was the following private note : " Monsieur le Marquis, —
The Emperor was desirous of giving direct expression to
His Majesty the King of Naples of the feelings of regard
which he entertains towards him. He also wished to
make known to him what great importance he attaches
to the maintenance of the peaceful conditions now so
happily subsisting between the two countries. I have
been instructed, Monsieur le Marquis, to send you the
Emperor's letter, and to beg Your Excellency to transmit
it to His Majesty. It will be found attached to the
letter which I now have the honour to write to you." l
This message, however, was not fated to meet with any
better fortune than its forerunners.
Happily for Napoleon, the submission of Marseilles at
last enabled him to make free use of the Proven9al coast
and the sea for the purposes of his correspondence. The
moment he became aware that there was a possibility
of getting letters through by this route he forwarded
the following instructions to Decres : " Send a dispatch-
boat to Naples with copies of all the letters of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs. You yourself can get together all
the copies of the Moniteur that have been issued to date
since the 20th March and send them with a letter to the
King of Naples in order that he may know the successful
i Caulaincourt to Gallo. Paris, April 4, 1815. Naples. Archives de la
Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria.
488 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
course events are taking in France." l Caulaincourt
therefore collected together the various letters he had
written to Gallo, and added to them the following note
for Fesch : "I have the honour to inform you that His
Majesty has just appointed you his Ambassador Extra-
ordinary to the Holy See. . . . Your Excellency is also
accredited for the time being to the King of Naples, to
whom the Emperor will send a Minister as soon as com-
munications are possible. You are at liberty, Monsieur
le Cardinal, to appoint a Charge d 'Affaires at Naples if you
deem it expedient. We take it for granted that the
King is aware of the various machinations of which he
is the object. He will scarcely have been deceived by
Monsieur de Metternich's fallacious declarations, nor will
he suffer himself to be misled by false statements or
forged documents. The Emperor is unwilling to sever
his cause from the King's. If the latter's throne were
threatened, the Emperor would make war upon the Allies
in order to support him, even though they had no quarrel
with France." 2
This letter was included with those which Napoleon
was asking to have re-dispatched by boat, and on the
1 2th April Decres advised Caulaincourt that he was
sending on the packet to the maritime prefect at Toulon.
In pursuance of the Emperor's instructions, he wrote to
the King of Naples as follows : " Sire, in obedience to
the Emperor's commands, I am sending a dispatch-boat
from Toulon to convey to Your Majesty's Minister for
Foreign Affairs a copy of all the letters written to you
by the Emperor's Foreign Minister.
" The Emperor also bids me do myself the honour of
writing to Your Majesty to inform you of the satisfactory
position of affairs in France. Your Majesty will find en-
closed copies of the Moniteur from the 20th March to date.
1 Correspondance, 21,783.
* Caulaincourt to Fesch. Paris, April 8, 1815.
THE FINAL HAZARD 489
" Your Majesty will learn therefrom that His Majesty
has been greeted with the loving welcome of his people
and the acclamations of the entire army.
"During the whole of his triumphal progress from
the Gulf of Jouan to the Tuileries not a single drop of
blood was shed. His Majesty had but to direct his
march on Paris, and the few opponents who had pre-
tended to dispute his return fled without waiting for
his approach." l
These letters were conveyed on board the schooner
Biche, which, after a successful voyage, dropped anchor
in Naples harbour on the 2ist April.2 Dispatched by
special messenger to Joachim's army, they were delivered
at their respective destinations, and Gallo ultimately
wrote to Caulaincourt acknowledging their receipt. " I
received," he said, " the letter which Your Excellency
did me the honour to write me from Paris under date
of the 4th instant, as well as the various papers relating
to the auspicious events which have recently taken place
in France. In view of the distance which at present
separates me from His Majesty the King, who is at the
head of his army, I can do no more than hasten to send
him the letter from His Majesty the Emperor, as well
as Your Excellency's own important communications.
" I am only awaiting His Majesty's instructions in
order to reply to Your Excellency, it being impossible
for me at the moment to do more than acknowledge
receipt of the letters with which you have favoured me."
These tidings from France became very widely known
in Naples, for the Monitore of the 22nd April proclaimed
the news that the Biche, flying the tricolour, had arrived
1 Decres to Murat. Paris, April 12, 1815. Naples, Archives de la Societa
Napolitana di Storia Patria.
2 Mtmoires du roijtrdmc. Diario di Nicola,
8 Gallo to Caulaincourt. Ancona, April 24, 1815. Naples, Archives de la
Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria.
490 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
from Toulon. The journal gave the most encouraging
account of the progress of events in France/ stating that
the Emperor had written to the King to announce his
victorious return, and that Cardinal Fesch had been
accredited Minister Plenipotentiary at the court of Naples
and at the Holy See.1
Thus the only way that Napoleon succeeded in trans-
mitting news to Murat was by boat. As a consequence,
the King knew nothing officially before the 25th April.
The Emperor did not wait for his brother-in-law's
reply before establishing relations with the kingdom of
Naples. He hastened to inform his ministers of the
terms he was on with Murat, and he also commanded
General Grouchy to sketch out a plan for a movement
on Mont Cenis which he considered would be a means
of affording relief to the King of Naples, who certainly
seemed to be coming to blows with Austria. But it was
principally from the dispatch of an ambassador — a step
which he had promised to take as long ago as the 29th
March — that he looked for a really satisfactory re-estab-
lishment of relations with Naples. On hearing how
matters had been progressing in the south, he wrote to
Caulaincourt saying : " Monsieur le due de Vicenza,
Marseilles has submitted ; it is therefore necessary that
you should see to the immediate dispatch of a Charge
d' Affaires for Constantinople and of a Minister for Naples.
If General Belliard cares about the task, he would be
the very man for the latter post." 2 He next sent for
Belliard himself in order to sound his feelings. " * My
necessities require/ he said, ' that you should be with
Murat ; he is a friend of yours, and he has great confidence
in you. You will be able to help him with your advice.
You will be assisting him and at the same time doing
me a service. He seems to have attacked the Austrians.'
1 Monitore des Deux Sidles, April 22, 1815.
2 Correspondance, 21,784.
THE FINAL HAZARD 491
' So much the worse for him, Sire. If he has done that
he is lost/ replied Belliard. ' I am vexed that he has
done so/ the Emperor went on. ' I was not anxious for
war/ ' It seems to me that it will be difficult to avoid
it, Sire/ was Belliard's rejoinder ; ' unless you have
come to an agreement with Austria/ ' I have not/
said the Emperor. ' Up to the present I have been
unable to procure the delivery of any dispatches. MujcaL.
jms^een jaaorkirjg for
You must tell him that I am getting together an armyy
on the Piedmont frontier in order to lend him a hand.
Murat's dream is to be sovereign of Italy. My own idea
is not so much for the union of Italy as for making it into
two separate kingdoms divided by the Po. If such a
division comes to pass, Murat should have the right bank
and I would dispose of the left. With regard to Piedmont
and Genoa, which in the interests of France would have
to be considered as forming part of the left-bank division,
that part of the question could be gone into later on.
Anyhow, you will see what can be done when you are on
the spot ; you have carte blanche from me, but start
quickly — Murat has need of you/ " 1
These instructions, which gave Belliard similar powers
to those which had formerly been conferred on Eugene,
show that Napoleon's intentions regarding the territory
to be allotted to Murat in Italy had undergone no modi-
fication since March 1814. Belliard could not refuse the
task, and on the I3th April he was formally appointed
the Emperor's envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary to the King of Naples. Leaving Paris on
the 22nd April, Belliard proceeded to Toulon, where he
embarked on the Dryade, commanded by Senes, who was
under orders to put the Due de Padua ashore in Corsica.
After calling at Bastia and Porto Ferrajo,8 the Dryade
1 Belliard, Mtmoires.
2 Belliard to Napoleon. Archives des Affaires £trangtres.
492 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
was holding on her course when, on the gth May, some-
where about Ischia, there hove in sight three British
men-of-war — a ship of the line, a frigate, and a brig —
which immediately began to give chase. While the
Dryade proceeded to clap on every stitch of canvas in
order to give her pursuers the slip, Belliard and his two
aides-de-camp got into the ship's dinghy and managed
to reach Naples. The same evening he was received
in audience by Caroline.1 The General informed the
Queen how favourably the Emperor was disposed towards
Naples. Caroline on her side freely voiced her grievances,
and lamented that Murat had left against her wishes.
Nevertheless the French emissary was received with a
good show of welcome, and the official statements which
the Queen ordered to be issued to the public were couched
in a Francophile tone that had latterly become distinctly
unfamiliar. " The tidings brought by General Belliard
regarding the condition of France are excellent," wrote
Maghella to Desvernois . ' ' The enthusiasm of the army and
the attitude of the whole nation are worthy of their chief."
Even the Monitore published an official announcement of
the arrival of " Comte Belliard, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
the French, who is proceeding to the King's headquarters."
It was evident Mier was no longer on the spot.
Belliard 's stay at Naples was of the briefest duration.
He left again immediately, and on the evening of the
nth he was with Murat at Castel di Sagro. But instead
of the host of eighty thousand men and one hundred
pieces of cannon of which the Emperor had told him,
he found but the poor, disheartened remnants of an army
which now did not number more than eight or nine
thousand all told.2 After acquainting the King of the
1 Mtmoires du
2 Belliard to Davout. Castel di Sagro, May 12, 1815. Jung, Lucien
Bonaparte et ses Mtmoires.
THE FINAL HAZARD 493
instructions which he had been commanded to deliver,
Belliard told the King how favourably disposed the
Emperor was towards him. Murat on his side was
anxious to explain the reasons which had led him to
attack the Austrians. According to his statement of the
case, he had only taken this step at the urgent prompting
of the Queen and his advisers. This came as a surprise
to Belliard, who had just heard a totally different account
of the matter from Caroline. As for Napoleon, Joachim
would have it that he was equally culpable. He had
only been in such a hurry to commence hostilities because
he had received a letter from Joseph written in the
Emperor's name. Of his own personal aims, of his
infatuation, of his untimely haste to rid himself of the
Austrian yoke, of the ambition which had led him on
and on until he made his fruitless appeal to the Italian
people he said not a word. Joachim had merely acted
upon other people's advice ; the real culprits were his
wife, his brother-in-law, and his advisers. Such was his
plea. He added, as though it were hardly worthy of
mention, that "he had not obtained from the people
of Italy all the support he had a right to look for." 1
Belliard listened to what he had to say, and, being a
man of insight, he wrote that " the Emperor ought not
to count on any assistance from the King of Naples.
The King," he said, " could do absolutely nothing, and
would be very fortunate if he succeeded in maintaining
his position." In truth the end was approaching. De-
serted and betrayed, the King hurried back to Caserta,
where he arrived on the i8th May ; at eight o'clock in
the evening of that day he was in Naples ; 2 on the morrow
he was a fugitive. In his flight Murat looked in vain
for help or succour. His wife was a hostage in the hands
of the Allies, and her family had taken ship to France.
1 Belliard, M£moircs.
3 Belliard's report, June 17, 1815. Affaires Etrangtres.
494 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
>- M
Jerome, Fesch, and Madame had indeed already left
Naples. After making a fruitless attempt on the igth
April to get away on board a Neapolitan vessel, the
Gioachinno, which was obliged to put back owing to the
heavy weather,1 they made use of Belliard's ship in order
to return to France. On the I3th May the Dryade, with
all three on board, set sail for the coast of Provence, and
at nine o'clock on the morning of the 22nd May their
Imperial Highnesses went ashore at the Gulf of Jouan.
Madame and Cardinal Fesch proceeded on their journey
by easy stages, but Jer6me, who had sent on Fuht, his
aide-de-camp, in advance, drove rapidly across France
in a carriage belonging to Cavaignac, the ex-Neapolitan
official, as whose secretary he described himself, and
arrived in Paris on the 27th May.2 The Emperor had
previously questioned Cavaignac at great length on the
subject of Italy, Joachim's army, and the temper of the
people,3 and had displayed great anxiety as to Joachim's
fate, saying over and over again, " Will he beat the
Austrians ? " No sooner, then, did Jerome arrive than
he was called upon by the Emperor to discuss the
situation.
Jerome gave him an account of all that had happened
up to the time of his departure from Naples, and thus
the Emperor learned of the disasters that had befallen
the King and of his present desperate plight.4
1 Mtmoires du roijfrdmc. Diario di Nicola.
2 Mon.it eur Universe I.
9 Mdmoires d'une inconnue.
4 It was perhaps after his conversation with Jerome that Napoleon
ordered a note to be sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the
affairs of Naples. It would not be impossible that, after his brother's account
of the state of Murat's affairs, of his attempts to gather the Italians round him
and to proclaim the independence of the Italian race, Napoleon, furious at
finding himself deprived of a support on which he had been counting, sent
the following note : —
"The Emperor requires a memorandum regarding the King of Naples,
covering all the events of his last campaign (1814) and the injury which he
THE FINAL HAZARD 495
In no long time Napoleon was to receive tidings of a
still more serious and decisive character. Murat had
succeeded in reaching Ischia, and, thanks to Manhes,
who had allowed him to go on board the Sainte Catherine,
he arrived without mishap in France. Landing at Cannes
on the 25th May, he at once dispatched a messenger to
the Emperor asking for orders. While waiting for a reply,
he put up with the members of his suite at a little local
inn.1 Murat 's emissary informed Napoleon of his master's
reverses, of the capitulation of Casa-Lanza, of the King's
flight and arrival in France. As the Emperor was by
no means anxious to see his brother-in-law, at all events
for the present, he decided to send Baudus to him with
a message, at the same time dispatching orders to
Caulaincourt. " Monsieur Baudus," said he to the latter,
"is to leave immediately for the Gulf of Jouan. He
is to inform the King of Naples that His Majesty desires
him to select an agreeable country residence between
Gap and Sisteron, there to remain until the Queen's
arrival and until we receive some definite news from
Naples. He is to state in language of courteous restraint
inflicted upon France. The Emperor when on the island of Elba received
no mark of interest from him, no token of remembrance even. It did not
consort with the dignity of the Emperor in his misfortune to make the first
advance. The proclamations issued by him caused it to be asked by the
people of Bologna and the kingdom of Italy whether their rightful King was
dead. This impolitic conduct paralysed the national movement in Italy, the
majority of whose inhabitants were at heart loyal to the Emperor, and only
viewed this hostile movement with regret. The King having been unable to
offer any satisfactory explanation, having even gone so far as to betray his
hatred of the Italians who turned a deaf ear to his inducements of 1814,
failed on his side, and consequently came to grief . . ." Correspondence,
21,809.
If this note was not drawn up immediately after Napoleon's conversation
with Jer6me, it could only have been dictated on 1st June, when the Emperor
learned of Murat's arrival in France. At any rate, it cannot bear the date,
1 5th April, which is ascribed to it in the Correspondence, but is to be placed
somewhere between the 27th May and the ist June.
1 Belliard, Mfmoires. Mtmoires de Robert Guilletnard.
496 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
how greatly the Emperor regrets that the King took the
offensive on his own initiative and before any steps had
been taken to instruct the loyal subjects of Italy how
they were to act.
" the : King decidedjhefate of France a year ago by
paralysing fhp a rfn^Col^gjy^,^^
difference of sixty^AousancT men to our "disadvantage^
Tr"w77u1cf scarcely be^Bel^imngnfoT^rie^^RIng^to cometo •
Paris. The Queen should precede him thither, in order
that the public may become habituated to his downfall.
" Monsieur Baudus will console him and assure him \
that the Emperor's recollection of his faults, however
grave they may be, is lost in the contemplation of his .,
misfortunes, but that he does not wish him to come to
Paris till all matters are finally settled concerning him.
These duties have been entrusted to Monsieur Baudus
because he is known to be popular with the King. He
will correspond directly with the Minister and speak
without reserve regarding the King's private and political
behaviour.
" Monsieur Baudus, as agent of the Emperor, is to
impress upon him that if the Emperor had wished him
to march into Italy he would have let him know how to
"act. He will further observe that proclamations issued
from Paris would have produced a totally different
effect, that he was responsible for the downfall of France
in 1814, that in 1815 he has compromised her position
and brought about his own undoing, and that his behaviour
in 1814 ruined him in the eyes of the Italians because
they saw that he intended to abandon the Emperor's
1 Correspondance, 21,826. The publishers of the Correspondanec have
wrongly dated this letter the iQth April 1815. Baudus's mission could not
have taken place at that date since the King was still in Italy. It is very
probable that the note in question was dictated by Napoleon on the 1st June,
after receipt of Murat's message, and reproduced the day after by Caulaincourt
in his instructions to Baudus.
THE FINAL HAZARD 497
On receipt of the above note Gaulaincourt immediately
sent instructions to Baudus, those instructions simply
being a copy of the Emperor's orders.
Setting out for Cannes, Baudus arrived there on the
Qth June and saw Murat — how changed, alas, from the
brilliant King of former days ! His position was mournful
and distressing in the extreme. So low and depressed
was he that Baudus requested Caulaincourt to beg the
Emperor to send a letter, a remembrance, anything, to
lighten the melancholy reflections of the King. As to
his financial position, it was apparently more than em-
barrassed.1 In view of Baudus's message, Murat decided to
look for a country residence, but as he was too deeply con-
sumed with a longing to behold the Queen and his children
once more to go far away from the coast while any hope
of seeing them remained to him, he resolved to take up
his abode near Toulon, and on the I2th, while most oi
the Parisian papers were announcing his supposed arrival
at Gompie'gne, he was leaving Cannes for a country
residence called " Plaisance," belonging to Vice-Admiral
Allemand. There, while the brilliant cavalier of days
gone by was dragging out a miserable existence, he received
a letter from Fouche* by the hands of Gruchet, the captain
of his Guards, enjoining him to wait patiently until the
Emperor should break silence. On the 20th he sent back
Gruchet with a letter for the Emperor, probably his last,
in which he lamented that he had not been summoned
to the army, and reminded him of the letter which he
(the Emperor) had commanded Monsieur de Caulaincourt
to write to him — that letter at the foot of which he had
added in his own hand, " Take the field, and I will sup-
port you to the utmost of my power." The King concluded
by saying that, having lost his crown for the Emperor,
he should deem himself happy if he might shed his last
1 Caulaincourt to the Emperor. Paris, June 15, 1815. Affaires
Etranrtres.
21
498 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
drop of blood in his service.1 But this crowning false-
hood, these final protestations, availed him not. Napoleon,
his heart filled with bitterness against Murat, kept him
relentlessly at a distance. Yet in after years at St.
Helena he would sometimes regret his harshness, and ask
himself whether, if that incomparable sabreur had been
at hand to lead them, his cavalry might not have forced
the British to give way. Meanwhile the Fates were
working their will ; the destiny of each was being
accomplished. The Imperial sun was slowly sinking,
soon to be quenched in the hopeless night of Waterloo.
Of all the Emperor's mighty power, of all his
European domination, of the sway which Murat had once
wielded over Naples, of the splendid dreams of Italian
sovereignty which had once been his, nothing now
remained but two lonely, fallen men, and while the one
was holding on his way to his long exile at St. Helena,
the other was setting forth to meet his doom at Pizzo.
1 Mtmoires de Robert Guillemard.
APPENDIX
TREATY ENTERED INTO AT BAYONNE ON THE I5TH JULY 1808
between
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND THE GRAND DUG
DE BERG ET DE CLEVES
FOR THE CESSION TO PRINCE MURAT OF THE THRONE OF
NAPLES.
His Majesty the Emperor of the French being desirous of
disposing in favour of his brother-in-law Prince Joachim
Napoleon, Grand Due de Berg et de Cleves, of the crown of
the Two Sicilies, ceded to him by his august brother, Joseph
Napoleon, at present King of Spain, by the Treaty of Bayonne
of the 5th of the present month, His Majesty the Emperor
and King, and His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand
Due, have appointed the following to act as their pleni-
potentiaries in arranging the conditions relating to the said
cession, namely : His Excellency Nompere de Champagny,
Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty the Emperor df the
French, &c., and His Excellency M. Martius Mastrilli, Marquis
de Gallo, Councillor of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs
for the Kingdom of Naples, acting on behalf of His Imperial
and Royal Highness the Grand Due de Berg et de Cleves.
The said plenipotentiaries, having satisfied each other as
to their full powers, have agreed together on the following
articles : —
ARTICLE I. — His Majesty the Emperor and King hands
over to His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Due de
Berg, his rights in respect of the crown of the Two Sicilies.
ARTICLE II.— His Imperial and Royal Highness shall enjoy
499
500 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
the possession of the same for ever, he and his heirs male,
in order of primogeniture, to the exclusion of the females
and their descendants for ever.
ARTICLE III. — Nevertheless, if Her Imperial and Royal
Highness the Princess Caroline survives her august consort,
she shall remain Queen of the Two Sicilies, and she alone
shall enjoy the sovereign title and prerogatives thereof, and
the same shall be exercised by her in their plenitude. The
reason wherefore this single exception is made in the funda-
mental principle, is that the said Princess, who by means of
the present cession, made especially in her favour, places her
family upon the throne, must always occupy a rank superior
to that of her children.
ARTICLE IV. — In default of legitimate male issue of His
Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Due de Berg, the
crown of the Two Sicilies shall devolve upon His Majesty
the Emperor and King, his heirs male and descendants,
legitimate or adoptive.
In default of the legitimate male issue, natural or adoptive,
of H.M. the Emperor and King, the crown of the Two Sicilies
shall belong to the legitimate male descendants of Prince
Joseph Napoleon, King of Spain. In default of the legitimate
male issue of Prince Joseph Napoleon, the crown of the Two
Sicilies shall belong to the legitimate male descendants of
Prince Louis Napoleon, King of Holland. In default of
legitimate male issue of Prince Louis Napoleon, the crown
of the Two Sicilies shall belong to the legitimate male de-
scendants of Prince Jerome Napoleon, King of Westphalia.
ARTICLE V.— H.I. and R.H. the Grand Due de Berg shall
as King of the Two Sicilies retain the dignity of High Admiral
of France, which dignity shall remain vested in the Crown of
the Two Sicilies, so long as the order of succession laid down
by the present treaty shall continue.
ARTICLE VI.— H.I. and R.H. the Grand Due de Berg
pledges himself alike in his own name and in the name of his
successors to the throne of the Two Sicilies, to carry out and
uphold the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies
as laid down by King Joseph and guaranteed by H.M. the
Emperor and King, whereof a copy is hereunto annexed.
APPENDIX 501
ARTICLE VII. — H.I. and R.H. the Grand Due de Berg
hands over to H.M. the Emperor and King, for his use and
to be disposed of by him as he may think fit, the Grand Duchy
of Berg and of Cleves, as it at present exists, with the states
thereunto annexed, together with the rights and prerogatives
exercised in Germany by His Imperial and Royal Highness.
As from the first day of August next the revenues of the
Grand Duchy shall belong to His Majesty the Emperor and
King, and, in the same manner, all expenses connected with
the administration and government of the said Grand Duchy
shall likewise become chargeable to him.
ARTICLE VIII. — There shall exist an offensive and de-
fensive league, on sea as well as on land, between H.M. the
Emperor of the French and H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies
and their successors respectively.
ARTICLE IX. — The contingent to be furnished by H.M.
the King of the Two Sicilies in the event of a continental
war shall, in terms of the said league, consist of 18,000 in-
fantry, 3000 cavalry, and a train of 25 pieces of horse artillery,
with a due proportion of gunners, sappers, and miners. Until
the King shall have entered into possession of Sicily, the con-
tingent shall be 16,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 20 pieces
of horse artillery. The said troops shall be at full strength
when they cross the frontier of Naples.
ARTICLE X. — The said troops, so long as they are in Italy
or the other states of H.M. the Emperor, shall be maintained
and paid by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies. Elsewhere
the King of the Two Sicilies shall only be responsible for
their pay.
ARTICLE XL — The French troops required to insure the
safety of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be paid and
maintained by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies.
Nevertheless, if circumstances require that more than 12
regiments of infantry and 10 squadrons of cavalry should
be so employed, then any additional troops shall be paid
by H.M. the Emperor, and maintained by H.M. the King of
the Two Sicilies. The number of French troops in the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be reduced on the King's
request, in proportion as the organisation of the Neapolitan
502 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
army is perfected and the tranquillity of the country becomes
assured.
H.M. the Emperor shall furnish an additional number of
troops to His Sicilian Majesty, in accordance with the con-
ditions hereinbefore set forth, if they become necessary in
order to attain the object for which the two powers shall
have declared war.
ARTICLE XII. — The contingent to be furnished by H.M.
the King of the Two Sicilies in the case of a maritime war shall
consist of six ships of the line, two carrying 80 guns and
four carrying 74 guns ; six frigates, and six brigs or corvettes.
This squadron shall act in conjunction with the French
squadron for the defence of the common interests.
To obtain this naval force, the King of the Two Sicilies
undertakes to launch each year two ships of the line and two
frigates, commencing with the year 1809.
ARTICLE XIII. — When the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies
shall have attained to the possession of the naval forces set
forth in the preceding article, H.M. the Emperor guarantees
peace to the said Kingdom with the States of Barbary ; and
in the event of war against any of the said States, H.M. the
Emperor shall make common cause with the King of the Two
Sicilies and unite his squadrons with the Neapolitan squadron
in order that peace may be the more speedily attained.
ARTICLE XIV. — One consequence of the league between the
two countries is that the measures taken or hereafter to be
taken in France in respect of the blockade of England and
the destruction of her commerce, shall be carried out in the
States of H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies as soon as notifica-
tion thereof shall have been given to the Neapolitan Govern-
ment.
ARTICLE XV. — The present treaty shall remain secret until
such time as H.M. the Emperor shall deem it expedient to
make it public.
It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged within ten days at the latest.
J. B. NoMpfcRE DE CHAMPAGNY. LE MARQUIS DE GALLO.
Bayonne, i$th July 1808.
APPENDIX
503
Separate Articles.
ARTICLE I. — On the death of the person vested by H.M.
the Emperor in the possession of the Principality of Bene-
vento, H.M. promises, in return for due compensation, to
annex the said principality to the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies.
ARTICLE II. — The palaces and estates in the Roman State
known as the biens Farnhiens, at present in the possession
of the Crown of the Two Sicilies, shall be thereunto per-
manently guaranteed.
ARTICLE III. — H.M. the Emperor and King cedes to their
Imperial and Royal Highnesses the Grand Due and Grande
Duchesse de Berg, for their private use and enjoyment, a
revenue of 500,000 francs, to be taken from the revenue of
one million in landed estates which he reserved to himself in
accordance with the statute of the 30th March 1806.
Particulars of the landed estates forming the balance
shall be duly set forth, and the said estates placed at
the disposal of H.M. the Emperor before the ist January
1809.
The estates intended to form the six grand fiefs of the
Empire instituted by His Majesty under the title of duchies
shall likewise, before the same date, be scheduled and placed
at His Majesty's disposal, the net revenue of each duchy being
fixed at 60,000 francs.
ARTICLE IV. (and last). — Their Imperial and Royal High-
nesses the Grand Due and Grande Duchesse de Berg hand
over to H.M. the Emperor and King their Palace in Paris, the
house possessed by them at Neuilly, the stud-farm known as
the stud-farm of Artois, the La Mothe estates, and, in
general, all property possessed by them in France, without
exception, together with all furniture, fixtures, &c., in their
palaces and houses, all pictures, statues, objets d'art, and
decorations contained therein, of whatsoever nature they
may be.
His Majesty shall enter into possession of the aforesaid
property on the ist August of the present year.
504 NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT
These separate articles shall be ratified, and the ratifications
thereof exchanged, at the same time as those of the treaty of
this date.
J. B. NOMP£RE DE CHAMPAGNY. LE MARQUIS DE GALLO.
Bayonne, I5th July 1808.
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INDEX
ABERDEEN, Earl of, 252, 263, 291,
294, 309, 3io, 334, 342, 352, 368,
390-1, 403
Agar, 24, 31-2, 132, 139, 160, 478
Alexander, Emperor, 122, 126,
131, i87
Allemand, 497
Alopeus, M. d', 103
Ambrosio, General, 287, 292-3,
398, 472, 476, 478
Angelis, Cavaliere de, 339, 446
Angri, Princess d', 168, 173
Anthouard, General, 298
Arlincourt, M. d', 168
Aspre, Baron d', 333, 370, 390-1
Aubuisson, Marechal d', 102
Ayme, 24, 29, 148, 175, 287
Azzia, 36
BARBON, 385
Bartolucci, 458, 462
Bassano, 132, 137, 147, 149, 153,
162, 174, 177-8, 184, 1 86, 203,
208, 217, 220, 241, 245, 260, 297
Bathurst, Lord, 403
Battaglia, Felice, 284-5
Baudus, 140, 155, 495-7
Bausan, 40
Bayonne, Treaty of, 9, 27, 53, 56,
69, 86, 93, 98, 101
Beauffremont, Colonel de, 317, 338,
411, 434. 477, 485
Beauharnais, Eugene de, 13, 37-8,
42, 52, 92, 154, 198, 202, 233,
235, 243, 257, 267, 271-6, 296-8,
349, 385, 388, 395, 420, 433,
437-9, 441-2, 444-5
Bellegarde, Comte de, 320, 338,
340, 412-4, 422-3, 426, 429, 434,
436,450-1,463,477
Belhard, General, 32, 211, 490-1,
493-4
Benkendorff, Count, 103, 167
Bentinck, Lord William, 221-9,
232, 237, 241, 252, 265-6, 272,
286, 291, 294, 307-12, 320, 333,
340-2, 344, 346, 350-1, 353, 359,
370-1, 373. 390-2, 403-4, 415,
423-7> 439-40, 449, 455
Berg, Grand Due de, 2, 3
Berthemy, Colonel, 335, 370, 390-1,
394
Berthier, 19, 52, 107, 182, 198-9,
209, 245, 259
Bertrand, 129, 455, 463
Beugnot, n
Bianchemani, 1 1 1
Boccino, 196
Bonaparte, Caroline. See Caroline
Jerome, 482, 492
- Joseph, 4, 6, 14, 21, 23, 67-8,
271, 438,482, 493
Louis, 1 06-8
Lucien, 475
Pauline, 457-61, 463-4
- Napoleon, appoints Murat
King of Naples, 4 ; real aims in
the matter of the Sicilian expe-
dition, 17 ; insists on the full
enforcement of the Code Napo-
leon in Naples, 19 ; the Nea-
politan debt, 23 ; demands
Saliceti's dismissal, 30 ; refuses
Murat's request to go to Austria,
39 ; demands settlement of
Neapolitan debt, 55 ; formally
authorises Sicilian expedition,
69 ; measures to prevent a
serious attack, 75 ; indignation
at Murat's return to Naples, 85 ;
refuses to withdraw the French
troops from Naples, 99 ; in-
vites Caroline to be godmother
to the King of Rome, 129 ;
reorganises the French army in
Naples, 145 ; resolves to bring
Murat to heel, 163 ; his ulti-
matum, 165 ; commands dis-
505
506
INDEX
missal of Neapolitan officials,
177 ; the Russian campaign,
191 ; enters Moscow, 193 ; re-
turns to Paris, 195 ; asks
Caroline for troops, 201 ; en-
deavours to retain Murat's
allegiance, 298 ; sends Fouche
to Naples, 300 ; exhorted by
Joachim to make peace, 316;
learns of Murat's defection, 374 ;
recalls the French from Naples,
379 ; authorises Eugene to
negotiate with Murat, 439 ; at
Elba, 453; his return to France,
468 ; triumphal march to Paris,
483 ; letter to the Sovereigns
of Europe, 487 ; learns of
Murat's downfall, 495 ; refuses
to see Murat, 498
Bosset, 222-3
Broadbent, 90
Brunetti, 262, 432
, 19, 268
Campana, 245
Campbell, 79, 458
Campochiaro, Duke di, 39, 62,
93-4, 104, 121, 124, 127-8, 130,
135-7, 144, 149, 152, 158, 160,
162, 168, 172, 175, 179, 225, 339,
353. 356, 358, 407. 410-11. 446,
465, 467-8, 471
Caracciolo, 79, 217, 254, 264, 269
Carafa, 196, 245, 251
Carascosa, 112, 184, 245, 282, 288,
347, 380, 398, 421, 424, 433,
443-4
Cariati, 188, 209, 216-20, 234,
246-8, 253-4, 259, 264, 268-9,
279, 291, 294, 309-10, 318, 338,
465
Carignano, 32, 185, 207-8, 210,
217, 220, 240, 251, 280, 362, 438
Caroline, Queen of Naples, 5, 7, 8,
10, 21, 26-9, 32, 41, 43, 48-51,
53. 56-9, 61-2, 82, 89, 99, 107,
112, 115-6, 122-3, 128-9, 136,
155, 166-9, i72-4. 1 80, 182,
184-5, 188-90, 192-4, 196,200-7,
210, 212, 216, 233, 242, 244,
247-8, 251, 255-6, 258-9, 261-2,
270, 274, 278, 311-2, 343-5, 355,
367-70, 376, 392, 394-6, 438,
441, 447-8, 450, 455. 457~8. 464.
474, 478-80, 485, 492-3, 496
Cassetti, no-i
Castlereagh, 227-8, 252, 335, 342,
346, 350, 368,^ 402-4, 409-11,
44i. 465
Caterbi, 459
Catinelli, 423
Cattaneo, 455
Caulaincourt, 264, 305, 377, 438,
486-9, 495, 497
Cavaignac, 73, 78-82, 86, 494
Cerculi, 223
Champagny, Due de Cadore, 3, 30,
45. 47. So, 52, 54-6, 58, 76, 91-3,
99-100, 103, 117, 121, 128
Clarke, Due de Feltre, 16, 33, 46,
64. 67, 75, 77, 84, 99, 130, 144,
146, 233, 235-6, 245-6, 268, 271,
298
Coffin, Lieut.-Col., 222-7
Colletta, 112, 264, 287
Colonna, 458, 462, 468-9
Compere, 33
Concannon, 222
Consalvi, 460
Corner, 425
Coucy, 320, 331, 370, 402
Cozza, 441-2
DAURE, 33, 136-7, 139, 148, 154-
61, 172-6, 192
Davout, 131
Decres, 16, 17, 67, 68, 101, 485-6,
487-8
Defermon, 202
Delamotte, 32
Dery, General, 73, 78, 121, 140
Desvernois, 245, 475-6
Domont, 251
Durant, 105, 119, 121-2, 132, 140,
147-9, I5I~4. J58, 161, 165-8,
171, 177-8, 181, 184, 187, 190,
203, 206-7, 212, 233-4, 238,
240-2, 245-7, 257-8, 260, 265,
271, 281-2, 286-7, 293, 297,
312, 357, 366, 368-9, 371, 380,
386, 393. 396, 401, 436
ELISA, Princess, Grand Duchess of
Tuscany, 274, 280, 296, 298,
354, 358, 372, 385
Exelmans, General, 139-40, 158
Madame, 168
FAIN, 264
Ferdinand I., King of Sicily, 17,
INDEX
507
63, 176, 224, 226-7, 241. 250,
319, 323. 348. 250, 393. 404, 415
Fesch, Cardinal, 169, 457-9, 463.
488-90, 494
Filangieri, 245, 440, 476
Firrao, Cardinal, 180
Foljambe, Captain, 342
Fontenelli, 280
Fouche, Joseph (Duke of Otranto),
18, 19, 24, 43, 47, 57. 62-3, 186,
271, 287, 297, 300-5, 312, 354,
428, 437. 497
Franceschetti, 469-70
Francis I., Emperor of Austria,
261-2, 322, 339, 382-3. 410-1
GABRIAC, M. de, 245
Galbois, 259
Gallo, Duke di, 7-9, 45. 94. 103,
135. 137- 147-8. 152-3. 158-60,
168, 170, 178, 207-8,210-11,217,
219, 233-4, 238, 240, 246,
257-8, 279-80, 282, 284-5,
293-4, 298, 309, 320, 325, 332,
338.340,342,349.353.368,371.
374, 38i, 390, 393, 396, 4".
415-19, 426-7, 446, 455. 467.
478, 487-9
Duchess di, 448
Gaudin, 47
Gifflenga, General, 388, 420
Giuliani, 251
Graham, James, 263, 321, 340-2,
350-3. 357-8, 363. 369-70. 377.
390, 396, 415, 444
Grenier, General, 73, 75, 77, 80-2,
86, 92, 140, 142, 144-8, 164-6,
170-1, 191, 204, 235, 300, 433
Grosbois, 54, 70, 94, 99, 116, 118
Grouchy, 490
Gruchet, 485, 497
HALL, General Robert, 307
Hardenberg, 402
Hauterive, M. d', 380, 401
Hiller, 292-3, 309, 352
Hoeffling, Baron, 106
Hudelist, 269, 279
JANVIER, Commandeur, 168
Jones, Robert, 90, 224-5, 353
KEITH, General, 239
LABROFFE, Comte de, 122
Lafosse, 172, 387
Lamarque, General, 15, 73, 78, 80
Lannes, 19, 38
Lanusse, 139-40, 156-8
La Salcette, 387, 428
La Vauguyon, 29, 32, 46, 48, 113,
148, 162-3, 175, 179, 386-7, 389
Lecchi, 112, 440
Leclerc, 75-6
Lecrosnier, General, 387
Levecq, 487
Livron, 446
Longchamps, 33, 137, 154
Louis XVIII., 486
Lucca, Prince of, 49
MACDONALD, 47
Macedonio, 389
Maghella, 29, 36, 113, 132, 136,
142, 155-6, 158, 160-3, 166,
176-80, 183, 188, 385-6, 389.
395,478, *?>,«<>
Malet, 195
Manhes, 307, 495
Manzi, Tito, 389
Maret, 76, 163, 177
Marie Caroline, 60, 63, 87, 110
Marie Louise, 230
Massena, 127
Mazzuchelli, 430
Mejean, 274
Menz, 153, 169, 290, 292, 294, 303,
335. 337. 340, 35L 366, 370, 402,
403, 404, 407
Mere, Madame, 121, 470, 476, 494
Merfeldt, 265-6
Metternich, 153, 188, 206-10, 216,
218-20, 229, 246, 251-4, 260-5,
269, 271, 276-7, 279, 290, 293,
301, 303, 307, 309, 319, 321, 324.
33L 333. 335. 337. 348-9. 352,
367-8, 380-1, 402-4, 407, 420,
433. 435-6, 444. 463. 465, 467-8,
488
Mier, 106, 167-70, 183, 206-7, 218,
233, 238, 246-7, 251-4, 257-62,
265, 269, 276, 278, 280, 290, 294,
319-20, 335, 338, 348, 366-9.
380-1, 384, 392, 394-5. 407-8,
410-11, 416, 422-3, 427. 434,
436, 447. 471-2, 478-9. 492
Minutolo, General, 398
Miollis, 12, 13. 35. 37. 252, 258,
272 276, 280, 282, 285, 287,
INDEX
295-6, 298, 303, 357, 371-2,
385-8, 394-5- 428
Mondragone, Duke di, 33
Monteleone, 17, 33, 54
Montesquieu, Madame dj, 464
Montrond, 137
Montveran, 264
Mosbourg, 87, 163, 448
Murat, Joachim, becomes King of
Naples, 4 ; lack of administra-
tive ability, 5 ; jealousy of
Caroline, 8 ; disappointed am-
bitions, 13 ; reception in Naples,
13 ; retakes Capri, 15 ; puts
forward proposals for a Sicilian
expedition, 16 ; reprimanded by
Napoleon, 18 ; treatment of the
Code Napoleon, 20 ; conspires
with Fouche and Talleyrand,
24 ; harshness towards the
Queen, 28 ; lack of advisers, 30 ;
anxiety to play the Grand
Monarch, 34 ; ordered to Rome,
35 ; sends a deputation to the
Emperor at Schoenbrunn, 39 ;
hurried journey to Paris, 43 ;
military ambitions, 45 ; dissen-
sions with the Emperor, 47 ;
continued ill-treatment of the
Queen, 49 ; demands trading
licences, 57 ; return to Naples,
59 ; learns of the betrothal of
Napoleon and Marie Louise, 61 ;
in Paris again, 63 ; his mis-
givings, 63 ; anxiety to return
to Naples, 65 ; authorised to
carry out the Sicilian expedi-
tion, 69 ; dash to Lagonegro,
70 ; reception en route, 72 ;
grasps the Emperor's real aims,
77 ; determines to make the
attack, 78 ; quarrel with
Grenier, 81 ; his proclamations,
83 ; incurs Napoleon's wrath,
84 ; growing hostility to the
Emperor, 87 ; dealings with
Broadbent, 90 ; renewed de-
mands for licences, 91 ; the
Neapolitan debt, 93 ; increases
his army, 95 ; unprincipled
recruiting, 96 ; desires with-
drawal of French army, 97 ;
fears for his throne, 104 ; letter
to Caroline, 107 ; dealings with
the Patriots, in; the Nea-
politan flag, 114; journey to
Paris, 121 ; interview with
Napoleon, 129 ; return to
Naples, 133 ; his naturalisation
decree, 137 ; again menaced by
the Emperor, 146 ; has an
attack of fever, 148 ; discovers
Caroline's infidelity, 155 ; igno-
minious dismissal of Daure, 1 56
sends Caroline to Paris, 168
joins the Imperial army, 175
jealousy of Caroline, 192
abandons his command, 197
state entry into Naples, 205
renewed apprehensions regard-
ing his throne, 211; writes to
the Emperor, 213 ; aspires to
the sovereignty of a united Italy,
221 ; negotiations with Lord
William Bentinck, 221-30; re-
fuses the demand for troops,
230 ; writes to Marie Louise,
230-2 ; resolves on a rapproche-
ment with the Emperor, 242 ;
sets out for Dresden, 254 ; his
attitude after Leipzig, 265 ;
joins the Coalition, 269 ; Libe-
rator of Italy, 289 ; interview
with Fouche, 301-5 ; failure of
negotiations with England, 310 ;
endeavours once again to make
friends with the Emperor, 312 ;
negotiations with Austria and
England, 318-46 ; his duplicity,
357 ; abandons the French
cause, 359 ; endeavours to
establish himself in French
Italy, 371 ; proclamation to
his army, 397 ; enters Ancona
with much pomp, 399 ; his
brief triumph, 400 ; disillusion-
ment, 4 1 1 ; turns once more
to the Emperor, 431 ; his des-
perate position, 446 ; returns
to Naples, 453 ; relations with
Elba, 455 ; writes to Castle-
reagh and the Prince Regent,
465 ; learns of Napoleon's
escape from Elba, 468 ; his
policy, 471 ; he takes the field,
478 ; his last bid for Italian
sovereignty, 481 ; his failure,
493 ; reaches France, 495 ; his
distressing plight, 497 ; cast off
by the Emperor, 498
INDEX
509
NEIPPERG, 317-21, 324-5. 33 1.
338, 342-3, 348-51, 353. 355.
366-7, 369-70, 378, 381-2, 384,
39°, 394. 407-8, 410-11, 415-6,
422, 425, 444
Nicola, 114
Norvins, 169, 283, 298
Nugent, 282, 285, 321, 350, 414.
437. 476
ONOFRIO, 389
Orloff, 79
Oswald, Major, 222
Oudinot, 47
PACCA, Cardinal, 487
Pacca, Tiberio, 463
Pactod, 80
Padua, Duke of, 31, 491
Palombini, 288, 430
Paolucci, 288
Partounneaux, General, 41, 73, 78,
80
Pasquier, 24
Pebord, 251
Pepe, 112, 245, 296, 311, 429
Perignon, Mar6chal, 10, 75, 92,
loo, 103, 118-9, !36, 164-6,
170-1, 187, 196, 204, 363, 368
Pescara, 264-70, 276-7
Pignatelli-Cerchiara, 371
Pignatelli-Strongoli, 42, 52, 61, 71,
81, 138, 196, 245, 290, 317, 370,
396, 422
Pino, General, 288, 290, 296, 430,
487
Pinodo, General, 430
Pius VII., Pope, 12, 34-5, 277,
281, 283, 45I~2. 474-5
Plato w, 195
Poerio, 184, 389, 398, 406
Polignac, Comte de, 464
REYNIER, 10, 32
Ricciardi, 9, 19
Roccaromana, Due di, 339
Rochambeau, 188
Roederer, 53
Romeuf, 394-5
Rosetti, 1 88
Rovigo, Due de, 163
SAINT MARSAN, Comte de, 217
Saliceti, 13, 26-7, 30, 35-7, 42,
48
Sara, Marquis di, 39
Savary Rene, Due de Rovigo, 7,
163, 378
Schinina, 260-2, 265-7, 307-11,
367, 406, 408, 412, 420-1, 426
Schonfeldt, Comte de, 338, 419
Senes, 491
Severoli, General, 437
Simonetti, Chevalier Mariano, 282
TAILLADE, Captain, 458-9
Talleyrand, 24-5, 211, 460, 465,
468
Tassoni, Chevalier, 34
Tchernycheff, 121-2
Torella, Prince de, 102
Torlonia, 462
Tower, Captain, 458
Truquet, Admiral, 129
Tugny, 158, 280
VALLAISE, Comte de, 487
Vernette, Mademoiselle de la, 168
Vignolle, 423
WESSEMBERG, Count von, 210
Wilson, Sir Robert, 341-2, 449~5°
Winspeare, 389
THE WIFE OF GENERAL BONAPARTE.
By JOSEPH TURQUAN, Author of " The Love Affairs
of Napoleon," £c. Translated from the French
by Miss VIOLETTE MONTAGU. With a Photogravure
Frontispiece and 16 other Illustrations. Demy 8vo,
i2S. 6d. net.
%* Although much has been written concerning the Empress
Josephine, we know comparatively little about the veuve Beauharnais
and the citoyenne Bonaparte, whose inconsiderate conduct during her
husband's absence caused him so much anguish. We are so accustomed
to consider Josephine as the innocent victim of a cold and calculating
tyrant who allowed nothing, neither human lives nor natural affections,
to stand in the way of his all-conquering will, that this volume will
come to us rather as a surprise. Modern historians are over-fond of
blaming Napoleon for having divorced the companion of his early
years ; but after having read the above work, the reader will be con-
strained to admire General Bonaparte's forbearance and will wonder
how he ever came to allow her to play the Queen at the Tuileries. In
drawing this unconventional portrait of Mme. Bonaparte, M. Turquan
has not allowed himself to be prejudiced ; he does not give his own
opinions; his anecdotes are taken from such standard authorities as
Bourrienne, Th. Jung, Meneval, Miot de Melito, Constant, Frederic
Masson, &c. &c. He does not forget to give Mme. Bonaparte credit
for the grace and perfect tact with which she acted the difficult part of
hostess, first at the Petit-Luxembourg and afterwards at the Tuileries,
and endeavoured to reconcile what remained of the France of the Roi
Soleil and Louis the locksmith with the France of the Marseillaise and
the Chant du Depart.
A QUEEN OF SHREDS AND PATCHES :
The Life of Madame Tallien Notre Dame de Ther-
midor. From the last days of the French Revolution,
until her death as Princess Chimay in 1835. By L.
GASTINE. Translated from the French by J. LEWIS
MAY. With a Photogravure Frontispiece and 16 other
Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 125. 6d. net.
%* There is no one in the history of the French Revolution who
has been more eagerly canonised than Madame Tallien ; yet according
to M. Gastine, there is no one in that history who merited canonisation
so little. He has therefore set himself the task of dissipating the mass
of legend and sentiment that has gathered round the memory of "La
Belle Tallien " and of presenting her to our eyes as she really was.
The result of his labours is a volume which combines the scrupulous
exactness of conscientious research with the richness and glamour of
a romance.
MADAME DE BRINVILLIERS AND HER
TIMES. 1630-1676. By HUGH STOKES. With a
Photogravure Frontispiece and 16 other Illustrations.
Demy 8vo, 123. 6d. net.
*** The name of Marie Marguerite d'Aubray, Marquise de Brin-
villiers, is famous in the annals of crime, but the true history of her
career is little known. A woman of birth and rank, she was also a
remorseless poisoner, and her trial was one of the most sensational
episodes of the early reign of Louis XIV. The author was attracted
to this curious subject by (Charles le Brun's realistic sketch of the
unhappy Marquise as she appeared on her way to execution. This
cheftCauvre of misery and agony forms the frontispiece to the volume,
and strikes a fitting keynote to an absorbing story of human passion
and wrong-doing.
SOPHIE DA WES, QUEEN OF CHANTILLY.
By VIOLETTE M. MONTAGU, Author of " The Scottish
College in Paris," &c. With a Photogravure Frontis-
piece and 1 6 other Illustrations and Three Plans.
Demy 8vo, 123. 6d. net.
*#* Among the many queens of France, queens by right of marriage
with the reigning sovereign, queens of beauty or of intrigue, the name
of Sophie Dawes, the daughter of humble fisherfolk in the Isle of Wight,
better known as "the notorious Mine, de Feucheres," "The Queen of
Chan tilly," and "The Montespan de Saint Leu" in the land which
she chose as a suitable sphere in which to exercise her talents for
money-making and for getting on in the world, stands forth as a proof
of what a woman's will can accomplish when that will is accompanied
with an uncommon share of intelligence. The story of Sophie Dawes'
long sojourn in France is the record of an extraordinary career culmi-
nating in a tragedy, which for political reasons was hushed up and
never properly explained, viz. the sudden and mysterious decease of
the last due de Bourbon, prince de Conde, the father of Napoleon's
victim, the unhappy young due d'Enghien.
THE VICISSITUDES OF A LADY- IN -
WAITING. 1735-1821. By EUGENE WELVERT.
Translated from the French by LILIAN O'NEILL.
With a Photogravure Frontispiece and 16 other Illus-
trations. Demy 8vo, 125. 6d. net.
%* The Duchesse de Narbonne-Lara was Lady-in- Waiting to
Madame Adelaide, the eldest daughter of Louis XV. Around the
stately figure of this Princess are gathered the most remarkable
characters of the days of the Old Regime, the Revolution and the first
Empire. The great charm of the work is that it takes us over so
much and such varied ground. M. Welvert has discovered new docu-
ments that throw light on many doubtful points of the history of the
Revolution, and at the same time contain details and anecdotes that
lend charm and interest to his narrative.
JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD, VIGO ST., LONDON, W.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY
Return to desk from which borrowed.
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1963
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY